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THESIS SUMMARY 
This thesis seeks to explain the organisational, programmatic and ideological renewal of 
the French Parti Socialiste (PS), employed as a test case to examine the veracity of the 
'crisis of social democracy' literature. Chapter I reviews the crisis of social democracy 
literature, introducing a framework for the analysis of social democracy in general, and 
the PS in particular. Chapter 2 establishes the historical and institutional context of PS 
development. Chapter 3 demonstrates how organisational changes have altered the 
opportunity structures of the key actors, crucially affecting how the party articulates its 
electoral and policy strategy. Chapter 4 explores PS electoral strategists' attempts to 
resolve problems posed by the fragmentation of homogenous electoral blocs of support, 
increasing electoral volatility, and the competitive challenge of new parties. Chapter 5 
analyses PS ideological evolution in the 1990s in the context of the collapse of 'actual 
existing socialism', the exhaustion of traditional social democratic means, the enforced 
peaceful co-existence with the new market orthodoxy, and the increasing relevance of 
supra-national co-ordination for social democracy. In Chapter 6 we will explore the 
implications of globalisation for social democracy. The thesis rejects the 'hyperglobal' 
interpretation of the relationship between social democracy and globalisation, which 
asserts that national economies are now subsumed into a 'borderless world', within 
which social democracy is an historically exhausted project. Analysis of the development 
and implementation of the PS's macro-economic policy, job creation policy, labour 
market policies, and 'structural adjustment' policies, such as the shift towards a 35 hour 
week, demonstrate enduring social democratic policy activism. Chapter 7 presents a 
comparative political economic analysis of the economic strategies of the PS and the 
British Labour Party which further illustrates the potential for social democratic policy 
activism. Finally, the conclusion summarises and draws together the arguments. 
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Introduction 
Two factors cast a shadow over the future of social democracy. One is the 'crisis of 
social democracy', and the other is the process of globalisation. Social democracy came 
to rely upon the potentialities of the nation state to 'deliver' social democratic 'goods'. 
The nation state's role as the principal regulator of economic activity within a well-
defined national economic 'space', was a fundamental 'given' of the Keynesian 
paradigm. 'Hyper-global' theorist's excitement about the end of the nation state is 
surely premature. However, the areas of nation-state activity where global theorist's 
predictions are most prescient (the nation-state's ability to regulate its national 
economic space) are precisely those potentialities of the nation-state on which social 
democrats came to depend. 
Programmatically, then, these are hard times for social democracy. However, we argue 
that it is a misconception to see markets 'imposing' a neo-liberal policy agenda on 
governments. This misreads the nature of global financial markets, seeing the markets as 
a unitary rational actor with a pre-established policy-agenda. To infer from the centrality 
of 'credibility' , and the changing costlbenefit analysis of national economic policies. 
that European social democracy has become unworkable, as Gray does, is mistaken. The 
claim that globalisation spells the death knell of social democracy, we argue, is not 
sustained by coherent argwnent but rather relies on dubious assumptions underpinning 
the 'hyperglobalist' world view. 
The definition of social democracy at the heart of the 'end of social democracy' 
argument explains the confidence in assigning it to the rubbish bin of history. By 
confining itself to a static conception of social democracy, as deficit-financed full 
employment, a comprehensive welfare state and egalitarian tax policies it la Golden age, 
the argument misunderstands the nature of social democracy and prematurely discounts 
its capacity for renewal. "The strategic amalgam of 'Keynesianism plus welfare state' is 
but one historically contingent context within which to pursue the politics of social 
democracy." (Pierson 1995 : 34) Some of its relevance is on the wane, yet the themes of 
that 'strategic amalgam' still provide the building blocks of any new formulation. 
This thesis explores these issues in relation to the French Parti Socialiste CPS) and 
argues that both the crisis of social democracy literature, and the globalisation literature 
underestimate the importance of national context, and of the nature of each particular 
party. Therefore this thesis seeks to demonstrate how the PS developed its particular 
strategy in response to both exogenous and endogenous pressures. The argument here is 
predicated upon the importance of both the importance of national context and the 
nature of the specific party in question. 
Instead of the crisis of social democracy and globalisation 'happening upon' the PS, the 
party is here conceived as an indepedent variable - which interacts with and responds 
actively to its changing context. We examine the organisational change of the party, the 
development of its electoral strategy, the recent evolution of its ideology, and finally its 
economic strategy. In every case, we shall demonstrate that, in seeking to explain how 
parties of the left 'respond' to globalisation, we have recourse to a range of national 
factors. This is testimony to the limited applicability of the 'strong' globalist thesis -
which asserts that national economies are now subsumed into a 'borderless world', a 
global economy - perceived as a perfect market. Understanding such domestic factors as 
the internal organisation of the party, and demands of electoral competition, is, we 
argue, an essential pre-condition to assessing the relationship between social democracy 
and globalisation. To highlight this importance of national context, the final chapter 
compares the experience of the French PS with that of New Labour, and explores how 
their respective renewal strategies are conditioned by national specific contextual 
factors. 
Organisational Change 
A recurrent problem when examining how changing economic, ideological and electoral 
conditions affect social democracy is that parties are viewed as dependent actors, upon 
whom such changes 'impact'. Such an approach, we argue, fails to appreciate the nature 
of parties as independent variables - which are, in Przeworski's phrase, 'relatively 
autonomous' from their social and economic context. The 'black box' of intra-party 
politics must be opened to understand the nature of the internal workings of the party -
the 'transmission belts' mediating external factors within the party. The party's 
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organisational structure, the role of leadership within the party, and institutionalised 
factionalism within the party conditions and influences internal debates on how to 
respond to external changes, crucially affecting the dominant 'frame of reference' 
through which the situation is interpreted. Structure also affects what resources are at 
actors' disposal, providing a set of opportunities and constraints and pushing actors into 
coalitional strategies. Accordingly, a prerequisite of our exploration of the changing 
French Parti Socialiste in the 1990s is an adequate understanding of the organisational 
structure of the party, and the changes it underwent. 
Two key crisis moments and the question mark hanging over Mitterrand's succession 
crucially determined the path of internal reform within the PS. In 1990, a highly 
publicised bout of factional infighting made the party brutally aware of the 
dysfunctional nature of the party's internal organisation. Secondly, the crushing 
electoral defeat of 1993 was interpreted as a vote of no confidence in the party's 
behaviour in recent years. However, although the reform process began in the wake of 
the internal crisis, and was stepped up after April 1993, a question mark remained. The 
shape of the arena in which the gladiatorial encounters between competing 
presidentiables were carried out was a central concern of all those in the ring, and their 
struggle was thus an important determining factor of the pace, nature, and depth of 
change. This accounts for the limited nature of reforms and attempts at what was termed 
party renovation in the period between 1990 and 1995. At this point the need for change 
was acutely appreciated, but the issue of Mitterrand's succession had not been settled. 
As a result, all attempts at thorough-going change either met with resistance from 
courants (factions) adversely affected by them, or were manipulated by those set to gain 
from such changes. 
It was only after Jospin's return that his 'incontournable' (un-bypassable) position, 
underpinned by a dominant coalition comprising his own followers, the friends of Pierre 
Mauroy, and the Rocardians, created the stability and consensus required to effect the 
changes discussed since 1991. Direct democracy was both a guiding principle of, and a 
means of legitimation for the changes. This has acted in concert with the introduction of 
majority voting as a counterweight to the traditional proportionality, which has in tum 
changed the modus operandi of the courants, or sensibilites. Individual members have 
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also seen their voice in the party enhanced, both through the one member, one vote 
principle, and through the expansion of the national convention as a locus of doctrinal 
and organisational innovation and precision. 
The reforms have only been a partial success, with enduring problems, such as co-
optation, requiring qualification to the party's claims to internal democracy. 
Furthermore, the extent to which they rely on the personal authority Jospin currently 
commands in the party demands scepticism about the permanence of the new stability of 
the PS and peaceful co-existence of its courants. 
Electoral Strategy 
This study takes issue with the view of social democracy as doomed to electoral decline 
by socio-economic change, notably the shrinking of the manual working class, social 
democracy's 'historical agent'. Such a reading is both excessively deterministic and at 
variance with the facts. The ability to articulate a cross-class appeal has since the 1970s 
been the key explanatory factor in the PS' s electoral successes. That said the electoral 
failings of the PS in the early 1990s were, we argue, of fundamental importance as 
catalysts for change. Conversely, subsequent successes have been the yard-sticks by 
which to measure the success of the party's renovation. 
Changes in the party system in the 1990s have not been as exaggerated as some 
predicted. Increased dissatisfaction with the political system has translated into higher 
levels of electoral volatility and abstentionism, and a significant reduction in 
'governmental' party support. For all the talk of a crisis of governmental parties, 
however, there is little evidence of their terminal decline. After years of decline, the 
PCF is now a localised political force, routinely gaining 10% of the vote. On its road to 
marginality, the PCF has met a number of new political formations, travelling in the 
opposite direction. Smaller parties, in particular the FN and the various ecologist 
formations, bolstered by more proportionality, have made considerable progress, 
exerting competitive pressures on the PS. 
These developments in the party system in part reflect the changing class structure and 
voting behaviour. There is a fragmentation of homogenous electoral blocs of support 
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which characterised the left electorate in the Fordist period. The class structure is now 
more variegated and decreasingly manual working class. Secondly, these sociological 
variables are decreasingly reliable predictors of voting behaviour, as more volatile 
voters display an increasing propensity to vote strategically and shift allegiance or 
abstain. 
This has created a new configuration around the Left pole of the French party system. 
The PS remains the largest single electoral force, yet the crushing defeat of 1993 began 
an age of diminished expectations, in which the PS accepts that it cannot gain power 
without the help of a growing number of allies. As well as traditional partners, the 
Radicals and the PCF, there are new groupings, the Verts and Chevenement's MDC. 
Yet for all this proliferation, the systemic inducements for rassemhlemenT of the 
majoritarian two-round system for decisive elections continue to lead smaller parties to 
come to an arrangement with the PS. 
In strategic terms, the same logic that once underpinned the Union de Gauche was the 
guiding principle behind Jospin's work with electoral allies since 1993, and now brings 
the gauche plurielle together. The gauche plurielle, we argue, was only possible in the 
light of certain endogenous developments within the PS. The courant 'cease-fire' was 
an important precursor to the forging of a new electoral strategy, and Jospin's internal 
hegemony was essential in managing the difficult candidate nomination procedures, 
essential for delivering on the PS's electoral agreements with its allies. 
The fruits which the strategy bore at the 1997 legislative elections are, we argue, 
misleading. Paradoxically, despite the success, the results point to the enduring 
electoral frailty of the PS, particularly in the context of fairly high levels of electoral 
volatility. Even with the help of its allies, the PS continues to struggle with some of the 
groups whose support contributed to its success in the 1980s, notably the working class 
and underprivileged. The diminished loyalty of the electorate, and the declining 
relevance of the term 'core electorate,' we argue, oblige the PS to engage in a perpetual 
process of the reconstitution of their electorate, attempting to reunite different segments, 
with diverse ideological orientations and social positions at each election. This process 
is made all the more problematic by certain key issues which dominate electoral 
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campaigns serving to draw out the tensions and divisions between constituent elements 
of the social democratic electorate, or indeed between partners in the gauche plurielle 
coalition. Furthermore, the alliance remains under considerable pressure, exerted as 
much by destabilising effects of conflicting competitive strategies induced by frequent 
elections as by the pressures of government on the PS dampening the radicalism desired 
by the PCF and the Verts. 
Ideology 
Although deeply affected by the collapse of communism, socialism in France was 
already undergoing a period of redefinition, as much in response to internal as to 
external factors. The contours of the nebulous redefinition of socialism, we argue. owe 
at least as much to French socialism's peculiar ideological history, and to France's 
specific intellectual heritage, as to any global crisis of socialism. 
At first sight, the collapse of Communism appears advantageous to the PS, further 
undermining the already weak and declining PCF, and allowing the PS to formulate 
doctrine according to its internal dynamics, without an eye to the left. Yet, 
ideologically, the PS has evolved with reference to the PCF, and reference - implicit or 
explicit - to this 'other' has been a constitutive element of PS identity. This, we argue. 
results from the nature of party competition in France, the once extremely strong 
position of the PCF on the extreme left of the political spectrum, and the votes it 
historically commanded. 
The PS was thus deeply affected by the wider collapse of Communism. Social 
democracy is the theory of the 'middle way' between capitalism-ordering society 
according to capitalist principles (private ownership, the primacy of market 
mechanisms); and communism- ordering society according to communist principles 
(common ownership, from each according to means to each according to needs). With 
one pole gone, the PS recognised that, "the rupture which has happened calls into 
question some of the foundations of the socialist project."] 
I Final text of the Arche conference Le Poing et /a Rose no. 135 January 1992 p 29 
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This 'calling into question' has been further complicated by the occupation of 
governmental office. Since its inception, the dialectic between the minimalist and 
maximalist2 traditions had ensured that French socialism always attached great 
importance to, 'the theology of the final goal' (Sassoon 1996). The collapse of 
Communism compounded the effects of the abandonment of 'transcendentalist' rhetoric 
which had accompanied the 'rupture avec Ie capitalisme.' There was a need to fill the 
gap, since capitalism was not about to be transcended. What was in prospect, in Blum's 
terminology, was the exercise du pouvoir - a theoretical justification for the socialist 
management of capitalism. This began a process, which preceded the fall of the Berlin 
wall, but which was accelerated by it, referred to subsequently as the 'secularisation of 
French Socialism,,3 a simultaneous shift away from maximalist programmes, and from 
an analytical framework heavily influenced by Marxism. 
The importance of Republicanism as an orgamsmg frame of reference for French 
socialism has been bolstered in recent years by the demise of its Marxist rival. 
Republicanism as an intellectual apparatus has, we argue, been at least as important as 
Marxism in shaping French Socialist thought, and accounts to a significant degree for 
the enduring faith in the state's interventionist role, and to the strength of attachment to 
equality as a core Socialist value. Renewed emphasis on Republicanism has 
compensated for the ideological deficit resulting from the decline of Marxism. 
In the wake of the 1983 V-tum, the party was so caught up in the act of governing, that 
the task of digesting these developments at the theoretical or doctrinal level was 
eschewed. In order to paper over these cracks, Lionel Jospin advanced the theory of la 
parenthese, which avoided head-on confrontation of difficult questions by 
conceptualising the 1983 V-turn as merely a pause in its radical reformist trajectory. 
This formulation enabled French Socialism to avoid the extremely problematic issue of 
reconciling its principles to the constraints of holding governmental office. The triptych 
of 'planification, nationalisation, autogestion' was defunct, but with only the warm 
words of modernisation to replace it as justification for a neo-liberal policy agenda, 
2 Which owes its longevity within French socialism first to Jaures' formulation of 'evolutionary 
revolution' which retained a revolutionary end-game in a reformist strategy, and later to Blum's 
theorisation of the conquest and exercise of power. 
3 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
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French Socialism in the 1980s lacked coherence. 
By the 1990s, the need to rediscover a coherent ideological outlook was keenly felt. The 
Arche Congress was a first attempt to rediscover that coherence, which. we argue, only 
really began to return after 1995. The 1995 presidential candidate choice is significant in 
this light. The choice, by the rank and file in an extraordinary primary, of Jospin over 
Emmanuelli, was a break in the cycle of extreme shifts to the Left in periods of crisis 
and redefinition. Jospin's selection represented an internal turning point, prioritising 
electoral responsibility over partisan sentiment, demonstrating that the membership had 
assimilated to a significant degree the 'culture of government'. 
Economic Strategy 
We insist here on the need to distinguish between the accelerating process of 
globalisation on the one hand, and the increasing acceptance of the rhetoric of 
globalisation (strongly influenced by the neo-liberal thinking) on the other. Whilst not 
disputing that radical changes in economic context have occurred, the implications of 
the changes for the strategic options open to social democratic governments are, we 
argue, often misconceived, leading to excessively dire prognoses. 
The new international economic context has made Socialists painfully aware of the 
limits of the possible. From every comer, political projects were founded on the 
assumption that international competitiveness was a necessary precursor to socialist 
advance. Pursuing Socialist policies in an open economy in the late twentieth century 
had been shown to be an extremely difficult task due to the competing nature of claims 
to social justice and economic efficiency in the international economic context of the 
1980s and 1990s. 
However, whilst we accept that 'credibility' is the cornerstone of macroeconomic 
policy, securing credibility, we argue, is not necessarily incompatible with social 
democratic goals. Despite the changing costlbenefit analysis of social democratic 
policies, there may be room to manoeuvre for governments of the left, gained by 
perceived overall rectitude, facilitating policy activism which does not undermine 
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underlying credibility. Whilst globalisation does constrain social democratic policy 
options, it is a mistake to infer from this that there are no longer significantly different 
approaches to economic policy, involving different hierarchies of priorities in terms of 
employment, inflation and redistribution, and more fundamentally, different 
understandings of how the economy works. The implementation of a 35 hour week, 
aiming to redistribute wealth and create more jobs, the state orchestrated creation of 
700,000 jobs through the Plan Aubry, and moves to co-ordinate growth oriented macro-
economic policy and fiscal activism at the EU level are offered as evidence that 
globalisation does not rule out social democratic policies. 
In our comparative analysis of PS and New Labour economic strategies, we argue that, 
despite considerable ideological and substantive differences, both Realisme de Gauche 
and New Labour's Third Way offer potentially viable, and - albeit to different degrees -
recognisably social democratic economic strategies compatible with a world 
characterised by globalisation. There are significant differences between New Labour's 
Third Way and Realisme de Gauche, both in terms of national institutional settings, and 
intellectual aspirations. This, we argue, is evidence of social democratic governments' 
room to manoeuvre, and further underpins our suggestion that, whilst the constraints 
highlighted by 'hyperglobal' pessimists are indeed powerful, their analysis of 
globalisation overstates its incompatibility with social democratic policy activism. 
Summary 
This thesis will, in chapter 1, review the literature on the crisis of social democracy and 
globalisation, and establish a framework for the analysis of social democracy in general. 
and the PS in particular. Chapter 2 will establish the historical and institutional context 
within which the PS developed, and explain the impact of this context on PS 
development. Chapter 3 will show how organisational changes have significantly 
changed the opportunity structures of the key actors involved, crucially affecting how 
the party articulates its electoral and policy strategy. 
Turning to that electoral strategy, chapter 4 explores PS electoral strategists' attempts to 
resolve problems posed by a number of developments. Chief among these are the 
fragmentation of homogenous electoral blocs of support; the decreasing reliability of 
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sociological variables, evidenced by more volatile voting behaviour and an increasing 
propensity to vote strategically, shift allegiance or abstain; and the increasing 
competitive pressures in a party system characterised by more new parties, both 
ecologist and Front National, and declining satisfaction with the party system in general, 
and the 'governing' parties in particular. 
The implications of the collapse of 'actual existing socialism', the exhaustion of 
traditional social democratic means, the enforced peaceful co-existence with the new 
market orthodoxy and the increasing relevance of supra-national co-ordination for social 
democracy will be explored in chapter 5 through analysis of how the ideology of the 
French PS has evolved in the 1 990s. In chapter 6 we will explore the implications of 
globalisation for social democratic economic strategy through analysis of development 
and implementation of the PS's economic policies in the 1990s. This will cover fields of 
industrial policy, macro-economic policy, job creation policy, labour market policies, 
and 'structural adjustment policies such as the shift towards a 35 hour week. Then, in 
chapter 7, we will further explore the implications of globalisation for social democratic 
economic strategy through a comparative political economic analysis of the economic 
strategies of the PS and the British Labour Party. Finally, in the conclusion, we will 
draw together the strands of our argument. 
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Chapter 1 
The Crisis of Social Democracy 
The aim of this thesis is two-fold. On the one hand, it seeks to explain the fortunes of 
the French PS, which is employed as a test case to examine the veracity of the' crisis of 
social democracy' literature and its predictions for the future direction and fortunes of 
social democratic parties. A second concern is to explore the relationship between social 
democracy and globalisation. In depth analysis of PS economic strategy, and a 
comparative political economic analysis of the economic strategies of the PS and the 
British Labour party will contribute to the understanding of the relationship between 
social democracy and globalisation, as well as testing some of the theories emanating 
from the globalisation literature. 
This introduction has two sections. The first focuses on the concept of social 
democracy, and seeks to establish a framework for the analysis of social democracy and 
sets out the focus of this study. 1 The second section considers some of the literature on 
the crisis of social democracy, and on the relationship between globalisation and social 
democracy. The 1980s and 1990s has been widely represented as an era of crisis for 
social democracy, and this crisis is seen as operating on three planes, ideological, 
electoral and programmatic. Globalisation is often cited as a key explanatory variable. 
In ideological terms, it is argued, the collapse of communism has eroded the coherence 
of social democracy by removing one of its definitional reference points. In electoral 
terms, the new international division of labour has led to a relocation of 'smokestack' 
Fordist industries to newly industrialised economies, stripping the West European social 
democratic parties of their core electoral constituency, not to mention their historical 
agent - i.e. a large and homogenous working class. In programmatic terms, structural 
changes in the international economic context have practically ruled out national 
Keynesianism which was for so long the cornerstone of social democratic economic 
strategy, undermining social democrats ability to deliver on their pledges to full 
employment and increased equality. This thesis challenges the view, often extrapolated 
from the above observations, that social democracy is forced to take on a neo-liberal 
I We address the methodological implications of the research strategy suggested by this framework in a 
methodological appendix. 
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agenda by globalisation. 
Analysing Social Democracy 
Gramsci's dictum that the writing of the history of a party is like writing the history of a 
country from a monographic point of view offers an insight into the role the national 
historical and institutional context plays in shaping a party. The history of all socialist 
parties in the twentieth century has been the struggle with the social and economic 
structures of capitalism. Such fratemising with the enemy has left an indelible mark on 
all political movements of the left. "Any movement that seeks to transform historical 
conditions operates under these very conditions. The movement for socialism developed 
within capitalist societies and faced definite choices that arise from this particular 
organisation of society. " (Przeworski 1985 : 3) 
Padgett & Paterson identify the principle elements of social democracy as, "a hybrid 
political tradition composed of socialism and liberalism ... .inspired by socialist ideals but 
heavily conditioned by its political environment and incorporating liberal values. The 
social democratic project may be defined as the attempt to reconcile socialism with 
liberal politics and capitalist society." (Padgett & Paterson 1991 : 1) The interaction of 
social democracy as an actor and advanced capitalism as a system is thus central to a 
deepened understanding of social democracy. 
Yet each socialist party did not develop within some abstract 'capitalism', but within a 
specific historical capitalist formation wedded to a nation-state. Some have 
characterised this as social democracy's 'methodological nationalism.' "[P]olitical 
parties ... work out the ethics and the politics corresponding to these conceptions and 
act, as it were, as their historical 'laboratory'." (Gramsci 1971 : 273) Each national 
setting provided a different set of laboratory conditions in which social democracy 
'worked out its ethics and politics. ' 
National-level Factors 
Accordingly, in the process of analysing social democracy, we will explore the enduring 
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and overriding importance of national context in explaining how social democracy has 
responded to the changing international context. At the national level, structural 
variables are threefold. Firstly, there are the constraints imposed by the organisation of 
the state and the political system and its resultant constitutional and electoral practices. 
Secondly, the socio-economic structure of society, and in particular the working class is 
an important contextual influence on the workings of socialist parties. Thirdly the 
contours of the insertion into the interdependent international economy, by which we 
mean the size, profile, and relative openness and competitiveness of the economy, plays 
a key role in influencing behaviour. 
Analysis of the interaction of these variables and the PS is an essential precursor to the 
changing strategies of the PS in the 1990s. The national institutional context of the 
French Parti Socialiste CPS) structured the field of action within which it operated and 
evolved. The most significant nation-specific variable influencing the PS has been the 
institutional context of the Fifth Republic. The 'strong state' nature of France's Semi-
Presidential democracy made pursuit of the Elysee the ultimate political goal. It was a 
key determining variable in the development of the party system, heralding the change 
from 'polarised pluralism' to a bi-polar pluralism, dominated for the first twenty years 
of the Republic by the Right? A second variable is the contours of local-level 
democratic institutions in France, which shaped the internal organisation of the party. In 
the 1960s, when the conflict of interests between local and national political strategies 
became acute, a process of restructuring was undertaken - the outcome being a more 
nationally co-ordinated party. Thirdly, the weak and fragmented nature of trade 
unionism, together with its confrontational traditions affected the party's development, 
explaining its failure to develop a mass base. In ideological terms, weak fragmented 
unions prevented the development of the neo-corporatist strategies which helped some 
Northern social democratic parties cope with the economic crisis of the 1970s and 
1980s. These themes will developed at greater length in chapter 2. A fourth, very 
important though not exclusively national factor is the position of France within the 
process of European construction. The effects on French economy and society of the 
advancing process of European integration will be considered in chapters 6 and 7. 
2 The development of the party's internal structure can be seen as a response to the new context ofa 
presidentialised party system. 
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Party specific factors: Social Democratic Party as Independent Variable 
A recurrent problem when examining how changing economic, ideological and electoral 
conditions affect social democracy is that, "parties are viewed as completely dependent 
actors.,,3 (Koelble 1991 : 4 ) Yet parties are independent actors - which are, in 
Przeworski's phrase, 'relatively autonomous' from their social and economic context. 
"Parties do have some choices about how to respond to social changes in the electorate, 
how to respond to economic difficulties, and how to react to new social 
demands."(Koelble 1991 : 4) Such observations also inform Kitschelt's contention that 
the explanation for party decline or success is to be found not in the external 
environment but in the internal workings of the party. ( 1994) 
The 'black box' of intra-party politics must be opened to understand the nature of the 
'transmission belts' mediating external factors within the party. This demands 
consideration of a series of party specific variables, which include the party's 
organisational structure, and the role of leadership and factionalism within the party. As 
Koelble argues, "institutional structures shape the rationalities of actors inside a political 
party in a profound way .... institutional structures shape political outcomes by setting 
limits and creating opportunities for the participants of the intra-party competition over 
positions and policy." (Koelble 1991 12) The organisational structure of the party 
conditions and influences internal debates on how to respond to external changes, 
crucially affecting the dominant 'frame of reference' through which the situation is 
interpreted. This is what Scharpf has termed the 'cognitive framework' which requires 
analysis of the conditions of the 'decision environment.' (1991 : 14) Structure also 
affects what resources are at actors' disposal, providing a set of opportunities and 
constraints and pushing actors into coalitional strategies. (Panebianco 1988;) 
Mindful of such considerations, recent changes in the PS' s organisational structure will 
be explored in depth. Chapter 3 will show how organisational changes have 
significantly changed the opportunity structures of the key actors involved, crucially 
affecting how the party articulates its electoral and policy strategy. 
3 For an example of such an approach, see Gray (\996) 
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Global-level factors 
Finally, we come to a set of global factors, which we will broadly categorise as the 
crisis of socialism, and the crisis of social democracy. The collapse of communism in 
the former USSR and eastern Europe effectively put an end to ideological competition 
between capitalism and socialism, leaving capitalism of some form as 'the only game in 
town' thus seriously damaging the prospects of transition to a socialist society. The 
crisis of social democracy is more complex, involving structural and ideological 
elements. Structurally, there have been changes in the international economic order over 
the last twenty-five years. Accelerating 'globalisation,' defined as the growing 
economic interdependence of the world's economies, has undermined the Keynesian 
welfare state model predicated upon the fixed exchange rate regime of 'embedded 
liberalism' which obtained in the 1945-1971 period.(Ruggie 1982) Ideologically, there 
has been the perceived failure of the Keynesian policy paradigm to deal with ensuing 
economic crises problems such as stagflation. Secondly the rise, on an international 
scale, rival neo-liberal policy paradigm as a potentially viable alternative to the old 
orthodoxy. 
The Crisis of Social Democracy: 3 planes 
1. The Electoral Crisis 
Analysis of the electoral 'crisis' of social democracy has tended to be excessively 
apocalyptic. As Bergounioux & Grunberg point out, "if one compares the average 
percentages of votes cast for all [European] democratic socialist parties since the war .... 
between the years 1945-1974 and the years 1975-1995, the decline appears very slight: 
31.7% in the first period against 30.4% in the second."(1996 : 271-277)4 This is 
corroborated by Merkel(l992) and Sassoon.(1996) What has changed significantly, 
however, is the socio-economic composition of the left electorate. As the industrial 
profile of Western democracies changed, with a new international division of labour 
seeing 'smokestack' manufacturing industries shift south, and increasing tertiarisation 
of OEeD economies, so the traditional social democratic electoral base - the unskilled 
manual working class - shrank. Thus while talk of social democratic electoral decline is 
4 The authors exclude Spain. Greece. and Portugal, which have not been democratic systems throughout 
the period, but argue that if those countries are added, the decline is yet more negligible. 
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misleading, the relation of social democracy to its electoral base is changing, in part in 
response to socio-economic change. 
In the post war era, the social democrats prioritised workers' interests, due in part to 
economic policies whereby, "through the alchemy of Keynesian economics, the 
particular interests of the workers in redistribution toward themselves was transformed 
into a general social interest."(Rogers & Streeck 1993) Socialist and social democratic 
parties remained largely working class in character during the Fordist era. "Up to the 
end of the sixties .. the industrial proletariat was numerically the largest component of the 
electorate, structurally the best organised, morally the most authoritative ... .it was what 
Italian theorists termed centralita operaia - the 'centrality of the working class' - that 
welded together an array of forces of the left. Typically, this is no longer so today." 
(Anderson 1994 ; 11) Yet even during the 'Golden Age', as Przeworski and Sprague's 
Paper Stones attempts to rigorously demonstrate, social democracy's relationship with 
the working class was problematic. Socialism's 'electoral dilemma' is that a 'pure' class 
strategy will not succeed, because of a shrinking working class. On the other hand, 
cross-class strategies aimed at courting the middle class involve alienation of some 
working class support - seen by the authors as more or less a zero sum trade-off. (1986: 
25,31, 50-62) The thesis is 'proved' through extensive statistical testing of European 
electoral results. 
However, although attractively parsimonious, the theory is problematic. Firstly, the 
definition of working class employed by Przeworski & Sprague is rather narrow, 
"manual wage earners in mining, manufacturing, construction, transport and agriculture 
and their inactive household members"(1986 : 72), thus excluding manual workers in 
'unproductive' sectors and white collar workers.(see Kitschelt 1993; King & Wickham-
Jones 1990 : 390) A bigger problem with the model is that it is at variance with the 
facts. Assumptions made about the composition of socialist parties and electorates do 
not hold. The French PS was never a predominantly working class party, either in terms 
of its sociological composition or in terms of its electorate. (Hanley 1987) Similar 
problems are identified by King & Wickham-Jones regarding the British case. (1990 : 
390-395) As Merkel points out, "the electoral appeal of the French, Spanish, and Greek 
socialists to large segments of the middle class shows that the social democratic parties 
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are not irrevocably doomed due to Przeworski' s dilemma. "(1992 : ] 46) Indeed, it is 
generally accepted that the ability to articulate a cross-class appeal in the 1970s is the 
key explanatory factor in the PS's subsequent electoral successes.(Bell & Criddle 1988; 
Bergounioux & Grunberg 1992) 
Furthermore, electoral socialism has not 'failed,' even after the 'Golden Age.' More 
Left governments were in power at the end of the 1980's than was the case at the 
beginning of the 1970's. (Sassoon 1996 : Table 16.5, 467) Crude causal relationships 
between a shrinking industrial manual worker population and fewer socialist voters are 
thus difficult to sustain. For Bergounioux & Grunberg, what is remarkable is electoral 
socialism's resilience despite difficult circumstances. (1996 : 278) The reason for this 
mismatch between theory and facts can be traced to assumptions made about the 'micro-
foundations' of the model - i.e. voter choice. "Analysis of electoral politics voter 
preferences are implanted from outside so that workers becomes dupes of macro-actors, 
in particular, of parties and trade unions."(Buraway quoted in King & Wickham-Jones 
1990: 391) 
The problem is the degree of sociological determinism inherent in their assumptions. 
(Merkel 1992) Przeworski and Sprague seem unable or unwilling to take their valuable 
insights into the 'relative autonomy' of parties from their social/structural context and 
apply them to working class voters and their social context. A similar problem 
underpins Gray's less sophisticated analysis about the implications of the numerical 
decline of the working class, which Gray interprets as the death knell of social 
democracy, "social democracy is now a political project without an historical agent." 
(1996 : 12) Underlying both Gray's assertion and Przeworski and Sprague's analysis is a 
rather crude, sociologically deterministic view of the relationship between social 
democracy and the working class. 
In order to avoid the sociological determinism of the approaches outlined above, this 
study will adopt the framework suggested by Mayer & Perrineau, the 'supply and 
demand model' of voting behaviour. (1992 : 72-111; see also Boy & Mayer 1997b) 
Within the model, the electorate is conceptualised as the demand side, and the 
configuration of the election, the electoral strategy, and the political conjuncture 
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conceptualised as the supply side. It is beyond the ambit of this study to explain every 
aspect of voting behaviour in France. The focus here is on the electoral strategy pursued 
by the PS in the 1990s. This is clearly based on certain assumptions about voting 
behaviour, and on an interpretation (or set of interpretations) about the cause of electoral 
defeat in 1993, hence the need for a framework for analysis of the electoral fortunes of 
the PS. 
On the demand side, the model attempts to synthesise 'sociological' and 'rational' 
approaches to voting, seeing the two as complementary. The voter is neither a prisoner 
of sociological variables, nor the footloose utility maximiser of neo-classical economic 
theory. Thus the sociological make-up of the electorate is a significant contributory 
factor to discerning electoral behaviour, but "the model is not a deterministic one. The 
key variables entail probabilities more or less strong - of voting left or right, but no 
group is politically homogenous, and no individual defines themselves with reference to 
a sole group. "(Mayer & Perrineau 1992 : 83) Furthermore, these 'variables' operate 
'through the prism of subjective definition in one group or another.' Secondly, socio-
economic change is altering the class structure, and thus the relative importance of the 
key variables. With the expansion of the public and tertiary sectors, a 'new middle 
class', composed of office workers, administrative staff, technicians, teachers, and 
health and social professionals more than doubled in size between 1954 and 1975 to 
equal the size of the working class. The influence of these sociological factors is 
tempered by acceptance of elements of the 'rational voter thesis'. The principle 
expression of this autonomous rationalism being a more 'strategic' approach to voting, 
increasing electoral volatility. In part as a result, the strength of the correlation, for 
example, between Catholicism and right voting, or between working class status and left 
voting, is declining. 
On the supply side, a large number of contextual factors crucially affect voting 
behaviour. First and foremost, there is the nature of the election - be it national 
(presidential) or local (municipal). In France, there is also great variation of electoral 
system depending on what office is being sought. A second supply factor is the point of 
insertion into the party system. Both Bergounioux & Grunberg and Merkel insist on the 
importance of situating the parties within the context of their national party systems to 
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understand their competitive situation. (something Przeworski and Sprague's 
methodology precludes). With the decline of communist parties, socialist parties now 
constitute the principal parties of the Left. As a result, all social democratic parties have 
participated in government for many years, and all (with the exception of Ireland and 
Belgium) have led governments for a number of years. (Bergounioux & Grunberg 1996; 
282 Table 8) 
Other 'supply' factors include the personal popularity of a candidate, the key issues of 
the campaign, and the nature of the campaign itself. The fact of incumbency, 
Bergounioux and Grunberg argue, is the best starting point for explaining the 
difficulties of electoral socialism in the last 20 years. "The numerous electoral defeats 
are explained by the difficulties of governing in a period of recession and high 
unemployment which has seen rising inequalities. If one considers the electoral 
evolution of socialist parties over their last three legislative elections, it appears clearly 
that the fact of being in power or in opposition in the parliament prior to the election is 
the real key to explaining these evolutions. (1996 ; 271 & Table 6 277) Such consistent 
rejection of governing parties lead some to speculate about a crisis of representation 
within political systems. The 'systemic' trends of abstentionism and volatility, 'decline' 
of governmental parties is often cited as evidence of such a crisis. Exploiting the 
perceived shortfalls of governmental parties, 'protest' or anti-system parties have made 
significant advances. In France, the role of such 'supply' variables as the declining vote 
share for' governmental' parties, and competition from the Greens, peF, and other Left 
groupings, not to mention the FN is crucial to understanding PS' s point of insertion into 
the electoral environment of the 1990s. 
The lessons to be drawn from the demand side of the 'supply and demand model' of 
electoral behaviour are principally two-fold. Firstly, class structure is changing, with a 
fragmentation of homogenous electoral blocs of support which characterised the left 
electorate in the Fordist period. The class structure is now more variegated and 
decreasingly manual working class. Secondly, these sociological variables are 
decreasingly reliable predictors of voting behaviour, as more volatile voters display less 
satisfaction with the party system in general, and 'governing' parties in particular, 
increasing their propensity to vote strategically, shift allegiance or abstain. On the 
supply side, the party system is characterised by more new parties, both ecologist and 
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Front National, exerting competitive pressures on the PS. 
All this has implications for social democratic electoral strategy. "Not able to count on 
the loyalty of the electorate as much as before, they are now pushed, at each election, to 
engage in a process of reconstitution of their electorate, attempting to reunite different 
segments, with diverse ideological orientations, preoccupations, and social 
positions."(Bergounioux & Grunberg 1996 : 292) This process of perpetual 
reconstruction of the core electorate is made all the more problematic by certain key 
issues which dominate electoral campaigns serving to draw out the tensions and 
divisions between constituent elements of the social democratic electorate. Chief among 
these is the issue of European construction. "In the 1995 presidential election first 
ballot, 34% of voters who voted yes in the Maastricht referendum voted for Jospin, 
compared to only 8% of those who had voted no. "(Bergounioux & Grunberg 1996 : 
286) Further analysis shows that this hostility to European construction correlates with 
class quite strongly, with the 'couches populaires' (working class) more likely to 
respond to accelerating European construction through increased nationalism. Thus 
voting on European issues, "reinforces the cleavage between the middle and working 
classes." (Bergounioux & Grunberg 1996 : 292) PS electoral strategists' attempts to 
resolve such contradictions are considered in chapter 4. 
2. The Ideological Crisis 
"Once, in the founding years of the Second International, it was dedicated to the 
overthrow of capitalism. Then it pursued partial reforms as gradual steps towards 
socialism. Finally it settled for welfare and full employment within capitalism. If 
it now accepts a scaling down of one and giving up of the other, what kind of 
movement will it change intoT(Anderson 1994 15-16) 
i) Crisis of Socialism 
The triumphalist 'end of history' proclamations of Fukoyama et al in the 1990s suggest 
that the historic dichotomy - between ordering society according to capitalist principles 
(private ownership, the primacy of market mechanisms in most or all walks of life) and 
ordering society according to communist principles (from each according to means to 
each according to needs) - is now resolved. 1989 marked the "triumph of the West" as 
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well as "the total exhaustion of viable systemic alternatives to Western liberalism." It 
heralded "end of history as such: that is. the end point of mankind's ideological 
evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of 
human government."(l989 : 3-8) Or as Dr. Pangloss would have it, 'all is for the best in 
the best of all possible worlds.' 
The anti-Communist revolutions5 upset socialism's positivistic, rationalist 'meta-
narrative' of modernity. These developments suggested, contra socialist received truth, 
that the market. not the state, appeared a more likely harbinger of modernity.6 
Assumptions about the dovetailing of the project of modernity and the establishment of 
a socialist society became unsustainable. Events pointed in a radically different 
direction to the one prescribed by that comforting telos. The final goal - the rationalist 
creation of a differently ordered society to transcend capitalism - which has motivated 
generations of socialists seemed now beyond reach. It became a commonplace even on 
the Left that, "Socialism can no longer be considered as an alternative socio-economic 
system that is viable and superior to capitalism."(Lukes 1990 : 573-4) 
Habermas offers a welcome corrective to the 'liberal interpretation' which see the 
"development of a market economy independent of the political system" as, "a surge in 
the modernisation process reaching out towards Central and Eastern Europe." "The 
liberal interpretation is not wrong," Habermas notes, "it just does not see the glint in its 
own eye. "(Habermas 1991 : 31) The problem with this triumphalist liberalism is that 
instead of critiquing the 'philosophy of history' that most socialists trace back to Marx, 
which sees at work immanent laws of historical development which will ultimately 
favour socialism, liberal triumphalists hijack this 'historicism'. Triumphalists simply 
claim that socialists have read their historical maps wrong, and furthermore that 'we 
have arrived.' 
Yet for parties of the left, the seismic shift is a major transformation. "The collapse of 
Communism in the East, far from strengthening its historical rival, has for the moment 
further weakened it. For all their mutual disclaimers, the two were joined as heirs of the 
ideals of nineteenth-century socialism. The victory of capitalism over the revolutionary 
~ Or more precisely the prevalent (liberaVconservative) interpretation of the revolutions 
b see Anderson (\ 991) 
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attempt to replace it was never likely to leave untouched the reformist 
endeavour."(Anderson 1991 : 324) As Mann observes, "the collapse of Soviet autarchy 
opened up most of Eurasia to capitalist penetration .... capitalist commodity exchange 
clearly dominates. With no confident adversary in sight, capitalism is becoming - at 
least minimally - global. That was not so in 1940, or even in 1980." (1997 : 479) As the 
PS itself realised, "the rupture which has happened calls into question some of the 
foundations of the socialist project." 7 
Social democracy is the theory of the 'middle way' between capitalism - ordering 
society according to capitalist principles (private ownership, the primacy of market 
mechanisms in most or all walks of life); and communism- ordering society according 
to communist principles (from each according to means to each according to needs). 
Paradoxically, the formal 'social democratisation' of the PS (at the Arche Congress in 
1991) coincided with the disappearance of one of the 'poles' in relation to which social 
democracy has historically defined itself. This disappearance has left social democracy 
in a state of ideological flux in the 1990s.(Anderson 1991; Bergounioux & Grunberg 
1996; Sassoon 1996) The fact that formal social democratisation came so recently is 
testament to the importance of the commitment to a transition to a socialist society 
within the PSIS ideological heritage. The crisis of socialism, "poses the question of a 
redefinition of what the left may be tomorrow. Not in relation to commUnIsm, 
but intrinsically."g It begs a further question, of the relationship with capitalism, an 
answer to which has never been codified in PS doctrine. Mitterrandls 'economie mixte . 
fell some way short of unquestioning embrace of the capitalist society. Subsequent 
attempts to address the question are considered in chapter 5. 
ii) The Crisis of Keynesian Social Democracy. 
The damaging effects of the crisis of socialism were compounded by the fact that social 
democracy's traditional programmatic 'strategic amalgam' proved increasingly 
incompatible with the new economic context. The crisis took place on two planes. 
Firstly, as we shall see later objective conditions were changing to the detriment of 
social democracy and Keynesianism. A series of crippling external shocks - the Nixon 
7 Final text of the Arche conference Le Poing et fa Rose no. 135 January 1992 p 29 
8 P. Mauroy speech 24/11/91 Paris; Fondation Jean Jaures. 1992 
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shock which scuppered Bretton Woods and then the oil price hykes being the most 
spectacular and structurally significant among them - increased the strain on a social 
democratic consensus already showing the cracks in the form of rising wages and 
flagging productivity. The dramatic effects of these shocks on indicators such as 
inflation precipitated calls for something to be done. Secondly, on the subjective plane 
an ideological onslaught from the New Right fed off the difficulties social democracy 
was having in dealing with these structural shocks. The history was being told by the 
New Right, and their apparent intellectual 'monopoly on good ideas' meant that the 
battle of ideas over what kind of policy prescriptions would be appropriate to deal with 
the objective change in conditions was, for social democracy, a rout. 
"Interests, however, like intents, necessarily remain platonic unless they are translated 
into politics by the means of some social instrumentality." (Polanyi 1945 : 8) In the 
post-war era, the establishment of the social democratic welfare state can be seen in 
these terms as the social instrumentality which resulted from the translation of the 
interests of the social democratic left into politics. In his attempt to open "the black box 
that separates the declared programmatic intentions from the output of policies" Merkel 
identifies two core social democratic policy outputs. These are state intervention in the 
sense of macro-economic steering and policy regulation, and welfare commitments to 
provide collective goods and monetary transfers. (1992 : 152-3) Keynesian economics 
emerged as the theoretical lynch-pin of both social democratic 'outputs' in the post-war 
world. (Przeworski 1985; 7-45) 
Keynesianism laid down a blueprint of how the economic regulatory potentialities of the 
nation state could be tailored to secure social democratic goals of full employment and 
more equitable distribution, "the means of steering the capitalist economy to deliver 
[welfare and full employment] ..... through monetary policy and fiscal policy. The basic 
instruments of macroeconomic management were, on the one hand, setting of interest 
rates and exchange rates, and on the other, control of taxation".(Anderson 1994 : 14) 
As Pierson puts it, "social democracy ... attached its political aspirations to the 
Keynesian Welfare State project" (Pierson 1995 : 52) The use of Keynesianism as a 
justification for social democratic action by governments was crucial to social 
democrats' perceived 'fitness to govern'. In the last 25 years, changing global economic 
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conditions on the one hand and sustained political attack from the New Right on the 
other have served to radically undermine the intellectual paradigm of Keynesian 
economics. As a result the political economy of social democracy has entered a 
prolonged crisis. 
The theoretical reaction against Keynesianism was multi-faceted and diverse, but can be 
categorised into three groups. The theme which unites all facets of New Right 
economists' assault on Keynesianism is the theoretical undermining of the size and 
scope for state activism in economic affairs. Foremost in terms of chronology and 
impact were the monetarists. In principle, monetarism reopened a technical debate to 
which both Keynesians and monetarists could contribute. However, the monetarists 
based their analyses on a series of assumptions which meant that in practice, no 
dialogue was possible. The neo-classical view of the world rejected all the assumptions 
about the state's beneficial role in the running of the economy which form the bedrock 
of Keynesian economic analysis. Friedman's argument was, "that as high inflation 
became anticipated this would lever the inflation rate up again and again, eliminating 
any stability in the inflationary price for high employment."(Glyn 1995 : 36) The 
significance of this is in altering the relative importance of tackling unemployment and 
inflation overwhelmingly in favour of the latter. Lurking beneath the model is the 
assumption that the state cannot be responsible for securing the full employment of the 
workforce. 
The second strand of anti-Keynesian thought, which built on foundations laid by the 
monetarists, is New Classical Macroeconomics (NCM). At the heart of NCM is the 
rational expectations hypothesis; "economic agents are completely aware of the true 
structure of the economy (i.e. the form of each equation and the size of the coefficients 
in the econometric model which mirrors it)and make full use of this knowledge in 
forming their expectations."(Bleaney 1985 144) So influential were these arguments 
that, even on the Left, "there is a strong belief that higher levels of inflation tend to 
accelerate - and so lead eventually to counteracting deflationary policies."(Corry 1994 : 
53) 
Friedman first introduced the expectational aspect to labour market behaviour. NCM 
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applied the rational expectations framework more widely, with clear implications for the 
assumed effectiveness of state intervention in the economy. The logic of NCM assumes 
"no expectational errors to push the economy above or below its sustainable growth 
path. Thus without cyclical activity appearing - or it only appearing because of 
expectational errors which would not systematically persist - fiscal and monetary policy 
would be useless. The inflationary effects of these would be fully anticipated, and thus 
discounted by economic agents." (Thompson 1990 : 195-196) The state, then, cannot 
act to affect the economy, because any measure taken will fall foul of a pre-emptive 
strike by agents fully anticipating the consequences. This is what Iversen terms the 
policy neutrality thesis.( 1999 : 19) 
IfNCM seeks to establish that the state could not act, the third strand of anti-Keynesian 
ideas, the Austrian or Hayekian strand, is preoccupied by an insistence that the state 
should not act. "Since the state can never know more than markets because of the way 
knowledge is dispersed in a modem economy," Hayek would argue, "all forms of 
intervention are likely to be harmful and destabilising." (Gamble 1986 : 42) Any 
attempt to control the marketplace, however honourable in intent, is necessarily doomed 
to failure. Keynes' insight was that markets can fail, Hayek's article of faith was that 
governments will fail. This conviction appeared increasingly pertinent as the crisis of 
Keynesian political economy deepened, and the state seemed increasingly powerless, 
despite its size and reach, to counter the simultaneous manifestation of stagnation and 
inflation and halt the relative decline of the British economy. 
This onslaught coincided with a period of intellectual inertia for social democracy, and 
"resurgent economic liberalism easily drowned out the resulting silence." (Marquand 
1991 : 220) This ideological victory, over how to correctly read the events of the last 
twenty-five years, and what policy prescriptions are now appropriate has fostered a 
nascent new economic orthodoxy inimical to social democracy. The state was now 
seriously discredited as an effective economic actor, and the market fully rehabilitated. 
"A tight monetary policy, fiscal self-discipline and a growing reliance on the private 
initiative in a context of competitive market forces - this was the way forward that 
monetarists exhorted governments to take, over the corpse of 
Keynesianism."(Thompson 1996 : 236) 
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Subsequently, however, New Keynesian Macroeconomics (NKM) has offered a critique 
of the conception of the self-sustaining market at the heart of NCM and the Hayekian 
approach, as well as the policy neutrality thesis. NKM's more complex approach to 
markets invites scrutiny not only of market type, but also of the institutional context in 
which a market is embedded. NKM, in modelling the insight that markets are 
occasionally prone to fail formally, questions the core assumptions about uncertainty 
and information, upon which NCM models expectation formation and wage and price 
setting. NKM points out that markets operate in real, historical time, where information 
is neither perfect nor perfectly distributed. Furthermore, markets rely on the operation of 
contracts and trust, which markets on their own cannot sustain. (Hargreaves-Heap 1992) 
NKM also highlights the possibility of multiple equilibria; "there are a number of 
expectations anyone of which will prove to be a rational expectation if expected and 
acted upon all agents, and anyone of which will not prove to be rational if held in 
isolation." (Hargreaves Heap 1994 : 39) The selection of an equilibrium requires co-
ordination, "multiple equilibria occur under the assumption that individuals are 
instrumentally rational. Hence it requires the introduction of some other guide to action 
to explain equilibrium selection." (Hargreaves Heap 1994 : 40) This co-ordinating role 
is played, within the NKM framework, by the institutions and mechanisms which 
provide the context within which the economy operates. The various possible equilibria 
may have widely divergent welfare properties, and therefore this co-ordinated equilibria 
selection constitutes a political choice of the appropriate social institutions of capitalism 
- a selection in which the state will playa pivotal role. 
Nevertheless, the Hayekian and NCM challenges to the role of the state coincided with 
practical demonstrations of the limited ability of the nation state to govern over its 
national economic space, most notoriously the failure of the 'Mitterrand experiment'. 
(Muet & Fonteneau 1985; Hall 1986, 1990) This dual assault on the nation state was 
extremely problematic for social democracy. As we have already seen, 'methodological 
nationalism' has been a defining feature of social democracy throughout the century. 
With the 'limits of the possible' at the national level being starkly demonstrated, social 
democracy was obliged, at the ideological level, to explore other arenas, the most 
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fruitful being supra-national co-ordination. Such ideas as Delors' 'post-national' 
socialism began to gain a certain currency, centring on the EU as the appropriate arena 
within which to pursue social democracy.(Delors 1989) The increasing significance of 
supra-national level policy activism for the viability of national level social democracy 
demands that, at an ideological level, social democracy confronts a paradox. "The 
politics of a rational Left needs to be international in a new and more radical way today: 
global in its conclusions. But it has not yet ceased to be national in its 
conditions."(Anderson 1991 : 351) 
The implications of the collapse of 'actual existing socialism', the exhaustion of 
traditional social democratic means, the enforced peaceful co-existence with the new 
market orthodoxy and the increasing relevance of supra-national co-ordination for social 
democracy will be explored in chapter 5 through analysis of how the ideology of the 
French PS has evolved in the 1990s. 
3. The Programmatic Crisis: Globalisation and Social Democracy. 
As well as changing PS ideology, the crisis of social democracy (or perhaps more 
accurately the structural economic changes which heralded it) necessitated a re-
evaluation of economic strategy. The framework used to explore the issue of social 
democratic economic strategy in a changing economic environment will be the literature 
on globalisation and social democracy. 
Kenichi Ohmae's The End of The Nation State asserts that national economies are now 
subsumed into a 'borderless world', a global economy - perceived as a perfect market -
where financial markets and transnational corporations dominate. "In terms of the 
global economy, nation states have become little more than bit actors. "(1995 : 11-13) 
The other position, espoused by Hirst & Thompson, (1996, see also Drache & Boyer 
1996, Vandenbroucke 1998) is more sceptical about how far the process has advanced. 
The sceptics seek to distinguish between the accelerating process of globalisation on the 
one hand, and the increasing acceptance of the rhetoric of globalisation (strongly 
influenced by the neo-liberal thinking outlined above) on the other. Whilst not disputing 
that radical changes in economic context have occurred, the implications of the changes, 
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and the strategic options open to social democratic governments in the wake of them 
remains in dispute. Such questions are by their nature almost impossible to answer 
conclusively - but this general problematic offers a backdrop to the specific 
consideration of the impact of developments within the international political economy 
on the French PS and the British Labour Party. 
As we saw above, over the course of the century, socialism and social democracy came 
to rely upon the potentialities of the nation state to 'deliver' social democratic' goods'. 
Within its model the key locus of economic and political activity has been the nation 
state, whose role as the principal regulator of economic activity within a well-defined 
national economic 'space' able to secure economic growth, full employment and 
welfare provision, was a fundamental 'given' of the Keynesian paradigm. It is to this 
use of the nation state within the economic realm that Gosta Epsing-Andersen refers 
when observing that, at its core, social democracy is about 'politics against 
markets' (1985). If the global theorists are to be believed, in today' s international 
economic environment, markets are of ever increasing importance, whilst the 
importance of politics is on the wane. 'Hyper-global' theorist's excitement about a 
borderless world is surely premature.(Ohmae 1995) Indeed, the extent to which, in 
seeking to explain how parties ofthe left 'respond' to globalisation, we have recourse to 
national factors (see above), is testimony to the limited applicability of the 'strong' 
globalists thesis. However, the areas of nation-state activity where global theorist's 
predictions are most prescient (the nation-state's ability to regulate its national 
economic space) are precisely those potentialities of the nation-state on which social 
democrats came to depend in order to deliver their political programmes. 
There appears to be broad acceptance that low inflation, national competitiveness, 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), securing market confidence to avoid capital 
flight, and the credit rating of national governments must be central to any 
government's economic strategy. Such concerns point towards the centrality of anti-
inflationary policy and the reduction of national debt and deficit, as codified in the 
Maastricht Treaty and its convergence criteria. Many commentators believe that these 
new parameters of national economic management have fed through into a new 
'settlement', replacing the social democratic 'settlement' of the post-war era. "The 
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indicators (inflation, profitability, strikes) suggest that the distributional conflict 
declined during the 1980s and that by the end of the decade a 'stabilisation' had been 
reached on terms much more acceptable to the employers than those pertaining at the 
beginning of the decade." (Glyn 1995 : 46) Keohane argued that the post-war regime of 
'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie 1982) retained "a bias against those forms of social 
democracy that do not sufficiently take account of the constraints of the markef'(1984) 
However, whereas in the era of embedded liberalism, the international political 
economy still offered social democratic governments considerable room to manoeuvre, 
today social democrats appear ever more tightly constrained. 
In terms of the economIC processes of globalisation, three phenomena are of 
fundamental importance. These are the growing intensity of international trade, of 
international financial exchanges, and the increasingly dominant role of multinational 
corporations and foreign direct investment. Debates rage as to the appropriate choice 
and interpretation of economic indicators to empirically evaluate how far advanced 
these processes are. (Hirst & Thompson 1996, Held et ai, 1999) In chapter 6 we will 
explore the implications of these changes in depth. Here our aim is to examine whether 
conceptions of the relationship between globalisation and social democracy and 
globalisation prevalent within the literature are accurate. 
Is Social Democracy Unworkable Given Advancing Processes Of 
Globalisation? 
One way of answering this question is through cross-national quantitative analysis of 
government expenditure and deficit levels. Whilst accepting the logical consistency of 
the position which sees capital mobility as tightly constraining government macro-
economic policy-making options, Garrett's analysis of 16 OEeD countries between 
1967 and 1990 seeks to unearth how far the process has actually progressed. The 
findings suggest considerable variations in expenditure and a wider room to manoeuvre 
for governments than is generally appreciated.( 1995) Janoski's study of levels of 
spending on active labour market policies (1996), and Hicks' analysis of the social 
democratic corporatist model of economic performance (1996) offer similar insights. As 
well as macroeconomic room to manoeuvre, these studies also emphasise the role of 
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(more or less centralised) corporatist wage bargaining institutions within social 
democratic economic strategy. (see also Iversen 1999) The absence of such institutions 
from the French context (see chapter 2), and their marginal relevance to New Labour's 
economic strategy (see chapter 7) in part explains the focus of our study. As a 
complement to the above approaches, our case-based qualitative study aims to explore 
in depth the interrelationship between social democracy and globalisation, and the 
possibilities for social democratic activism in the absence of strong and centralised 
'corporatist' institutions.9 
At first glance, John Gray's contribution to the social democracy and globalisation 
debate seems to go beyond the simple-minded hyperglobalist position, aware as he is of 
its limitations and of contradictions within it. Gray departs from 'hyperglobal' 
hyperbole, observing that, "policy options open to nation-states in the 1990s are not 
delivered to them as a menu with fixed prices ... there are few, if any, rules of monetary 
and fiscal rectitude whose violation will result in predictable penalties."(1998 : 66) As 
such he escapes the misconception that markets 'impose' a neo-liberal policy agenda on 
governments. Such a view seriously misreads the nature of global financial markets, 
seeing the markets as a unitary rational actor with a pre-established policy-agenda. 
As Perraton et al point out, "markets' responses to government policies depends on their 
assessments of the economic credibility of the government; as such there is no set 
response to particular policies .... Rather than global financial markets imposing specific 
policies on national governments, they have significantly changed the costs associated 
with particular and instruments through their effects on interest rate risk premia and 
exchange rate movements."(1997 : 270) Gray infers from this centrality of 'credibility' , 
and the changing costlbenefit analysis of national economic policies, that, "global 
mobility of capital and production in a world of open economies have made the central 
policies of European social democracy unworkable"(1998 : 89) 
Gray interprets globalisation as the death knell of social democracy, "the new global 
freedom of financial markets so hems in national governments as to limit severely, or to 
rule out altogether, traditional social-democratic full employment policies." (1996 : 
9 See the methodological appendix for a more detailed discussion of the reasons for the choice of cases. 
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12,13) Globalisation, Gray argues, makes the egalitarian aspirations of social democracy 
unachievable, and "without this animating egalitarian political morality, social 
democracy is nothing. "(1996 : 26) 
Gray's apocalyptic vision is, in one sense, a welcome corrective to accounts of social 
democracy which conceptualise the economic difficulties experienced by Keynesianism 
since the 1970s as just another downturn. Merkel refers to the "temporary blockage of 
the Keynesian co-ordination."(1992 : 126) For Koelble, "de-industrialisation and 
increased unemployment" presented "adjustment problems in terms of electoral and 
political strategies. "( 1991 : 116) Whilst this is no doubt the case, it is rather lame 
terminology for developments which left social democracy bereft of a cogent economic 
strategy. Kitschelt treats the problems facing Keynesianism more seriously (1994 : 99-
104) yet still insists, "if social democratic parties wish to remain 'progressive' in 
advanced Keynesian welfare states, they cannot confine themselves to the pursuit of 
equality, the value social democrats have best institutionalised in contemporary 
capitalism." (1994 : 299) Kitschelt's assumption that equality has been successfully 
institutionalised within capitalism is questionable, given that the welfare state's ability 
to secure egalitarian goods is increasingly undermined by the international economic 
context. Indeed, elsewhere, Kitschelt himself highlights precisely those international 
economic developments which undermine the 'social democratisation' process. (1994 : 
Ch.3) 
In this light, Gray's shot across the bows is necessary. His inference, however, is not 
sustained by a coherent argument. For all Gray's critique of modernity, there is a telos 
at work here, "distinctively social democratic policies have suffered irreversible 
setbacks in several European countries, including France and Sweden ..... economic life 
in Sweden is now evolving ineluctably towards the neo-liberal norm increasingly 
dominant in the rest of Europe."(1996 : 24 & 36 emphasis added) Gray seeks to align 
himself with the position of Perraton et al. (1998, 55) however, his approach seems to 
smack of the 'hyper-globalists' air of inevitability more than he might care to admit. 
The rhetoric of globalisation is used to undermine ideological directions he considers 
unviable, but the case against such directions does not appear as compelling as Gray 
asserts. 
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Similar limitations underpin Kitschelt's account. The "globalisation of the economy" 
forces European social democracy to "give up far-reaching objectives to change 
economic property rights and income equalisation."(l994 : 297) As a result, left and 
right parties offer, "only slightly different methods of support and correct private market 
allocation of scarce goods. In advanced industrial democracies, parties no longer offer 
voters stark alternatives on the distributive dimension."(1994 : 297) Whilst globalisation 
does constrain social democratic policy options, it is a mistake to infer from this that 
there are no longer significantly different approaches to economic policy, involving 
different hierarchies of priorities in terms of employment, inflation and redistribution, 
and more fundamentally, different understandings of how the economy works. Kitschelt 
may be correct in observing that such differences are more marginal today than during 
the Golden Age, but in asserting that, "economic policy turns from being a 'positional' 
issue to a 'valence' issue on which technocratic 'capacity' of parties is all that divides 
them in voters' eyes"(1994 : 297) Kitschelt surrenders to the neo-liberal assumption that 
'there is no alternative'. 
At the heart of this problem is a dubious reading of the implications of globalisation for 
social democratic economic strategy, packed with many of the assumptions 
underpinning the 'hyperglobalist' world view. Kitschelt observes that 'libertarian 
policies' of the Mediterranean socialists, "could be maintained only inasmuch as they 
did not conflict with the imperatives of capital accumulation."(1994 : 275 emphasis 
added) The similarity of the terminology to economistic Marxism is significant. There is 
an underlying dichotomous opposition between "responding vigorously to the challenge 
of supply-side market efficiency", and "the intellectual ghetto of traditional socialist 
visions of nationalising industry, economic planning, expansionary fiscal policy, and 
incomes policy."(1994 ; 104) Kitschelt's accounts of 'successes' and 'failures' are 
straight-forward 'policy learning' tales, assuming that supply side policies to improve 
market competitiveness are 'right', demand policies are now 'wrong'. Embracing the 
neo-liberal policy prescriptions which, Kitschelt assumes, the 'challenge of market 
efficiency' demands, is the only answer. 
Whilst theorists, and indeed social democrats, accept the importance of 'credibility' as 
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the cornerstone of macroeconomic policy (see e.g. Moscovici 1997, Balls 1998), not all 
see the securing of such credibility as incompatible with social democratic goals. We 
may take the Maastricht criteria as a shorthand for the kind of limits that the securing of 
credibility entails. There may, however, be room to manoeuvre for governments of the 
left, which can be exploited in terms of policy activism which does not undermine 
underlying credibility. As Perraton et al point out, "governments pursue policy 
packages, and markets impose opportunity costs on the package as a whole."(1997 : 
270) Within the overall policy-package, leeway may be gained by perceived overall 
rectitude of policy to allow policy activism at the margins. 
The reason Gray does not entertain this possibility, is the kind of social democratic 
policies he is referring to. "The inheritance of neo-liberal deregulation, together with 
ongoing globalisation," Gray observes, "constrain or remove many of the policy levers 
on which social democratic governments have hitherto relied. More particularly, they 
make the distributional goals of social democracy unachievable, at least by traditional 
social-democratic means."(1996, 32 emphasis added) Pursuing the goals of social 
democracy by means other than Keynesian national economic management may not 
meet with the same obstacles. As V andenbroucke has pointed out, (1998) Gray's caveat 
undermines the confidence of the rest of the argument. 
Gray's definition of social democracy explains his confidence in assigning it to the 
rubbish bin of history. "By social democracy I mean the combination of deficit-financed 
full employment, a comprehensive welfare state and egalitarian tax policies that existed 
in Britain until the late 1970s and which survived In Sweden until the early 
1990s."(1998 : 88) By confining himself to such a static conception, Gray 
misunderstands the nature of social democracy and prematurely discounts its capacity 
for renewal. "The strategic amalgam of 'Keynesianism plus welfare state' is but one 
historically contingent context within which to pursue the politics of social democracy." 
(Pierson 1995 : 34) There is a sense in which some of its relevance is on the wane, and 
that particular conjuncture is past. Yet even if some elements of this particular 
'strategic amalgam' are now untimely, the themes of its arguments and the nature of its 
compromise still provide the building blocks of any new formulation. 
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Where Gray's argument most glaringly underestimates the limits of the possible in 
terms of social democratic strategy is in the realm of supra-national co-ordination and 
policy activism. An increasingly important component of social democratic economic 
strategy in the post-Bretton Woods world is the potential advantages of international co-
operation and co-ordination. Regionalism, understood as, "a state-led or states-led 
project designed to reorganise a particular regional space along defined economic and 
political lines," (Payne & Gamble 1996 : 2) is an increasingly significant element of 
social democratic economic strategy. The constraints on social democratic strategy at 
the national level have led to an increasing propensity to explore the possibilities of 
activism at the supra-national level, which for European social democracy means the 
EU. 
It is increasingly at the European level that social democrats seek to resolve the tensions 
between globalisation and social democracy. This explains moves at the supra-national 
level to prevent 'beggar-thy-neighbour' downward tax regime competition. Co-
ordination and harmonisation of minimum standards and tax regimes is seen as essential 
to prevent 'tax dumping', or 'social dumping'. Such co-ordination also has the potential 
to foster more growth and job-creation-orientated macro-economic policies. More 
generally, it is at European level that social democrats seek to protect workers rights, 
ensure minimum standards, and protect social cohesion. 
One potential avenue for social democrats is the revival of a Keynesian policy agenda at 
the EU level.(Delors 1993) Global capital flows, it has been accepted, rule out 
traditional Keynesian macro-economic policies, because of the anticipated reaction of 
financial markets to such policies. Keynesian-style policies at the EU level, some social 
democrats insist, may not be incompatible with the need for peaceful co-existence with 
global financial markets. Gray, predictably, asserts otherwise, "continental 
Keynesianism is a dead end. Europe-wide social democracy has been removed from the 
agenda of history." (1998 : 98-99) This disagreement returns us to the distinction 
between the rhetoric and process of globalisation. Has financial integration and capital 
mobility practically ruled out 'Keynesian' policies at the European level? 
At the fundamental ideological level, we may conceptualise the debate between Gray, 
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and Vandenbroucke, as one about the implications of globalisation for social democracy 
regarding the level of commitment to egalitarianism (and in tum redistribution),and the 
role of the state in the economy. Gray asserts that 'social democratic deals of equality' 
are incompatible with an increasingly 'globalised' economy (1998 : 88-89) whilst 
Vandenbroucke is at pains to insist that 'egalitarian employment policies' are 
compatible with recent changes in the international political economy.(1998 : Chs 4-7) 
At the policy level, these differing conceptions of the limits of the possible have 
implications in terms of macroeconomic policy and the feasibility of European-level 
Keynesian policies, job creation and employment policy, labour market policy and the 
appropriate level at which the minimum standards 'ceiling' should be set. 
In reality the social democratic economic policy debate is carried out in the middle 
ground which Kitschelt's underlying dichotomous opposition between "responding 
vigorously to the challenge of supply-side market efficiency", and "the intellectual 
ghetto of traditional socialist visions of nationalising industry, economic planning, 
expansionary fiscal policy, and incomes policy."(1994 ; 1 04) ignores. Whilst full 
employment through domestic demand management may no longer be an option, 
sceptics such as Gray fail to entertain the possibility of supply-side measures which 
further social democrats' economic goals. Reducing unemployment through job-
sharing, reducing the working week, or active public sector job-creation schemes are not 
necessarily unattainable. Nor are such objectives necessarily incompatible with 
international competitiveness. Furthermore, Gray's assumptions about the degree of 
welfare state retrenchment may be overstated, and predictions of a convergence towards 
a minimal 'liberal' welfare state premature. 
In chapter 6 we will explore the implications of globalisation for social democracy, 
rejecting the 'hyperglobal' interpretation of the relationship between social democracy 
and globalisation, which asserts that national economies are now subsumed into a 
'borderless world', within which social democracy is an historically exhausted project. 
Analysis of development and implementation of the PS's macro-economic policy, job 
creation policy, labour market policies, and 'structural adjustment' policies such as the 
shift towards a 35 hour week demonstrate enduring social democratic policy activism. 
Chapter 7 presents a comparative political economic analysis of the economic strategies 
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of the PS and the British Labour Party which further illustrates the potential for social 
democracy in a global era. 
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Chapter 2 
The Historical and Institutional Context of the Parti Socialiste 
"[P]olitical parties ... in the elaboration and diffusion of a conception of the world 
... work out the ethics and the politics corresponding to these conceptions and act, 
as it were, as their historical 'laboratory'." Antonio Gramsci (1971 : 273) 
The nation institutional and historical context of France provided a particular set of 
laboratory conditions in which French socialism and social democracy, as articulated by 
the PS, 'worked out its ethics and politics.' This chapter will assess in tum the 
structural variables, outlined in our framework for analysis (see chapter 1) which 
crucially affected (and continue to affect) the path of development of the PS. Firstly, 
there are the constraints imposed by the organisation of the state and the political system 
and its resultant constitutional and electoral practices. Secondly, the socio-economic 
structure of society, and in particular the working class is an important contextual 
influence on the workings of socialist parties. Analysis of the interaction of these 
variables and the PS is an essential precursor to understanding the changing strategies of 
the PS in the 1990s. 
The French national institutional context structured the field of action within which the 
Parti Socialiste (PS) operated and evolved. We will analyse a number of key factors and 
their influence in tum. Firstly, the nature of centre-periphery relations in France, and 
their effects on both local and national political organisation, will be explored. The 
conflicting traditions of lacobinism on the one hand and notablism - the tendency of 
local notables and their electoral machines to overshadow the national party influences -
will be outlined. We will explore how the contours of local-level democratic institutions 
in France shaped the internal organisation of the party, and the effects of these intra-
party centre periphery relations on the organisation of the French Socialist Party. In the 
1960s, when, we argue, the conflict of interests between local and national political 
strategies became acute, a process of party restructuring was undertaken - the outcome 
being a more nationally co-ordinated party. 
Secondly, the weak, fragmented and confrontational characteristics of organised labour 
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in France will be outlined, and impact on the party's development of the arms-length 
relationship with organised labour examined. Anderson's distinction between 'northern' 
and 'southern' social democracy will be invoked to explore the ideological, and 
organisational effects on the PS of the absence of a strong organised labour movement. 
This absence, we argue, explains its failure to develop a mass base and the particular 
sociological profile of the party's membership and elite. In ideological terms, weak 
fragmented unions prevented the development of the neo-corporatist strategies which 
helped some Northern social democratic parties cope with the economic crisis of the 
1970s and 1980s. 
The most significant nation-specific factor shaping influence on the PS is the 
institutional context of the Fifth Republic. The inadequacy of the simple view of the 
political system as a 'transmission belt' of interests and ideas shall be demonstrated 
when the effects of the new constitutional context of the Fifth Republic on the Parti 
Socialiste's ideology and economic and political strategy are explored. The 
Presidentialism of the new system, as codified in the constitution, but also as 
personified by De Gaulle's behaviour in office underlined the 'strong state' nature of 
France's Semi-Presidential democracy. This, we argue, made pursuit of the Elysee the 
ultimate political goal. 
Our analysis of the French polity will primarily take place at the level of the party 
system. We insist that Presidentialism was a key determining variable in the 
development of the party system, heralding the change from 'polarised pluralism' to a 
bi-polar pluralism dominated for the first twenty years of the Republic by the right.) 
Given the centrality of the party system to the analysis, considerable attention will be 
paid to the PS's competitor parties, both new and old, in explaining the evolution of the 
system itself, and of the PS's fortunes within it. Any assessment of the changing 
political fortunes of the Parti Socialiste under the Fifth Republic has as its necessary 
corollary an evaluation of the changing fortunes of the peF. This is because the French 
Socialists were the second party of the left in the three decades following 1945. The 
trajectories of the two parties, it shall be argued, have been mutually reinforcing, 
particularly in the years after Epinay (1971). A further key determinant of the fortunes 
1 The development of the party' s internal structure can be seen as a response to the context of a 
presidentialised party system. 
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of the PS is the socio-economic structure of society. We will thus outline the evolving 
electorate of the Parti d'Epinay, examining change in both geographical distribution and 
socio-economic composition. 
The Impact of Centre-Periphery Relations on the Parti Socialiste 
Understanding the impact of centre-periphery relations in France on the evolution of the 
French Socialist Party requires appreciation of two conflicting traditions. Firstly, there is 
the historic significance in France of the Jacobin tradition. The contours of the French 
local political system today bears startling similarities to the prefectoral system, set up 
by Napoleon in 1800. This was an hierarchical division of the French territory into 
bureaucratic units, establishing a pyramid of command, all under central control. Each 
of the 90 departements had a prefecture situated in its administrative capital, housing 
Napoleon's representative, the prefet. The departements were subdivided into (2-5) 
arrondissements, containing a sub-prefecture. The arrondissements were subdivided 
into Cantons (over 2,000 in all), which were in tum divided into communes (numbering 
over 38,000). The permanence of this system is remarkable. As Machin notes, "the 
boundaries and names of almost all the units, at all levels have remained largely 
unchanged .... even in the 1970s, the local government units remained very largely the 
same as in 1800." (1979: 30) 
The other tradition is one of a rural, localised society with a highly fragmented local 
government structure. This tradition is attested to by the sheer scale of local government 
in France. Each level of administration has a representative assembly. At the 
departmental level, there is the conseil general elected for a six year term (with half the 
seats contested every three years) from single member constituencies, the cantons. The 
conseils generaux vary in size from 17 (Lozere) to 109 (Paris) members. (Wright 1989 : 
300) Furthermore, each of the 36,000 or so French communes has its own mayor and 
municipal council, elected for 6 years by a list system. At this level alone, "roughly half 
a million French men and women - nearly 1 % of the population - hold municipal 
elective office. "(Knapp 1991 : 18) The predominance at this local level of local political 
notables has been a defining feature of local French politics. 
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As Frears notes, "local government is very presidential .... local power is a reality in 
France, and a local notable - the mayor of a large town, for example, or president of a 
conseil general - has the standing, the resources - office, personal staff, a car, a budget 
- and the opportunity for tangible local achievement to build a national leadership 
role. "(1991 : 195-196) Indeed, Meny argues that given the hold notables have gained 
over partisan political organisations, "notables are a central feature of French political 
life, and are a kind or Republican aristocracy. Unlike the traditional aristocracy, the 
status of the notable is purely political .... the parallel lies in the use of a local power 
base to achieve influence in the national political arena."(1995 : 183) These two 
traditions, the centralising Jacobinism and the localised notablism, inform the "curious 
hybrid of national and local political power that is the bedrock of French democracy." 
(Ashford 1990: 47) 
This already dense mosaic has been added to under the Fifth Republic, with the creation 
of 22 regional bodies. Although created in 1960, the laws of 1964 and 1972 did not 
seriously empower regions. The 1982 Defferre laws were a wide-ranging 'legislative 
avalanche'(Loughlin & Mazey 1995 : 2) aimed at decentralising power within the 
French political system. In this aim, the laws were at least partially successful. To the 
above list Defferre added the conseils regionaux, directly elected (on departmental PR 
lists) for 6 years. Regional independence, both financial and administrative, from the 
state was increased (a priori tutelage was replaced by a posteriori supervision, and 
block grants replaced many project specific grants). Executive power was transferred 
from the departmental and regional prefects to the chairperson of the elected 
departmental and regional assemblies. Thirdly, regions became fully fledged local 
authorities (collectivites territoriales) with corresponding upgrading in their legal and 
political status. (Douence 1995: 11) 
However, the Defferre reforms have done little to simplify the French polity. Rather 
than apportioning powers rationally, the reforms merely added new bodies to the 
existing patchwork of local bodies, causing further duplication and overlapping of 
competencies. The boundaries of local government were not rationalised, nor were the 
number of units reduced.2 Thus in practice, local administration involved many elected 
2 France still has in excess of 36, 000 communes, 26, 000 of which have a population of less than 700 
(Ashford 1990 : 57) indeed, Mazey notes that some communes have no population at all. (1989 : 43) 
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actors, as well as the technical field services, operating under ministerial auspices. Even 
before the decentralisation reforms, the theoretical hierarchy of prefect and state field 
services over local elected officials did not obtain in practice. As Knapp observes, 
municipalities needed central services for subsidies and technical expertise. State field 
services in turn needed mayors and councillors as allies (in their competition against 
other service providers), and as clients for their consultancies. Prefects (who move on 
average every 2 years) needed local mayors and their contacts and the local legitimacy 
they embody. Thus, "the real relationship between central government representatives 
and local elected officials was one of interdependence rather than hierarchy." (1991 
26) 
Predictably, in the wake of the reforms, the relation between centre and periphery has 
become more complex still, varying considerably according to the resources at the 
disposal of local political actors. The key role of local notables remains unchanged, not 
least because Defferre himself was a formidable political 'boss' in Marseilles, with a 
sizeable political machine, intricately enmeshed with local elective office in the 
Bouches-du-Rhone area. Thus, Knapp notes, "the new legislation bore the imprint of the 
notables .... modelled on big cities with big budgets and their own technical services." 
(1991 : 27) For smaller municipalities, without such resources, the degree of 
dependence on central provision remained largely unchanged. 
Cumul Des Mandats and Political Parties 
One means of overcoming the co-ordination problems in such a complex set of 
institutional relationships between the centre and the periphery is the tendency of 
politicians to straddle the local-national divide by simultaneously holding office at 
various levels (national, departmental, regional, or municipal) through the cumul des 
mandats. As well as smoothing the relations between the centre and an extremely 
fragmented periphery, the cumul also facilitates co-ordination at the local level. Thus, 
the cumul gives a coherence to the local I national link which would otherwise be 
lacking, and is, "highly functional to the system."(Knapp 1991 : 25) Whilst the cumul 
des mandats is not unique to France, "its extent and its near-systematic character 
are."(Knapp 1991 : 18) Of all the deputes elected in the 1978, 1981, 1986 and 1988 
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parliamentary elections, "over three quarters of the total for the four elections also held 
office as mayors, adjoints, municipal councillors, conseillers generaux, or regional 
councillors." (1991 : 19, & Tables 1-5) Within the French political system, "the 
incentive to combine local and national office appear to operate more or less 
indiscriminately on all parties."(Knapp 1991 : 25) 
Although the Jacobin tradition places certain limits on the importance of local office-
holding, the mayoral office, especially in larger towns and cities, remains a significant 
centre of local political power and has been a traditional stepping stone in any national 
political career. The favourite combination being the depute-maire. "Mayors seek 
national office either for itself of for the resources that access to Paris can deliver. 
Deputies seek municipal office either for itself or for the local resources - in terms of 
goodwill, cash and logistical support - that a town hall can deliver. Thus national office 
reinforces local office and vice versa. "(Knapp 1991 : 30) 
French parties exhibit low membership rates,3 which means that revenues from 
subscriptions are low. There are no union dues to rely on, but elections are frequent and 
expensive (although, unlike the USA, parties cannot buy air time). As a result, party 
resources at the local level are often meagre, with all but the biggest federal offices 
comprising a small office with phone, photocopier, and a small meeting room. (Rey & 
Subileau 1991 : 126) Local elected office provides a source of funds and resources to 
help fight these campaigns. Thus there are strong systemic incentives to establish a 
localised power base or 'party machine'. "The functions normally fulfilled by political 
parties at local level - recruiting and retaining activists, grooming candidates for office, 
and raising funds -are to a considerable extent under municipal control, managed by the 
notable rather than the party section. "(Knapp 1991 : 33) 
The often determining role that municipal power plays in the relative strength of the PS 
at the local level is attested to by Rey & Subileau's classification of PS federations 
which distinguishes on the grounds of the percentage of mayors in a departement who 
are socialist. In particular, municipal mandates in towns of 20, 000 inhabitants or more, 
3 In 1980 the Socialists claimed 189,580 members, rising to a peak of 204, 172 in 1989 (Bergounioux & 
Grunberg 1992 : 361) - the total is less than a third of their German counterparts. Given the French 
tradition for exaggerating membership levels, the actual figure may be presumed to be lower still. 
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which are of considerable importance on the local political scene, offer, "an indicator of 
the dynamism and the solidity of structure in a given federation, and a demonstration of 
the ability to root the organisation in local politics." (Rey & Subileau 1991 : 128) The 
importance of a federation cannot be assessed merely in terms of the number of 
members. This is in part because such statistics are notoriously unreliable in French 
politics.4 More importantly, however, the appropriate criteria for judging a federation's 
strength must be more broadly conceived; "the ensemble of means of intervention, and 
capacity for political expression, including the ability of leaders to put this expression 
into effect."(1991 : 129) This approach is necessary because, "even with few members, 
if a federation succeeds in getting one of its own as leader of the com'eil general, or runs 
one or many of the larger towns, it will be more influential than a federation with more 
members but fewer electoral mandates." (1991 : 129; see chapter 3) 
Elective office provides means, in terms of both materials and influence. More so than 
national parliamentary office, municipal offers "status, without necessarily onerous 
duties (particularly in the case of maire-adjoint) and financial and material resources 
(offices, subsidies, a place on the board of local public/private initiatives) but also 
means for propaganda, and several opportunities to meet the population, and its 
representatives."(l991 : 129) This can be seen as part cause and part effect of the 
weakness of French political parties. 
The existence of strong local power centres induces a tradition of local autonomy which, 
combined with wide regional variation in party strength and influence, has made 
national-level action difficult to co-ordinate, The implications for the post-war 
development of French socialism were damaging, for it permitted the simultaneous 
flourishing of the SFIO at local level (for example under Defferre in Marseilles, and 
Mauroy in Pas-de-Calais) with its floundering at national level. The 'third force' 
rationale of centrist alliances, which worked at municipal level, was incompatible with 
the new national context of the Fifth Republic (see later), yet continued municipal 
success lessened the urgency of drastic strategic and organisational reassessment to 
improve national fortunes. Indeed, insulated as he was by his impregnable Bouches du 
4 Ysmal observes that, given the extraordinary secrecy and opacity surrounding French party membership 
levels, no reliable data has yet been acquired about any French party. despite the attentions of many 
analysts, using a number of different methodologies. (1989: 157-162) 
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Rhone party machine, Defferre only became fully aware of the need for national-level 
reform after his derisory 5% showing in the 1969 presidential election. 
The Parti D'Epinay: Internal Centre-Periphery Relations and the 
Union De Gauche 
In the 1971 local elections, the cost of pursuing uncoordinated strategies began to be felt 
at local level as well. "In 45 cities over 30,000 the left was still unable to form a unified 
list, and in 13 cities the Rocardians helped to shatter Socialist unity."(Ashford 1990 : 
48) At the Epinay conference which followed just three months later, the need for unity 
must have been keenly felt. Arguably, part of the reason for the party's post-Epinay 
resurgence at national level is its ability to co-ordinate and discipline local actors.(Lewis 
& Sferza 1987) The 1977 local elections displayed two significant trends in this regard. 
Firstly, local observance of the Union de Gauche strategy meant that a unified list was 
presented in 90% of cities with 30,000 plus inhabitants. Secondly, and demonstrating 
the power shift in internal centre-periphery relations within the party, "national 
headquarters was able to discipline local Socialist parties for alliances with centrist 
groups in violation of the joint programme." (Ashford 1990 : 49) The fact that the 
Socialists' tripling of their hold of cities over 30,000 between 1965 and 1977 coincided 
with a national resurgence suggests that national-local co-ordination was an important 
factor in Socialist electoral success. This success in municipal elections was replicated 
in the cantonal elections of 1976 and 1979. (Knapp 1991 : 24) 
The context of this resurgence was what would today be called a 're-energising' of the 
grassroots. Not only were the numbers increasing sharply, but the kind of members, and 
indeed the nature of membership, were being transformed. As Lewis & Sferza note, "by 
the mid-1970s, the PS did indeed look different from the SFIO. Many once-stagnant 
federations had become promising melting pots bringing together activists from a 
variety of cultural and ideological backgrounds. Party congresses were no longer 
controlled by the party bosses ..... new members brought valuable militant capital from 
union and associational movements which could be used to extend Party influence 
among previously hostile or indifferent groups such as Catholic workers or peasants in 
Western and Eastern France."(1987 : 104) Since the party's refoundation at Epinay, 
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there has been a considerable shift in the geographical distribution of power within the 
party. Whereas in the 1960s, the three 'bastions' of Nord, Pas-de-Calais, and Bouches 
du Rhone represented 43% of the PS membership, today, that proportion is down to 
25%. This is largely due to the new recruits flocking to the party in areas of traditional 
weakness such as Lorraine, Brittany, notably in the wake of the Assises du socialisme in 
1974. (Y smal 1989 : 175, & Maps 4.3 & 4.5) However, this did not lead to a sea change 
in modes of centre periphery relations - quite the opposite. The local power bases, 
gained in 1977, "had the effect of turning the young Turks of the PS into notables. One 
after another would exploit to the limits the possibility of cumulating offices ... 
extremely functional in the double quest for an anchorage at the base and the conquest 
of the summit."(Meny 1995 : 184) 
The decentralisation and regionalisation reforms entailed a partial de-coupling of the 
links between national, regional, and local institutions, and a further strengthening of 
local power bases. The 1985 law limiting the cumul des mandats to just two major 
offices further weakened what Machin has called, "the nationalising and coherence-
inducing effect on parties of the participation of members of the national assembly in 
local councils at all levels."( 1989 : 78) This in part explains the continued importance 
of autonomous local expression to PS internal relations. Large federations such as 
Bouche-du-Rhone, Nord and Pas-de-Calais, continued to flex their muscles, particularly 
when the First Secretary was in a weak position internally. 5 Local prerogatives, such as 
candidate selection, tended to be jealously guarded by the federations, particularly for 
legislative elections. Local particularities remain very much in evidence, and, "the 
process of party homogenisation is only relative, the weight of local tradition, and of the 
particular histories of federations .... continue to leave their mark on the 
federations."(Rey & Subileau 1991 : 141) The internal workings of the party are still 
dominated by a few large federations, even if the number of medium-sized federations 
has increased considerably. 
In this light it is not surprising that the problems associated with the domination of local 
politics by party bosses presiding over extensive 'party machines' have not all been 
solved. The extremely long reigns of some mayors, who were at the same time bosses of 
5 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
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a powerful local political machine, were doubtless facilitated by the fact that "French 
political finance has traditionally been shrouded in obscurity", and the long standing 
precedent that, "official receipts and actual expenses incurred do not add up." (Knapp 
1991 : 30) The culture of clientelism, a corollary of the very significant powers of 
patronage at the Mayors' disposal, endured.(Rey & Subileau 1991 : 147; Hanley 1987 : 
21) Numerous corruption scandals befell local Socialist politicians, notably Defferre's 
successor as Mayor of Marseilles, Bernard Tapie. The prevalence of creative municipal 
accounting was unearthed in the early 1990s by "a series of indictments of leading 
Socialists for fraudulent campaign fund-raising - typically, faked invoices to PS 
municipalities for fictitious services, with the money kicked back into the party. "(Ross 
& Jenson 1994 : 183) 
French Trade Unionism and the Parties of the Left 
The first point is that, "financial and institutional links [between unions and parties of 
the left] do not represent fruitful areas of study ... French trade unions do not make 
major contributions to the coffers of political parties ..... are not represented on the 
governmental and administrative bodies of political parties, nor do they wield a block 
vote at party conference ... nor do they have the opportunity to exercise some tenuous 
control over political parties through the sponsoring of individual Members of 
Parliament." (Bridgford 1991 : 7-8) This conveyed certain advantages, allowing the PS 
to develop its programme without requiring union assent.6 
Analytically, then, organised labour represents an exogenous factor. This is not to say 
that French unionism is irrelevant to the study of the PS, but its influence is less direct. 
In particular, it shall be argued, the absence of formal links led to much weaker 
associations between Socialist Party and the working class than has historically been the 
case in Britain. Two fundamental features characterise French trade unionism. Firstly, 
the French union movement is very weak in terms of the formal organisation of the 
workforce. Studies differ, but most put the figure at just over 2 million members, or 
11 % of the workforce (Labbe 1996 : 1) which puts France behind all other industrialised 
countries. Relatively low unionisation levels have a long historical pedigree in France, 
6 A point which leads Kitschelt to suggest the PS structure as the optimal organisation form of social 
democratic parties.( 1994) 
46 
partly because the conditions which fostered strong unionism elsewhere in Europe never 
obtained in France to the same degree. 7 
Some of the reasons for the weakness of French trade unionism are, however, 
endogenous to the movement. Firstly, French unionism has been more fragmented, 
reflecting more cross-cutting divisions than have been prevalent in British unionism. Of 
importance earlier in the century were unions organising on revolutionary versus 
reformist lines, but perhaps most important for the left parties have been the divisions 
between Catholic and lay unions. Such ideological divisions have meant that union 
pluralism was rarely co-operative or constructive. The second characteristic- the historic 
radicalism of the French unions - may be partially explained by the former. Its weakness 
fostered the early development of French unionism as an outsider.8 Thus because "the 
labour movement did not have the opportunity to influence working conditions through 
collective bargaining, it sought to make virtue out of necessity by developing a strategy 
of confrontation. "(Milner 1995 : 229) This then fostered a further characteristic 
weakness, namely difficult and distant relations with the employer association, the 
patronat. 
The effects of these characteristics on the relationship between unions and left parties 
has been significant. The trade unions decided in the Charte d 'Amiens of 1906 that, 
"confederal organisations are unions, and should not have dealings with parties and 
organisations which may elsewhere freely pursue the goal of social change."( quoted in 
Bridgford 1991 : 7) Union strategy was one of complete independence from any 
political party, and a refusal of parliamentary political means in the pursuit of the 
interests of the working class. (Bergounioux & Grunberg 1992 : 40-41) By the time the 
CGT did choose to seek political allies, the more radical (and numerically stronger at 
7A large part of the explanation for this can be found in the slow, late and only partial industrialisation 
that France underwent in the twentieth century. Agricultural workers outnumbered industrial workers in 
France into the post-war years. (Milner 1995) It was only in the 1954 survey that manual workers finally 
out-stripped agricultural workers, comprising 33.8% and 26.7% of the workforce respectively. 
(Economique et Statistique : July 1977) Furthermore, the large-scale Fordist production plants, such as 
the Billancourt Renault plant were the exception and not the rule until well into the 1960s. In 1962. only 
37% of the industrial workforce worked in 500+ plants. By 1974 it rose to 45%, but fell again by 1983 to 
38% (Borne 1988) 
8 The institutionalisation of French unionism only began in 1936 with the Matignon accords (which in 
theory recognised collective bargaining rights, but did not in practice lead to their proliferation) agreed by 
Blum's popular front government. The process continued after the second world war, but the only formal 
ally of a union - the PCF - was excluded from office from 1947 onwards. 
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both electoral and membership level) PCF was understandably considered a more 
natural ally. The more moderate second strongest union in France, the Catholic CFTC, 
could have provided a natural ally for a more moderate reformist left party. However, 
that Party was the SFIO, which was staunchly secular. 
This had important implications for the role of the working class in left wing politics in 
France, "whereas the Communist Party maintained strong ties with the working class 
through its link with the CGT and its 'mass and class' policies (and largely because the 
Communist Party occupied this political space after 1920), the Socialist Party failed to 
achieve real mass working-class support." (Milner 1995 : 213) The absence ofa strong 
working class membership is reflected by the virtual absence of working class 
representation within the PS elite. (Hanley 1987 : 20; Y smal 1989 : 198-204) 
The Absence of Social Democratic Corporatism in France 
Anderson distinguishes between northern or 'classical' social democracy and its 
southern variant. northern social democracy, which obtained in Britain, the Low 
Countries and the German speaking lands, has been characterised by either a working 
class "industrially stronger or more numerous than anywhere else", or by "favourable 
social alliances with a rural population of small independent farmers." In this 
environment, it is argued, "northern social democracy won its electoral spurs early on." 
With institutionalised corporatist structures, and the policy tools of the Keynesian 
revolution in their hands, northern social democrats "could typically preside over full 
employment, rising incomes and improved services."( 1992 : 310) 
In some countries, notably Sweden , the structural assets of northern social democracy 
enabled it to manage the conflict brought about by the economic crisis of the 1970s 
quite effectively. This can be understood if "inflation and the medium term level of 
unemployment [are] viewed as the outcome of the 'distributional struggle' - the tug of 
war where the rope is income and the teams are firms and workers." (Driver & Wren-
Lewis 1995 : 28) The outcome is determined at national level. "In a context of weak 
private demand and slow productivity growth, maintaining full employment required 
severe restraint on workers' pay and consumption to keep exports competitive, 
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investment profitable, and the budget under control. Where social democracy was 
capable of mobilising such support and self-discipline, full employment and an 
extension of other egalitarian policies was sustainable." (Glyn 1995 : 54) 
Despite a certain rapprochement between the PS and unions, and formal links such as 
delegations of the CGT and CFDT9 at the 1977 Nantes conference (Bridgford 1991 : 8), 
the development of a 'neo-corporatist' strategy would never have been easy given the 
historical and institutional context of industrial relations in France. When the economic 
crisis hit the Mitterrand experiment, the potential conflict between full employment and 
inflation became evident. However, an incomes policy could not be effected beyond the 
public sector, for the reasons of the weakness and fragmentation of French industrial 
relations outlined above. Nor was the degree of social consensus orchestrated, not least 
because the public sector workers who were subjected to the wage freeze were the PS' s 
core constituency. The failure to articulate a 'neo-corporatist' strategy meant there was 
no viable alternative to the 'quasi-monetarist' deflation embarked upon in March 1983, 
and Mitterrand may have had cause to rue the absence of the structural assets of 
northern social democracy, and the ideological options they offered.(see chapter 6) 
Therborn's observations about some nation's greater ability to keep unemployment 
down, often hinge on the presence of the structural assets of northern social 
democracy. ( 1986) Their absence in France could be argued to be a key factor in Ross 
and Jenson have termed the subsequent Tragedy of the Left In France. 
The Institutional Context of the Fifth Republic and Presidentialism 
The parameter-setting effects of the organisation of the state and the electoral system on 
the Party system generally, and the Socialist Party specifically, are particularly visible in 
France because twentieth century France has witnessed four very different sets of 
constitutional arrangements. The affect of these institutional parameters on the evolution 
of the Socialist Party has been both profound and dynamic, evolving considerably since 
the formation ofthe Fifth Republic in 1958. 
The need to overcome the immobilisme which had characterised the Fourth Republic 
9 As 90% of the CFTC renamed itself after its secularisation in 1964. 
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was at the heart of the new constitutional project. Government, it was argued, had to be 
afforded supremacy over Parliament, and this supremacy was codified in the new 
constitution. This appeared to be a blueprint for Prime Ministerial government. The 
following constitutional analysis draws on Wright (1989), Keeler (1993) and Machin 
and Elgie (1991). Firstly, government was empowered through a series of 'structural 
assets' which institutionalised his dominance over parliament. (Keeler 1993 : 521) The 
censure vote regulations were severely tightened, precluding the frequent dissolutions of 
parliament of the past. The area where parliament could legislate were tightly delimited 
by article 34, with legislation on all other matters necessarily emanating from the 
government (article 37). The government sets the legislative agenda (article 45), and 
can declare unconstitutional any amendments which entail a reduction in revenue or an 
increase in spending. 
Secondly, the government possessed a set of 'constitutional weapons' to be wielded in 
response to particular circumstances. (Keeler 1993 : 521) The government has the 
ability to speed up the legislative process through a declaration of urgency (article 
45.2), thus avoiding a second reading of a bill. Alternatively, it can by-pass the 
parliamentary process altogether by legislating through ordinances (article 38). Lastly, 
the government has at its disposal a number of mechanisms for preventing the 
legislature's interference. The house may be required to decide with a single vote on an 
entire bill, retaining only amendments suggested or approved by the government.(article 
44.3) A bill may be decreed an issue of confidence, whereby the bill is passed unless the 
National Assembly succeeds in passing a censure motion; "the truly 'exorbitant' quality 
of 49.3 is that it allows for the adoption of a law not only without debate or amendment, 
but also without a vote on the law itself." (Keeler 1993 : 526) Finally, article 45.4 
allows the National Assembly to circumvent the senate and rule definitively on a bill 
when a joint parliamentary committee cannot provide a common text. 
By comparison, the President's constitutional powers, although not insignificant, appear 
limited. He may negotiate foreign treaties (article 52), appoint the Prime Minister 
(article 8), dissolve the Assembly (article 12), and most ambiguously of all, the 
President must ensure respect for the Constitution by his arbitration to provide for the 
regular functioning of public authorities (article 5). However, a purely textual analysis 
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of the new constitution fails to capture its significance. A distinction must be made 
between constitutional theory and Presidential practice, for if the new constitution 
codified the shift from 'weak' to 'strong' government, De Gaulle personified that shift. 
The birth of the Fifth Republic must be understood in the context of the Algerian crisis. 
Machin and Elgie offer a useful 'segmented decision model' of the French polity, in 
which certain policy areas are considered the exclusive domain of the President. These 
include foreign policy, colonial policy, defence policy and crisis management (1991 : 
74-76). The origins of these areas of Presidential predominance can be found in De 
Gaulle's instrumental role in solving the Algerian crisis. De Gaulle was seen to offer the 
only hope of its resolution, and thus the National Assembly afforded the President 
constitutional leeway in the above areas. Desperate situations require desperate 
measures, and the 'presidential' majority may not have accepted such constraints had 
there not been a constant threat of civil war or military coup. Nevertheless, as far as De 
Gaulle was concerned, the precedent had been set. 
Hence upon resolution of the crisis in 1962, De Gaulle moved quickly to ensure his 
predominance continued by other means. He sought to make the President directly 
elected by universal suffrage (instead of electoral college), thus giving the President an 
enhanced national mandate and a degree of legitimacy to challenge the National 
Assembly. De Gaulle then dissolved the hostile Assembly, and went to the electorate 
asking for both a yes vote in the referendum and a vote for a candidate who would form 
part of a 'presidential majority '. This masterstroke precipitated a revolution in the 
French parliamentary system. The presidential majority cast the mould for future 
relations between President and Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, commanding a 
sizeable majority, should have been powerful, but henceforth, that majority's raison 
d'etre became voting for the government and policies chosen by the President. The 
President's electoral campaign platform became the blueprint for the subsequent 
government programme. 
One should be careful not to overstate Presidential predominance. The segmented 
decision model does leave significant areas of policy in the Prime Minister's and the 
government's hands. This was attested to in the period of cohabitation between 1986 
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and 1988, and France is best characterised as 'semi-Presidential'. However, in the final 
analysis there is little doubt who, potentially at least, has the upper hand. These 
developments in the locus of power structured the French polity within which the 
Socialist Party operated. The powerful Presidency became the ultimate political goal of 
all major parties, including the 'anti-system' Communist Party. In its pursuit sacrifices 
would have to be made. The impact of this new institutional context will be explored in 
terms of the Party system, and the Socialists' point of insertion into it. 
The Fifth Republic and the Presidentialised Party System 
The advent of the fifth Republic brought with it a new electoral system for presidential 
and legislative elections, specifically designed to preclude the perceived systemic 
weaknesses of the fourth Republic. The scrutin d'arrondissement a deux tours, 
requiring parties to reach a threshold vote before proceeding to the second ballot lO , 
presented a hurdle to smaller parties. However, this change alone cannot explain the 
subsequent developments in party politics under the fifth republic. For that, the 
procedural change must be placed in a wider context, and analysis must take place at the 
level of the party system. For whilst the new electoral arrangements permitted the 
mutation from multi-polar to bi-polar pluralism II, they did not determine the change. To 
adequately explain that change, we must also consider Presidentialism, and the impact 
on the party system of Gaullism. 
Sartori highlights a number of important analytical distinctions which are instrumental 
in understanding the fortunes of the Left under the Fifth RepUblic. Firstly, Sartori sets 
out, on two levels, criterion of relevance of parties. At the levels of party strength and 
ideology or 'its position value ... along a left-right axis' we must examine the 
'governing' or 'coalition potential '.(1990) We may apply these criteria to the Cartel des 
Non exercise of 1962. This event was a straw in the wind of growing Presidentialisation 
of the new Republic. It was an attempt by the SFIO, the Radicals and the MRP (left-
leaning Catholics) to prevent De Gaulle from changing the constitution to permit direct 
\0 Set at 5% of those voting in 1958, revised to 10% of the registered electorate in 1966, which was in 
tum raised to 12.5% of the registered electorate in 1976. 
II In 1958, only 20% of second round contests were straight fights. By 1981 that proportion was 96.6%. 
(Bell & Criddle 1988 : 23) 
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election of the President. Their approach entailed the same 'third force' logic - of 
coalition between centrist and left parties - which they had used to curb De Gaulle's 
influence under the Fourth Republic. 
The Fifth Republic's empowered Presidency, coupled with De Gaulle's huge popularity, 
meant that Mollet's desire to return to Parliamentary, Cabinet government remained 
adrift in the sea of pious wishes. De Gaulle's 'presidential majority' succeeded in 
capturing the old 'centrist' constituency.{Bell & Criddle 1988 : 28) Thus Mollet was at 
odds not only with the institutional logic of the Fifth Republic, but also with the 
electoral realities of a France swayed by Gaullism. The failure of the blocking move 
enhanced De Gaulle's legitimacy, and his consolidation of the Gaullist position through 
the creation of the 'presidential majority' exacerbated the declining relevance of parties 
wedded to the institutional logic of the old order, virtually eliminating their governing 
potential. 
The demise of the SFIO was not unicausal. It was declining long before 1958, thanks in 
part to Mollet's handling of Algeria whilst Prime Minister, to the PCF cornering the 
working class vote, and to the MRP capitalising on the SFIO's anti-cIericism. However, 
the incompatibility between its modus operandi and the institutional context of the Fifth 
Republic was arguably the catalyst which administered the coup de grace. Mollet 
personified this incompatibility, he was unpopular in the country and uncharismatic -
therefore never a serious presidential candidate. Indeed, the incompatibility was 
consciously reinforced by him, since he believed Fifth Republic to be a flash in the pan 
Gaullist interregnum, soon to be superseded by a reversion to coalitional Cabinet 
government. (Wilson 1988 : 508) 
Mitterrand and the Union de Gauche 
Mitterrand appreciated Presidentialisation for the irresistible force that it was, and 
accordingly "became the first politician of the Left to recognise the implications of 
Presidential politics"{Bell & Criddle 1988 : 29) This was signified by his candidacy in 
the 1965 Presidential elections. Gaining as he did 45% of the vote in the second ballot, 
he proved to others on the Left what a potential asset he was in the new Presidentialised 
Fifth Republic. In ideological terms, Presidentialism and Gaullism were changing the 
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'direction of party competition'. Sartori distinguishes between centripetal and 
centrifugal forces of party competition. Whereas Mollet had always looked to the centre 
for his coalitional allies, Mitterrand appreciated that centrist support had either withered 
on the vine or already been picked up by De Gaulle. Thus Mitterrand was forced to look 
elsewhere for support. Gaullism's dominance, which encompassed most of the Right, 
but extended into the centre and even to elements of the working class Left electorate 
(Bell & Criddle 1988) suggested a shift to the Left, "for the very fact that the central 
area is occupied feeds the system with centre-fleeing drives and discourages centripetal 
competition."(Sartori 1990 : 332) 
This is a case of Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis turned on its head, skewed by France's 
pluralistic bi-polar presidentialised party system, and the extraordinary 'catch-all' 
success of the Gaullist UNR, which Kirchheimer himself commented upon.(l990 : 54-
55) Yet, the 'competitive phenomenon'(l990 : 56), of other parties responding with 
similar catch-all strategies did not at this stage materialise. The governing potential 
enhancing rationale of key actors, "turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to 
exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral 
success" (Kirchheimer 1990 : 52) could be argued to conform to the catch-all thesis. 
However, the direction of ideological change that this rationale suggested was a 
surprising one. There was none of Kirchheimer's 'de-ideologization' and no hint of a 
"drastic reduction in the party's ideological baggage."(1990 : 58) On the contrary, there 
was a reaffirmed turn to the left, which, "far from indicating any desire to retreat into 
socialist purity, was marked by a positive craving for political power. No longer was 
there a perceived contradiction between the idea of gaining power and a distinctive 
socialist profile."(Sassoon 1996 : 535) 
Historically, the French socialists have felt the need to remain ideologically distinct 
from the Communists - an imperative which in part explains the SFIO's curious 
doctrinaire but only quaSi-Marxist rhetoric.(see chapter 5) However, whilst an 
affordable luxury in a multipolar system, such ideological distance was less compatible 
with a party system bipolarised by Gaullism. This is not to say that the distance itself 
reduced. Bartolini quite rightly points to the ideological gulf which separated the PS and 
PCF.(l984) The centrifugal tendencies of the French Left certainly did not vanish, as 
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the Communists' turning on the PS in the 1974 elections, and its temporary 
abandonment of the Union de Gauche strategy in the summer of 1977 proved, but such 
tendencies were on the whole overwhelmed by countervailing forces. The fact that 
parliamentary and presidential elections take place over two rounds makes the need for a 
transfer of votes from other Left groupings to the most likely winner between ballots of 
utmost importance. Appreciation of these systemic factors lay at the heart of 
Mitterrand's strategic vision. As Bichat observes, "the PS is an extraordinary 'machine' 
for bringing together diverse electorates at the second ballot. That is a considerable 
strength.,,12 The resulting balance of electoral forces became known, during the 1970s, 
as the 'quadrille bipolaire'; 
"The combination of the two-ballot majority system of legislative elections with the 
popular election of the president has thus yielded 4 large parties in two opposing 
coalitions [RPR + UDF vs. PS + PCF] .... The discipline of the alliances is made 
necessary by the system of government .... based on a president who is also the head 
of a parliamentary majority obedient to him. His challenger must secure the same 
docility from the opposition in order to be regarded as a serious rival."(Duverger 
1986 : 82-3) 
The bipolarity of the Party system encouraged by Gaullism and Presidentialism was 
conducive to centripetal forces operating around the Left 'pole' - or perhaps more 
accurately between the two Left poles (Machin 1989). These centripetal forces are 
instrumental to an understanding of PS ideology in this period, "the balance of forces 
between the PCF and PS was such that through 1981 the strategic puzzles of managing 
these divisions within the left pointed it towards strongly radical projects." (Ross & 
Jenson 1994 : 159) The need to effectively oppose a predominant and, until the mid-
1970s relatively united Right informed the Union de Gauche strategy. This was no 
fundamental unity of purpose, but an operational necessity. 
For some participant observers such as Benassayag and Weber, the dichotomy between 
the two 'cultures' of the French Left is ultimately reducible to a differing electoral 
strategy - hinging on the acceptance or otherwise of the Union de Gauche. Alliance 
with the Communists, according to Benassayag, "is the whole question at the centre of 
the cleavage between Rocard and Mitterrand. Mitterrand's analysis was pertinent, he 
12 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 22/9/97 
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believed that the PCF did not represent a threat in France ...... Whereas Rocard feared 
that the PCF would strip the PS of votes, Mitterrand understood that it was he who 
would strip the Communists of votes.,,\3 At the July 1972 Vienna conference of the 
Socialist International, Mitterrand clarified this position to Social Democratic leaders. 
"Our fundamental objective is to recreate a large socialist party on the terrain occupied 
by the Communist party itself, in order to demonstrate that, out of 5 million communist 
voters, 3 million may vote socialist."(quoted in Charlot 1994 : 269) This objective was 
to prove eerily prophetic of the results of the 1988 presidential election.(Frears 1991 
64) 
The Congenital Weaknesses of the French Party System 14 
The French Party System is characterised by frequent change, displaying few 
'systemic' qualities - such as consistent patterns of voting behaviour or party 
competition - over long periods of time. Machin charts 4 'stages' in the development of 
the system between 1970 and 1990,(1989) and Guyomarch, in bringing the evolution up 
to date, offers at least two more.(l996) Meny identifies a, "persistent incapacity of 
France an the French to construct a solid and stable party system."(1995 : 192) One 
reason for such inconsistencies is that French political life involves many different 
electoral systems, electing the numerous representative bodies within the French polity, 
"elections are too numerous and frequent, different electoral systems encourage 
different and sometimes conflicting competitive strategies and electoral systems are 
often changed. "(Machin 1989 : 76) 
The complex nature of the pressures felt by parties operating within the French system 
is compounded by the tradition of change and experimentation with electoral systems. 
(see Criddle 1992) Different electoral rules in effect demand conflicting electoral 
strategies. The need to distinguish between ephemeral and lasting changes is paramount. 
In that respect, one can discern a shift away from an almost exclusively majoritarian 
system which fostered the 'quadrille bipolaire' in the 1970s. Even here, however, the 
process is anachronistic, "the 'rules of the game' were changed, but not in any 
consistent or coherent way, so parties were pushed towards different strategies in the 
13 Interview with Maurice Benassayag 22/9/97 
14 The title is borrowed from Meny (1995) 
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many different elections they contested."(Machin 1989 : 75) 
The winner takes all nature of the 'first past the post' second round of presidential, 
parliamentary, and (until 1982) municipal elections, "penalised isolated and small 
parties, especially if geographically evenly spread, and stimulated coalition formation 
and 'centripetal' competition between coalitions."(Machin 1989 : 75) With the advent of 
proportional European elections in 1979, that majoritarian dominance began to be 
challenged. With a 5% threshold, and the country treated as one constituency, this 
encouraged centrifugal competition and discouraged coalitions. In 1982, Municipal 
elections became semi-proportional- with 50% of the seats awarded to the majority (or 
plurality) in the second ballot, but with the other 50% of seats shared in proportion to 
votes cast. 
The trend towards proportional representation reached its peak in the 1980s. "A single-
ballot proportional representation system was introduced for the 1986 parliamentary 
elections, the same system was adopted for the first ever elections of the regional 
councils and the two elections were scheduled for the same day. The 96 departements 
were taken as multi-member constituencies for both elections, a 5% threshold for 
representation was set, and the 'highest average principle' chosen for distribution of 
seats."(Machin 1989 : 75) Although the Chirac government reverted straight back to the 
old majoritarian system for parliamentary elections, proportional representation 
remained for the regional councils. Thus small parties such as the Front National and the 
ecologists, were no longer condemned to obscurity, even if they chose not to forge 
alliances Proportionality in regional, European and (to an extent) municipal elections 
allowed them a political foothold, even if their support were not densely concentrated in 
localised pockets. 
In order to simplify a very complex reality, analysts separate French elections into two 
categories. On the one hand, there are the presidential and legislative elections, whose 
level of importance leads commentators to describe them as 'decisive' elections. On the 
other, there are European, Regional, Municipal and Cantonal elections, which, because 
of their lesser impact on national political life, are called 'intermediary' elections. On 
the 'decisive' front, "the rules of parliamentary and presidential elections push for 
coalition building, especially at the second ballot when the winner is 'first past the 
post'." This contrasts sharply with the strategies pursued by both small and large parties 
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in elections, "held under rules of proportionality, whether restricted (1989 municipal 
elections), departmentally based (1992 regional elections), or nationally organised (1989 
European elections)."{Guyomarch 1995) The proportional nature of many of these 
'intermediary' ballots induce small parties to 'stand up and be counted', an impulse 
which is likely to be much less in evidence at (majoritarian) legislative or presidential 
elections. 
Thus understanding party competition, influenced by these different electoral rules, 
according to the different offices being sought, requires distinction between types of 
election and the treating of electoral strategy for each, if not in isolation, at least 
separately. The situation is further complicated by the different process of designation 
within the PS, affording different degrees of influence to the national and local 
organisations. ls This must be put into the context of the traditional 'weakness' of the 
PS, due largely to the hold that local notables, what Meny calls the 'Republican 
aristocracy', have over the national party organisation. 
This tradition of local autonomy is highly significant in terms of electoral alliances, 
given the differential local performance of some of the PS' allies. An established 
notable, taking account of the relative strength of potential electoral allies in his or her 
locality, will decide the appropriate strategy accordingly, with scant regard for national 
strategic directives to the contrary. For example, as Bichat recalls, "even though 
'l'ouverture' did not happen in the AssembltSe nationale in 1988, in 1989, at the 
municipal level, there were still instances of alliances more akin to Rocard-style 
'ouverture' than the traditional' Union de Gauche ,.,,\6 
The localised strategic variation can be demonstrated by briefly analysing the variable 
nature of the PS' s relations with the PCF. As Claude Bartolone, former national 
secretary in charge of elections, observes, "the problem is that our allies are not really 
national, but regional." The PCF's localised support mean that, "different departments, 
different zones or regions can induce very different electoral behaviour on the part of 
the PS .. in a departement like Seine-St. Denis, where the PCF and the PS are equal, our 
IS The proportional list elections (Regional, European) involve a high degree of central input into list 
construction. For cantonal, and municipal elections, candidate selection is, on the whole, decided at the 
Section level. For parliamentary elections, candidate selection takes place at the departmental or 
federation level. 
16 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 22/9/97 
58 
discourse is very much influenced by that power relationship. But in Brittany, where the 
PCF scores below 5%, the dominant discourse is one which targets the Christian 
democrat composition of a section of that electorate.,,17 The powers of patronage at the 
town hall's disposal can be instrumental in smoothing the otherwise fractious relations 
between socialists and communists forced into tactical majority coalitions on local 
councils. As Frears notes, "according to Socialist mayors, the Communists need paid 
jobs for their full-time party workers. French local councils are generous payers of 
allowances and providers of office accommodation and staff to mayors and maires-
adjoints, The price of these perquisites in a Socialist-led town is to refrain from 
criticism of Socialist policy and to vote for the budget. "( 1991 : 65) The end result is 
that no strict generalisations can be made about national electoral strategy, since it 
varies in accordance with local electoral realities. These are variations which the 
national organisation has neither the ability, nor perhaps the inclination, to counter. 
Party System Change in the 1980s and 1990s 
"In the space of a decade, there has been a fragmentation of the system which has 
put an end to the 'quadrille bipolaire' which once structured the French political 
system."(Bergounioux & Grunberg 1992 : 412) 
A cursory glance at electoral results for the period 1989-1994 suggest dissatisfaction 
with the traditional 'governmental' parties, and an increase in support for small parties. 
The 1994 elections - Cantonal then European, are witness to this proliferation of 
smaller parties, and the ensuing fracture of the Left vote. "With 40.9% of the votes 
cast," concludes Le Gall, "the Left sees at last an end to the disgrace which has afflicted 
it since 1991. "(1 994a : 6) Despite this fact, the fragmentation of this vote across a 
greater number of political formations, including Communists, MOC, extreme Left, 
Radicals and other Left wing formations, and the absence of co-ordination or co-
operation between these groups prevented the conversion of this regained electoral 
strength into political capital. 
However, as Charlot notes, reading a 'systemic' change into the improving electoral 
fortunes of smaller parties between 1989 and 1994, may be premature. Most of the 
elections held were not 'decisive', but 'intermediary' - which, because national power-
17 Interview with Claude Bartolone I III 2/97 
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wielding is not at stake, lend themselves to 'protest' voting 1 8. The 1994 European 
elections, fitting both the intermediary and proportional bill, were always likely to 
exaggerate both the decline of larger parties and the rise of smaller ones. For these 
reasons, "a protest vote, at an intermediary election, offers little indication of an 
eventual vote at a decisive election."(Charlot 1992 : 21) 
In this light, the 1993 result represents a more significant shift for the parties of the 
French Left, with the level of disenchantment amongst the electorate such that the PS 
did not benefit from the 'centripetal' logic of the two round majoritarian electoral 
system. With nearly 40% of the votes cast, "never before, in legislative elections, have 
the 'peripheral' political forces [FN, PCF, extreme Left and ecologists] received so 
many votes .... this level shows that disaffection with parties of government now affects 
the most 'decisive' elections in our political system."(Perrineau & Ysmal1994 : 14) As 
further testament to this 'disaffection', abstention levels have increased steadily in the 
last 20 years. Habitually below 20% in the 1970s, the level has exceeded 30% for the 
last three legislative elections. Spoilt or blank ballot papers have increased from below 
2% in the 1970s to 3.7% in 1993. 19 
The coincidence of this growing disaffection with the political system, and the 
governmental parties within it, with the electoral system changes outlined above is 
significant. Proportional representation greatly increased the effectiveness of expressing 
such disaffection through protest voting. In this context, "the electorate has become 
more volatile, more fluid, adjusting its behaviour as a function of the economy, of men 
or of strategic choices much more than through allegiance to a party. This electorate, 
which prefers to order a la carte rather than from a fixed menu, is highly unstable and 
modulates its participation and its vote as a function of the stakes of the election."(Meny 
1995 : 189) 
This parallel development in voting behaviour, is attested to by the increased tempo at 
which the political pendulum has swung in France in the last two decades. "The number 
of those who identified with any party fell from 29% in 1978 to 17% in 1984, according 
18 Commenting on the 1992 cantonal and regional elections, Le Gall identifies "the desire to sanction the 
executive," in elections which are "not really regional or cantonal [but national]."(1992 : 3-4) 
19 All figures are for first ballots. (Le Gall 1997 : 16) 
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to Eurobarometer polls .... In these circumstances an increase in electoral volatility 
seemed likely, and post-electoral analyses showed that a substantial increase did indeed 
occur after 1979."(Machin 1989 : 69) This high level of volatility, was accepted as a 
given by PS strategists.(see chapter 4) 
That said, 1993 did not represent the triumph of smaller parties over 'governmental' 
parties, even within the Left. The PS, even in its darkest electoral hour, still received 
more support than any other political grouping on the Left. Whilst the hegemony of the 
governmental parties has receded since the 1970s, in the face of increasing volatility and 
abstention which signals significant disaffection with the system, the smaller parties 
have not made the advances some analysts predicted for them. None of the larger parties 
(PS, RPR, or UDF) has sustained claims to the 'catch-all' party status Kirchheimer 
bestowed upon the Gaullist UNR in the 1960s. This is in part because smaller parties 
have been able to exploit the 'protest voters' disaffected with the system as a whole. 
Yet, these smaller formations have not been able to more than dent the support of the 
large parties. 
In this situation, with the PS unlikely to succeed alone, but likely to remain the most 
important single Left grouping, the need for electoral allies is clear. As Charlot puts it, 
"this combining of forces between forces necessarily close at the level of ideas and 
political interests ... finds its cement in the institutional constraints which make the 
abandonment of union politically costly. "(1992 : 23) These 'institutional constraints' 
are, firstly, the need reach the 12.5% threshold in the first ballot of parliamentary 
elections and the rule that only two candidates progress to the second ballot of 
presidential elections. Allied to this is the need, in the second ballot, to gain votes 
transferred from the likes of the PCF, eliminated after the first. Secondly, the 
majoritarian two ballot legislative system favours both alliance candidates from the first 
ballot, and agreements of the weaker Left candidate to stand down between the two 
ballots. 
The extent of the redrawing of the electoral landscape of the Left in France cannot be 
judged on the 1993 defeat alone, nor indeed on surrounding 'intermediary' electoral 
defeats. Successive 'decisive' or 'governmental' elections are a more appropriate 
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yardstick to assess the electoral health of the various parties of the Left. For this reason, 
in chapter 4, whilst taking account of some 'intermediary' electoral results, will 
concentrate mainly on the two 'decisive' elections after March 1993, to discern the state 
of the French party system, and the PS position within it, in the late 1990s. 
Socio-economic structure and the PS Electorate 1970-1990 
The development of the PS vote in the two decades after the Epinay conference was 
characterised by two trends, best analysed on two different planes - geographical and 
sociologica1.2o Firstly, in geographical terms, there has been a 'nationalisation' of the 
Socialist vote. Previously, Socialist electoral support was largely confined to a number 
of pockets, "socialist strongholds in certain south-western departments, such as Landes, 
Haute-Garonne, Tam, Ariege, Aude, Gers, Hautes-Pyrenees and Gironde, but also in the 
Nord, Pas-de-Calais, and in Bourgogne, the department of Nievre ... there was also the 
'Red Midi' - from Languedoc-Roussilon to the Var, as well as parts of the Massif 
Central."(Brechon 1991 : 19) 
Apart from the industrial North, Socialist strength was centred in the traditional, 
agricultural zones south of the Loire. The PS had previously failed to make an 
impression in the old bastions of the Catholic right, such as the west interior, and 
Alsace-Lorraine. Through the 1970s, the PS, "succeeded in 'nationalising' its electoral 
influence, halting the decline in its bastions as well as making significant progress in the 
old target areas - Alsace, Lorraine, Brittany, Normandy, Rhone-Alpes, Loire and He-de-
France. Socialist influence homogenised, passing, in 1978, 20% in every 
region."(Grunberg 1994a : 199) By 1988, PS support exceeded 20% in all but 5 
departements. There were, however, losses as well as gains. The PS declined along the 
eastern Mediterranean Coast (a former bastion), and in the Gard. Brechon puts this 
down to migration, "the midi witnessed an influx of pied-noirs, senior cadres, and OAPs 
- all marked right wing voters. "(1991 : 20) Yet overall, the picture is one of a sharp 
upturn in electoral fortunes. 
The progress made by the PS in this period is explicable in part in terms of the internal 
process of rev ita lis at ion within the party in the decade after Epinay. As noted earlier, an 
20 In chapter 4 we analyse the PS' relationship with its electorate in more detail, employing the demand 
and supply model to strongly reject sociological determinism. 
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increase in membership and activism levels linked to a rejuvenation within the party 
were important contributory factors.(Sferza & Lewis 1987) However, wider socio-
economic changes within French society were also providing an environment 
conducive to Socialist advancement. One such development was the secularisation of 
French society. Traditionally, as Frears notes, "where the Catholic church is strongest, 
the vote for the left is weakest. The map [correlating religious practice with voting 
behaviour] has endured for generations because it is a map of where the church retained 
its influence after the upheavals of the French revolution - notably the west, Alsace-
Lorraine, and parts of the Massif Centrale. "(1991 : 132) 
In the last three decades, the number of practising Catholics declined steadily, reaching 
a low of 8% of the population in 1990.21 The declining influence of the Catholic church 
helped loosen the grip of the conservative right in areas such as Brittany where, for 
many years, Catholicism had been an obstacle to the electoral advancement of French 
socialism.(Frears 1991 : 133) "The new 'permeability to socialism' of areas with strong 
Catholic and conservative traditions can be explained by the changes experienced by a 
society in the process of urbanisation, where the church plays an ever lesser role in 
socialisation and ideological formation. To this may be added the ageing of conservative 
elites unable to articulate these changes politically." (Bergounioux & Grunberg 1992 : 
386; see also Frears 1991 Tables 11.2-11.4) 
Contemporaneous to this partial secularisation was the increasing popularity of Catholic 
traditions within the French Left, Chevenement's CERES and Rocard's Courant des 
Assises. This created an environment more conducive to left-wing Catholicism. These 
two developments enabled the PS to extend beyond its previous strongholds which were 
in areas of strongly secular tradition. "The West, the East, the East Centre, and the 
Parisian region are the four areas where the relative increase in membership was 
greatest, these were the areas where the courants of Rocard and Chevenement are 
strongest, and those where socialist militant membership of the [predominantly catholic] 
CFDT is greatest." (Bergounioux & Grunberg 1992 : 390) 
Turning now to the sociological plane, the PS after Epinay made progress both among 
social groups growing rapidly within French society, and also among groups whose 
support had long eluded them. For much of the century, the electoral strength of the 
21 Guyomarch (1996: 159); see also Frears (1991 : 133) Table 11.2 
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PCF constituted an obstacle to the socialist electoral infiltration of the working class. 
After Epinay, the Union de Gauche strategy, codified in the 1972 Programme Commun, 
gradually redressed the PS's traditional weakness among the working class. This 
dynamic of 'reequilibrage' of the working class vote from the PCF towards the PS, 
anticipated by Mitterrand, was further facilitated as the decline of the PCF accelerated 
into the 1980s. As we shall see later, however, the PS was not the sole benefactor from 
the decline in communist voting among the working class. 
French society has undergone considerable change in the last three decades, and a by-
product of the process of urbanisation and economic changes heralded by the trente 
glorieuses was a rapid increase in the salaried middle classes. Whilst farmers declined 
from 12% to 6% of the electorate between 1962 and 1982, and manual workers from 
31% to 26%, white collar clerical workers increased from 14% to 21%, and junior 
professionals and management increased from 6% to 13%. (Frears 1991 : Table 11.5) 
"These social groups," Bergounioux & Grunberg argue, "young, well-educated, urban, 
and as much female as male - working predominantly in the tertiary sector, saw in the 
Left, politically renovated after the Union de Gauche, the political inheritance of May 
68 and the best political translation of their aspirations." (1992 : 390) Ysmal's analysis 
of the development of the Socialist electorate from 1962 to 1986 unearths a number of 
trends; "a feminisation, a rejuvenation, an influx of workers in the tertiary sector, the 
Parti Socialiste is thus firmly rooted at the heart of the modem and dynamic sections of 
society. It best represents the 'new' women and the 'salaried middle classes.' Since 
workers, although underrepresented in 1986, are not absent, the objective of the class 
front is achieved at the electoral level, in contradistinction to the sociological profile 
within the party itself."(1989 ; 284 & Tables 6.23, 6.24) The degree to which the PS 
was the benefactor of this explosion of the salaried middle classes in the 1970s and 
1980s has led Grunberg to speculate that, rather than a 'catch-all' party, the PS in this 
period may best be characterised as 'the party of the salariat. '(1994a) 
This chimes with Bell and Criddle's assessment of the PS in the 1970s and 1980s, 
swimming as it was with the tide of socio-economic change, as a party "whose time had 
come".(1988 : 191-210) The growing and better educated salaried middle classes, the 
development of individualism and values of cultural liberalism, and the transformation 
of the lot of women, all provide the context for the synthesis in terms of electoral appeal 
developed by the PS in the two decades since Epinay. Grunberg summarises it thus; "On 
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the one hand, the working class, who saw the PS as the defender of the small man, of 
the workers against the bosses, and the defender of a state protecting them against the 
dangers of liberalism. On the other hand, the new salaried middle classes, who saw the 
party as the defender of individualist values and cultural liberalism. "( 1994a : 210) 
However, socio-economic change was not all beneficial for the PS in electoral terms. 
Whilst it caused an expansion in one core PS constituency, it also caused that more 
traditional electoral mainstay of social democracy - the working class - to shrink. 
Whereas in 1960-61, 27% of the active population were involved in manufacturing, by 
1992-93, that figure was down to 18.9%. In the same period, those working in 
community, social, and personal services had increased from 20.1% to 27.8%22. To take 
the example of one industry, France lost 80,000 steelworkers between 1961 and 1991. 
(Sassoon 1996 : 652) Clearly, this did not necessarily bode ill for the PS. Indeed 
Kitschelt asserts, "the varying electoral fortunes of socialist parties are all but unrelated 
to national differences in the size of the working class or working class decline over 
time."(1994 : 41) 
As Sassoon points out, "on their own, [socio-economic] changes do not militate against 
the fortunes of the Left. The key variable is the ability of the Left to exploit them." 
(1996 : 656) Claude Estier, who has spent 30 years at the helm of PS election 
campaigns, argues the PS has more than compensated for working class decline with its 
advances in growing social groups. "The PS's clientele is less and less the working class 
- because the working class itself exists less and less. The base clientele is the middle 
classes, middle management, white collar workers, teachers, civil servants. Those are 
the people who, first and foremost, we address, because in order to win a majority, you 
must first gather your own electorate, and then afterwards try to expand. ,,23 
Yet the fact that, during the 1980s and 1990s, the salaried middle classes have tended to 
be more volatile voters meant that the progressive erosion of a solid working class 
electoral base did prove a handicap. There is no reason to expect the working class to be 
less volatile than any other section of the electorate. However, the fact is that, in its old 
industrial bastions like the Nord, the working class continued to support the PS, but - in 
relative terms - that support was less significant. For example, in the 1995 presidential 
election, "Jospin's second-ballot geographical strength lay in traditional bastions of the 
22 All figures from ILO yearbooks of Labour Statistics. 
23 Interview with Claude Estier 19/9/97 
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left which are no longer the most populous regions ... the combined number of votes in 
the three most populous regions which he won, Nord/Pas de Calais, Midi Pyrenees, and 
Picardie, was less than that of the Paris region."(Guyomarch 1996 : 159) 
Although the socio-economic changes in France bestowed mixed blessings on the PS's 
electoral fortunes, into the 1980s PS strategists continued to be optimistic. The best-case 
scenario of Mitterrand's Union de Gauche strategy was that ultimately, the PS would 
come to represent a truly hegemonic electoral force similar to that which Gaullism 
represented for the first 20 years of the Fifth Republic, commanding around 40% of the 
vote. However, the PS never really sustained its claim to Kirchheimer's 'catch-all' party 
status. Indeed, Grunberg argues that the 'permanent electoral fragility' of the PS must 
be recognised. Its great successes of 1981 and 1988 were always on the coat-tails of 
presidential victories, which somewhat artificially inflated the PS vote. Left to its own 
devices, the PS in the absence of the help provided by a wave of popularity for a 
socialist president, remains "a medium sized party, and certainly not the large social 
democratic party which some socialists imagined it to be in the aftermath of the great 
victories of 1981 and 1988."(1994a : 188) 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the institutional context of the Parti Socialiste structured 
the field of action within which it operated and evolved. The contours of local French 
democracy, it has been argued, shaped the internal organisation of the party. In the 
1960s, when the conflict of interests between local and national political strategies 
became acute, a process of restructuring was undertaken - the outcome being a more 
nationally co-ordinated party, albeit with enduring local autonomy. The weak and 
fragmented nature of trade unionism, together with its confrontational traditions, have 
been seen to have a significant impact on the party's development, explaining its failure 
to develop a mass base. In ideological terms, weak fragmented unions prevented the 
development of the neo-corporatists strategies which helped some Northern social 
democratic parties cope with the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. 
The most significant nation-specific shaping influence on the French Socialist party, it 
has been demonstrated, is the institutional context of the Fifth Republic. Presidentialism 
has been shown to be a key determining variable in the development of the party 
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system, heralding the change from 'polarised pluralism' to a bi-polar pluralism 
dominated for the first twenty years of the Republic by the right. The development of 
the party's internal structure, it has been argued, can be seen as a response to the new 
institutional context of a presidentialised party system. The impact of the party system, 
despite its changing nature, continues to exert strong pressures to forge electoral 
alliances with competitor parties on the extreme and centre left, as well as with the 
ecologists. The changing socio-economic structure of society, entailing both 
fragmentation of electoral blocs, and increasing electoral volatility, has important 
implications for the electoral fortunes of the PS, leading us to insist - despite 
appearances to the contrary - upon the party's enduring electoral fragility. 
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Chapter 3 
Organisational Change In The Parti Socialiste In The 19905 
Some accounts of how changing economic, ideological and electoral conditions affect 
social democracy see such 'external' conditions as simply 'impacting upon' parties, 
which are treated as dependent variables. I Yet as we saw in chapter 1, parties are 
independent variables - which are, in Przeworski's phrase, 'relatively autonomous' 
from their social and economic context. The 'black box' of intra-party politics must be 
opened to understand the nature of the 'transmission belts' mediating external factors 
within the party. This demands consideration of a series of party specific factors, which 
include the party's historical traditions, organisational structure, leadership, and the role 
of factionalism within the party. The organisational structure of the party conditions and 
influences internal debates on how to respond to external changes, crucially affecting 
the dominant 'frame of reference' through which the situation is interpreted. This is 
what Scharpf has termed the 'cognitive framework,' which requires analysis of the 
conditions of the 'decision environment.' (1991 : 14) Structure also affects what 
resources are at actors' disposal, providing a set of opportunities and constraints and 
pushing actors into coalitional strategies.(Panebianco 1988) This chapter will begin with 
an insistence upon the importance of this 'structural' approach to the study of political 
parties in general, and of the importance of the role of internal factionalism to the study 
of the PS in particular. 
The examination of the organisational changes within the PS presented here brings to 
the fore the importance of conjunctural factors, both internal (such as the proximity of 
party congresses, the formation of tactical coalitions) and external (phenomena within 
the wider political system, such as the proximity of major elections). These conjunctural 
factors have been both the catalysts and facilitators of change. There has been an 
interrelationship between internal power struggles within the party (centred on 
Mitterrand's succession) and projects for internal reform. The shape of the arena in 
which the gladiatorial encounters between competing presidentiables have been carried 
out has been a central concern of all those in the ring, and their struggle has thus been an 
I For an example of such an approach, see Gray (1996) 
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important determining factor of the pace, nature, and depth of change. Essentially, this 
acted as a force of inertia, since any fundamental change emanating from an opposition 
camp would necessarily be viewed with suspicion, yet any project of reform failing to 
secure the support of all major groupings within the party would be unlikely to succeed. 
Competing with these forces of inertia, a number of crisis moments have also provided 
powerful incentives for evolution. The damaging effects of the Rennes conference, 
which tarnished the public image of the party, made changes in behaviour and structure 
imperative, it was perceived, if the party was to function in an increasingly media-
centric environment. Secondly, the immense scale of the defeat in 1993, which 
propelled the Parti Socialiste from natural party of government status to virtual 
obscurity, engendered a realisation that fundamental change was a pre-requisite to 
political survival. The defeat ended a number of political careers, and thus provided the 
conditions for a shift within the party's make-up. The dire prophecies which abounded 
at the time proclaimed a minimum of 10 to 15 years opposition. Given this long 
timescale, it is perhaps not surprising that a younger generation began to flex its muscles 
within the national leadership of the party. Allied to this change was a partial 
feminisation of the party, a long-held objective which found the extraordinary post-
defeat circumstances more conducive to success. 
Under Jospin, thanks to his personal authority within the party, to tactical allegiances 
first forged at Rennes, and to the extraordinary turn of events which dragged him back 
from the political wilderness to the presidential candidacy, the party has experienced a 
rare degree of internal stability. This has permitted the distilling of all the above 
influences into a coherent reform project, built on foundation stones laid at the Arche 
conference in December 1991. The most important guiding principle of the project has 
been the injection of direct democracy into all levels of representation within the party. 
Indeed, nearly all the changes the party has undergone have been sanctioned by a direct 
vote of all members at the time of Jospin's election, and the reform process undertaken 
since has been legitimated by that direct democratic mandate. 
Having demonstrated the importance of the 'structural' approach in establishing a 
framework for analysis of PS organisational change, this chapter will provide the 
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historical context of the 1990s changes by outlining the SFIO's organisational history 
before 1971, and then underlining the constitutional stability which characterised the 
first 20 years of the PS' s existence. This will form a backdrop to consideration of the 
various stages of the organisational reform. The courant system will be examined as 
both a focus of the process of reform , as well as a constitutive feature of the party 
which structured the decision environment in which that reform process was worked 
out. The early reforms were of two types, formal institutional, such as the instigation of 
one member one vote, and informal conventional, such as the revival of prior 
compo siting of major courant motions ahead of party Congresses to present a united 
front. Once these foundations have been set out, the acceleration of the reform process 
under Jospin will be assessed, looking first at his own direct election, then the direct 
election of the federal secretaries and the implications of this for the nature of the 
'parliament of the party', the Conseil national. A number of enduring problems will be 
highlighted, before going on to explore the changing composition of the party, both in 
terms of the generational change witnessed in recent years and in terms of its 
feminisation. Finally, the evolving methods of organisational change, and the 
importance of the national convention to the direct democratic reforming praxis of the 
reforms under Jospin, will be insisted upon. 
The Party as an Independent Variable 
Some years ago, William Schonfeld noted the need for a 'structural approach' to the 
study of political parties (an approach neglected since the path-breaking work of 
Michels, Schonfeld argued). This approach involves viewing political parties as 
"settings for activity", and as such requires a research technique which involves 
developing an "organisational sociology of parties." The variable set is identified by 
Schonfeld as, "authority relations (participation, responsiveness, influence flows, and 
patterns of compliance) among members of the top national leadership and between 
them and other segments of the party; the bases and degree of cohesion and division, the 
climate of everyday human relations, the decision-making processes, the motivational 
factors leading to commitments of time and energy, and recruitment to top leadership 
positions." (1983 : 494-495) 
70 
"The settings approach," involving "a deep understanding of types of party 
organisation," could, Schonfeld noted, "provide a context in which to examine how 
parties perform the various functions that have been attributed to them."(1983 : 496-
497) In recent years, scholars such as Koelble, Kitschelt and Panebianco have answered 
Schonfeld's call. Their work treats parties not simply as 'victims' of their social and 
economic environments, but as independent variables. Such an approach appreciates 
that, "to explain why certain parties were able to respond better than others [to the 
economic crisis of the 1970s] one has to look carefully inside the parties themselves, to 
their institutional structures, ideological traditions, and leadership."{Berman 1997 : 102-
103) 
Koelble's work seeks to transcend what he sees as the oversimplistic Michelsian 
framework, which is considered too constricting a lens through which to view 
developments of internal organisation. Importing as he does the framework of analysis 
from the 'new institutionalist' school, Koelble seeks to rigorously establish firm 'micro-
foundations' for explaining party actor behaviour. As one might expect, institutions do 
much of the explanatory legwork. "The institutional structure of each party provided 
each group of players with a set of opportunities and constraints, while their respective 
strategies in building coalitions with other policy groups were imposed on them by the 
institution."{1991 : 9) This approach draws on the rational choice perspective, but 
modifies it slightly, insisting that personal rationality is bounded by institutional 
frameworks. "Institutional structures shape the rationalities of actors inside a party in a 
profound way .... by setting limits and creating opportunities for the participants of the 
intra-party competition over positions and policy.... Decisions are to a large extent 
shaped by their perception of how institutional rules and structures help or hinder them 
in their pursuit of policy and organisational power." (1991 : 12) 
Whilst sharing with Michels the conviction that organisational structure in political 
parties plays an important role in shaping the outcome of intra-party conflict, Koelble 
differs greatly in how this role is played out. The root of the difference is partly 
methodological, based upon Koelble's importing of the 'systematically ignored' 
structuralist and choice approaches into analysis of intra-party politics. Once the fine-
grained understanding of institutional structures which a combination of these 
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approaches permits is 'factored in' to analysis, it is possible, Koelble argues, to "define 
the power of one set of actors - party leaders, activists, or members of interest groups -
over another set." (1991 : 13) 
Panebianco, whilst retaining Koelble's concern for institutional structure, seeks to 
reconcile this with a deeper understanding of agency within that structure to explain 
power relations within political parties. The role of organisational resources is central to 
understanding the internal distribution of power. Six key power resources are involved; 
firstly, competency, understood, "both as an attribute of the actor and as the attribution 
of a quality to the actor by others in the organisation."(1988 : 34) The second is 
environmental relations management, or controlling the 'frame of reference' ofa party's 
response to exogenous factors such as a changing electoral or public opinion climate, or 
altering the nature of relations with competitor parties. The third is internal 
communication, "he who can distribute, manipulate, delay or suppress information 
controls a fundamental zone ofuncertainty."(1988 : 34) 
The fourth area is that of control of interpretation of the formal rules of a party 
organisation? As Panebianco notes; 
"in every organisation there are many rules which are not observed due to a tacit 
agreement that Downs has defined as the 'institutionalisation of deviation from 
written norms' .... The establishing of rules, the manipulation of their 
interpretation, and their enforcement are thus zones of uncertainty, of 
organisational unpredictability whose control is another decisive resource in 
power relations. A party's statutes do not describe its organisation any more than a 
political system's written constitution does. It is only a pallid trace, fleeting and 
imprecise, little more than a point of departure for the organisational analysis of a 
political party." (1988 : 35) 
A fifth and more obvious resource is finance, "he who controls the channels through 
which flow the money that finances the organisation controls another crucial 
resource."(1988 : 35) Finally, there is recruitment - controlling the joining of an 
organisation, and more importantly, the advancement of internal careers within the 
2 An excellent example ofthis is the formal outlawing of organised tendances in the Parti Socialiste's 
constitution. The particular interpretation of this clause by Mitterrand permitted the proliferation of 
factions within the party in the 20 years after its foundation, but at a particular moment the CERES 
faction was deemed to have fallen foul of this statute, and was disciplined by the party conference. (Bell 
& Criddle 1994 : 117) 
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organisation. These power resources, Panebianco argues, tend to accumulate, but a 
leader, "even if he leads because he controls crucial zones of uncertainty, must (more 
often than not) negotiate with other organisational actors: he is at the centre of a 
coalition of internal party forces with which he must at least to a certain degree 
negotiate."(l988 : 37) This 'dominant coalition' controls the key resources outlined 
above, and "the control over these resources, in its tum, makes the dominant coalition 
the principal distribution centre of organisational incentives in the party."(l988 : 38) 
A Framework for the Analysis of Intra-Party Politics in the PS: the 
Importance of Presidentialised Factionalism 
This framework for analysis, outlined by Koelble and Panebianco represents a general 
theoretical approach to the study of intra-party politics. In order to apply it to our 
particular case, we must add certain factors. Key among these are the institutional 
context of a presidentialised Fifth Republic, and internal proportionality 
institutionalising factionalism within the party. 
The centrality of courants to the parti d'Epinay, and the significant evolution of their 
role in more recent years, demands that we consider the limited theoretical literature on 
factionalism in political parties. Rose distinguished between a 'faction', which he 
identifies as an organised, disciplined and self-aware group, and a 'tendency', which he 
sees as a 'stable set of attitudes,' without any formal organisation. (1964) This useful 
distinction, however, leaves certain questions unanswered, (questions which are 
particularly pertinent to the recent history of the PS) such as how does one classify a 
clearly cohesive and homogenous group with definable common interest distinct from 
those of the wider party, but who eschew formal organisation? 
As Cole notes, "to label certain groups as factions (or fractions), but to spare others that 
title would be in itself to impose a negative value-judgement on 'factional' 
activity."(l989 : 78) There has been a long-running semantic debate, which need not 
detain us at length, over the appropriate choice of terms.3 Whilst mindful of this 
3 Hanley and Sartori reject 'faction' as too pejorative, and choose instead 'fraction,' a 'purely descriptive 
tenn.' This position is rejected by Cole, who sees 'fraction' as "possibly the most pejorative manner of 
labelling intra-party group conflict." (1989 : 78) The situation is further complicated by what the various 
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semantic minefield, this study will employ the term 'courant', and where appropriate 
(see later) its more recent replacement 'sensibilite' in a neutral descriptive manner. 
The Causes Of Factionalism 
Hines' framework for the analysis of factionalism in West European parties identifies 
'structural' incentives to factionalism. Following Sartori4, Hine places considerable 
emphasis on the role of internal PR, arguing that, "the use of proportional ism can have 
an important impact on the nature of intra-party conflict , and, when introduced, can 
make actions more rigid and draw more individuals into their ambit."( 1983 : 45) Sartori 
makes the case stronger still, arguing "a highly proportional type of electoral system 
will .... encourage and produce fission."(l976) 
Following Cole, we argue that whilst this hypothesis is intuitively plausible, it must be 
approached with caution. The reason is that such structural incentives provide a 
necessary, but not sufficient explanation of factionalism. As Hine himself notes, 
"proportional representation is certainly not the only variable to consider when 
analysing the nature and causes of intra-party conflict."(l983 : 45) This point is best 
illustrated by charting the fluctuating levels and intensity of factionalism within the PS 
since 1971. There were periods of intense factional infighting, notably 1978-1980 (Cole 
1986; 1989) and 1988-1992 (see later)- which were interspersed with periods of relative 
calm. Such fluctuation leads us to search for other factors influencing factionalism, 
since the system of PR, in operation throughout, cannot explain the variation. 
This leads us to explore other explanatory factors, such as the political context of 
factionalism. As Hine notes, "there are certain incentives rooted in party procedure or 
custom or in the wider political system, which lead or indeed force politicians to form 
factions."(1983 : 42) This highlights an important point, that the courants respond to 
external as well as internal stimuli. As Cole notes, "factional relations are governed by a 
tenns gain (or lose) in translation. 'Tendance' is inextricably linked with the factional infighting in the 
pre-war SFIO, 'fraction', as Cole alludes, is tarred with the same brush. 'Courant' emerged as (initially, 
at least) a neutral replacement for these discredited categories. However, with the degeneration of courant 
pluralism into an open civil war to detennine Mitterrand's succession, in full view of the media, in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, courant too acquired pejorative overtones. 
4 G.Sartori (1976: 94-104). 
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combination of external incentives and constraints (the party is only one element of a 
wider political system), by the internal dynamic created by external pressures, and by 
the mechanisms of intra-party competition itself. " (Cole 1986 : 189) This central role of 
external circumstances makes appreciation of context crucial, "within the PS, 
factionalism results from the existence of a complex, interrelated cleavage structure, 
whose visibility will depend on the external concatenation of circumstances, and on the 
party's salient external objectives, for example, the proximity of elections." (Cole 1986 : 
189) 
In the case of the Fifth Republic, the presidentialism inherent in the political system 
shapes that external incentive. Bell & Criddle have labelled the PS variant of intra-party 
conflict 'presidentialised factionalism.' Each courant leader had also, if they were to be 
powerful, to be a potential future presidential candidate, or presidentiable. This 
potential presidential candidate status is a key element, within the French context, of the 
'competency' seen by Panebianco as an important resource.(l988 : 34) After Mitterrand 
successfully saw off Rocard in 1979-80, a partial factional cease-fire descended, 
because once the presidential candidate issue is decided, accommodation must be sought 
so as not to miss out on the spoils of presidential patronage. Later in the 1980s, and 
particularly after 1988, the search for the next presidential candidate began in earnest. 
The true nature of the courants as 'presidential stables' quickly revealed itself. This 
flags up what Hine calls the 'non-structural incentives' to factionalism. These are 
identified by Cole as, "personality (of heightened importance in the presidentialised 
Fifth Republic), ideology/policy, strategy/tactics, organisation and historical origins." 
(Cole 1986 : 189) 
Given that structural incentives to factionalism are not all determining, the role of 'non 
structural' incentives to factionalism must not be underestimated. However, the 
importance of 'structural incentives' or 'rules of the game' will be amply demonstrated 
when we examine how the mechanisms of intra-party competition became a key 
battleground between competing courants. The shape of the arena constituted one of the 
key sites of gladitorial skirmishing. This illustrates Panebianco's point about the 
interpretation of the formal rules of party organisation being a key power resource.( 1988 
: 35) The significance of the mechanisms of intra-party competition is still more evident 
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when we explore the means by which the PS sought to curb the excesses of internal 
factionalism in the years following the disastrous Rennes congress. Great emphasis was 
placed on the need for statutory change in general, and the limiting of proportionality in 
particular, as a means of moving away from divisive courant infighting. 
French Socialist Factionalism in the 20th Century 
As Panebianco points out, the formal structures, the statutes, do not tell the whole story 
of how parties organise, it is nevertheless with the constitutional arrangements that our 
enquiry must begin. Our central concern is with changes in the party's organisational 
form in the 1990s, however, we must contextualise this study with a brief outline of the 
organisation of the PS both before and after the 1971 congress. A defining feature of 
French socialism at least as far back as the Paris Commune has been its organisational 
and doctrinal diversity. The plethora of small, well organised, and sharply ideologically 
differentiated groupings which existed between before 1905 did not entirely disappear 
when the Socialists unified.(Cole 1986; Portelli 1992 ; Kergoat 1997) The use of PR in 
internal party elections contributed to this.5 In the inter-war years, the SFIO leadership 
under L. Blum, and P. Faure, was unable to prevent the emergence of organised 
factions, first Zyromski's Bataille Socialiste, formed in 1927, and later Pivert's Gauche 
Revo/utionaire, formed in 1935, and ultimately expelled from the party in 1938.6 The 
influence of these factions translated into a culture of internal pluralism and doctrinal 
diversity within the movement. This internal diversity was curbed between 1945-1971, 
when the refoundation of the party after the war abolished internal proportional 
representation in favour of majority voting. In the post-war SFIO, led by Guy Mollet 
after his displacement of Blum at the 1946 congress, majority suffrage gave the majority 
at both national and local level complete freedom to decide candidates and key office-
holders. The plight of minorities in the Mollet era is attested to by the nick-name the 
majoritarian system received - 'the pigeon shoot' . 
The Fifth Republic and the end of the SFIO 
5 B.Graham (1982: 142). 
6 Other factions included the 'neo-socialists' around Marcel Deat, who, in contra-distinction to all other 
Socialist groups, went on to be collaborators in the Vichy regime. 
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The chief reason for the demise of the SFIO and the advent of the PS was need for the 
non-Communist Left to group under one party banner, rather than to continue operating 
as an amalgamation of 'political clubs'. 7 The electoral failures of 1968 and 1969 were 
seen by Mitterrand as in part a result of the structural variegation of the federation of the 
Left (FDGS). The two years after Defferre's comprehensive defeat were spent trying to 
agree a new organisation structure between the diverse elements including 
Chevenement's CERES, Mitterrand's CIR, Mauroy's working class bastion in the Nord 
federation and Defferre's 'municipal' socialist Bouches du Rhone federation. 
At the crucial Epinay conference, organised factions were made 'legal', which had not 
been the case in the SFIO. The new structure allowed the PS to confront the relatively 
united Gaullist right with at least the public facade of a unified non-Communist left. 
Lieber takes a sanguine view of the party's internal arrangements, seeing them as the 
operationalising of a core socialist value, as socialist praxis. "It is quite consciously that 
Socialists defend internal party democracy as the best guardian against the abuses of 
arbitrary decision-making and bureaucratic fossilisation ... a Socialist Party therefore is 
not expected to be homogeneous, but pluralistic - like the future Socialist society it 
seeks." (Lieber 1977 : 455) 
Whilst this may be the case, internal proportional representation was arguably the only 
feasible mode of organisation given the diversity of the factional elements. The 
superficial unity of purpose concealed sharply divided factions constrained by a fairly 
fragile non-aggression pact. This pact was 'enforced' by the legacy of repeated recent 
electoral failure. Significantly, the new arrangement was in tune with the institutional 
logic of the fifth Republic. The party's structure facilitated the uniting of the diverse 
factions behind the left's presidentiable - or prospective presidential candidate. At the 
same time, however, each of the factions was afforded the luxury of their own 
presidentiable who could playa prominent role in internal party life, could fight his or 
her faction's doctrinal comer, and in the longer term could groom themselves and 
position themselves as Mitterrand's heir apparent. In this sense, "the socialist party 
7 Initially, the 'clubs' presented a more attractive organisational prospect than the SFIO, since they 
carried none of the baggage of association with the fourth Republic. (Wilson 1988 : 508) However, 
lacking the organisational strength to stand alone. they still had to work with the SFIO and the Radicals in 
the FDGS between 1965 and 1968. It was the enduring influence of Mollet's SFIO which, Mitterrand was 
convinced, enabled Defferre to take the 1969 presidential candidacy from him.(8ell & Criddle 1988 : 61) 
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modelled itself on the state it yearned to possess and modify."(Sassoon 1996 : 535) 
Le Parti D'Epinay 
When, in 1971, proportionality was re-instated, ideological diversity flourished once 
more. Under the new proportional representation system instigated at Epinay, organised 
internal factionalism was allowed to structure the life of the party, permitting minority 
courants who could pass the 5% threshold a voice in the party and seats on its 
governing bodies. This fundamental shift allowed greater internal pluralism, but the 
corollary was heightened competition. So deep-seated are these norms of diversity and 
pluralism that one commentary sees the PS as, "more a juxtaposition of courants, 
traditions, and personalities than a genuinely unified party." (Bergounioux & Grunberg 
1992 : 293) 
The formal power structure of the parti d'Epinay is outlined by Cole thus; 
"Theoretical power ascends from the base to the summit, or from the section, 
through to the federation, and to the bi-annual party Congress, the party's supreme 
authority. The Comite Directeur (henceforth CD) is elected on a proportional basis 
according to the percentage proportion of mandates achieved by competing 
motions at Congress. On the same principle, the smaller Bureau Executjf is 
composed of representatives of all factions having achieved more than 5% of the 
mandates at Congress, and is responsible for precise functions delegated by the 
CD. Real power, however, lies with the Secretariat National (henceforth SN) 
composed only of the party majority, and with the Premier Secretaire. The party 
majority consists of that faction, or combination of factions agreeing to the text 
receiving a majority of votes in the final vote at Congress, after the proponents of 
the various motions have attempted to reach a compromise in the Commission des 
Resolutions (Resolutions Committee). This considerably limits the impact of PR : 
the leader of the dominant faction can call the tune, and usually decide the 
contours of a future leadership alliance."(Cole 1986 : 10) 
The factions are thus the key organisational unit within the party, and the congress 
resolutions became the yardsticks by which factional strength was judged. After 
publication in the party newspaper, Le Poing et la Rose, with a list of signature 
appended, resolutions were, "sent down to activists for debate, amendment and voting. 
The leadership of the party at local level is decided by votes on these resolutions." (Bell 
& Criddle 1994 : 117) 
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Each courant leader - or 'elephant' as they are not-so-affectionately called in the party-
must be the first signatory to their courant's 'motion' or general political statement8 
which is presented at a conference, or occasionally a convention. After the leader's 
name come other key figures within his or her 'courant'. The federal structures mirror 
the national. where, at the departmental level, all factions are represented 
proportionately on the Federal Executive. The majority in the Federal Congress controls 
the federal Secretariat. The same organisational blueprint applies at the section level, be 
it a geographical, workplace, or university section. (see Bell & Criddle 1988 : pp210-
216 & Fig 10.1) Within a given section or federation, the strength of any given 
'courant' - in terms of candidacies or positions of power on the party's governing 
bodies9 - is directly related to the number of votes the motion it puts to the party vote 
receives. The bottom line is a mathematical equation between proportion of votes 
obtained and proportion of internal positions of responsibility. It then falls to the leader 
and first signatory to allocate his or her allotted number of seats to his allies, i.e. the 
other signatories of the motion. 
The Official and Actual Authority Structures 
As Panebianco would predict, however, "the official authority structure bears only a 
distant relationship with reality. "(Cole 1986 : 10) The reason for this owes much to the 
control of the internal career structure outlined by Panebianco above. The first secretary 
of the party was originally conceived in 1971 as primus inter pares within the national 
secretariat.(Portelli 1985) However, in practise, it falls to the first secretary to appoint 
the national secretariat, which clearly puts the first secretary in a strong position. 
Furthermore, as first signatory of the majority motion, the first secretary also ultimately 
decided who fills 'their' allocation of seats on the parliament of the party, further 
8 Another of the foundation stones of the party, established at Epinay, was a principle and an operating 
procedure finnly linking key actors to their stated orientation. This link dove-tailed with the novel 
internal pluralism in the party heralded by proportional representation. The principle reason for this was 
the discrediting of the old SFIO due to the gulf between official doctrine and actual practice, particularly 
when Mollet was in the coalition government during the Algerian war. It was assumed that the stronger 
this link between personality and doctrine was, the more difficult it would be to indulge in 'Molletist' 
schizophrenia. The link is also of central importance in understanding the relationship between mandated 
voting and internal factionalism within the PS. 
9 Bureau National[fonnerly bureau executif], Conseil National[formerly Comite Directeur], and Conseils 
Federaux 
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underpinning his or her internal strength. This power of the courant heads to determine 
the roll calls on the lists attached to motions (which determine who sits on the party's 
governing bodies), meant power was concentrated in the hands of the elephants, the 
faction leaders. 
A convention developed early in the PS's history!O which further underpinned the first 
secretary's internal strength. Major factional players composited a motion prior to 
congress, which a number of major factional leaders signed. Such a situation 
considerably strengthened Mitterrand's hand, affording him 'leader above faction 
status.' (Cole 1986 : 190) Thereafter, even major players owed their position in the party 
hierarchy ultimately to Mitterrand as first signatory of the composite motion. This 
deviation from the kind of internal pluralism which one might expect given internal 
proportional representation can be explained by the Presidentialism inherent in the 
French Fifth Republic. Mitterrand's peculiar position as the only credible Presidentiable 
on the left at the time brought centripetal!! pressures to bear on other actors. 12 
Thus in the 20 years after Epinay, some significant changes to the internal functioning 
of the party did occur. Firstly, there was an evolution in the factional system away from 
straightforward pluralism which, Sartori argues, internal PR should create. Particularly 
after 1981, Mitterrand's 'leader above faction' status brought powerful centripetal forces 
to bear on other courant leaders. Secondly, there were changes heralded by the 
accession to governmental office and the need to define the role of the party relative to 
the government in what was, for the socialists, a novel institutional setting (holding the 
reigns of power in the Fifth Republic). However, in terms of codified organisation and 
internal selection, the constitution of the party went largely unamended. This 
constitutional stability came to an end at around the same time as the climate of internal 
10 First instigated at the 1973 Grenoble congress, reversed in 1978, only to return, reaching its apogee 
with the unanimity at the 1981 Valence congress. 
II The term is employed here not to refer to the centre along a left/right ideological axis, but rather to 
refer the centre in terms of organisational power. 
12 As Cole notes, "[t]his system of leadership cooption increased Mitterrand's margin of manoeuvre. 
Savary had signed Mitterrand's motion, and had to recognise the MitterrandlMauroy axis as the dominant 
element, and Mitterrand as the centrist element of the leadership. It also limited the effect of PR in 
internal party elections as a structuring variable of factionalism (a hypothesis retained amongst others by 
Sartori and Hine). For minority factions, fearing extinction if they presented a distinct motion, or merely 
seeking to preserve a measure of authority in the leadership, would henceforth be inclined to compromise 
with Mitterrand before Congress, in return for recognising Mitterrand as 'leader above faction'." (1986 : 
190) 
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stability, exemplified by the unanimous vote at the 1981 Valence congress, provided by 
Mitterrand's unquestioned leadership. After re-election in 1988, it was clear that 
Mitterrand would not be the next Socialist presidential candidate. It was equally clear 
that his successor would be drawn from among the big courant leaders. As the stakes of 
intra-party fighting were raised, so too was the degree of hostility. 
Worst Excesses Of Courant Fighting: The 1990 Rennes Congress 
The Rennes Congress was the first time that the convention established at Valence was 
ignored by all major courants. Despite isolated exceptions, \3 the practice of compositing 
a motion before congress, to which not only the Mitterrandists but also other key 
factions (such as Mauroy) sign up in advance, putting Mitterrand's authority within the 
party beyond question, had been observed by all major players. (see Philippe & 
Hubscher 1991 ppI86-187) At Rennes, Mitterrand's authority in the party was waning. 
This had been demonstrated two years earlier by the party's choice of Mauroy over 
Fabius (Mitterrand's dauphin) for first secretary.(see below) With that countervailing 
force on the centrifugal impulse of proportionality removed, everyone chose to 'stand 
up and be counted'. A total of 7 motions were presented: 
1. Mauroy-Jospin Motion 1 29% 
2. Fabius Motion 5 28.9% 
3. Rocard Motion 3 24.2% 
4. Chevenement Motion 7 8.5% 
5. Poperen Motion 2 7.1% 
6. Dray-Melenchon Motion 4 1.3% 
7. Liennemann Motion 6 0.6% 
source Philippe & Hubscher (1991 : 187)14 
The cracks had begun to emerge within the Mitterrandist camp in 1986, with Jospin's 
outrage at Fabius' attempt to monopolise the running of the general election campaign. 
13 Notably Chevenement in 1983, and Rocard in 1985. 
14 Bell & Criddle offer slightly different perecentages, but very similar margins between scores.( 1994) 
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Indeed, some traced hostility between Fabius and Jospin back as far as 1981. 15 By 1990, 
this had led to a wholescale split within the Mitterrand camp, between Jospin and 
Fabius. 16 (see chapter 5) Jospin's dogged opposition to Fabius' candidacy for the 1995 
presidential elections allied him with Mauroy, and to a lesser extent Rocard. Fabius' 
own behaviour further strengthened the rassemblement against him. As Bell & Criddle 
note, "Fabius, as a more credible presidential contender [than Jospin], could conceivably 
have expected a nomination from those in the party who did not want Rocard, but a 
degree of rather too obvious political manoeuvring, and an attempt to claim the position 
too brusquely, had again united a coalition against the former prime minister."(1994 : 
126) 
At Rennes, the logic of PS internal fighting was taken to absurd extremes. Such was the 
bitterness that the different courants could not even agree on a voting process, let alone 
a text. The number of mandates allotted to each courant was hotly disputed -
particularly given the narrow margin between JospiniMauroy and Fabius. The losers 
complained of vote-rigging and other improprieties. Thus although all the delegates 
were gathered together, no votes could be taken on any subject - indeed it could not 
function as a party conference. For the first time in the party's 20 year history, no 
synthesis motion, based on a deal between the courants, was established. 
The Changing Structure Of The Courants 
The perceived pejorative overtones of the terms courant has, in recent years led to the 
evolution of a new label, which also claims to reflect a change in nature, and thus 
returns us to Rose's distinction.(1964) In the aftermath of the calamitous Rennes 
conference, the most urgent priority for any project of internal reform became the 
curbing of the worst excesses of the courants. Courants, the received wisdom goes, are 
a positive and enlivening element of internal debate when they bring forth new ideas 
and engage in debates. However, those tasks, which were performed admirably in the 
IS A sentiment noted of Fabiusians by Jean-Marcel Bichat in interview with the author (4/12/97), 
although Bichat himself suspected a retrospective exageration of earlier rifts. 
16 Fabius took the fight to the Jospinistes, extending beyond his traditional stronghold in Seine-Maritime 
to make progress in Bouches-du-Rhone and Pas-de-Calais, as well as gaining support in the FEN (the 
French teachers union) during Jospin's tenure as education secretary between 1988-1992.(Bell & Criddle 
1994: 121) 
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1970s, have been superseded. In the mid to late 1980s, courants - with their own 
finances, offices, and newspapers, behaved increasingly like parties within a party. The 
importance to each courant of its own means of communication - through its own press 
and journals, underscores Panebianco's point about the means of internal 
communication providing a key organisational resource within parties.(1988 : 35) The 
title 'courant de pensee' became decreasingly appropriate as the doctrinal role 
diminished, leaving only the organisational, power-brokering role. Rennes, the apogee 
of the courant system as a gladitorial power struggle, made this drift all the more 
apparent. There ensued, in the years after the Rennes Congress, a sea change in the 
approach to internal pluralism, with a shift away from formal organisation along the 
'parties within parties' lines, and towards Rose's 'stable sets of attitudes' model. 
Cole has developed a useful set of ideal types to aid the classification of courants in 
the PS. These are, "the or~anisatjon faction, with its roots in the party apparatus itself, 
and refusing the label faction (MitterrandiMauroy), the parallel faction, manifesting a 
relatively highly level of independent factional organisation, parallel to the party's 
official structures (CERES, to a lesser extent Rocard) ; the external faction, seeking to 
rely on public popularity to conquer opinion within the party (Rocard)." (Cole 1986 : 
189) No courant can be expected to consistently display all the attributes of its ideal 
typical form. Furthermore, the model allows for evolution, enabling us to retain the 
framework for analysis to account for subsequently developments which have changed 
the PS's factional landscape considerably.(see chapter 5) Thus in recent years, the 
former 'parallel faction', CERES, has left the PS altogether. However, the Gauche 
Socialiste and the Poperenistes now operate along 'parallel faction' lines, although their 
weight and influence in the party is somewhat limited. These 'parallel factions' continue 
to run their own newspapers (or newsletters), to present motions to congress which are 
ideologically distinct from the majority motion, and to display high degrees of 
organisational independence. 17 
Rocard's followers no longer operate as an 'external' faction, since within the post-
Mitterrand PS they have become part of the mainstream 'ligne majoritaire.' The 
Rocardian's new labels, 'ex-courant', 'sensibilite' or 'historical allegiance,' reflect this 
17 Interview with Marie-Therese Mutin (23/9/97), interview with Jean-Luc Melenchon (29/9/97) 
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shift, superseding as they do the ostensibly tarnished terminology of courant. Other 
sensibilites include Jospinistes, Fabiusians, and Mauroy's former followers, along with 
smaller groupings around figures like Mermaz. These sensibilites tend to eschew formal 
organisation, do not tend to have permanent offices, and are generally less inclined to 
publish their own newspapers and journals. Indeed, the subsuming of most of the former 
factions under the umbrella of the' ligne majoritaire ' allows the latter to present itself as 
part of a post-courant landscape. This suggests that the ligne mqjoritaire comprising 
inter alia Jospinistes, Rocardians, and Mauroy's former followers, is the closest current 
approximation to the 'organisation faction.' ( see later) 
This analysis, however, is not unproblematic. The problems are allied to the grey areas 
associated with Rose's distinction between faction and tendency alluded to earlier. We 
may illustrate this point with reference to the Fabiusian sensibilite. Like other 'ex-
courants, ' they have shifted away from formal organisation, and from running their own 
newspaper. However, it remains unclear whether this reflects a fundamental shift in 
nature, or merely the response to a political conjuncture where any opposition to 
Jospin's ligne majoritaire would be politically suicidal. Should circumstances change, it 
is far from inconceivable that the Fabiusians would re-emerge as a courant a I 'ancienne 
in any future power struggle (see chapter 5).18 Such questions are impossible to resolve 
adequately until such a change of context occurs, but the long-held habits of internal 
skirmishing within the PS are likely to die hard, despite the reduction of structural 
incentives to return to familiar ways. 
The Changing 'Political Space' Of Factionalism 
One reason for the drift towards power brokering functions and away from doctrinal 
debating functions by factions in the PS in the 1980s is an important development in the 
'political space' of internal factionalism within the PS. In his study of PS factionalism 
from 1971-1981, Cole identified the strategic advantage enjoyed by the Mitterrand 
faction which resulted from its central position within an ideological 'triangulation' 
between CERES to the Left on the one hand, and Rocard and Mauroy to the Right on 
18 A prospect made all the more likely by Fabius' recent acquittal from any blame over the contaminated 
blood scandal. This scandal hanging over him was for years seen as Fabius' main barrier to the Elysee 
Palace. 
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the other. 19(1989) This 'triangular' dimension of brokering between left and right is 
considerably less relevant today because the ideological range of PS courants has 
reduced. This is due in part to the novel experience of 'fa duree', literally staying in 
power for a considerable period,2o in the 1980s and early 1990s. This novel situation, 
which co-incided with the ideological 'secularisation' of French Socialism, involving a 
shift away from maximalist programmes, and away from a frame of reference strongly 
influenced by Marxism, affected the degree of doctrinal diversity within the party.(see 
chapter 5) The relationship between the Socialist government and the party was 
complex, as Vaillant noted in the early 1990s, "there is a need for autonomy vis-a.-vis 
the government, we must support it, whilst continuing to listen carefully to public 
opinion.,,21 However, the autonomy never led to out and out contradiction of 
government policy or opposition to the government. 
These changing parameters on the ideological activities of the party in the 1980s meant 
that the ideological battles the courants had fought in the 1970s were no longer feasible. 
Years of being either being part of the government, or offering support to it, either way 
of being made sharply aware of the limits of the possible, reduced the sharp 
programmatic and ideological diversions which characterised the interplay between the 
courants in the 1970s, at conferences such as Nantes and Metz. Fundamental differences 
- ideological or strategic - have diminished between the different 'sensibilites' in the 
party since 1981. This tendency towards ideological similarity was compounded by the 
fact that the courant leaders tended to be members of the government, and it was not 
considered acceptable that members of the same government should be signatories to 
different motions at conference.22 
At the tactical level, this constraint, Huchon argues, accounted for the failure, at Rennes, 
of the plan by the Jospinistes and Rocardiens to marginalise Fabius. "Michel Rocard did 
not dare sink the dagger into Fabius' back. He was prime minister, and he thought it 
19 "Mitterrand's central internal party position meant that he could ally with the 'left' against the 'right', 
or vice versa - a degree of leverage open to no other leader. Moreover, his central location enabled him 
to pose as guardian of the juste milieu, the party's ideological orthodoxy, threatened alternatively by left 
and right."(1989: 86) 
20 Something which no other Socialist government has ever achieved in France 
21 Daniel Vaillant PS INFO no. 512 
22 The instances where key courant figures did 'stand up and be counted' - by signing their own motion 
distinct from the majority - Chevenement at Bourg-en-Bresse in 1983, and Rocard at Toulouse in 1985 -
both came after the courant leader concerned had left the government. 
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would provoke a governmental crisis. At the time, Beregovoy came to see me to explain 
to me that all the Fabiusien ministers would resign from the government the day after 
the conference if the move went ahead.,,23 Thus paradoxically, and contra Sartori's 
predictions, given the institutional constraints of government, the courants came to 
secure not diversity, but similarity. This point was later insisted upon by key courant 
reformer Daniel Vaillant, "this (courant) system ends up with a form of thought which 
resembles enforced ideological conformity, or, worse still, the confiscation of the 
process of retlection.,,24 The degree of conformity should not be overstated. Important 
divergences remained in the 1990s, with the Rocardians more inclined to seek allies 
towards the centre as opposed to traditional Union de Gauche strategy favoured 
elsewhere in the party,25 but the adverse effects of the Rennes conference in terms of 
public opinion and the media image of the party made it inconceivable to act in a 
confrontational manner within the party on the basis of such differences. 
In terms of the political space occupied by the courants, there has been a tendency for 
all the main courants to cohere around a '/igne majoritaire' . Interestingly, this pattern 
held whether the First secretary was a moderate, such as Rocard, or a left-winger, such 
as Emmanuelli. After Chevenement left the party in 1993, the only groups outside of 
this '/igne majoritaire' have been the Poperen courant, and the Gauche Socialiste 
courant which grew out of the Drey-Melenchon courant at Rennes. In terms of 
ideological space, there is very little to choose between them, existing at the left fringe 
of the party's political space.(see chapter 5) 
Institutional Reform - Curbing The Courants 
The adverse effects of the Rennes conference made the confrontational model of intra-
courant rivalry appear unsustainable within the party. The changing modus operandi of 
courants in the PS since the early 1990s has two dimensions. Firstly, there has been a 
revival of the convention first established under Mitterrand at Grenoble, of compositing 
motions before congress into a majority motion, with all the key courant leaders as 
23 Interview with Jean-Paul Huchon 29/9/97 
24 Daniel Vaillant on the modalities of the Etats generaux in PS INFO no. 545 (8/5/93) 
25 Seen by Henri Weber as the only genuine basis for the talk of the 'two cultures' within the party-
Interview 29/9/97 
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signatories. (see earlier) The concern for more peaceful co-existence exerted centripetal 
pressures on the courants to present a pre-agreed single majority motion. Presenting 
seven different congress motions, and attempting to synthesise the various courants 
positions, reaching accommodation between them ideologically, in terms of the wording 
of the final doctrinal statement, and institutionally in terms of sharing out seats on the 
governing bodies, was deemed to be divisive a practice. 
A single majority motion, including all major courants, was presented to the 
conferences at Bordeaux (1992), Bourget (1993), and Lievin (1994) despite the issue of 
the presidential candidacy remaining ultimately unresolved. Formal opposition in the 
shape of other motions presented to congress came only from fringe minority courants 
such as Gauche socialiste or the young socialists, who had no chance of securing the 
presidential candidacy. This leads us to offer some qualification of the 'presidentialised 
factionalism' thesis. The apparent coincidence of courant cease-fire, or at least peaceful 
co-existence, and fierce competition for Mitterrand's succession can be explained by the 
horse-trading which went on between the key players. "In January 1992 a modus vivendi 
was reached between Rocard and Fabius in the run-up to important elections, with 
Fabius taking the leadership while virtually conceding Rocard's claims to the 1995 
presidential nomination. "(Bell & Criddle 1994 : 116) The second dimension to the 
curbing of factionalism was institutional or as Hine would put it, 'structural.' 
One Member One Vote 
Statutory revision began to be discussed and, at length, implemented, with the intention 
of restraining infighting. Strictly speaking, the first significant shift cannot be 
interpreted as a response to Rennes, since it was a reform instituted at that congress (or, 
to be exact, a week later, when the courants finally came to some agreement). This was 
the move to one member, one vote. The shift was prompted by abuses of the mandate 
system in some of the PS's 'rotten boroughs' (such as Herault, and Bouches-du-Rhone) 
where clientelism was distorting the internal functioning of the party, and raising serious 
questions about the party's democratic probity. 
In 1990, the mandate system was revised. This affected the balance of power not only 
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between strong and weak sections and federations,26 but also between majority and 
minority courants within each section or federation. The importance of one member one 
vote can be attributed to the fact that the strength of a section, or a courant within it, has 
traditionally related not to the number of votes actually cast in favour of a given motion, 
but rather on the number of votes mandated to each courant in each section. In order to 
consolidate their strength in the party's sections, a local notable's team could exploit the 
mandate system's indirect nature, which involved voting by theoretical member.27 
Mandated votes reflect the cards paid by a section, not necessarily its actual 
membership. Well-organised courants were able to artificially inflate support for their 
high profile leader. "There were sections where there was a great difference between the 
purported number of members, the number of cards paid for to the national organisation 
- one hopes that these people actually existed - and the number of people actually 
d· . ,,28 atten mg meetmgs. 
Voting by mandate favoured large federations, such as Nord, Pas-de-Calais, and 
Bouches-du-Rhone, benefiting from an established local political networks, based often 
on mayoral office, or still better, a combination of mayor and member of parliament at 
the same time. Such networks offer both financial and human resources which facilitate 
not only larger membership, but also the undetected practice of illicit card-buying to 
boost numbers and bolster political strength. (see chapter 2) The extremely fierce 
competition between the courants - evidenced by the catastrophic Rennes conference -
created enormous pressures; "when votes are added together to create mandates, a whole 
series of manoeuvres can ensue .... there was an exacerbation of the battle of the chiefs, 
and it got to a point where it was imperative to calm things down.,,29 
After the initial period of membership expansion in the 1970s, the mandating process 
tended to ossify internal democracy within the local organisations.30 This ossification 
offers evidence of Panebianco's point about recruitment being an important resource in 
internal power relations.(l988 : 35) An established power relationship in terms of the 
26 As noted in chapter 2, size is not always a reliable indicator of the strength of a section, given the 
importance of local political officeholding. 
27 Interview with Jerome Lambert 3/12/97 
28 Interview with Louis Mermaz 1110/97 
29 Interview with Yannick Bodin 26/11/97 
30 Interview with Yannick Bodin 26/11/97 
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number of mandates 'belonging' to each courant within a section rarely evolved. The 
leadership, after having bought enough cards to assure that its 'courant' held the key 
posts in a section, would be suspicious of new members joining who might upset the 
balance of power. If these newcomers allied with a rival courant within the section, it 
would necessitate buying more membership cards to retain the equilibrium! This 
'Malthusian' approach to recruitment, Sferza argues, is an important explanatory factor 
in membership decline in the 1980s.( 1996 : 197-198) The upshot was that courants with 
only a handful of members in a given section tended to be marginalised, with little 
prospect of attaining positions of responsibility within the section or federation. 
Since the Rennes conference in 1990, article 3.4 of the party statutes, relating to voting 
regulations reads "the number of mandates at a section's disposal is equal to the total 
number of members present.,,31 The idea of one member-one vote, and the stipulation 
that only those present are entitled to vote entails a considerable shift in internal party 
procedures. "We have abolished the principle of voting by mandate in favour of direct 
democracy. Before, members felt they were participating in a suppressed democracy, a 
highly organised, filtered democracy, in which their vote was posted with other votes, 
turned into a mandate, which joined other mandates and created a power relationship 
within the party. By the time one arrives at this stage, the members are no longer in the 
picture.,,32 This dose of direct democracy shifted the power balance, both between 
stronger and weaker sections, and also between minorities and majorities within 
sections. 
"Since Rennes, sections, even small ones of 60 members who do not 'own' a town or a 
network of local elected officials, carry some weight if they mobilise themselves on the 
night of the vote.,,33 This ensured a far more level playing field between larger and 
smaller federations and sections. Furthermore, within each section, the power of the 
courants, who kept a tight control on the brokering process associated with the old 
mandate system, was undermined. "We see minorities fighting their comer, mobilising 
themselves, establishing syntheses with other minorities, creating networks in the party. 
31 Vendredi 17112/93 p.38 
J2 Interview with Yannick Bodin 26/11/97 
33 Interview with Jacques Salvator 19/9/97 
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All of a sudden, the change allowed them to achieve much better results.,,34 As we shall 
see later, this development coincided with other changes, some intentional some 
conjunctural, which, over the course of the 1990s, reduced the pressures of internal 
factionalism. 
Although a great deal of progress has been made in the internal democratic practices of 
the PS, to the benefit both of minorities within sections, and of smaller sections in 
general, one must be careful not to over-estimate the democratic health of the party. No 
process of regulation or monitoring has been instituted to ensure that the one man one 
vote principle is indeed observed in each section. This leads some to make rather less 
ambitious claims for the effects of one man, one vote. "Behind each card, there has to be 
a real person. But as for the physical participation of that person in a vote, if one looked 
closely in some sections, some federations, abnormalities must be widespread. One 
member one vote limits abuses. Before, one member was worth two, today, that 
proportion is greatly reduced.,,35 
La Commission Vie interne: Towards Direct Internal Democracy 1991-1994 
The second major statutory step towards changing the 'structural incentives' to 
factionalism within the PS was taken in June 1991, with the creation of a committee of 
the internal life of the party. The committee was asked by the bureau executifto prepare 
a set of proposals for the renovation of the party, with particular emphasis being placed 
on curbing the role of the courants. At the Arche conference in December 1991, the 
committee's request that a process of revision of statutes and internal rules be 
undertaken was approved. The main concern of the committee was the appointment 
process of party officials at every level, and the nature of the party structures 
themselves. Four principles were agreed upon by the members of the committee 
(coming from all the courants). Firstly, "the respect of proportional representation of 
the courants, but the avoidance that reference to a courant he the only criteria for 
choice," Secondly, "the ensuring of a fair geographical apportionment via the 
representation of each federation', thirdly 'the adoption of a fully democratic method of 
designation, avoiding methods too close to co-optation by organising a secret ballot at 
34 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 22/9/97 
3S Interview with Jerome Lambert 3/12/97 
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every level of responsibility in the party," and lastly "reinforcing the permanent political 
authority of the new structures, allowing conferences to be held every 3 years, not every 
2.,,36 
Despite the turbulent times that ensued within the party, with the national leadership 
resembling a game of musical chairs, changing first secretary five times in as many 
years, those axioms continued to guide the process of internal renovation. However, a 
tension existed within these principles. What was needed was a means of introducing 
some counter-weight to the courants in the national power structures. This proved 
problematic for the PS. As Bichat notes, "the litany against the courants continues, but 
the key question - how can we restrain proportional representation and the courants -
that question has never been answered.,,37 Proportionality was too sacred a cow to be 
sacrificed in the interests of internal stability. Instead, it had to be forced to co-exist with 
other forms of designation. The need for amelioration of the designation process for first 
secretaries, both national and federal, was a central concern of the Commission de Ie 
Renovation du Parti, which had replaced the Commission Vie interne at I' Arche. 
Vaillant's 1992 report of the committee called for, "greater member participation in ..... 
designation of party officials at all levels, and candidates for election in order to put an 
end to co-optations. Only election confers democratic legitimacy. 15 years ago, a small 
group proposed a list of candidates. Today, this group designates them, and the 
members are obliged to approve. ,,38 
From 1971 until 1988, the membership had little or no say in the choice of first 
secretary. It was either Mitterrand or Mitterrand's choice, Lionel Jospin, who as first 
signatory of the majority motion was automatically appointed. In 1988, this process -
the 'emergence' of Mitterrand' s candidate unopposed as first secretary - was challenged 
for the first time. Fabius, Mitterrand's dauphin, was considered unacceptable. 
Emmanuelli amongst others attacked Mitterrand's 'monarchical' designation style.39 
The hostility to Fabius, widespread in the party elite, proved too strong, and the party's 
choice - Pierre Mauroy - was duly appointed against Mitterrand's will. A triumph for 
36 Yannick Bodin in the final text of the Arche conference. Le Poing et /a Rose no. 135 (January 1992) 
P-i ~~terview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 22/9/97 
38 Daniel Vaillant PS INFO no. 512 
39 see Dupin (1994 : 13) 
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party over president, this may have been. A triumph for direct democracy it was not. 
The designation process was still elite level brokering between the courants using their 
weight on the Comite Directeur which formally elected the first secretary. Mauroy's 
successful bid emerged from this process as a fait accompli which the members simply 
had to accept. 
One of the main problems with organisational change in this period was that, whilst 
attempting to reform the system which had fostered such intense power struggles, the 
key protagonists continued to be involved in that power struggle. The irony was 
highlighted by Melenchon at the post mortem Comite Directeur of April 1993, "one 
after the other, people have stood up to denounce the courants - but it is the courant 
chiefs who are doing it!,,4o The Commission de fa renovation du parti had entertained 
the possibility of establishing statutory criteria to define a 'courant', as distinct from a 
'presidentiable's stable'. It never did so, perhaps because most of the big courant's were 
more concerned with 'their' presidential candidacy than the doctrinal evolution of the 
party at this time. "There was an impoverishment of the collective thought of the PS, 
there were no more debates, no production of ideas ... all the texts looked the same, they 
were usually empty .... in place of a debate, we had a battle between the chiefs.,,41 What 
were once divisions based on both ideological and tactical/strategic differences had 
evolved into personalised power struggles - the prize being the presidential candidacy in 
1995. 
There was, however, a countervailing pressure on the unbridled competition of the 
courants, linked to the extremely damaging effects of the confrontation at Rennes. The 
media's keenness to pounce on the highly personalised war of succession, and the party 
elite's apparent readiness to give the media what they wanted, was cited by many at the 
post-mortem Comite Directeur following the defeat of 1993 as a fundamental cause of 
the defeat. Jospin's comments, which follow his announcement of his resignation from 
the bureau executif, are typical of the sense of collective guilt felt about the behaviour at 
Rennes, "never again will I engage in that kind of confrontation. ,,42 There was a 
realisation that all the 'courants' at least had to co-exist within the same party, and this 
40 Melenchon' s intervention in the Comite Directeur 3 avril 1993 in PS Info no. 544 (17/4/93) 
41 Interview with Yannick Bodin 26/11/97 
42 Jospin's intervention in the Comite Directeur 3 avril 1993 in PS Info no. 544 (17/4/93) 
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demanded certain norms of communal existence. With the perceived 'perversion' of the 
courant system, it was, as we saw earlier, no longer conceivable to have all the 
'elephants' presenting their own motions. 
Thus political circumstances dictated that the number of orientations on offer was 
greatly reduced, altering the link between proponent and political orientation which had 
been a structural feature of the courant system since 1971. This development prompted 
another fundamental shift in the courant system. Daniel Vaillant's contribution to the 
Etats generaux of 1993 sought to disconnect the candidate from the courant to which 
they belonged, "voting on texts must be dissociated from votes on people called upon to 
represent members, we must rid our discussions of the power stakes if we want to avoid 
falling back into the perverted logic of the courants.,,43 The means to this end was to 
introduce the direct election of the first secretary by the 'universal' suffrage of all party 
members. 
The progressive transition to direct internal democracy proceeded in stages, the first 
coming when Rocard stepped up the pace of internal reform with the Etats Generaux, 
followed by the statutory changes at the Bourget conference.44 At Bourget, Rocard's 
position as the natural presidential candidate fostered a degree of rassemblement, 
analogous to the position enjoyed by Mitterrand at Grenoble in 1973, with all the 
attendant 'kingmaker' structural attributes which went with the prospect of Rocard 
potentially being at liberty to distribute the substantial presidential spoils in two years 
time. Rocard won an 82.27% majority for his 'motion A' - which grouped all the key 
'courants'. Rocard was elected first secretary by a secret ballot of all delegates, gaining 
80.92% of the vote.45 It is no co-incidence that Rocard's apparently strong internal 
position co-incided with this step towards the increased involvement of the 
membership. There tends to be a strong correlation between moments of apparent 
clarification of the issue of Mitterrand's successor and examples of advancement in the 
internal reform process. The democratic progress was, however, limited. Rocard, after 
all, was the only candidate in the election. 
43 Daniel Vaillant PS INFO no. 545 (8/5/93) 
44 Fabius - compromised by his role in the contaminated blood scandal and the defeats the party had 
suffered when he was first secretary - was marginalised, and Rocard looked for all the world like the 
'candidat nature/' in 1995. 
4S Vendredino.212171l2/93 
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Rocard's replacement, after the calamitous 14% polling of his list in the European 
elections of June 1994, attested to the enhanced 'parliament of the party' status on the 
Conseil National. The full proceedings of the Conseil National of June 19th were 
published in the weekly La Lettre du Vendredi, such was considered their significance 
for the party. The 217 members of the Conseil National voted on the two candidacies 
presented - Emmanuelli and Dominique Strauss-Kahn. These two candidates 
represented genuinely diverging political orientations, and thus the legitimacy of the 
process was enhanced. However, the principle of delegatory democracy remained 
unchallenged, and was reinforced when Emmanuelli was re-elected at the Lievin 
conference six months later. Here, opposed by only a motion presented by the Young 
Socialists which received less than 8%, the majority motion received over 90%, and 
Emmanuelli's unopposed candidacy for first secretary obtained 87,57% of the votes 
46 
cast. 
Putting the Ideas into Practice - Lionel Jospin's Return 
Although much was discussed in committees, and gradual advances were made, notably 
at the Bourget conference, thorough-going change of the party's internal practices was 
slow in coming. The internal instability and frequent changes of first secretary did not 
provide a climate conducive to fundamental reforms, which would have to be co-
ordinated between all the powerful 'sensibilites' in the party. It is fitting that real change 
began with the designation of the presidential candidate in February 1995. This event 
settled once and for all - and rather later than anyone had anticipated - the issue of 
Mitterrand's successor, and was to herald a novel era of internal stability. The report on 
the activities of the party since Lievin says of the presidential candidate designation, 
"the procedure put into effect constitutes a first in its nature and in its form for the Parti 
socialiste. The vote takes place in every section of the party on the third of February.,,47 
For the first time in the history of the party, all the members voted for their presidential 
candidate by direct universal suffrage. 
Jospin, seen by many as the man who rescued the party from the brink of obscurity, 
46 Vendredi no. 2399/12/94 (supplement) 
47 L 'Hebdo des Socialistes no. 38 (31110/97) 
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commands a respect which fosters stability. This stability is underpinned by the absence 
of the destabilising influence of competition for the number one spot; 
"It took many things for us to arrive where we are; that Beregovoy commit 
suicide, that Fabius be tainted by the contaminated blood scandal, that Rocard 
showed himself to lack all the capacities to occupy such a spot, that Delors said 
no. Today, things have been greatly simplified, because life chose for us. We 
understand that power is no longer at stake, no-one can oppose Jospin. We realise 
that either we (the government) succeed, he will be our candidate, and will be 
elected, or - if we fail - no matter who the candidate is, we will lose. Thus the 
context .... is much more relaxed than it has ever been.,,48 
This stabilising influence was consolidated by the re-emergence of old, predominantly 
tactical, allegiances. The courants at Rennes may have been divided on many issues, 
but a number of traditional opponents were united on one axis. The Jospinistes, 
who had spent the last 20 years brushing shoulders with the Fabiusians in 
Mitterrand's courant, and the Rocardiens and Mauroy's supporters were, as we saw 
earlier, agreed upon a policy of 'tout sauf Fabius,.49 This axis, between essentially 
Jospin, Maur% and Rocard was to prove highly significant in the ideological 
developments of the PS in the nineties. Rocard, speaking on France Inter, referred to 
"a logic ofrestructuration (of the party) around a majority."SI However, Rocard's talk of 
'restructuration' was premature. The JospinIRocardlMauroy axis did not become 
permanent, rather, it reappeared periodically - for example with Rocard and Mauroy's 
joint proposition for the Etats generaux after the defeat of 1993, and with Rocard's 
invitation to Jospin to organise the Assises de fa Transformation sociafe.(see chapter 4) 
Such collusion was to provide the foundations for a new stable majority. Jospin's 
presidential campaign team - with the presence of many Rocardian lieutenants such as -
Bergounioux, Huchon, as well as Mauroy and his allies such as Jean Le GarrecS2 
shows how that 'tout sauf Fabius' axis was crystalising into what, once Jospin 
became premier Secretaire, was to become the 'ligne majoritaire'. Thus under Lionel 
Jospin, for the first time since Mitterrand's grip over the party loosened, a degree 
48 Interview with Claude Bartolone 11/12/97 
49 Interview with Jean-Paul Huchon 29/9/97 
so who was obliged by his position as premier secretaire to seek consensus between the fractious 
Mitterrandistes. 
51 E.Dupin (1994: 61) 
52 La Lettre du Vendredi no. 45, 24 fevrier 1995 p. 3 
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of internal stability returned to the party. 
For years, the party had agonised over the question of a successor to Mitterrand, this 
question caused the worst excesses of the courant system and much of the instability 
within the party between 1990 and 1995. In the three years preceding the 1995 election, 
a series of events - mostly beyond the control of anyone in the party- proceeded to 
eliminate all potential candidacies. When the unexpected opportunity suddenly 
presented itself in late 1994, Jospin returned from 18 months obscurity to seize it. It was 
a risk in terms of political credibility, for Jospin remained far from sure whether or not 
he would even be present in the second round.53 The unexpected 'success' of the 
campaign - winning the first round and securing 47.5% of the vote in the second -
resolved the question that had tormented the party since 1988. This result confirmed 
what Panebianco would call the presidential 'competence' of the narrowly defeated 
candidate. Jospin wasted no time in converting the credibility gained from this 
'victorious defeat' into security of tenure for himself as first secretary. 
Lionel Jospin, in October 1995, was directly elected by all the members. Exploiting the 
coat-tails of a remarkably successful presidential election campaign, he decided to 
underpin his commitment to renovation of the party and a reduced role for the courants 
by instigating the direct election of the first secretary before it had reached the party 
statute book. Jospin saw an opportunity to consolidate his external legitimacy -
conferred by the vote of confidence from the French electorate that 47.5% represented, 
with a new level of internal legitimacy. Jospin had been careful to include a number of 
'sensibilites' (the new sanitised euphemism for the courants) in his campaign team. The 
heterogeneous nature of Jospin's support makes his ligne majoritaire resemble Sartori's 
'faction of interest,' (1976 : 77) an observation made by Cole of Mitterrand's faction in 
the 1970s and 1980s. (1989 : 87) A similar internal logic, allied to Jospin' s current 
'leader above faction' status, explains the current consensual and stable internal party 
relations as accounted for Mitterrand' s command of support in the mid-1970s.54 
Jospin's ligne majoritaire closely approximates Panebianco's concept of a 'dominant 
53 Interview with Claude Bartolone 11112/97 
S4 Of which Cole notes, "underpinning the tendency to convergence by those leaders signing Mitterrand's 
text at the 1975 Pau Congress (Mitterrand, Mauroy, Defferre, Savary, Poperen, Rocard) lay a desire to 
participate in the party leadership, as a preliminary to future participation in government. These self-
interested, rational motives overrode personal rivalries, and differences over policy." (Cole 1986 : 191) 
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coalition,' constituting as it does the "distribution centre of organisational incentives 
within the party." (1988 : 37-38) 
The context of factionalism had, as we saw earlier, evolved significantly. Infighting a la 
Rennes was discredited, and the political space of factionalism was considerably 
reduced. In this context, Jospin sought to exploit the rassemblement inducing effects of 
the above internal logic to attempt to transcend the old courants. Jospin presented 
himself as something of an 'anti-courant' candidate, with some legitimacy since the 
focus of courant activity in recent years had been the presidential candidacy - a position 
for which he was never in the running until December lih 1994, when Jacques Delors 
chose not to stand. Indeed, for this reason, Jospin was recognised in the party as a 
champion of the courants in their old, positive guise; "codified, controlled internal 
debate is not dangerous- 'courants' of ideas, of reflection, whose only aim is to bring 
benefits to the party. Lionel Jospin and Francois Mitterrand, have, for their part, used 
courants in this way.,,55 Significantly, Jospin has continued to resist the temptation to 
organise his support on a more formal basis.(Bell 1998 : 80) 
Direct election of the first secretary constituted a fundamental change in the internal 
functioning of the party. Up until that time, the only means of achieving high office 
within the party was through the courant system. Only a member of the most powerful 
courant, or a candidate acceptable to the key courants, would emerge unscathed from 
the brokering process in which the courant leaders engaged (to decide how 'their' 
members of the Conseil national, or 'their' conference delegates would vote). Now, 
however, the first secretary owed his post to a majority in a secret ballot of all the 
members. This disconnected the head of the party from a power struggle between the 
courants. Direct election thus "acts as a safety valve in relation to the weight of the 
courants .... the idea is to introduce into the leadership people who do not owe their 
• • ,,56 pOSltIon to a courant. 
The effect has been to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the first secretary - both 
national and federal. "The greater the basis of legitimacy of the leader, the more his 
authority is recognised.... he is no longer the first secretary belonging to the party 
55 Daniel Vaillant PS INFO no. 512 
56 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 22/9/97 
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apparatus, designated by the apparatchiks, from on high ...... the leader realises he owes 
his position to the base."s7 It is however, difficult to distinguish, in the case of Jospin 
how much legitimacy he owes to the new designation process, and how much is due to 
the extraordinary circumstances in which he was the catalyst for a renovation of the 
party, and how much he derives from his personal authority. The real test for the new 
statutory arrangements, some have argued, will come after Jospin's next presidential 
bid.58 
Lionel Jospin and the 'Presidential Party' 
The centrality of the presidential election cycle to understanding the internal workings 
of not only the PS, but all major French parties has led to a literature emerging on the 
'presidential party' .(Cole 1993; Gaffney 1990; Thiebault 1993) Parties are conceived as 
presidential machines, whose primary function is to act as a springboard for a 
presidential candidacy, and subsequently to act as an organisational resource for the 
president ('the president's party'). A set of propositions has been established regarding 
the behaviour of such a party. Thiebault summarises them thus; "Concerning the chief 
of state, the 'president's party' is devoted to playing the part of a 'dominated' party. The 
formal leader of this kind of party is effectively appointed by the President himself with 
the formal methods of selection only serving to ratify the President's choice. The formal 
leader's authority and legitimacy depends on the President. He is often a political figure 
of the second order, non-presidential candidate, former minister or not. He must never 
appear as a competitor to the President. He can be neither Prime Minister, nor even a 
minister, only a former minister."(1993 : 287) 
Ironically, Lionel Jospin was traditionally evoked to prove this rule, when first secretary 
between 1981 and 1988. Given the dramatic upturn in his political fortunes since 1995, 
the boot is now on the other foot. The concept of the 'presidential party' also has some 
pertinence to the analysis of the relationship between undisputed presidential candidate 
and party. In this respect, there have significant evolutions it the relationship between 
presidential candidate and party in recent years. Whereas once, Mitterrand remained 
first secretary up until, and indeed for 4 months after he had been elected president, 
57 Interview with Yannick Bodin 26/11197 
58 Interview with Marisol Touraine 25/11/97 
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more recently, there has been a tendency to establish a certain distance between 
presidential candidate and party prior to the elections. This is not exclusive to the PS, 
since Chirac also ceased to be formal leader of the party prior to the 1995 elections. 
Within the PS, the issue was complicated by Jospin becoming Prime Minister. As 
Thiebault observes, "the two offices of Prime Minister and leader of the dominant party 
have never merged."(1993 : 289) This probably prompted Jospin to relinquish formal 
leadership of the party in 1997, perhaps earlier than he had planned. 
Notwithstanding such changes, the selection of Francois Hollande conforms to 
'presidential party' predictions about the relationship between president (or presidential 
candidate) and party. Hollande is a consensus building figure within the party, who has 
stood aloof from the courant skirmishing for some time. He is well liked within the 
party, but is by no means the biggest political heavyweight in the PS elite.59 His 
ascendancy to first secretary at Brest was exactly the kind of formality the 'presidential 
party' model would predict. He was clearly Jospin's dauphin, and although the choice 
had to be ratified by the membership, there were similarities between Jospin's backing 
of Hollande's candidacy, and Mitterrand's 'monarchical' designation of Jospin in 1981. 
Opposed only by Melenchon, the Gauche Socialiste candidate, who secured only 8.82% 
of the vote, Hollande was elected with 91.18% of the vote.60 
However, the changes in the designation process of the first secretary may, in time, 
upset the extant power balance between 'virtual' presidential candidate,61 and formal 
party leader. Political parties being conservative organisations, the statutory evolutions 
will take time to translate into structural change within the party. However, even now, 
the fact of direct election means a virtual presidential candidate cannot back a successor 
as first secretary who is unpopular in the party, since anything other than a convincing 
victory for 'their' choice would undermine their credibility. Furthermore, in time, direct 
election will provide a resource for the first secretary in terms of democratic legitimacy, 
and a mandate within the party, which may increase autonomy from presidential 
S9 Indeed, prior to his election as first secretary at the Brest congress in November 1997, there had been 
some speculation as to whether it might not be wise to choose Cambadelis, a more ruthless political 
~rator, over Hollande. 
L 'Hebdo des Socialistes no. 43 (5/12/97) p. II 
61 The formal powers of the president are such that a first secretary, even a directly elected one, is 
unlikely to see his power vis-a-vis the president significantly increased. 
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contenders. "The election will, in time, give the first secretary a weight in relation to the 
sensibilites. He will not be elected or chosen by such and such a sensibility, but by all 
the members. In practice - and it may take 10 to 15 years - it will give him an authority 
superior to what it has been in the past. It also depends a great deal on the personality of 
the man or woman designated.,,62 
Parliamentary Reform 
The desire for evolution in the nature of internal factionalism within the PS, embodied 
in Jospin's bid to transcend the courants was an important motivating factor in the 
reform of the party's parliament in the 1990s. The dual considerations in the search for 
evolution of the courant system were captured by Vaillant, "we must find an appropriate 
and suitable criteria for a 4 courant de pensee ' and the respect of the democratic vote. ,,63 
Under pure proportionality, anyone sitting on the Conseil Nationa/ 64owed their position 
directly to their courant leader, whose task it was to allocate that courant's allotted 
seats. Thus, up until the Lievin conference in November 1994, the only route to a 
position of power in the party was via the courants, and the composition of the Conseil 
National was a direct reflection of the political strength of the courants at the previous 
conference. The nature of the party's governing body has changed since Lievin.65 There 
was a desire, due perhaps in part the calamitous media experience arising from the 
infighting of the Rennes conference, to reduce the frequency of conferences, from every 
two years to every three years. The corollary of this was a greater authority and 
permanent status afforded to the new body - referred to as the parliament of the party. 
The traditional proportional element now makes up only two thirds of the Conseil 
National, with a final third being composed of all 102 federal first secretaries of the 
party. This upheld the principle established at I' Arche of fair geographical 
representation. 
Eventually, this inclusion of the federal first secretaries would also uphold another 
principle - the curbing of the courant's influence. As the report of the Commission sur 
62 Interview with Jerome Lambert 3/12/97 
63 Daniel Vaillant PS INFO no. 512 
64 As the Comite directeur has been known since Bourget. 
65 Changes, like those voted at Bourget in 1993, only enter into application at the following conference. 
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la Renovation du Parti to the Comite Directeur of May 23rd 1992 stated, "this totally 
new organisation within our party must allow the launching of the debate within it 
which transcends the traditional cleavages. ,,66 Calls for reform continued, only with 
greater urgency, in the wake of the electoral rout of March 1993. The Etats gem?raux, 
instigated by Rocard and Mauroy, which took place in June 1993 were characterised by 
a desire to structurally reform the courants system. Moscovici' s summary of the 
proceedings to the Comite Directeur of July t h reports, "the functioning of our 
courants must evolve, their influence must be limited. We propose a mixed electoral 
system - to provoke an evolution of the statutes voted at Bordeaux. This system will 
applied progressively, both at national and locallevel.,,67 
However, the real change only came in the wake of Jospin's direct election by secret 
ballot of all members. Once this election system was instituted at national level, it 
naturally followed that greater democratic legitimacy should be established at 
departmental and local level. The logical step to expand this designation process to the 
federal first secretaries crucially altered the nature of the Conseil national. The strict 
logic of the courants was, as Vaillant predicted, broken. The federal first secretaries, 
obviously, had their political preference, favouring a particular 'motion', but they now 
owed their position on the Conseil national not to the courants but to their territorial 
base, to the fact that they had been directly elected in a secret ballot of every member in 
their federation. Under the new majority system, the mechanical weight of the courants 
in determining the designation of the first position of power in the party, or in the 
department, has gone. "Before, a balance had to be struck between various groups, 
'we'll swap him for him', it was something that went on completely over the heads of 
the members. Now, it is the militants who designate their officials, and they do it 
without any reference to the membership of a 'courant'. ,,68 
However, one should not be too hasty in one's assessment of the impact of these 
important electoral changes. Many of the federal secretary elections, after all, had only 
one candidate. "1 fear that in an organisation like ours, ... .it is the local notables (office 
holders) who structure to large extent the voice of the party .... .in sections with a mayor 
66 Daniel Vaillant PS INFO no. 515 23/5/92 
67 PS INFO no. 552 (31/7/93) 
68 Interview with Claude Estier 19/9/97 
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or a regional councillor or president of a regional council, the member's voice is often 
the voice of the notable .... this political organisation is to a great extent structured by 
poles of local political power.,,69 (see chapter 2) The weight of these local poles of 
power renders the party's structures less malleable to change than many would like to 
make out. It will take time to adjust to the new climate of internal direct democracy. 
The Failure of the Quart Societal and the enduring problem of Co-optation. 
Another development aimed at adding a further counterweight to the courant's 
influence was the 'quart socit?tal' - the societal quarter. This involved adding an extra 
25% of members to the Conseil National to be drawn not from the party elite, but from 
societal groups and the unions. This was an attempt to bring party and society closer 
together. However, the implementation of this change was far from unproblematic. The 
members were appointed before the 'quart societal' had reached the statute book, and as 
a result no-one knew what their role was. Issues of their voting rights, and whether or 
not they were full members alongside the first secretaries and the proportionally 
allocated members, were not widely understood. The quart societal were able to vote on 
programmatic questions, but not on the designation of posts. In theory, this was to 
prevent the courants using the quart societal as a weapon in an internal power struggle. 
However, the suspicion of manoeuvres to flood the quart societal with friendly faces 
remained. 
Such teething troubles so discredited the quart societal that it was abolished soon after 
its inception -before much of the rank-and-file even new it existed.7o Harlem Desir, 
until recently national secretary in charge of relations with social movements, sees the 
abolition as a step backwards. "We have replaced the quart societal with a social and 
economic council, which reflects the institutions of the fifth Republic, as we have seen 
with other reforms ..... a council named by our directly elected first secretary, I do not 
believe that it is a positive development.,,71 
This highlights the problems involved in attempting to change the nature of internal 
69 Interview with Claude Bartolone 11112/97 
70 Interview with Yannick Bodin 26/11197 
71 Interview with Harlem Desir 21111/97 
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democracy. The process has to contend with deeply ingrained procedures and habits, 
which are often fiercely clung to by actors who feel their position will be undermined by 
change. This has hindered the ambitions of the party renovators like Vaillant and Bodin, 
who wanted to bring to an end all the dubious manoeuvres associated with the courant 
system in its degenerative state. One of the principles guiding the reform process had 
been a commitment to put an end to 'co-optation', the process whereby posts are filled 
through a series of negotiations involving haggling and trade-offs between courant 
leaders. As Vaillant reported, "co-optation calls into question the very principle of 
representation within our party."n The commission envisaged that direct elections of 
first secretaries would combat this, but not eradicate it. The discussions which take 
place between the first signatories of each 'motion', since they historically have the 
'right' to allot the seats their motion received, were also a hotbed of co-optation. In the 
early 1990s, plans were afoot to replace this system in order to, "allow members, 
without calling into question the proportional representation decided at Epinay, to 
designate by vote, in assemblies of each motion, the local, federal, regional and national 
governing bodies of the PS.,,73 
However, this more thorough-going change never reached the statute book. The 
procedure remains somewhat shrouded in mystery, for example in the composition of 
the bureau national, the first secretary presents a list to the Conseil National, no doubt 
after discussions with the key power brokers in the party. "It is only at that moment that 
250 of the 300 learn that they are not on the bureau nationaL ..... sometimes, a member 
would protest, he would be allowed to speak, but 99 times out of 100, I've never seen it 
otherwise, the vote would confirm the first secretary's choice .... It has not changed co-
optation at all.,,74 So the process of allocation within a motion has seen little change. 
This is curious, since developments in the courant system have rendered this internal 
partition more important than ever. As we saw, at Bourget and Lievin, the conference 
was characterised by a majority endorsed by all the key actors and regrouping in excess 
of 80% of the vote. The practice continued, in a stable, consensual climate, at Brest. All 
the main 'sensibilites' regroup under the one motion - strictly speaking they form one 
72 Report of the Commission sur fa renovation du Parti to the Comite Directeur 23rd May 1992 in PS 
INFO no. 515 23/5/92 
73 Report of the Commission sur fa renovation du Parti to the Comite Directeur 23rd May 1992 in PS 
INFO no. 515 23/5/92 
74 Interview with Jerome Lambert 3112/97 
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single courant. It is within the majority motion that the relative importance of, say, the 
Fabiusiens and the Rocardiens is determined. 
On this important process, the statute book is curiously reticent. Yannick Bodin. in 
charge of the Commission des Statuts at the Brest conference, said of the motion 
assemblies, "That is where they do their cooking! What happens there? If we do not see 
anything, we do not know. Each motion works it out for itself, with its own kind of 
democracy.,,75 Jerome Lambert, a close observer of internal party wranglings from his 
position on the Commission des contentieux, offers a little more insight into 
proceedings; 
"There are discussions which go on, there's no point denying it. They are not 
written into our texts, but in practice, of course, every leadership, national, federal, 
or even local, if there is a local-level power struggle, each leadership is the object 
of discussions between different sensibilites ..... we take into account the weight of 
the historical sensibilites in our party in composing the different levels of 
leadership. That is the reality. Anyone not doing so would risk minoritising one 
sensibility, that minoritisation would entrain bad feeling, and may provoke a vote 
against the majority.,,76 
What has changed in recent years is the climate in which these discussions take place, 
which is now much more relaxed. The introduction of universal suffrage of members 
makes marginalisation a dangerous game. The institutional logic tends towards 
consolidation of large majorities; "Sending people away to other, future, motions creates 
difficulties, because the first secretary, when up for re-election, needs people to vote for 
him or her. There is thus a tendency towards rassemblement, towards creating the 
largest possible majorities and eliminating no-one.,,77 Although this remark should be 
qualified, given that the 'pigeon shoot' logic has not entirely disappeared for 'parallel 
factions' like the Poperenistes or the Gauche Socialiste, on the whole the mood is more 
inclusive and consensual. As Bichat wryly notes; 
"we do not get the calculators out any more! We no longer have a situation or 
rigid, mathematical affirmation of the kind '30% of the vote = 30% of the seats'. 
There are historical solidarities which are respected, we know that a particular 
camarade represents a particular sensibility. I think in practice, the idea is not to 
7S Interview with Yannick Bodin 26/11/97 
76 Interview with Jerome Lambert 3112197 
77 Interview with Yannick Bodin 26/11/97 
104 
leave at the roadside someone who has participated in a big national debate in the 
name of a particular courant, rather than the purely mathematical conception 
which prevailed before.,,78 
Le Parti Socialiste Nouveau Est Arrive? : Elite-Level Rejuvenation and 
Feminisation 
Running concurrently to these institutional innovations in practices has been an influx 
of new personnel at elite level. By the early 1990s, the 'sabras' 79 of the 'generation 
Mitterrand', were - like Mitterrand himself - approaching the end of their political 
careers. Those that remained active in the party, such as Louis Mennaz, whilst 
commanding respect, did not command the same influence they once enjoyed. Fresh 
faces began to appear on the national secretariat, the likes of Jean-Christophe 
Cambadelis, Marisol Touraine, and Manuel Valls. 
Jospin was keen to cultivate this new talent, having for example fonned close links with 
Cambadelis when working with him on the 'Assises de fa Transformation sociafe " and 
under Jospin's premiereship, the younger socialist elite have seen their career paths take 
an upward turn. The next generation are aware of the gap which separates them from 
Jospin, "what are the ideological themes of the Left of tomorrow? I do not think that 
that (Jospin's) generation can make the change. It will be the young generation ,and it 
will be difficult, but the thought of French socialism for the next 50 years - that has yet 
to be invented.,,8o The renewing of the party's elite has been boosted by the position the 
party has taken under Jospin over the 'cumul des mandats' - or cumulative 
appropriation of elected offices.(see chapter 2) At the 1996 national convention on 'The 
actors of democracy', the lower echelons of the party reaffirmed81 their extreme 
hostility to this process.82 Jospin took this on board, and has since committed his 
government to legislate on the matter. 
78 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 8/12/97 
79 The sabras were so called after the first generation of native Israelis: they had come to the PS as their 
first conventional political engagement, with the renewal of the PS under Mitterrand. They came into the 
Earty at Epinay and ran the party at it various levels of organisation for the next twenty years. 
o Interview with Marisol Touraine 25/11/97 
81 For an earlier expression of discontent, see A. Bergounioux's Report of the Commission sur Ie Parti at 
the Etats Generaux PS Info no. 553 (14/8/93) 
82 Text of the 'Acteurs de la democratie' convention, page 37 (1996) Parti Socialiste Centre de 
Documentation 
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The issue has also been confronted within the party, with severe limits being placed on 
accumulation of offices by socialist elected officials. Perhaps unsurprisingly, those 
socialist politicians who had previously accumulated numerous posts were 
predominantly from the older generation. The clamping down on accumulation thus 
instigated at local and federal level a similar shift in age cohort as that seen at national 
level. "Let us take a case in point. There were 21 regional councillors in the Nord ... of 
those on the new list, in electable positions, there are only 3 who had been on the 
council for a long time ...... so ofthe 20, there are only 3 - including me, by the way, who 
were members of the old team .... there is an enormous renewal. No pressure was 
applied. The new first secretary, if he wants things to go smoothly, integrates the new 
generation.,,83 However, this rejuvenation at elite level has not been reflected within the 
party more widely. The age cohort recruited in the 1970s and 1980s have remained, with 
50% of the party membership aged between 50 and 69. 19% are aged between 40 and 
49, but only 14% are aged under 40, of which only 5% are under 30.(Subileau, Ysmal & 
Rey 1999 : 7) Thus all the reforms have not so far solved the party's problems of 
renewing itself by attracting young members. 
Contemporaneous to the rejuvenation of the party elite has been another shift - its 
partial feminisation. Back in 1991, the Commission vie interne, recorded the need to 
debate openly the place of women in the party.84 For years, a quota system was written 
into the party statutes, beginning with a stipulation that a minimum of 20% of all 
officials, elected bodies, and candidates for election should be women. This increased to 
25%, and then 30%, but "the quota was never really respected .... for years we said, in 
the name of democracy, 'we will not impose it, the members will choose it.' Obviously, 
the members chose nothing of the sort.,,85 The problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
women, in the absence of an effective quota system, are under-represented throughout 
all levels of the political system.86 As a result, they find it difficult to attain the positions 
of local power which are traditionally the training ground for French parliamentary 
office - such as Mayorships or seats on regional councils. 
83 Interview with Jean Le Garrec 16/12/97 
84 Yannick Bodin in the final text of the Arche conference. Le Poing et /a Rose no. 135 (January 1992) p. 
9 
8S Interview with Yannick Bodin 26/11/97 
86 A recent sruvet showed 79% ofPS national office holders, 77% ofPS federal office holders, 91% of 
PS mayors, 81 % of PS municipal councillors, and 88% of PS regional councillors to be men. (Subileau, 
Ysmal & Rey 1999 : 8) 
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Jospin imposed feminine candidacies for the last legislative elections to escape this 
impasse, not to respect a 30% quota but with the objective, since written into the statute 
book, of achieving parity. The implications of Jospin's plan for centre-periphery 
relations within the party were wide-ranging. Local party organisations are traditionally 
quite autonomous and do not take kindly to imposition from the national leadership. 
(see chapter 4) To alleviate the tension, the constituencies chosen to be reserved for 
women candidates were selected in large federations with a number of candidacies to 
verify. This way, a consultation process ensued which made it difficult for the 
federation to argue that not one of its five or six winnable candidacies could be reserved 
for a woman.87 The process was further facilitated, in 1997, by Chirac' s snap election, 
with the brief timescale preventing aggrieved locals ousted by nationally 'imposed' 
candidates running as dissident socialist candidates.88 
This has increased representation of women in the Assembhfe and the higher echelons of 
the party. 89 Furthermore, the electoral lists for the regional elections in March 1998 
were established on a basis of parity or something close to it. However, this success at 
the elite level has not been replicated within the party more widely. A 1985 survey 
showed that only 20% of the party membership were women. By 1998, that figure had 
only risen to 26%. (Subileau, Y smal & Rey 1999 : 7) This highlights the problem of the 
grey area surrounding what an objective of parity means in practice - what is the 
timescale? What if the objective is not met? Bodin insists of electoral lists and 
proportion of female candidacies, "above all, it signifies a political will, and at the very 
least, there is no question of ever going below 30% again. ,,90 At the level of the party as 
a whole, this goal of 30% appears still some way off. Encouragingly, however, 31 % of 
those joining in 1995 were women, a figure which rose to 34% in 1995, attesting to a 
slight feminisation of the party's new members.( Subileau, Y smal & Rey 1999 : 81) 
87 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 8/12/97 
88 Interview with Jerome Lambert 3112/97 - see chapter 4 for elaboration on this point. 
89 A record 8 of the party's 26 national secretaries, 16 of the 56 members of the bureau national, and 5 of 
the party's II ministers being women. La Nouvelle Direction du parti in L 'hebdo des socialistes no. 43 
(5/12/97) Symbolically, every debate at the Brest conference was jointly chaired by a man and a women 
to underline the commitment to move towards parity. 
90 Interview with Yannick Bodin 26111197 
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Changing Methods of Organisational and Doctrinal Change 
Under Mitterrand's reign, the conference was the key moment in the ideological life of 
the party, when the party's orientation was decided upon. In effect, a tacit agreement 
between all the courants at the Valence conference in 1981 ensured that Mitterrand' s 
'motion' always received majority support. 9 I Outside of these key moments, where 
Mitterrand's will was more or less sure to prevail, the 'instrumentalisation' of party 
doctrine92 entailed changes coming down from on high. Before the 1988 Presidential 
election, key doctrinal changes such as the 'ni privatisation, ni nationalisation'stance 
were enacted. Mitterrand, relied on his personal authority within the party and the 
legitimacy derived from his position as President of the Republic. Thus he could 
impose such fundamental doctrinal changes, almost 'from without', smce the 
'distanciation' between President and party had become exaggerated during the 
'cohabitation' of 1986-1988.(see chapter 5) Neither Jospin nor any other leader of the 
PS actual or potential could rely on such assets in their dealings with the Party. 
Such was the fragility of Rocard's premiereship, for example, that he could not 
really impose upon the party the doctrinal direction 93 he personally favoured. 
Mindful of this, Jospin embarked upon a new, or rather revived an old, method of 
effecting change within the party,94 using his new internal legitimacy, in concert with 
the novel stability of the internal factions to transcend some of the traditional internal 
restraint on ideological clarification in the party. 
1995 was not a standing start for the rehabilitation of national conventions. Even prior 
to the crushing defeat of 1993, there was talk on the relevant committees of reviving 
conventions as a means of reinvigorating the internal life of the party. The report to the 
Comite Directeur of may 1992 recommended that thematic conventions be held at least 
twice a year as part of a co-ordinated strategy to re-energise the militant base.95 This 
dynamic gained momentum in the wake of the electoral blow. The historic proportions 
of the loss signified, it was felt, a wider malaise in the PS. Years of governmental 
91 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 8/12/97 
92 For a detailed account of this process see Bergounioux & Grunberg (1992) 
93Interview with Jean-Paul Huchon 29/9/97 
94 National conventions were frequent in the 1970s, but the 1980s saw only two conventions in 1984 
(Modernisation et Progres Social) and 1988 (Propositions des socialistes pour l'election 
~residentielle ). 
s Proceedings of the Comite Directeur 23 rd May 1992 in PS Info no. 515 (23/5/92) 
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practice had fostered a distanciation between the party elite and the rank and file, who 
felt they had been neglected in recent years. An attempt was made to redress this 
balance in the Etats Generaux a national level meeting held in July of 1993. It was an 
opportunity for the members to speak, to express their dismay at the state of the party 
and the conduct of the higher echelons. As the report on proceedings noted, "members 
do not feel represented in the party bodies, particularly women members, regret that 
their hopes or opinions are not taken into account by the party.,,96 
The Bourget conference reflected this concern, and was followed a few months later by 
the first thematic national convention - on employment - in February 1994. In theory, 
the text proposed by Rocard's team could be subject not only to 'national' level 
amendment, i.e. by the national leadership of the courants, but also to local, even 
individual level input. In practice, the chances of one voice being heard are minuscule. 
The participation instructions imply a rather limited nature to that lower-level 'input', 
"each militant can enrich the document and give an opinion on any proposed 
amendment before voting on the text. ,,97 The text, along with the thirty 'national' 
amendments, was sent to each member and each section voted.98 Subsequently, a federal 
convention met one week before the national convention to integrate all the votes on the 
text and each amendment from a given federation, and decide how its delegates would 
vote at the national convention. 
Fittingly, the next thematic convention, embodying a kind of reforming praxis, was 
entitled 'the renovation of the party.' This was the occasion, on October 15th 1995, when 
Jospin was directly elected first secretary. The choice of Jospin as first secretary was 
only question one of a questionnaire addressing 18 separate issues all relating to internal 
party refonn. All the key organisational changes which were to ensue under Jospin -
parity, anti-cumul changes, election of the Conseil national, the creation of the Conseil 
economique et social - were voted on by all the members when they elected Jospin as 
first secretary.99 This created a democratic mandate for the changes that were to follow, 
96 A. Bergounioux's Report of the Commission sur Ie Parti at the Etats Generaux PS Info no. 553 
(14/8/93) 
97 Vendredi 28/1/94 
98 Amendments - providing receiving majority support - could be proposed in a section, although they 
were unlikely to make it beyond the federal convention stage. 
99 Parity received a 74.98% majority; Direct elections 81.84% the Conseil economique et social 81.98% 
see the Activity report presented to the Brest conference in L 'hebdo des socialistes no.38 (31/10/97) 
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and further consolidated the legitimacy of the reform process. Also contained within the 
questionnaire was the option to hold three more major thematic conventions. The move 
was approved, and, focusing on core themes that had emerged during the 'Assises de 
la transformation sociale' the 'conventions' were held on France's place in Europe in the 
face of globalisation, democracy in public life, and redistribution and economic and 
social policy. 
The use of the convention as a tool for doctrinal precision and evolution has certain 
advantages. Firstly, it ends with a vote by all the activists, which, if the majority is 
sufficient, bolsters the legitimacy of the new policy, as well substantiating PS claims 
to internal democracy. Secondly, experts and civil society actors such as union 
leaders can be brought in and consulted. 100 Thirdly, given the stable majority status of 
the ligne majoritaire, it offers the opportunity to give voice to the more radical 
'sensibilites' within the Party, such as the Gauche Socialiste, or the Poperenistes, 
whilst being safe in the knowledge that the arithmetic of the final vote will prevent 
their influence being excessive. However, this cannot always be relied upon. 101 
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the convention as a means of effecting doctrinal 
renewal is its all-encompassing nature, involving actors at every level of the party 
organisation in the process. There is some scepticism about how involved the lower 
echelons of the party really are, 
"texts are proposed by the national leadership, which, from the outset, delimits the 
debate a great deal .... of course there is a debate at the base, lasting 1, 2, 3 
hours. In general, we will agree with the motion, because it will have been 
prepared with great intelligence ... but as for propositions really emanating 
from the base, if it is not organised by the summit, it will not get 
anywhere .... that said, good ideas from the base can be taken up by leaders at the 
summit." I 02 
100 For example, in the build-up to the convention on Globalisation, Europe, and France's place in the 
World, Moscovici consulted a series ofleading academic economists, such as Jean-Paul Fitoussi. See 
Vendredi no. 276 (8/3/96) 
101 As was demonstrated by the 40% support for the Gauche Socialiste's anti-Maastricht amendment to 
the text ofthe convention on G1obalisation, Europe, and France's place in the World in March 1996.(see 
chapter 6) 
I02Interview with Jerome Lambert 3/12/97 
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However, everyone is involved m the debate and vote of a convention, albeit some 
in relatively minor roles. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has treated the PS as an independent variable, and insisted upon the 
importance of the' structural' approach to the study of political parties. It has sought to 
open the 'black box' of intra-party politics in order to understand how the organisational 
structure of the party, and the significant evolutions it has undergone, have affected and 
influenced the wider process of party change. The importance of both formal 
organisational rules, and informal organisational conventions as 'transmission belts' 
mediating external factors within the party has been insisted upon. We have shown how 
the organisational structure of the party conditions and influences internal debates and 
internal reform processes. The authority structure, we have seen, affects what resources 
are at actors' disposal, providing a set of opportunities and constraints and pushing 
actors into coalitional strategies. The evolving role of factionalism within the party is 
central to understanding the party's organisational structure. 
Up until 1995, the interaction of factionalism and the question mark hanging over 
Mitterrand's succession crucially determined the path that internal reform took. Rennes 
made the party brutally aware of the dysfunctional nature of the courant system, and the 
need to limit it excesses. Secondly, the crushing electoral defeat of 1993 was interpreted 
as a vote of no confidence in the party's behaviour in recent years, particularly as 
regards its members. However, although the reform process began in the wake of 
Rennes, and was stepped up after April 1993, the question mark remained. This 
accounts for the limited nature of reforms and attempts at what was termed party 
renovation in the period between 1990 and 1995. At this point the need for change was 
acutely appreciated, but the issue of Mitterrand' s succession had not been settled. As a 
result, all attempts at thorough-going change to the courant either met with resistance 
from courants adversely affected by them, or were manipulated by those parties set to 
gain from such changes. 
Only when Jospin's ligne majoritaire, compnsmg all the major courants, had 
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established a 'dominant coalition,' inducing internal stability, could both doctrinal 
precision and thorough-going organisational reform proceed. Jospin's 'incontournable' 
(un-bypassable) position created the stability and consensus required to effect the 
changes discussed since 1991. The importance of direct democracy, both as a guiding 
principle of the changes and a means of legitimation for them, can clearly be seen. This 
has acted in concert with the introduction of majority voting as a counterweight to the 
traditional proportionality, which has in tum led to changes in the modus operandi of 
the courants, or sensibilites. Individual members have also seen their voice in the party 
enhanced, both through the one member, one vote principle, and through the expansion 
of the national convention as a locus of doctrinal and organisational innovation and 
preclslon. 
The reforms have only been a partial success, with enduring problems, such as co-
optation, requiring qualification to the party's claims to internal democracy. A more 
significant fly in the ointment is the centrality of Lionel Jospin to the process of reform. 
At this stage it is impossible to discern how firm the foundations of the new operating 
procedures are. This has been illustrated with the evolution of the courants, which, we 
have shown, may be due less to fundamental evolution in nature, and more to changing 
tactical context. Do the changes in the courant system rely on the personal authority 
Jospin currently commands in the party, and the fact that to oppose him would be 
political suicide, or are they 'structural'? The real test will only come when the struggle 
for power begins afresh, which will not be before the next presidential election. The 
reforms will have been in effect for some time by then, but their ability to overturn long-
held habits of internal skirmishing is questionable. 
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Chapter 4 
PS Electoral Strategy in the 19908 
In chapter 1 we introduced the supply and demand model of voting as a framework 
through which to explore the electoral strategy of the PS in the 1990s. We saw in 
chapter 2 the evolution of the French party system, and how such 'supply' variables as 
competition from the Greens, peF, and the FN are crucial to understanding PS' s 
electoral environment of the 1990s. In terms of the demand side, we outlined the 
changing socio-economic profile of the PS electorate. Here we insist on the significance 
of counteracting demand side factors - of increasing electoral volatility, economic 
voting, and the declining vote share for 'governmental' parties - all of which serve to 
undermine the reliability of sociological factors as determinants of voting behaviour. 
This chapter explores the PS elite's electoral strategy. For, although, as we saw in 
chapter 2, significant local derogation from national strategy is an integral part of the 
French party system, our concern here is to explore that national strategy, determined by 
a set of actors at the summit of the party's organisation. Therefore we need to 
understand their 'reading' of demand side changes, enabling us to analyse their supply 
side responses. We argue here that the model is particularly advantageous since it aligns 
well with perceptions within the PS elite of their electorate and electoral strategy. 
Certain key features which it highlights, such as the implications of increasing electoral 
volatility, the importance of the context and kind of election in determining electoral 
strategy, the importance of electoral allies, and the less class structured nature of the 
electorate in France today all resonate with PS electoral strategists' understanding of 
their electoral context and their electoral strategy. 
The context for our examination will be provided by an analysis of 1993, the worst 
defeat in the party's history. The reasons for the scale and scope of the defeat will be 
explored using the supply and demand model. Developments in PS electoral strategy in 
the 1990s will be conceptualised as two distinct attempts to address and solve the 
dilemmas posed by the changing demand and supply conditions of the PS' s electoral 
context. The first was Rocard's 'big bang,' and the ensuing Assises de la 
Transformation sociale. We will explore the reasons for the failure of this attempt, an 
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explanation predicated upon Rocard' s dismal showing at the 1994 European elections. 
The second attempt to address the PS's electoral dilemmas began with Jospin's 
presidential bid and the resultant process of recovery. The recovery was in part based on 
a reconquest of some of the groups who had abandoned the PS in 1993. This 
phenomenon, although further evidence of electoral volatility, nevertheless restored the 
PS's electoral strength. Such renewed electoral strength facilitated the process of 
rapprochement with the constituent elements of the gauche plurielle. We will consider 
this strategy of alliances, bringing the PS together with the Radicals, the Verts, the PCF, 
and Chevenement's MDC. Looking first at 'endogenous' factors within the two key ally 
formations - the PCF and the Verts, we argue that the gauche plurielle was only 
possible in the light of certain endogenous developments within the PS. The courant 
'cease-fire' was an important precursor to the forging of a new electoral strategy, and 
Jospin's internal hegemony was essential in managing the difficult candidate 
nomination procedures, essential for delivering on the PS's electoral agreements with its 
allies. 
Finally, we will examine the fruits which that strategy bore at the 1997 legislative 
elections. Despite this success, the results, we argue, point to the enduring electoral 
frailty of the PS, particularly in the context of increased electoral volatility. Thus the 
dilemmas posed by the PS's electoral context have been addressed, but they have been 
by no means conclusively solved. Even with the help of its allies, the PS continues to 
struggle with some groups whose support contributed to its success in the 1980s, 
notably the working class and underprivileged. 
The 'Demand and Supply' Model and PS Electoral Strategy 
The demand side) of the supply and demand model of electoral behaviour attempts to 
synthesise 'sociological' and 'rational' explanations of voting behaviour, seeing both as 
I Much literature on voting behaviour and social democracy has identified a cleavage shift to post-
materialist values as a key demand side variable. This view is not entertained at length here for two 
reasons. Firstly, whilst an increase in 'cultural liberalism' is discernible within a significant proportion of 
the electorate (Grunberg & Schweisguth 1990), this has not been accompanied by a decline in concern 
for economic or material values. Secondly, a remarkable feature of value shifts within the French 
electorate is the rise of anti-universalist, xenophobic values, often rooted in fear of economic insecurity, 
which does not sit well with the 'post-material' values thesis. (Grunberg & Schweisguth 1997) 
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complementary.{see chapter 1) Insights from the different explanations inform the two 
dimensions of the demand side within the model - the enduring influence of 'heavy' 
sociological variables such as class and religion on the one hand, tempered by increased 
volatility and issue voting on the other. However, we must be careful to take into 
account the tension between 'rational' and 'sociological' approaches. Insisting on the 
enduring importance of religion and class, which 'all other things being equal,' continue 
to explain voting behaviour involves explained 'failures' of sociological explanations in 
terms of supply side 'distortions.' However, this misconceives the role of electoral 
volatility, a hesitant electorate, and 'economic' voting. These are not conjunctural 
supply-side features tied to a particular election, but rather structural, demand-side 
features of the electorate. The fact that every parliamentary election since 1981 has 
voted out the incumbents illustrates how structural a feature of the French electoral 
landscape these demand-side aspects of volatility and economic voting have become. 
We strongly reject any deterministic notion of the relationship between sociological 
variables such as class and religion and electoral behaviour.{Michelat & Simon: 1977) 
The structuring effect on the electorate of 'heavy' sociological variables is declining as 
such factors are increasingly undermined by counteracting demand side variables. These 
include 'economic' voting, the declining strength of party identification,2 heightened 
electoral volatility, and declining satisfaction with the political system in general and 
'governmental' parties in particular. The result is an increasingly mobile and hesitant 
electorate, which has an increasing propensity to decide later in the campaign and in 
some cases to abstain. A modified 'demand' side approach offers two insights. Firstly, 
class structure is changing, with a fragmentation of homogenous electoral blocs of 
support which arguably characterised the left electorate in the Fordist period. Secondly, 
the relevance of class to voting behaviour is declining. 
In terms of social class,3 Boy & Mayer argue that some broad trends remain discernible. 
Using the INSEE class indicators,4 they argue, "the principal electoral cleavage today 
2 87% of the electorate in 1995 still classed themselves closer to one party than any other, and 75% of 
those retained the same party loyalty as their parents, however, whilst this influence still conditions 
voting behaviour, it by no means determines it, as declining party loyalty demonstrates .. (Boy & Mayer 
1 997b : 15) 
3 The picture is complicated by changes in class structure and working experiences, and by different 
measures of class used by different electoral studies. 
4 These distinguish between' independent' earners (Farmers, Artisans, Traders, the self employed), 
salaried manual workers, and salaried non-manual workers. (Boy & Mayer 1997a : 108) 
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opposes independent earners, who vote mainly for the Right, with salaried workers, who 
vote more often for the Left." (1997a : 114) Yet this purported cleavage masks levels of 
variance over short periods of time which lead us to be sceptical about its validity. For 
example, the proportion of manual workers voting for the left has dropped significantly 
from 68% in 1988, to 52% in 1995, whilst the number of non-manual workers voting for 
the Left fell from 56% in 1988 to 46% in 1995.(Boy & Mayer 1997a : 108-110) 
Whereas in 1978, 70% of manual workers voted for the Left, by 1995 that proportion 
was down to 52% of manual workers (and 51 % of non-manual workers). For the 1997 
election, occupational class is still less reliable a predictor. There were no differences 
between non-manual and manual workers' propensity to vote for the Left. The 
difference between left voting of the self-employed and salaried workers also declined, 
from 42% in 1978 to 23% in 1997. ( Boy & Mayer 2000 : 156-157) 
The correlation between strength of commitment to Catholicism5 and propensity to vote 
for the moderate right fairs slightly better, remains fairly strong,6 suggesting we should 
not abandon all reference to sociological factors. However, even here, we must be 
cautious. In 1997, amongst non-practising Catholics (the overwhelming majority of 
French voters), 48% voted for the Left, whilst 52% voted for the Right or FN. This 
suggests that declining religious practice undermines the Right's 'capture' of Catholic 
voters.{Boy & Mayer 2000: 154) 
Boy & Mayer argue that new sociological cleavages 7 offer some explanatory 
purchase.(l997; 2000) The note, for example, a fairly strong correlation has been noted 
between public sector employment and propensity to vote for the Left. "Modest 
amongst manual workers, (50% [private sector workers] as against 59% [public sector 
workers] voting for the Left) the tendency is more pronounced at the cadre (senior, 
supervisory) level, because of those working in the private sector, 40% vote for the Left, 
as against 59% of those working in the public sector." (Boy & Mayer 1997a : 131) 
However, none of these sociological variables tell the whole story, as one glance at 
recent French electoral history illustrates. Their ability to explain the depths of the 
S Overwhelmingly the predominant religion in France, although down from 82% of the electorate in 1988 
to 75% in 1995. (Boy & Mayer 1997a: \03) 
6 Thus whilst only 19% of regular practising Catholics voted for the Left: in the first round of the 1995 
fresidential elections, 68% of those without religion voted for the left. (Boy & Mayer 1997a: 104-106) 
This echoes the work of Dunleavy and Husbands in Britain.( 1985) 
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defeat suffered by the PS in 1993 is, to say the least, limited.(see later) The 
counteracting trends within the demand side are essential part of the story. As more 
volatile voters display an increasing propensity to vote 'economically,' shift allegiance 
or abstain, sociological variables are decreasingly reliable predictors of voting 
behaviour. 
The role of prospective economic perfonnance in explaining electoral outcomes in 
France (Lewis-Beck 1988; 1997;2000) has been neglected by those still focusing heavily 
on sociological explanations. Here we reassert its importance within the demand and 
supply approach. For example, the degree of importance attached by voters to 
unemployment as a government priority has, unsurprisingly, risen in tandem with 
unemployment itself.8 In this context, perception of the prospective effects on the 
economy of a candidate and/or party have become increasingly important issues in 
every election since 1981. Indeed, Lewis-Beck argues such perceptions9 were a key 
detenninant in the 1995 presidential election.(1997 : 261) The effect of such 
considerations is to undennine the relationship identified in sociological approaches to 
voting. As Lewis-Beck notes, "other things being equal, the French will make the same 
partisan choice election after election. Of course, other things are not always equal, and 
certain issues, such as immigration or economics, will drive some away from their 'first' 
party, perhaps pennanently."(2000 : 13) 
The upshot of such 'issue voting' is increased volatility. A recent study by Jaffre and 
Chiche of electoral mobility noted that, "electoral mobility seems to be on the increase, 
from 21% in 1986, to 26.5% in 1993, reaching 30% in 1995." (Jaffre and Chiche 1997 : 
292) Their analysis of mobility between the elections of 1993, 1994 and 1995 found 
44% of the electorate to be stable, 26% to consistently abstain, and 30% of the 
electorate to be mobile. This figure is less alarming when one realises intra-Left and 
intra-Right shifts account for 9% each, but nevertheless the degree of volatility appears 
high. (Jaffre and Chiche 1997 : 291) The Left's stable electorate - those voting in each 
election for the same party of the Left - was only 13%. Another feature of a more 
hesitant electorate is the propensity to decide later in the campaign. The number 
8 In 1981, when asked' Among the following things, which should the government give priority?' the 
mean response for unemployment was 56%. By 1995, the mean had risen to 83%.(Sofres 1989;1996) 
9 Asked if the economy would be more likely to improve under Chirac or Jospin, 72% of respondents 
opted for Chirac, 28% for Jospin. Asked if the economy would be more likely to worsen under Chirac or 
Jospin. 82% opted for Jospin. and only 18% for Chirac.(1997 : 242) 
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deciding long before the 1988 presidential election was 75%, down to 52% in 1995. 
Those deciding during the campaign rose from 8% in 1988 to 21 % in 1995, and those 
deciding at the last minute rose from lOin 1988 to 20% in 1995.(Jaffre and Chiche 1997 
: 307) One of the clearest indications of the level of electoral volatility is that the 
'pendulum' has swung at every parliamentary election since 1981. 
On balance, the evidence suggests the enduring electoral relevance of class to voting 
behaviour which, 'other things being equal' should lead to a good showing for the PS 
amongst some of the working class and the salaried middle classes. Yet this fails to 
capture a qualititative change in French electoral behaviour. 'Other things' are not equal 
in a context where electoral volatility, economic voting and strategic voting have 
become structural features of the demand-side of the electoral behaviour 
equation.(Dupoirier 1990; Beck 2000; Jaffre and Chiche 1997) 
PS strategists accept this demand-side shift and attempt to work within the changed 
'demand' conditions. As the party's number two Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 
rhetorically asks; 
"did we pursue the 'median' voter? No, because of the volatility of the French 
political situation. There are solidly constituted blocks - on the right and the left 
in France - which balance each other out roughly. But there is a third block, 
which is extremely volatile, and which has been swinging back and forth since 
1981 - depending on the moment when the election is held. Thus, the conjuncture 
is all important. The strategic art is to unite the left block with that floating 
electorate." I 0 
However, even this more nuanced approach to the demand side is not sufficient to 
understand the 'conjuncture' of an election fully. Each election result must be 
contextualised through analysis of the supply-side conditions surrounding it. The most 
important 'supply-side' factor is the changing party system, with new parties, both 
ecologist and Front National, exploiting declining satisfaction with the party system in 
general, and the 'governing' parties in particular (see chapter 2), and exerting 
competitive pressures on the PS. Thus any electoral agreements reached between the PS 
and other parties of the Left are a crucial supply side condition. 
Another structuring supply-side condition are the increasing strict rules governing 
campaign funding. In an attempt to curb political corruption, laws in 1988 and 1990 
10 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
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limited presidential and parliamentary election expenses and tightened regulations on 
party political broadcasts. In 1993 and 1995, laws augmented state funding of parties 
from 270 million francs to 580 million, outlawed funding of political parties and 
electoral campaigns by firms and companies, and further reduced the election 
expenditure 'ceiling' by 30%.(Fay 1995 : 673) 
The other, more ephemeral, but nevertheless often highly significant supply-side 
variables are the popularity of the party or the leader at the time of the election, public 
perceptions of the key themes of the electoral campaign, and the fact of incumbency. 
These factors are crucial given the demand side conditions outlined above which have 
rendered such considerations increasingly important to voting behaviour. The political 
conjuncture is a further crucial factor, for example, whether or not a legislative election 
comes on the 'coat-tails' of a presidential one. Finally, as we saw in chapter 2, local 
political realities - such as municipal incumbency and the relative strength of potential 
allies - provide the strategic 'supply-side' context of elections. 
The demand and supply model has implications for social democratic electoral strategy. 
The PS finds itself obliged, at every election, to attempt to reconstitute the electorate, 
taking account of the nature of the election, the strategic context, the key issues and 
personalities of the campaign. This process of reconstituting an electorate involves 
bringing together diverse ideological orientations and people from widely differing 
social positions. In 1990, Bergounioux characterised the dilemma facing the PS in an 
article for the party's Nouvelle Revue Socialiste, "the cleavages are numerous. The class 
cleavage is no longer on its own a determinant of political cleavages. The role of parties, 
or their leaders and of their members, is to seize, in any given conjuncture, upon which 
cleavages will be instrumental to creating a political majority." As a result of people 
increasingly getting their information and political formation not through the party but 
through the media, Bergounioux argues, "opinions are more autonomous, and more 
'floating' electorally."(1990 : 115-116) 
1993 : The Worst Defeat in the History of French Socialism 
Election results between 1986 and 1989 illustrated to protagonists and analysts alike 
that, "the PS, effectively dominant under Mitterrand, seems to be losing that hegemonic 
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position - under the pressure of competition from its allies and from the ecologists. It 
has become clear that the hopes, of first Gaullists and then Socialists, to become an 
established electorally dominant force commanding 35-40% of the vote, have come up 
against the inherent multi-partyism of the French."(Charlot 1992 : 22) For PS electoral 
strategists, then, the 1990s is an age of diminished expectations. Bartolone, then 
National Secretary in charge of elections, recalls of the period prior to the 1993 defeat, 
"we were obliged to accept that the idea of a 'single' party - dominating the whole of 
the Left and imposing its views on the Left - had to be rethought." II 
These recollections suggest an awareness of the PS' s fragile position, but nothing could 
have prepared the party's leaders for the scale of their defeat at the polls. In the event, 
only 62% of voters who declared themselves 'close to the PS', and less than one in two 
voters who classified themselves as 'on the left' of a left/right divide voted for the PS in 
1993.(Le Gall 1993 : 11) Analogous to the nationalisation of support in the 70s and 80s, 
1993 represented a nationalisation of defeat, with sharp fall in support being replicated 
in every region of France. 12 All the good work and progress made since Epinay seemed 
to be reversed overnight. The electoral map showing those areas where the drop in PS 
vote share since 1988, "looks like the traditional electoral map of the French right: 
West-Interior, Alsace-Lorraine, South East of the Massif Central, Rhone Alpes, and the 
Paris Basin."(Grunberg 1994a : 200) 
One key supply-side factor which helps explain the scale of the defeat is the party's 
strength relative to potential allies and competitors within the party system, 
demonstrated by the strength of the PS vote relative to its competitor parties. A 
significant proportion of the disenchanted PS vote chose instead the FN, whose 
advances among the working classes continued to be consolidated. As Le Gall noted in 
the PS periodical Vendredi Idees post-mortem of the defeat, "The FN, who totalled 
12.6%, is markedly more successful [than the PS] among workers, employees, amongst 
the young, and even more so among those classing themselves as 'underprivileged'." 
(1993 : 22) In addition to the Cote d' Azur, \3 where the FN has long challenged the PS, 
II Interview with Claude Bartolone 11112/97 
12 see Grunberg 1 994a in particular table 2 and Map 1 
13 see Grunberg 1 994a Map 5 - showing the FN outstripping the PS vote From East of Marseilles to the 
Italian Border. 
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new areas of socialist weakness emerged in 1993 from which the FN benefited. 14 The 
PS's inability to replace the PCF in urban areas with large immigrant populations has 
considerably aided FN progress, and further undermined PS support with the working 
class. In 1993, the FN outpolled the PS at the first ballot in 151 constituencies, going on 
to face the moderate right in an all right-wing second ballot in 81 
constituencies.(Grunberg 1994a : 196) 
As Grunberg's analysis shows, areas where PS losses were most severe were precisely 
those where not only the FN, but also the Ecologists, and PCF made their best scores. 
The PS hegemony on the Left was so radically undermined that it was not clear whether 
the party would remain the single largest non-Right grouping. "The PS is confronted by 
competition from many new political forces, whose actions, in addition to those of 
traditional competitor formations, considerably reduce the PS level of influence ... .In 
Rhone-Alpes, the Parisian basin, Provence-Alpes-Cote d' Azur, in the Lille suburbs, in 
Alsace and Moselle, advances by the Front and the ecologists converged to weaken the 
Parti socialiste."(1994a : 206) 
Another supply side factor was a generalised disenchantment with an incumbent 
government tainted by infighting, serious corruption scandals (Fay 1995 : 370; Lafay & 
Servais 2000), and unacceptably high unemployment. Satisfaction with the government 
was at record lows, with 82% declaring themselves dissatisfied, as against 15% 
satisfied.(Giacometti 1993 : 58) This was all the more damaging since potential 
electoral allies were disinclined to come to arrangements with the PS (see later). The PS 
was further hindered by association with an ageing and, it later transpired, seriously ill 
'lame duck' President whose sureness of political touch had begun to desert him, as 
illustrated by the ill-judged appointment of Cresson as Prime Minister.(Cole 1997 : 172) 
Mitterrand's personal popularity slumped in the 3 years leading up to 1993. In 1989, 
those having a 'positive opinion' were 61%, those holding a 'negative opinion' 31%. By 
1993, those figures had changed to 35% and 60% respectively. (Giacometti 1993 : 58) 
Reinforcing our point about the declining relevance of class to voting behaviour, 
dissatisfaction with the PS was sufficiently widespread to cross all socio-economic 
14 see Grunberg 1994a Map 4. 
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barriers. Le Gall, writing here in his capacity as the PS' s foremost electoral strategist 
claims that, "on March 21 st, 'inter-classist' socialism gave way to a sociological quasi-
indeterminism." (1993 : 21) The 1993 vote continues to support the old 'Parti des profs' 
tag of the PS. The only social categories in which the PS, taken together with the 
ecologist vote, outperformed or at least equalled the right were, "teachers, the scientific 
professions, 'intermediary' professions such as health and the employment service, and 
in the public sector." According to BVA polls, 50% of those classing themselves as 
'upper middle class' voted for the mainstream right, whilst only 22% of this category 
voted for the PS and 'divers gauche'. Amongst the lower middle class, the results were 
scarcely more encouraging with scores of 41% and 21% respectively. (Le Gall 1993 : 
21-22) Nor was the performance amongst the workers much better. "At the level of its 
electorate, the PS has performed a 'super-Bad Godesburg', but sadly without social 
democracy: only 20% of labourers and employees voted for it. The conservative right 
out-polled the PS, and indeed the whole of the Left, in almost every social category, 
including small eamers."(Le Gall 1993 : 21-22) 
Thus, in 1993, the post-Epinay electoral synthesis was pulled apart in two directions. 
Firstly, the working classes deserted the incumbent government for parties of protest, be 
it the PCF, other extreme Left parties, or the FN.lS Secondly, the young, salaried, well-
educated middle classes without close ties with the catholic church (i.e. the other core 
constituency of the Epinay synthesis) voted in larger numbers for the moderate right or 
h I · 16 t e eco OglstS. 
The 'Big Bang' and the Assises de la Transformation Sociale 
In the aftermath of the PS' worst ever defeat, Rocard, the new 'president' of the party, 
sought to follow up the logic of his 'big bang' speech by organising meetings between 
all the political groupings, and groups in civil society more widely, with whom the PS 
could hold a constructive discussion. Rocard's 'big bang' was probably intended to be 
IS SOFRES post-electoral surveys show that PS support amongst labourers, blue collar workers and the 
unemployed was halved between 1988 and 1993. BVA surveys showed those considering themselves 
working class or underprivileged, and those most worried about their future, voted in large numbers for 
the FN, PCF and extreme left parties. See Grunberg 1994a Tables 8-10. 
16 SOFRES post-electoral survey show ecologists best results among the young (18% of 18-34 year olds); 
the well educated (17% of graduates); and the non religious (18%) See Grunberg 1994a Table 10. 
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the beginning of his presidential bid, but he brought the speech forward to before the 
1993 elections, perhaps hoping to avoid the pre-empted rout. It was an attempt to take 
into account the changing socio-economic context of voting. "Once," Rocard observed, 
"if you told me where you work, where you lived, what your parents did, and whether 
you went to church, I could have told you how you voted .. [however, today] life in 
society is more a series of individual trajectories ... without clear solidarities." This 
necessarily leads, according to Rocard, to "the calling into question of traditional parties 
and political formations." 
Having outlined a few core principles, such as equality of opportunity guaranteed by the 
state, and then criticised the PS courants and the PS's traditional 'submission' of its 
allies, Rocard went on to present his vision. Rocard advocated, "a vast movement, open, 
modern and rich in its diversity, .... A movement which federates all those who share 
the same values of solidarity, the same aim of social transformation ..... it will 
encompass the reformism of ecologists, the loyalty to a social tradition of centrisme, 
and the authentic renovatory impulse of communism." After calling for the introduction 
of a 'dose of proportional representation' into the present (legislative electoral) system, 
Rocard finished by imploring all concerned to confront the obstacles to "the political big 
bang to which I aspire.,,)7 
The Big Bang sought to take account of the changes both in voting behaviour and the 
socio-economic structure of society. This was an electoral strategy designed to work in 
the context of Le Gall's 'sociological quasi-indeterminism'. Key demand side shifts, 
such as heightened electoral volatility and the declining relevance of socio-economic 
position to voting behaviour, had been 'factored in' to Rocard's analysis. Or so he 
hoped. One of the more radical changes implied by Rocard's strategic assessment of the 
electoral context of the PS was a new18 costlbenefit analysis of political strategy. Given 
the decline of the manual working class, Left wing allies such as the PCF were 
decreasingly important. Conversely, in a somewhat 'zero-sum' analysis, allies to the 
centre had the potential to tap into a larger pool of the growing salaried middle classes. 
17 All selections from Rocard's speech at Montlouis-sur-Seine 17/2/93 
18 Its novelty is perhaps questionable, given that Rocard had been advocating it for years. The innovation 
lay in tying an old argument to recent socio-economic and electoral trends. 
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Rocard's radical project caused a stir, not least because it seemed to threaten the end of 
the PS. Previous electoral strategy was predicated upon what Charlot calls a 
reequilibrage - involving a sizeable and permanent shift in support between largely 
unchanging parties. Rocard was proposing something more akin to 
dealignmentirealignment, which implies a re-designing of the political landscape (and a 
re-invention of existing political parties) as well as a transfer of votes.(Charlot 1994 : 
270) The explicit advocacy of alliances with the centre had long been the Rocardian 
political strategy of choice.(see chapter 5) The attraction of creating a political alliance 
with centrist groups is a permanent shift in the gravity of French politics away from the 
far Left. In the end, Rocard's 'big idea' never really weathered the storm which 
followed the defeat. The centrists firmly associated themselves with the parties of the 
Right, some joining the Balladur government. Thus the realignment was only likely to 
happen within the Left, or at best between the Left and the ecologists, since the centrists 
had taken up the drawbridge. (Charlot 1994 : 279) 
Huchon, Rocard's right hand man and a keen proponent of a centre-left alliance, 
explains what stopped the process coming to fruition in a slightly longer perspective; 
"We were trying to construct a democratic alliance, with people like Soisson, 
but unfortunately it never got off the ground because all the actors involved were 
much more Left-wing. The road to the centre was cut off in June 1988, at the 
moment when Rocard did not ask Mitterrand to dissolve the Assembly - when 
Rocard could have constructed a majority without the Communists. Rocard did 
not have the courage or the political intuition that the centrists were ready. He 
decided that he was too weak in relation to Mitterrand, and that if on top of that -
he appeared to be a puppit of the centrists on every vote, he would be washed out 
in three months. So he chose 'security' whereas, perhaps, he should have chosen 
the risk. In my opinion, had Rocard built a centre-socialist majority, he would 
have been untouchable.,,19 
Bichat, a Fabiusian, offers a Mitterrandist view of Rocard's aims of centre-left alliances; 
"The problem is, there is not the political reality to back it up. Apart from a few 
personalities like Soisson, there is no constituency in the heart of the centrists 
prepared to accept an agreement..... The centre has never been anywhere other 
than on the Right. There may be certain individuals who are prepared to act as 
messengers between the two camps in certain cases where some centrists are 
prepared to vote with us, like on the Plan Aubry. But there is not a centre distinct 
19 Interview with Jean-Paul Huchon 29/9/97 
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from the Right in France. ,,20 
Rocard, however, continued to believe in his strategy, and wanted to act upon it once at 
the head of the Party. 
According to Huchon, "when Rocard launched the Assises de fa Tramiformation 
Socia/e, his aim was to reconstitute an alliance between the PS, civil society, the trade 
unions and associations .... In Rocard's mind, it was in no way a reconstruction of the 
Union de Gauche.,,21 However, such was the scale of the defeat, and so tarnished was 
the Party by the corruption scandals which surrounded its final years in office, that it 
was not at all clear that anyone was prepared to enter into dialogue with them. As 
Cambadelis, co-orchestrator of the Assises, recalls, the PS initially encountered open 
hostility. "At first, we were thrown out of demonstrations [on the right to housing, and 
on the sans-papiers] but over time we became tolerated, then accepted, then actively 
encouraged, until finally the PS became seen as a useful weapon in all of these 
. ,,22 
campalgns. 
Although Rocard happily involved Communist 'renovators' such as Herzog, he did not 
see the Assises as an instrument of rapprochement between the PS and the PCF. 
"Initially," Huchon recollects, "the Assises was meant to be a meeting of clubs, 
associations, the CFDT, intended to become a mechanism facilitating a transcending of 
traditional political boundaries.,,23 However, as the process got under way, it became 
clear that Jospin and Cambadelis, chosen by Rocard to organise the meetings, did not 
share Rocard's strategic vision. Although marginalised in the party and contemplating 
leaving politics at the time,24 Jospin saw the Assises as an ideal opportunity to explore 
the potential of the Rouge-Rose-Vert coalition which Melenchon had championed the 
year before. Rocard became aware that the direction being taken by the Assises deviated 
from his vision, however his position in the party was not sufficiently assured to react 
strongly. Furthermore, the success of the venture - due largely to the efforts of 
Cambadelis and Jospin, was an important boost coming in the wake of such a 
20 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 22/9/97 
21 Interview with Jean-Paul Huchon 29/9/97 
22 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
23 Interview with Jean-Paul Huchon 29/9/97 
24 His political marginalisation,in the end short lived, has been satirised as 'the crossing of the sandpit.' 
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humiliating defeat. 
From Big Bang to Damp Squib 
Rocard's vision of the PS's path to electoral renewal, articulated in his big bang speech, 
suffered the same fate as his presidential ambitions. Both were scuppered by the pitiful 
14.5% Rocard's official PS list received in the 1994 European elections. The Rocard 
result was anticipated by Grunberg, for many years a Rocard advisor, who saw the split 
in terms of social cleavages which emerged in the Maastricht referendum as an ominous 
portent. "70% of cadres superieurs, 71 % of degree holders, 61 % of people with the hac 
and 57% of 'intermediary' professions voted yes, whereas 57% of labourers, 58% of 
blue collar workers, and 60% of people with less than the hac voted no."(Grunberg 
1994b : 22) Thus the European elections, coming less than two years after the 
referendum, represented for the PS, "a worrying situation, because its electoral success 
of the 1970s and 1980s was built on a synthesis of the values and expectations of the 
middle classes and 'couches populaires'."(Grunberg 1994b : 23) A synthesis between 
these increasingly divergent constituencies over the European question would at best 
prove elusive. Grunberg's analysis goes on to show that, on balance, the PS electorate is 
substantially more pro-European than anti-, but insists upon the need for the careful 
handling of the European issue so as not to offend the working class. 
Guidoni, National Secretary in Charge of Foreign Relations, offers a mild caricature of 
the PS's electoral dilemma which nevertheless reveals an important truth. "The 'normal' 
PS electorate is not 30% of the population, in fact, it is 15% plus 15%. 15% are middle 
class or upper middle class; very well educated, comfortably off, little to fear from 
unemployment; they are modem, culturally and morally liberal, and very European. The 
other 15% is the working class electorate; very attached to the public services, social 
security, and their droits acquis. They are poorer, and feel very threatened by 
unemployment, very concerned about social justice, and not very European. The 
difficulty for the Socialists, is to have both at the same time. So, when you run a 
campaign aimed at only one of those categories, well - you get the result Rocard 
achieved in the European elections of 1994.,,25 
25 Interview with Pierre Guidoni 24/9/97 
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Important 'supply side' factors contribute to a more nuanced explanation of the scale of 
Rocard's defeat. Chief among these was the nature of the election. The distinction 
between 'decisive' and 'intermediary' elections is important here. As an 'intermediary' 
election, European elections are more conducive to protest voting, and, bereft as they 
are of institutional pressures towards rassemblement, more difficult for 'governmental' 
parties to excel in. (see chapter 2) As such, the decision of Rocard to head the list was 
an extremely risky one. He could not reasonably expect to reverse the defeat of a year 
ago in a proportional election not conducive to 'governmental' party success. Rocard 
could have asked a lesser figure to head the list, which would not have 'personalised' 
the result as a reflection on Rocard himself. He chose not to and paid a heavy price. 
Another supply side factor was the relationship with competitor parties within the non-
communist Left at the 1994 European elections. The behaviour of Rocard's Arch enemy 
Francois Mitterrand after Rocard took the helm of the party is highly significant. 
Mitterrand's implacable opposition to Rocard's bid to succeed him as President was 
shared by Mitterrand's friends within the Party. As Guyomarch notes, Mitterrand's 
friends, "did not have to wait long before the opportunity arose .... the European 
elections in 1994 offered an ideal opportunity. Presidential friends joined Tapie's list in 
competition with the official list led by Rocard."(Guyomarch 1995) . 
Le Gall's analysis of the European election results seem to suggest that the cleavage 
anticipated by Grunberg and Guidoni did indeed materialise, though perhaps not quite in 
the manner anticipated. "Globally, the crisis of support for the socialist lists of 1994 
confirms the weak credibility of the PS among the young, labourers and blue collar 
workers; phenomena observed in the 1992 regional elections, and accentuated in the 
1993 legislative elections."(Le Gall 1994b : 6) Surprisingly, however, the benefactor of 
this abandonment of the PS was not the 'euro-sceptics' - the PCF or Chevenement's 
MDC. Rather, it was the federalist (although less overtly pro-European) Energie 
Radicale list headed by Bernard Tapie. "The rejection of governmental socialism, which 
continues to colour the PS image, seems to have had an enduring destructuring effect on 
the socialist vote, particularly amongst the working class, who preferred to vote for 
Tapie." Tapie's list beat the PS in 25 departements, 5 regions, 80 of the 225 towns with 
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30,000+ inhabitants, and in 148 legislative constituencies. (Le Gall 1994b : 6-7) 
1995 : Jospin's 'successful' defeat 
The extraordinary circumstances of Jospin's candidacy necessitated internal PS 
primaries (pitting him against his old ally Emmanuelli), delaying the start of Jospin's 
campaign. Many felt that Jospin's decision to stand was a big gamble. "Even among his 
close friends, many asked themselves whether he would even be present in the second 
round. Many political observers at the time thought it would be a run-off between 
Chirac and Balladur.,,26 Initially, Jospin was only really aiming to prepare the ground 
for the following presidential election, and to secure control of the party. However, the 
humiliation of not reaching the second ballot would have been very politically 
damaging. As the campaign gained momentum, and divisions on the Right began to 
work in Jospin's favour, Jospin's diminished expectations began to expand, "bit by bit, 
he 'presidentialised' himself, adding a new dimension to his candidacy, and making up 
for both the delay and his initial credibility deficit."(Estier 1996 : 302/7 
The scale of the recovery was demonstrated on April 23 rd, when Jospin came first in the 
first ballot, with 23.3% of the vote. This was undoubtedly a moral victory for Jospin, 
particularly when compared to the dismal PS electoral performances of 1993 and 1994. 
Indeed, the 1995 presidential electoral results seem to justify Charlot's earlier 
scepticism about the degree of 'restructuring' the French political system had really 
undergone. 1995 proved that, due in no small part to the systemic pressure exerted by 
the 'decisive' presidential electoral system, "the left-right structuring of the political 
space remained intact .... This proved some comfort to Socialist strategists, since it 
marked a partial return of the Left's electoral base (industrial and clerical workers, 
teachers, middle managers) after the nadir of I 993."(Cole 1995 : 343) 
However, the arithmetic of the first ballot results ensured that Jospin's victory would 
only be a moral one. It was not all good news. As Lewis-Beck noted earlier, Jospin did 
not succeed in restoring voter confidence in PS economic competence.(1997 : 242) 
26 Interview with Claude Bartolone 11/12/97 
27 Claude Estier was Jospin's campaign organiser. De Mitterrand a Jospin: Trente Ans de Campagnes 
Presidentielles 1996 Paris; Stock p302 
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There was no evidence of a regaining of the electoral strength of the 1980s. The 
sociological profile of the 1995 Jospin electorate continued to display worrying traits of 
a desertion by the working class. In the first round, "Jospin's strongest support came 
from public sector categories such as teachers (40%) or students (30%); or from high-
ranking (26%) and middle management (31 %). By contrast, industrial workers (21 %) 
remained suspicious of the Socialist representative; lower clerical workers (23%) were 
barely more accommodating."(Cole 1995 : 338) 
Polls suggest that Le Pen continued to be the beneficiary of this exodus. "The big 
changes in voting behaviour in 1995 were the marked decline in support for the Left 
among both blue- and white-collar workers, the rise of support for Le Pen among the 
same groups and the general increase in support for the candidates of the centre-
right."(Guyomarch 1996 : 153) The FN outpolled every other party amongst industrial 
workers with 27%, and the mapping of local FN strongholds correlates closely with 
some lost PS bastions, notably the Mediterranean coast and the NordlPas-de-Calais 
areas.(Cole 1995 ; Le Gall 1995) In the second ballot, when the institutional constraints 
of the presidential electoral system forced a choice between Chirac and Jospin, the PS 
candidate did poll 57% of the vote amongst industrial workers, compared to Chirac's 
43%. However, when placed in comparison with 1988, it becomes clear that this 
apparent 'success' masks a troubling trend. "Paradoxically, Chirac's gain among blue-
and white-collar workers contributed greatly to his victory. Among blue-collar workers, 
he gained 17% between 1988 and 1995."(Guyomarch 1996 : 155) 
Jospin's 1995 presidential campaign is best characterised as a successful damage 
limitation exercise. "If the bases of Mitterrand' s 1981 and 1988 social coalition had not 
disappeared in 1995, it had been so weakened that Jospin had no real chance of success. 
Jospin scored less well than Mitterrand in all areas and all social groups, but his decline 
was most marked among urban workers."(Guyomarch 1996 : 159) Nevertheless, the 
whole episode was something of a personal political triumph. Jospin succeeded, in 
adverse political circumstances, in reversing the acute electoral decline witnessed by the 
PS in the early 1990s. Furthermore, the first round 'victory', and the respectable 47.36% 
showing in the second round ensured Jospin's internal dominance within the PS. 
Overnight, Jospin became the 'incontoumable' de facto leader of French socialism, only 
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months after having declared his intention to leave politics. From this position, and 
having proved his worth as a potential pole de rassemblement for the Left, Jospin could 
court his potential electoral allies from a position of relative strength. 
The Allies 1. PCF 
The collapse of Soviet and East European Communism has given the decline of the PCF 
over the 1980s an irreversible air. Far from constituting a viable alternative model of 
society, the PCF could only hope to offer a viable depute or occupant of the town hall in 
disparate localities which still had pockets of strong Communist electoral support. 
These increasingly localised pockets of support make generalisations about PSIPCF 
electoral collaboration very difficult. Whilst the PS normally contests all seats at all 
elections, the Communists are increasingly marginal, competing in a limited number of 
seats, their realistic goals being some parliamentary leverage, a 'tribune' role and 
influence on public opinion, and representation at the European and, most importantly, 
municipal level. (Courtois & Lazar 1995 : 397-414) 
The nature of their parliamentary leverage has changed significantly in recent years. So 
much so, in fact, that the threatened erosion of the PCF's parliamentary foothold 
presented the PS with a bargaining chip. "The PCF's obsession has always been to keep 
their parliamentary group. Even in their accords with us, at one point, we agreed to 
reduce the number of deputes required to constitute a parliamentary group in order that 
the PCF could preserve their group. In the Senate, they saved their parliamentary group 
by inviting one of Chevenement' s friends to join it. ,,28 
Local politics has become of increasing importance to the PCF as it declines nationally. 
"At the municipal level, the PCF has never contested the alliance with the Left, because 
it constitutes the PCF's principal fallback position. Even more so with the collapse of 
communism in the Soviet Union. Town halls have become the sole basis, the key 
political reality.,,29 The need to retain this 'political reality' constrains the PCF at the 
national level, due to the autonomy which local notables derive from their local power 
bases. This has been compounded by national level decline, forcing the PCF to allow its 
28 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 22/9/97 
29 Interview with Jean Marcel Bichat 8/12/97 
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mayors to stand for parliamentary election. The PCF, "was forced, whether it liked it or 
not, to submit to the political logic of notabilization : the alternative in reality was either 
elect a red notable or lose the election."{Meny 1995 : 184) 
The PCF had always refused the cumul des mandats, fearing 'municipal cretinism', or 
the obscuring of doctrinal purity in the solving of local problems. Such a stance became 
a lUxury the PCF could no longer afford, but the concession entailed a loss of control for 
the central organisation. Under Marchais, with the resurgence of pro-Sovietism in the 
early 1980s, the (anti-Union de Gauche) 'militant autonomists' had triumphed over the 
(pro-Union de Gauche),frontists'. However, by the late 1980s, 'reconstructors' such as 
Claude Poperen and Marcel Rigout, inspired by Gorbachevian glasnost and 
perestroika, were attempting to counter Marchais' {un)democratic centralism. In the 
1989 municipal elections, with the leadership attempting to purge dissidents, the battle-
lines between 'reconstructors' and 'militant autonomists' were drawn. In the event, "a 
number of rebel local officials, whom the party had chosen to purge and attempt to 
defeat, did well with reconstructor support." (Ross 1992 : 54) In terms of relations with 
the PS, this de-coupling between central and local within the PCF is significant. It offers 
a degree of freedom to local pockets of 'renovators', 'reconstructors', or old-style 
'frontists', paving the way, in areas where alliance is mutually advantageous, for closer 
PSIPCF co-operation. "Communist office-holders [now] have greater latitude. There are 
certain Communists who, even if not supported by the party, could remain in their 
bastions and individually come to an arrangement with the PS. Thus the PCF is 
condemned to the Union.,,30 
Bartolone underlines the importance of such endogenous factors within the proposed 
ally party, "when Hue succeeded Marchais, the PCF was obliged to question its own 
future ... Given that there was no dominant cultural and political model to adhere to, the 
PCF had to choose between the fringe-group status of a number of European communist 
parties, or a process of social-democratisation in order to enter into alliance with social 
democrats - and that is what they did.,,3} This is not to say, however, that the wounds 
first opened at Tours in 1920 have healed overnight. Relations remained strained 
between PCF and PS in the 1990s, even after Marchais' departure. Indeed, some see a 
30 Interview with Jean Marcel Bichat 8/12/97 
31 Interview with Claude Bartolone 11/12/97 
131 
certain continuity in PCF approach to Socialist presidential candidacies of 1988 and 
1995. "In 1988, the PCF said; 'the evolution under Mitterrand has been catastrophic, 
things have never been so hard for the workers, but we will not vote for Chirac, and we 
must block Le Pen. Thus, we will vote Mitterrand, but we will remain firmly in 
opposition. In 1995, the PCF said 'we have to use the Jospin ballot paper' - those are 
the exact words - and one gets the impression that they will only touch it with a pair of 
tweezers. ,,32 
For all these difficulties, some foresee a steady reduction in the distance between the 
two historic rivals. None more so than Ernmanuelli, former PS first secretary, whose 
speech to the Brest Conference33 invited the communists to become the 'permanent 
concubines' of the PS. When asked to clarify his statement, Emmanuelli observed, "I 
see no future for the Communists. Bit by bit, I think we have to accept that they will 
become an extra sensibilite within the Parti socialiste - or part of some kind of 
confederation.,,34 Such predictions may paper over certain significant cracks - notably 
over the pace of reforms and European policy, where the PCF has not hesitated in 
voicing its criticisms of the PS. Yet without any serious prospect of reversing its 
decline, the PCF may not have many alternatives. 
Allies 2. Les Verts 
As well as the old and declining ally, much was made of the need to forge links with 
the new and emerging one. Even before March 1993, Rocard's 'big bang' speech had 
been a thinly veiled invitation to the various ecologist parties to join forces with the PS. 
Prior to the results, the political conjuncture was not conducive to the forging of such an 
alliance. Given the Socialist's calamitous Cantonal and Regional election results, their 
very bad public image, escalating corruption scandals, and the dire predictions of the 
pollsters, no self-respecting political party would have entertained the prospect of 
electoral pact with the PS. Furthermore, what turned out to be deceptively flattering poll 
results seemed to suggest that the ecologists might be about to replace the PS as the 
biggest non-Right party in France. 
32 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 22/9/97 
33 Which Robert Hue attended, receiving for his troubles a standing ovation. 
34 Interview with Henri Emmanuelli 10/12/97 
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Grunberg and Bergounioux's assessment of the ecologist's electoral potential in 1991 
captures the tone of prognostications at the time. "Declarations of intent to vote 
ecologist are most numerous among those categories who, in 1988, voted mostly 
socialist: young, salaried non-religious people. Such intentions are also high amongst 
graduates, that is. precisely the category where the PS has suffered the worst regression 
between 1988 and 1991. The ecologist vote thus directly threatens the Parti socialiste in 
precisely those groups where, over the last two decades, it made its most significant 
progress." (Bergounioux & Grunberg 1992 : 410) 
Bartolone offers evidence of the Verts' hesitance, "I remember that Beregovoy and 
Fabius emphasised the need for me to contact the ecologists. In August 1992, I attended 
their Inter-regional Conseil National at Saint-Nazaire in order to offer them at that early 
stage an electoral pact for the forthcoming legislative elections. I asked Waechter and 
one of his colleagues to return to the government. However, the PS was discredited, and 
the Verts saw themselves as all-conquering. ,,35 
The fact that one polling institution put ecologist support at 19% in January 1993 did 
little to dampen their hopes/6 and Bartolone's olive branch received only 20% support 
within the party at Saint Nazaire. Even then, such was the desperation of the PS that it 
took the extraordinary step of deciding to unilaterally withdraw from second round 
ballots in seats where the ecologists were ahead after the first, despite a lack of any 
electoral pact. (Boy 1994: 164-5) The eventual rather disappointing showing for the 
Entente Ecologiste (7.8%) may be attributed first and foremost to internal disputes 
within the Ecologist camp. Disunity and skirmishing between Les Verts and ex-
environment minister Brice Lalonde's Generation Ecologie seriously hindered electoral 
progress. 
Yet four years later, French political ecology continued to be dogged by divisions which 
continue to hamper its electoral advance. Brice Lalonde, once mistrusted by some for 
being too close to the PS, has more recently positioned his Generation Ecologie - who 
received 1.7% of the vote in 1997 - closer to the UDF. Meanwhile, Antoine Waechter 
3S Interview with Claude Bartolone 11112/97 
36 BV A 15th - 20th January, cited in Boy (1994 : 161) 
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continues to champion the 'neither Left nor Right' stance. Such is the degree of 
fragmentation that no fewer than nine ecologist parties contested the last legislative 
elections. These 'non-aligned' divers Ecologistes polled more than 3% of the vote 
between them.(Le Gall 1997 : 23) 
A number of developments were necessary before the distance between Verts and PS 
could be reduced. Firstly, the divisions within the Verts had to be transcended. "If, in 
1992, Voynet refused the agreement proposed by the PS, it was because she was not in 
control of the Verts. There was a power struggle within that political organisation. Once 
she and Cauche, the new leadership, had won the battle, they took stock.,,37 In time, the 
Verts overcame their internal strife to emerge as the dominant force in French political 
ecology. The Verts came to abandon their 'neither right nor left' stance. This was 
facilitated by the electoral difficulties at grass-roots level. It proved very difficult to 
maintain a 'neither right nor left' eschewal of all alliances, and still perform well 
electorally. When only Dominique Voynet made it to the second ballot of the 1993 
legislative elections, these difficulties were brought home to the Greens. "The electoral 
realities on the ground led the Verts to accept the need to forge alliances.,,38 
This more receptive attitude on the part of the ecologists was reciprocated on the part of 
the PS in the wake of their historic defeat. "Discussions with the radicals, the ecologists, 
and the PCF, were facilitated in the aftermath of March 1993. The Verts realised that 
they represented much less than they had hoped, and the PS, given the electoral 
battering they had just taken, were in a much more modest position from which to begin 
discussion. That helped the process enormously.,,39 Cambadelis re-inforces the point, 
"the PS had to demonstrate in some tangible way that it was changing, that it was no 
longer hegemonic. It had to prove itself capable of entering into dialogue, and that it 
wanted to find its place at the heart of the Left, on its classic territory, but without 
dominating it.,,40 In the period 1993-94, articles in the PS weekly Vendredi on electoral 
strategy contain the disclaimer, "in the spirit of partnership, exempt from any desire for 
hegemony, and respecting the autonomy of each formation.,,41 
37 Interview with Claude Bartolone 11/12/97 
38 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 22/9/97 
39 Interview with Claude Bartolone 11112/97 
40 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
41 see e.g. La Lettre de Vendredi no. 3121 octobre 1994 Communique commun PS / PCF 18/10/94 
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The modest performance of the ecologists in the 1994 Cantonal and European elections, 
and the difficulties they had fielding candidates on a national level42 further underlined 
what Daniel Boy has termed the 'coming back down to earth' of the ecologists in the 
period after March 1993.(1994) This all suggested that their 1992 results (14.8% in the 
regional elections, and 10% in the cantonals) represented the zenith of the ecologists' 
electoral achievements. In this light, it would be easier to come to electoral 
arrangements with the green movement. "Given the scores the Verts achieved in 1993, 
even with the PS in decline, they realised that with the PS recovery in the presidential 
election of 1995, there was no longer the political space available.,,43 
PS Electoral Strategy Since 1995 : La Gauche Plurielle 
"Since 1995 we have affirmed the will to build a Left alternative, with partners 
who have themselves evolved: the PCF with Robert Hue, and the ecologists 
having made the decision to be on the Left. ,,44 
The 1995 result set in train a dynamic of recovery for the 'governmental' party of the 
Left. This was the catalyst for the development of a new coherence in terms of one of 
the key 'supply-side' factors affecting its electoral strategy, namely the relative strength 
of the PS within the party system, and its relations with potential electoral allies. With 
the decline of the 'quadrille bipolaire', and the apparent durability of certain emergent 
smaller parties such as the FN and the ecologists, the Socialist electoral strategists of the 
late 1990s realised that the 40% of the electorate target was an unrealisable dream. The 
PS response to this situation, clarified over the period 1995-1997, did not follow the 
contours of Rocard's 'big bang', involving an 'opening' towards the centre. Instead, 
there was a renovation, with some alterations, of the Union de Gauche. 
Although he could not have realised it at the time, when orchestrating the Assises de la 
Transformation sociale in 1993-4, Jospin was in fact carrying out vital groundwork 
which would pay enormous dividends when, two years later, he returned to the post of 
42 Only 37% of constituencies had a green candidate in the cantonal elections, and they gained only 3.9% 
of the vote. See Le Gall (1994a & b) 
43 Interview with Claude Bartolone 11/12/97 
44 Interview with Manuel Valls, National Secretary in charge of communication. 23/9/97 
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first secretary of the party. "Jospin began usmg the proceedings as a political 
instrument, as a means of meeting and in turn constituting a much larger alliance ... By 
the end of the forums, we have precisely those elements which would eventually be the 
focus of the 4 conventions under Jospin, and we also had all the programmatic elements 
for the meetings with the PCF and the ecologists, so one can see a very clear link 
between the Assises and the Gauche Plurielle.,,45 
Certain conditions had to be fulfilled, however, before Jospin could translate his 
electoral strategy into practice. It was paramount that Jospin secured the internal 
legitimacy which his presidential campaign, and then his direct election by the militant 
base bestowed. (see chapter 3) Previously, reflections on electoral strategy, as with so 
many other issues which confronted the PS, had to pass through the internal channels of 
the courants. Indeed, in the Comite Directeur meeting which followed the 1993 defeat, 
Mauroy (in a thinly veiled attack on Fabius and his approach to the ecologists) held the 
courant system responsible for the ill-adapted electoral strategy of 1993. "The courants 
. .. made us forget a realistic and adapted strategy .... We refused to understand that the 
only possible dialogue with the ecologists had to start with the adoption of a mixed 
electoral system, responding to the demands of democracy given the new political 
configuration. ,,46 
Such criticisms and counter-criticisms were a feature of debates on electoral strategy in 
the 'post-Mitterrand' era. Rocard's plans for centrist alliances met with staunch 
opposition from ex-Mitterrandist courants, presenting themselves as the 'keepers of the 
faith'. In stark contrast, once Jospin's internal ascendancy was assured, his hands were 
freed to proceed as wished in shaping PS electoral strategy. Sure enough, praise is 
forthcoming from all sides of the old factional divides for Jospin's handling of the PS's 
alliances since 1995. "Jospin obliged all sides, including the PCF, to meet and engage in 
programmatic discussions, and political reflection (of alliance strategy). He encouraged 
them to reflect on their position on reform, and on Europe - that achievement must be 
recognised. ,,4 7 
4S Interview with Jean-Paul Huchon 29/9/97 
46 PS Info no. 544 (17/4/93) proceedings ofthe Cornite Directeur, 3rd April 93. 
47 Interview with Claude Bartolone 11/12/97 
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Benassayag sees in Jospin a strong element of Mitterrandist continuity; 
"Jospin did not envisage governing without the Union de Gauche. He is without 
doubt Mitterrand's best pupil on the tactical front. What is more, he sincerely 
believes in it - without the PCF and their 10%, we cannot win under our two-
round system. You only have to look at the electoral maps. Very few Socialists 
get in after the first round, but very few Communists make it to the second round. 
Mitterrand had a masterly understanding of all that.,,48 
The strategy of alliances, bringing together principally the PS, the groupings which 
gather under the umbrella 'divers gauche', including the radicals and Chevenement's 
MDC, the PCF, and Ecologists, was - it is argued - based on a reading of the core 
constituencies of the Left and how best to target them; 
"The PS had to be placed in a central position - not at the centre, but in a central 
position at the heart of the Left - because the French left is very heterogeneous. 
The aim was to try and unite the two great 'families' which, sociologically, the 
Left was losing. Firstly, the Left of the middle classes, more interested in moral 
than economic or social questions. Secondly, the workerist Left, very strong in 
France, but without political representation since the crisis of the PCF, which is 
more interested in social questions, even if the morality of its leaders is very 
. ,,49 Important. 
The 1997 Legislative Elections 
The real test for the new electoral strategy came earlier than anticipated when Chirac 
unexpectedly dissolved parliament a year early. A number of 'supply-side' factors help 
establish the context of the campaign. Firstly, in terms of the popularity of the 
candidates, Juppe's reputation was still tarnished by his swingeing cuts packages which 
had led to the mouvement sociale in 1995.50 A second supply factor was the political 
conjuncture of the election. Called amidst turmoil over France's relationship with 
Europe in the run-up to the single currency, Chirac believed it would provide a mandate 
for his nouvel elan - a euphemism for austerity measures to meet a strict interpretation 
of the criteria. As it turned out, the electorate was rather more sympathetic to Jospin's 
approach51 , imposing 'four conditions' on the passage to the Euro. 
A third 'supply-side' feature, emerging as a structural feature of French legislative 
48 Interview with Maurice 8enassayag 22/9/97 
49 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
so Indeed, fearing the poor first round showing was due to his unpopularity, he announced his resignation 
between the two ballots, which scarcely helped the campaign for the second ballot. (Portelli 1997 : 15) 
SI The PS, it seemed, had learned the lessons of 1994 in approaching the European question with caution. 
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elections, was the fact of incumbency. As we saw in chapter 1, incumbency in the 
context of high unemployment, and potentially rising inequalities has been offered as 
one of the explanations for the electoral difficulties of socialism. In France, it seems, 
such factors clearly also affect the right, since no incumbent government has won a 
legislative election since 1981. 
Given such 'supply-side' difficulties, Chirac's strategy was clearly a risky one. 
However, the aim had been to catch the PS unawares, before its process of strategic and 
programmatic renewal was complete. To Chirac's disappointment, the work undertaken 
by Jospin since 1995 proved a sufficiently solid foundation, both strategically and 
programmatically, from which to launch an election campaign. Indeed, in terms of 
internal party management, if anything, the' snap' election played into Jospin' shands. 
The candidate designation process presented Jospin with two major problems. Firstly, 
he had chosen to more or less impose feminine candidacies, not only to respect a 30% 
quota, but with the objective, subsequently written into the Party's statute book, of 
achieving parity. "After a complex process involving the national and departmental 
bodies, 134 candidacies (27.6% of all candidates) were reserved for women."(Le Gall 
1997 : 21) This meant that a significant number of male candidates who would have 
considered themselves the 'natural' candidate in a given constituency were obliged to 
stand aside. Secondly, the pre-electoral agreements with the PS's allies - principally the 
Verts and the Radicals52 - meant that, in certain constituencies, the PS candidate had to 
agree to stand aside in order to make way for an ally and fulfil the terms of the 
agreement. In terms of the internal candidate designation process, the run-up to the 1997 
legislative election was thus an extraordinary one; "What Jospin did for the 
parliamentary elections was very difficult. It was a case of organising a legislative 
election as if it were proportional. With the female candidacies and our allies, it was a 
case of constituency-based designation, organised on a proportional basis - i.e. putting 
names on a list. ,,53 
This high degree of national level tampering in what is normally regarded as a jealously 
52 The PS supported 39 Radical candidates, and 24 Green candidates. It fielded its own candidate in 482 
constituencies. (Le Gall 1997 : 20) 
53 Interview with Pierre Guidoni 24/9/97 
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guarded local prerogative could have had serious repercussions within the party. In both 
cases, the aggrieved 'deposed' candidate could have caused problems for the National 
leadership. However, as Jerome Lambert54 observes, "this time, it worked out quite 
well, because we had to act quickly. There was no time for dramas to develop. Those 
pushed aside - because 'exterior' candidacies were imposed on them - did not have the 
time to campaign against the move, or possibly even run as a 'dissident socialist' 
candidate. There were a few cases, but they were very rare. ,,55 
Mermaz sees in operation a quid pro quo in terms of candidate designation within the 
party which may help explain the smooth execution of this politically delicate task. 
Designation of candidates for all local elections - municipal councils, regional councils, 
general councils - are decided by the members at the section level, and in the vast 
majority of cases, there is no national-level intervention. "On the other hand," Mermaz 
notes, "where parliamentary elections are concerned, that is more important, and 
therefore more centralised. The federations - assemblies of members in each 
constituency decide. That said, there were constituencies reserved for female candidates 
- a decision taken by the Conseil National after a recommendation by the bureau 
national. Then there were arrangements with other parties, constituencies reserved for 
the Verts and for the Radicals, then a strategy of withdrawal from some second ballots. 
These were national decisions, applied without hitches. Thus there is at once more 
autonomy over local elections, but more centralisation for the big national elections."s6 
There was another innovation in the PS's electoral strategy in the run up to June 1997. 
"Before, the first alliance to be concluded was always between the PS and the PCF, after 
that, the Radicals followed suit. The novelty this time was that the first alliance to be 
concluded was between the PS and the Verts. That caught the PCF off-guard. The PS 
and the Verts came to an arrangement which was advantageous to each formation, 
given the balance of strength."s7 This arrangement between the more moderate forces 
within the gauche plurielle may have been one factor pushing the more extreme 
composite parts closer together. As Bichat recalls, "the bringing together of the gauche 
54 A member of the PS's 'contentions commission' which has to deal with such eventualities. 
55 Interview with Jerome Lambert 3/12/97 
56 Interview with Louis Mermaz 1/10/97 
57 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 8/12/97 
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plurielle was effected as well as could be expected with the likes of Chevenement's 
MDC, but they were more inclined to present common candidates with the PCF. ,,58 
Doubtless finding common cause in their Euro-scepticism, the Communists and 
Chevenement's party, the two formations came to a number of arrangements. Of the 22 
constituencies where no communists stood, 16 were because of a pact with the MDC, 
whilst only 2 were due to agreement with the PS.(Le Gall 1997 : 19) 
Nevertheless, the electoral agreements - be they of joint candidacies or of commitments 
to stand aside in the second ballot to allow the best place left candidate after the first 
ballot the chance to benefit from vote transfers from other Left parties - were in place. 
Arguably, this aspect of the Gauche Plurielle took explicit account of the intra-Left 
mobility outlined earlier. The alliance strategy was a means of preventing such moves 
being detrimental to the overall vote of the Left. This allowed Jospin to benefit from the 
work undertaken ever since the Assises de la Transformation sociale. Sure enough, 
when it came to the second ballot, "at the heart of the Left, whatever party the candidate 
(PS, PC Vert) the transfer of votes worked harmoniously." Analysis of Left-Right 
second round duels suggests, "a massive contribution, to the Left, of the votes of 
Ecologistes and 'unclassables' ."(Le Gall 1997 : 35) 
What is more, the PS badly needed such rallying to their cause, for the election was a 
close run thing. 'Demand side' conditions continued to display worrying signs for 
governmental parties. The potential volatility of the electorate was a feature of the 
campaign, "a high proportion of electors were undecided or wavering about voting 
intentions (Le Point 26.4.97) - and remained so throughout the campaign."( Hainsworth 
1997 : 72) The 1997 election reflected the continuing progression of abstentionism 
highlighted in chapter 2. Abstentions in the first ballots reached 32%, which, combined 
with record spoilt and blank ballot papers at 4.9%, made 1997 a record year for voter 
disaffection.(Le Gall 1997 : 16) After the first ballot, the result was too close to call. 
The Left opposition, including the Verts had won 44.5% of the vote, the right 35.8%, 
the FN 15.4%, and other ecologists and 'unclassables' 4.3%.(Le Gall 1997 : 33) 
To an extent, the electoral strategy also seemed to succeed in terms of reaching parts of 
S8 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 8/12/97 
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the PS' s target electorate which had eluded it during the 1990s. As Cambadelis notes, 
"these two constituencies [the middle class and the 'excluded' and working class] had to 
be unified politically, in a dialogue - with representations from smaller political 
formations, as well as the PCF and the ecologists. These formations do not directly 
represent those social categories, but in talking to them, we are able to address the above 
social groupS."S9 In sociological terms, analysis of the first round seems to confirm 
some of the PS strategist's hopes regarding the reconquest of parts of their old core 
constituencies. "According to SOFRES, the PS made its most significant progress 
among the young (+ 11 %), blue collar workers (+ 18%), and manual workers (+ 11 %). 
Similarly, according to BVA, the PS considerably increased its influence among those 
classifying themselves as 'lower middle class' (+ 10%), and as 
'underprivileged'(+14%)."(Le Gall 1997: 22) PS recovery amongst those it lost in 1993 
was encouraging evidence of the party benefiting from the electorate's mobility between 
legislative elections. However, volatility is a double-edged sword. Although 
advantageous in this instance, it points to the long-term permanent electoral fragility of 
the party. 
This fragility is underlined by the growth of the PS' s main rival for the working class 
vote. The first round ballot of May the 25th continued to display the enduring strength of 
the FN, even if the electoral system discriminated against it. Having won local successes 
in Orange, Toulon and Marignane in 1995, the FN added to its localised power base in 
Provence-Cote d' Azur with a local election victory at Vitrolles, outside Marseilles, in 
February 1997. Whilst support remains most intense in suburbs with large immigrant 
populations, in June 1997 the FN 'nationalised' its support, exceeding 10% in all but 4 
regions (Corsica, Limousin, Brittany, and Pays de la Loire). Whereas in 1993, the FN 
only exceeded 15% in 22 departements, in 1997 that figure rose to 145. In sociological 
terms, the FN electorate is revealed to be groups targeted by the PS electoral strategists. 
"FN support continues to develop among the working class, with the support of one in 
four manual workers ..... Le Pen's party made their most significant advances among 
those subjectively identifying themselves as 'underprivileged' (+9%)."(Le Gall 1997 : 
32) The second biggest advance was among those calling themselves 'working class' 
(+5%). 
S9 Interview with Jean-Christophe CambadeIis 25/9/97 
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Cambadelis characterises electoral strategy under Jospin as, "an attempt to forge a new 
strategic alliance between the working class, the excluded, and those feeling insecure, 
and lower-middle and middle class, concerned with social cohesion in the face of a 
liberalism which de structures all social relations.,,6o The SOFRES post-electoral survey 
- in identifying the sociological composition of the gauche plurielle electorate in the 
second ballot - gives some indication as to the success of that strategy. The Left and the 
Verts, "won an absolute majority of support among the 35-49 year olds, among middle 
management and the intellectual professions, and the 'intermediary' professions (52%). 
They also won the support of one blue collar worker in two, as well as a majority of 
support among the 'salariat' (52%). They received 57% support among public sector 
workers, and the vote of one in two of the unemployed."(Le Gall 1997 : 33) 
In the end, due in no small part to the FN's enduring support among the working class, 
the result was close (Left 48.28%, Right 46.02%, FN 5.7%), but the electoral system 
artificially inflated the margin in favour of the gauche plurielle. Coming only 4 years 
after its worst ever defeat, this represented a remarkable recovery of the French Left. 
The result was particularly impressive given that it was the first time the PS had ever 
won a parliamentary election without the benefit of a 'presidential dynamic', a 
successful presidential campaign whose coat-tails could be ridden on. That said, the 
closeness of the result, the mobility of sections of the electorate, and the reliance on the 
FN splitting the right wing vote did little to allay fears of the PS' s electoral frailty. 
PS Electoral Strategy at the End of the 19908 
Within the Party, opinions are divided as to the PS's target audience at the end of the 
20th century. Jean-Christophe Cambadelis surmises, "socio-political analysis is no 
longer reducable to a bipolar world between proletariat and Patronat, rather, we now 
have a multi-polar world." It is within this context, Cambadelis argues, that the PS, 
"must construct its 'political offering,' and it is this 'political supply' which defines the 
party's nature.,,61 The sociologically indeterministic supply and demand model, then, is 
sufficiently pervasive as to have influenced the terminology PS electoral strategists use 
60 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
61 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
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to characterise their task. 
According to Louis Mermaz, the PS electorate; 
"is composed of working class voters, although a section of the working class are 
attracted by the FN ... but we also have a large middle class electorate. Hence the 
difficulties in elaborating a programme, because, as Jean Poperen would say, it is 
a 'class front', but the classes are very different. We extend from the proletarian, 
and the unhappy left-voting unemployed, to the relatively comfortable middle 
classes, and who - intellectually - vote Left through a concern for liberty and 
justice, and a desire to change society.,,62 
However, some are increasingly prepared to abandon the concept of two core 
electorates, believing attempts to impose such coherence on a complex reality are 
artificial. Manuel Valls, who as national secretary in charge of communication is one of 
those at the helm of PS electoral strategy, sees a certain transcendence of the traditional 
two core electorates reading of the PS voters; 
"Certainly, one could say that the middle classes,jonctionnaires, urban dwellers 
are a natural target of the PS. The young, and women as well, given our choice of 
candidates. But we are more and more a political formation which looks to 
address the whole of society. From that point of view, a comparison with Clinton 
or Blair has a certain pertinence. ,,63 
On balance there is an enduring attachment to old 'core' constituencies, but at the same 
time heightened awareness that phenomena such as the FN's advance, socio-economic 
change and electoral volatility require the PS to always be looking beyond such groups 
for support. 
Conclusion 
Changes in the supply and demand conditions within which the PS operate have 
affected its electoral strategy in the 1990s. Increased dissatisfaction with the political 
system has translated into higher levels of electoral volatility and abstentionism, and a 
significant reduction in 'governmental' party support. For all the talk of a crisis of 
governmental parties, however, there is little evidence of their terminal decline. After 
years of decline, the PCF is now a localised political force, gaining routinely in the 
region of 10% of the vote nationally. On its road to marginality, the PCF has met a 
62 Interview with Louis Mermaz 1/10/97 
63 Interview with Manuel Valls, National Secretary in charge of communication. 23/9/97 
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number of new political formations, travelling in the opposite direction. Smaller parties, 
in particular the FN and the various ecologist formations, bolstered by more 
proportionality, have made considerable progress. 
This has created a new configuration around the Left pole of the French party system. 
The PS remains the largest single electoral force, yet in an age of diminished 
expectations, it cannot gain power without the help of a growing number of allies. As 
well as traditional partners, the Radicals and the PCF, there are new groupings, the Verts 
and Chevenement's MDC. Yet for all this proliferation, the systemic inducements for 
rassemblement of the majoritarian two round system for decisive elections continue to 
lead smaller parties to come to arrangements with the PS. 
In strategic terms, the same logic that once underpinned the Union de Gauche was the 
guiding principle behind Jospin's work with electoral allies since 1993, and now brings 
the gauche plurielle together. It remains to be seen how durable the gauche plurielle is. 
What is certain is that, before the next 'decisive' election, it will be put under extreme 
pressure. This will be exerted as much by destabilising effects of conflicting 
competitive strategies induced by frequent elections as by the pressures of government 
on the PS dampening the radicalism desired by the PCF and the Verts. Within a party 
system so prone to change as the French, all predictions are risky, but if the current 
strategic configuration can weather such storms, its prospects at the next 'decisive' 
election are healthy. Were Jospin to win that, the parliamentary elections that would 
ensue could be even more advantageous. Having won without the benefit of a 
'presidential dynamic', one can tentatively anticipate that, were it to contest an election 
in the wake of a presidential victory, the PS, at the heart of a gauche plurielle, may 
once again overcome its permanent electoral fragility to win a substantial victory. 
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Chapter 5 
Ideological Redefinition In The PS 
This chapter begins with an exploration of the nature of doctrine in the PS, placing the 
party's ideological debates in historical and institutional context. We argue that the 
party's current ideological configuration cannot be adequately understood without a 
thorough understanding of the institutional context of the party's structures and 
procedures (see chapter 3) and how this context frames the ideological debate. We 
demonstrate how doctrine was (and is) employed strategically, either with reference to 
internal power struggles, or changing relationships with electoral allies. Chief among 
the reasons for this 'instrurnentalisation' of the party's doctrine, we argue, is the role 
that ideas playas the currency of internal factional exchange. The presidentialised 
factionalism of the PS structured the 'field of action' of ideological debate. 
For all the tactical employment of doctrine, we nevertheless argue that the PS, like the 
SFIO before it, is a party where doctrinal debate is both extensive and significant. It is 
only through a clear understanding of the key debates and the doctrinal road travelled 
during the 20th Century, that the significance of contemporary ideological positions can 
be understood. We will then go on to explore some of the particularities of PS ideology. 
Turning to the PS' ideological heritage, a number of key evolutions will be charted, 
beginning with the complex relationship with Marxism. Here the tendency to define 
Socialist ideology in France with reference to the PCF1 has, we argue, created some 
perverse side-effects to the collapse of communism. 
The fact that, until 1981, no government of the French Left lasted more than a few 
months will also be highlighted. This allowed French Socialists to eschew fundamental 
re-evaluation of maximalist programmes in the light of governmental experience. 
Blum's distinction between the 'exercise' and 'conquete de pouvoir' has further 
pennitted maximalist aspirations to endure and flourish with French Socialist ideology. 
This all puts experience since 1981, or more particularly 1983, into its appropriate 
context, and flags up the historical significance of the 'end of transcendental rhetoric'. 
I For so long the largest and electorally most successful party of the Left in France. 
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This 'secularisation' of French Socialism represents, we argue, a seismic shift in the 
eschatology of French Socialism. 
Having thus established the framework for our evaluation of the reconfiguration of 
French Socialist ideology in the 1990s, we will turn to the constituent elements of PS 
ideology today, both in terms of 'historical allegiances' or 'ex-courants', and the 
ideological outliers such as the Poperenistes and the 'Blairites.' This provides the 
context for an exploration of the core ideas of the ligne majoritaire, which results from 
the consensus-inducing effects of internal stability given Jospin's hegemonic position 
and the desire to curb the factional infighting in the wake of the Rennes congress.(see 
chapter 3) 
A number of themes will emerge. Firstly, the ideological 'softening' of the party - a 
combination of reduced ideological 'space' between courants, and an inability to 
rediscover the ideological coherence of the 1970s triptych of 'nationalisation, 
planijication, autogestion.' This lack of coherence is, we argue, symptomatic of a wider 
'crisis' of social democracy explored in chapter 1. This relates primarily to the difficulty 
of accepting peaceful co-existence with capitalism in a world where the Keynesian 
paradigm, which allowed the reconciliation of market capitalism to social democratic 
goals of full employment and egalitarianism, has been undermined. It further relates to a 
difficulty in identifying the 'ideological geography', of French socialism in the wake of 
the collapse of communism, and thus the disappearance of one of the PS' s historical 
ideological referentials. 
The ideological flux in which French socialism finds itself also reflects the problematic 
relationship between social democracy and globalisation.( see chapters 1 & 6) With the 
limitations the processes of globalisation place upon autonomous national-level 
reformism increasingly apparent, the propensity of social democrats, at the ideological 
level, to explore supra-national co-ordination, has demanded a re-evaluation of 
'methodological nationalism.' This re-evaluation, however, is at best partial, and the 
increasing significance of supra-national level policy activism for the viability of 
national level social democracy demands that, at an ideological level, social democracy 
confronts Anderson's paradox; "The politics of a rational Left needs to be international 
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in a new and more radical way today: global in its conclusions. But it has not yet ceased 
to be national in its conditions."( 1991 : 351) 
The process of ideological redefinition within the PS is thus instructive for 
understanding the complex and evolving relationship between social democracy and 
globalisation. This informs the focusing, in the latter stages of this chapter, on the three 
areas where globalisation seems to have its biggest impact - European integration, the 
role of the state, and the commitment to egalitarianism. The effect of the perceived 
necessity of adapting to globalisation on the PS will be explored through understanding 
how debates on these issues between the ligne majoritaire and other sections in the 
party have evolved. 
The Nature of Doctrine, and the Courants, within the Parti Socialiste 
A defining feature of twentieth Century French socialism has been its doctrinal 
diversity. The plethora of small, well organised, and sharply ideologically differentiated 
groupings which existed between before 1905 did not entirely disappear when the 
Socialists unified.( see Portelli 1992 ; Kergoat 1997) Their influence translated into a 
culture of internal pluralism and doctrinal diversity within the movement. This culture 
was curbed between 1945-1971, when the post-war refoundation ofthe party resulted in 
majority voting rather than internal proportional representation. When, in 1971, 
proportionality was re-instated, ideological diversity flourished once more. So deep-
seated are these norms of diversity and pluralism that one commentary sees the PS as, 
"more a juxtaposition of courants, traditions, and personalities than a genuinely unified 
party." (Bergounioux & Grunberg 1992 : 293) This fact has methodological 
implications against conceiving of French Socialist ideology as an homogeneous, 
unified, internally consistent body of thought. 
The post-1971 PS provides an example of why ideological discourse must be analysed 
in its institutional context. The ideological development of the PS after Epinay was 
crucially mediated by the party's institutionalised factionalism. Ideology operated at two 
levels. Firstly, it offered a view of society and informed policy prescriptions consistent 
with that view. Secondly, it was a weapon employed by the presidentiables in their 
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quest for ascendancy in intra-party politics. In the presidentialised Fifth Republic, a PS 
which in tum institutionalised presidentiable factionalism shaped Socialist ideological 
debate. 
Various attempts have been made to organise the heterodox ideological heritage of 
French socialism in the 20th century into discrete traditions. A categorisation which 
achieved a certain currency is the 'two cultures' thesis. This famously entered the terms 
of debate within the party at the Nantes conference of 1977 when Rocard used the thesis 
to distinguish his socialism from that of Chevenement, and by association Mitterrand. 
Rocard identified one culture, "which has long been dominant, and is Jacobin, 
centralising, statist, nationalist and protectionist...the French working class is foremost 
within its logic." The second is "decentralising, regionalist, refuses arbitrary 
dominations, of both employers and state .... this culture ... fears administration and 
regulation. It prefers instead basic collectivities."(Rocard 1979 : 79-80) 
The 'deux cultures' thesis fails to capture the complexity of French Socialist ideology, 
which is a by-product of its diversity. However, some framework for analysis must be 
imposed if clarity is to be achieved. For this reason, the two cultures will be used as an 
organlsmg conceptual 'architecture' of the party's thought. The limitations and 
imperfections of this approach will at every stage be highlighted to deepen 
understanding of the nature of doctrine within the party. 
A recent ancestor of the Rocardian deuxieme gauche is the PSU, which welcomed a new 
generation of left intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s disillusioned with Mollet's 
conduct of the Algerian war whilst Prime Minister in 1956-57. These were the 
precursors to the 'new social movements' and the soixante-huitards. Imbued with a 
certain libertarianism, PSU support included left-leaning Catholics alienated by the 
SFIO's anti-clericalism. Hostility to the PCF meant the PSU instinctively looked to the 
centre for electoral allies. Later, ex-PSU members were never wholly convinced of the 
programmatic sacrifices involved in the Union de Gauche strategy. 
The 'premiere gauche's' most recent and coherent manifestation was the CERES, Jean-
Pierre Chevenement's club turned courant. This embraced elements of France's radical 
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left culture, combining a Jacobin statism and a heavy dose of nationalism, all reconciled 
to a particular reading of Marx.{see Hanley 1986) For CERES, the Union de Gauche 
was an article of faith. Thus an obvious jibe at the 'deux cultures' thesis is that it 
represents not a philosophical battle pitting Bernstein against Kautsky, but a purely 
strategic divergence about whether or not the PCF constitute appropriate electoral allies. 
The extent to which this observation rings true tells us a good deal about the level at 
which ideology operates within the party. 
Henri Weber invokes the absence of a sizeable rank and file as a counter-weight to the 
political office-holding elite within the party to explain the role of ideology in the party; 
"The relationship between the PS and theory has traditionally been a superficial 
one . ..... it is a party of office holders, who have a relationship with reality 
grounded in the political marketplace. They are not theoretically minded .... so 
there is a relationship with theory which is instrumental, and electoraL .... when one 
is capable of saying that the doctrine on public ownership is 'neither 
nationalisation, nor privatisation', that gives a good indication of the theoretical 
basis of the party! We do not look to ground in theory why there should be a 
public sector, and why a private sector, and what criteria should influence moves 
from one to the other - we adopt a position which is electoral, instrumental, 
dictated by the necessities of the moment.,,2 
Such 'necessities of the moment' are conditioned by the context of both internal intra-
courant competition, and external political strategy (see chapter 4). The impression that 
Rocard and Chevenement were but the most recent representatives of deeply ingrained, 
homogenous and definable 'cultures' within French socialism traceable down the 
century is misleading. This reading obscures the important tactical dimension to French 
socialist ideology. Their centrality owes much to their strategic position within the PS. 
At various times, Mitterrand needed each on his side as a counterweight to block the 
rising strength of the other within the party and ensure his own continued dominance. 
These short-term tactical factors are at least as important as the long-term cultural 
historical factors. The' deux cultures,' Weber insists, "is not where the point of cleavage 
is to be found. The best proof of the fact, is that these supposed two cultures have 
disappeared. 'Cultures' which produce effects for only 10 years are not true cultures -
they are polemical constructions. Real 'secular' cultures produce effects for decades.,,3 
2 Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
3 Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
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The tactical, and occasionally slightly superficial, nature of socialist doctrine in France 
is highlighted in Rey & Subileau's attempt to offer a more nuanced ideological 
definition of the 'deux cultures' of French socialism. Firstly, Rey & Subileau identify 
the' culture republicaine ., which emphasises citizenship, the general will, and equality 
and attaches great importance to laicite (secularism in public affairs) as its key rallying 
cry. It is inclined towards Jacobin, enlightenment statism, and it has certain paternalistic 
overtones reminiscent of the Fabian tradition in Britain. Secondly, there is the 
'moderniste' left concerned for 'autogestion,' freedom of the individual, and prioritising 
the role of civil society above that of the state. These categories are conceived not as 
strict determining structures, but as loose frames of reference. 
Yet even this compartmentalising exercise is problematic, due largely to the nature of 
French Socialism. Rey & Subileau's work was carried out in 1985-6, and even then, in 
their conclusion, they accept that some of the debates they identify as key organising 
and structuring edifices within the party, such as autogestion, are of declining import. 
The same could perhaps be said of iaicite. (see Bell 1997 : 36, 49-50) One reason for 
this is the tactical element of any ideological position within the PS - Weber's 
'necessities of the moment'.4 
Thus any attempt to define the intellectual architecture of the party, comes up against 
the problem of its malleability, and its liability to change rapidly. As a result, Rey & 
Subileau shy away from the kind of stark categorisation of Rocard, and with good 
reason. The spread of laicite and autogestion - present in both Rocardians and CERES, 
lead Rey & Subileau to identify, "value systems which are not reducable to internal 
cleavages, notably the segmentation between courants." (1991 : 217) The two cultures, 
in as much as they operate at all, "do not result in a marked division within the party, 
rather, they constitute indicators of politicisation." In setting up a set of dichotomies 
4 Autogestion was never the exclusive property of anyone 'side', with different courants offering - as 
usual - different readings and understandings of a common concept. However, autogestion was most 
thoroughly developed by the Rocardians, who saw it as a framework for analysis and basis for action 
which would, they hoped, supplant the curious hybrid of lacobinism and quasi-Marxism prevalent in the 
parti d'Epinay. When power was attained, governmental experience soon stripped the PS of any pretence 
to act in accordance with some of its more lavish left-wing rhetoric. As a result Autogestion, for 10 years 
a core organising concept within the internal debate of the party, lost its tactical raison d'etre and 
disappeared from debate and text alike, never to return. 
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what emerged were a whole series of cross cutting cleavages. (1991 : 231) 
Rey & Sublieau's research shows that the courant system is a far from perfect 
translation of actual ideological positions and cleavages into organisational reality, and 
that members of different courants often have more in common ideologically than 
fellow courant members. It is, the authors note, "extremely difficult to clearly associate 
choice of courant to a coherent ensemble of theoretical and historical reference points, 
and also to establish any homology whatsoever with the schools of thought identified 
as distinct in the history of French socialism. "(1991 : 120) 
Cambadelis, the party's 'number two' behind Francois Hollande, supports this reading. 
"These are not courants with an ideological basis - even Gauche Socialiste is not 
fundamentally ideological, because it has no strong ideological reference point. Instead 
it has a posture, it takes up a position. Thus there is no party with a strong or narrow 
ideological basis."s Cambadelis sees this developments as a fundamental shift in French 
Socialism. "Such things no longer exist in France. They used to exist in the 1970s, but 
today everything is focused around individuals, around personalities, who have a certain 
configuration, but who do not affirm their own distinct ideology.,,6 We will examine the 
reasons for this shift later. 
Weber's reservations about the 'cultures' are thus well grounded.7 Rey & Subileau's 
work suggests that assumptions about the internal ideological homogeneity within a 
courant cannot be made. The complexity of the picture thus increases, leading us to be 
circumspect in characterising the ideological debate in pure terms of one courant versus 
another. Furthermore, broader attempts at classification within 'cultures' are equally 
perilous, and must take account of the same cross-cutting cleavages. Rey & Subileau's 
findings have important methodological implications. The categories of 'courant' and 
'culture' must be used carefully in any analysis of French socialist ideology. 
The Instrumentalisation of Doctrine 
5 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cam bade lis 25/9/97 
6 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
7 Offered as it was by a key protagonist of a protracted struggle for control of the party two years before 
he attempted to wrest control of the party from Mitterrand at Metz, it is unlikely to be devoid of rhetorical 
content. 
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"I am not at all sure that a 'Bad Godesberg' would be possible or necessary in 
our party, because theoretical adjustments take place in a pragmatic way, 
empirically - along with the whole of society." Henri Weber 
No-one has done more to shape the role of doctrine in the 'Parti d'Epinay' than the man 
who became leader of the party on the day he joined. Mitterrand himself, in Un 
Socialisme du Possible, indicated his awareness the constraints reality imposes on 
abstract theorising; "the ideological debate is interesting but does not lead to 
anything ... the pragmatic debate can lead to everything." (quoted in Northcutt 1992 : 3) 
One should not, however, infer that Mitterrand initiated the instrumentalisation of 
doctrine within French socialism. 1971 was scarcely a standing start, but what changed 
after Epinay was the novel strength of Mitterrand within the party, and a peculiar talent 
of Le Florentin for effectively utilising the instrument of doctrine. Cole traces a number 
of constant framing influences on Mitterrand's thought throughout his political career, 
notably his commitment to European integration.{1997 : 56-67) However, to a 
significant degree, ideas for Mitterrand were the currency of intra-party factionalism, he 
remained aware of how much credit any faction had, and adjusted doctrine accordingly. 8 
This tactical role of doctrine in courant infighting has shaped the elaboration of 
ideology. If ever one courant, or courant leader, introduces a phrase or concept, the 
other courants fought fiercely to prevent that phrase from finding its way 
unaltered onto programmatic statements of the party, since that would concede to 
the rival. "Within the debates between the intellectuals in the party, everyone knows 
that a particular formulation is used by a particular personality, that courant 
thus has the impression of winning a victory within the party apparatus. Thus this 
Imposes a severe restraint on genuine debates, on ideas.,,9 An example is the 35 
hour week, where the Rocardiens have long been advocates of a reduction in salary to 
8 His readiness to subordinate doctrinal purity to tactical necessity was amply demonstrated in the 1970s, 
with the ideological gymnastics in which the party engaged between 1974 and 1979 as Mitterrand shifted 
his position tirst behind Rocard and the PSU to counter the rise of Chevenement and the CERES at the 
Pau conference of 1975, only to marginalise Rocard four years later at Metz by forging an alliance with 
Chevenement. (see Lieber 1977) In conferring the writing of the Projet Socialiste of 1980 on 
Chevenement, Mitterrand was deliberately marginalising Rocard's less radical position within the party, 
effectively scuppering any rival bid for the Presidential candidacy. 
9 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 22/9/97 
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accompany this measure. The debate at Bourget was reduced to a fight between 
Rocard and Emmanuelli over whether or not the 35 hours worked would be paid at the 
39 or 35 rate, which Emmanuelli won. IO 
Another effect of this competitive dynamic was to limit the amount of innovation 
possible. Should anyone courant stray too far from the known territory of the party 
line as enunciated by Mitterrand et ai, it left itself open to attack from other courants 
who could present themselves as the keepers of the faith protecting the party from 
such heresy. I I Such a false dichotomy emerged when Mitterrand aligned with 
Chevenement in the mid-1970s. Implicitly opposing the Mitterrandist and CERES purist 
protectors of French Socialist orthodoxy with the Rocardian heretical innovators. This 
effectively meant, in the 80s, that major change had either to be orchestrated by 
Mitterrand and his allies or at least have his blessing. 12 
The most fundamental impact of this tactical role of ideology has been on the role of 
doctrine within the party. The theoretical output of the PS has been primarily a vehicle 
for factional struggle, rather than a guide to actual objectives and goals. Mitterrand, like 
Blum before him, was a man of great literary talent. Given the status of the final party 
texts as factional battlegrounds, and the centrality of the form of words to those battles, 
such literary talent may be the necessary credentials for PS leadership. The talents of 
political philosophy are of lesser import, given that the PS, "never got beyond the stage 
of ideological tinkering about." (Dupin 1991 : 184) 
Yet it could be argued that the Party cannot advance beyond this stage. To do otherwise, 
Weber argues, would be to go against the genetic grain of the party. In establishing a 
theoretical basis for the mixed economy, "the process would have come into conflict 
with electoral interests, with a party of 'sensibilites', and thus we preferred ambiguity, 
ambivalence, a fluid position .... in reality, the position is a tactical one. So all this has a 
cost, but it has its advantages.,,13 Dupin identifies what, for Mitterrand, those advantages 
10 Interview with Jean-Paul Huchon 29/9/97 
II This was the attitude of all other courants to Rocard's enduring desire to establish centrist 
alliances. 
12 Thus Mitterrand's talk of' ['economie mixte' in Liberation in 1984 was a necessary precursor to the 
doctrinal shift the party experienced during Fabius's prime-ministership, from a rupture with capitalism 
to a modernisation of it, as exemplified in the Evry Convention on Modernisation et Progres Social. 
13 Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
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were in the late 1970s; 
"Did Mitterrand believe in his 'rupture with capitalism' discourse? Realistically, 
no. A section of his supporters were under no illusions about the role of the 
rhetoric ..... the party became locked in a largely formal ideological debate which 
did not correspond to the deep convictions of its leaders. The debate was 
instrumental for Mitterrand. It allowed him to guard his power within the party 
against Rocardian ambitions by relying on the old reflexes of the militants."( 1991 
: 84-85) 
The Parti Socialiste and Marxism 
A further problem with the 'two cultures' is the relationship of the PS to Marxism. 
Although more recently a 'liberal' voice of moderation, Michel Rocard began on the far 
left.14 Weber exaggerates only slightly in observing; 
"there was a great deal of consensus in the seventies between premiere and 
deuxieme gauche. This went for the CFDT and Michel Rocard, their definition of 
socialism was equally characterised by the 'vulgate marxiste' - their definition of 
socialism was reducable to three words - nationalisation, planning and 
'autogestion' .... it is a vision inspired by Marxism, and that of the 'premiere 
gauche' was no different."ls 
This highlights the pervasive influence of Marxism on both purported 'cultures'. There 
are a number of contributory factors. Firstly, as Portelli amongst others have noted, the 
Parti Socialiste has always been a parti des profs. Today many of the party elite are or 
have been university lecturers, and this level of higher education tends to be reflected in 
the rank and file. Perrineau identifies a correlation between this elevated level of 
education and interest in radical theoretical debate amongst party members. (Perrineau 
1992 : 224) A survey in 1990 showed that the PS boasted the most educated 
membership, with 64% having been through the higher education system. (Bergounioux 
& Grunberg 1992 : 367) Secondly, the damaging 'double language' of the SFIO under 
Guy Mollet created powerful incentives, particularly among the younger generation, to 
avenge the perceived 'treason' of the Socialist cause. One means to this end was an 
ideological re-invigoration of the party.16 
14 Interview with Jean-Marcel Bichat 8/12/97 
15 Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
16 The scars of Molletisme are still in evidence today. Jospin's speech at Brest sought to align himself 
within the traditions of French Socialism. It is interesting to note that he embraced the heritage of Jaures 
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This renewed activity was conditioned by the extremely fertile intellectual climate of the 
post-war French left, dominated by Marxism. 17 Given such parameters of intellectual 
debate on the left, Marxist influence on French Socialism is unsurprising. The 
Rocardian Bergounioux contends that, programmatically, the PS of the 1970s was 
reduceable to 'social democracy plus nationalisations', the novelty was not content but 
form; 
"Reform of the partition of riches, enlargement of the public sector, a commitment 
to humanism : here we find the traditional face of French socialism. All this was 
translated into a language borrowed from the fashions of the 1970s, influenced by 
Marxism and the ideas of the post-68 thinkers." (quoted in Dupin 1991 : 206) 
Thus Marxist categories and terms of reference pervaded internal debates in the PS. At 
Metz, Rocard was all too ready to use Marx's conception of the withering away of the 
state and the auto-determination of the workers to bolster the socialist credentials of his 
own position; 
"[S]ocialism is clear, it must absolutely reject Leninism, and interrogate Marx on 
the relationship between socialism and freedom. [Our motion] aims to remove the 
theoretical ambiguities with which French socialism has always lived: a discourse 
of liberty, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, today reduced to the exclusive 
role of the state."(Rocard 1986) 
This brief excerpt displays the rhetorical proximity between French socialism and 
Marxism. Yet Cambadelis' assertion that, "up until May 10th 1981, the PS remained a 
Marxist party," (1996 : 200) requires serious qualification. 
A distinction must be made between 'Marxist' and 'Marxisant', the latter entailing the 
use of the former's categories, and a rhetorical attachment to some of the concepts and 
policy prescriptions, but falling considerably short of an unquestioning embrace of all 
Blum, and more recently Mitterrand, but went out of his way to point out that he had not joined the SFIO 
as a young man, so appalled was he by the behaviour of the party in the 1950s and 1960s. 
17 Sartre's existentialist critique of traditional Marxism, centring on the journal Les Temps Modernes, 
sought to introduce a theory of subjectivity to Marxism, and was cited as the intellectual foundation for 
the 'events' of May 1968. This school of thought in tum provoked a counter-critique from Althusser in 
the vanguard of resurgent structuralist Marxism. Another group of French intellectuals, writing in the 
journal Arguments, were moved by Khrushchev's revelations to leave the PCF and revise Marxist 
categories (not method) in order to account for changes in social structure in advanced capitalist society. 
Still another group were the gauchistes, writing in the journal Socialisme ou Barbarie, and exemplified 
by the writings of Cornelius Castoriadis, who "viewed the communist movement as a conservative, 
bureaucratic machine working towards integrating the working class into the status quo. They traced the 
origins of this bureaucratic conservatism to Marxist theory itself - which they viewed as the theory of the 
bourgeois revolution." (Hirsh 1983 : 5) 
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Marxist assumptions and the Marxist view of the world more generally. As a rule, the 
closer to the 'maximalist' end of the scale, the greater the propensity to employ Marxist 
terminology. But for Chevenement, as for Pivert, the important intra-party logic and 
rational behind such stances has meant that the Marxist rhetoric could not be taken at 
face value. 
The Parti Communiste as 'Ideology of Reference' 
The idea of the two cultures of the French left existing almost solely within the PS does 
violence to the facts. In truth, ever since the Tours conference of 1920, the PCF has 
been the most potent ideological force of the left, relying the ties with organised labour 
(the CGT) which has always precluded the emergence of 'northern' social democracy in 
France (see chapter 2). Mindful of this, Weber redraws Rocard's boundaries. In his 
reading, the 'deuxieme gauche' rubric encompasses all the intellectual traditions within 
the French socialist party. The title of 'premiere gauche' is reserved for the inheritors of 
the anarcho-syndicalist movement which refused to associate with the parliamentary 
road to socialism. "The revolutionary, centralising culture exists in France, it is still 
strong ... .it expresses itself through a negativist attitude, of refusal, and protest. A whole 
section of the left in France, the extreme left, is a left purely of protest, and expresses 
that revolutionary culture which comes down the ages in this country." I 8 
Jospin, too, attests to the enduring importance on the French left of, "the revolutionary 
culture inherited from 1789-93," operating both within and outside the PS. This, he 
argues, explains the only partial impregnation of Bernstein's revisionism into French 
socialism; 
"In 1936, Blum was still talking of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', even if he 
had modified the meaning. In 1971, in the declaration of principles inherited from 
the SFIO, the Parti Socialiste was still defined as a 'revolutionary party'. 
Certainly, in practice, things were different, but there was a need to deny in its 
language what the party conceded to reality, which explains the 'double 
discourse' which characterised socialist texts."( 1991 : 102 emphasis added) 
So deep-seated was the French left's attachment to revolution that, "the reformist route 
itself bore the stamp of revolutionary methodology."(l991 : 102) 
18 Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
156 
Part of the explanation for this revolutionary zeal can be found in the nature of party 
competition in France. This has meant that, since at least the mid 1940s, the ideological 
identity of the PS has evolved with reference to the communist party. As Jospin 
observed in 1991, 
"the Parti d'Epinay, according to its first secretary, Francois Mitterrand, was not 
a Marxist party. But its proximity to and competition with the PCF, which 
advanced brandishing a 'scientific theory', obliged the PS to offer explanations, 
if not of the world at least of French society. This was the era when we defined 
the 'front de classes' (in response to the communist party's analysis of the 
working class); when we forged the Union de Gauche strategy, when we 
established the list of prospective nationalisations, whilst at the same time setting 
out our 'theses on autogestion' and talking of 'rupture with capitalism.' This 
party may not be taken seriously by Marxist scholars, it is not strictly speaking a 
doctrinaire party, but, within it, a theoretical political debate is animated by the 
controversies with the Communist party." (1991 : 17) 
The earlier dominance the PCF, and the votes it historically commanded, partially 
structured PS discourse, and thus its decline has deeply affected the Socialists. "The 
collapse of communism has," Moscovici argues, "hurt democratic socialism, which has 
always been distinct from it. The decline of the Communist Party has meant the 
disappearance of a feared rival, but also the weakening of a powerful ally, and the 
erasing of a reference point on the left which was at the same time both positive and 
negative." (1994: 15) 
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On the positive side, the collapse of Communism served to further undermine the 
already weak and declining PCF, leaving the PS freer to decide upon its doctrine 
according to its internal dynamics, and without an eye to the left. On the negative 
side, the PS was far from untouched by the cataclysmic effects of 1989. The PS 
recognised that, "the rupture which has happened calls into question some of the 
foundations of the socialist project.,,19 Social democracy is the theory of the 'middle 
way' between capitalism-ordering society according to capitalist principles (private 
ownership, the primacy of market mechanisms); and communism- ordering society 
according to communist principles (common ownership; from each according to 
means to each according to needs). Yet social democracy throughout the century defined 
itself with reference to these two 'others'. 
As Rocard observed in 1993; 
"despite national differences, social democracy has always defined itself by a 
double negation: neither capitalism nor communism. Today, it remains to be seen 
whether social democracy is capable of articulating a project, which can no longer 
be a 'middle way', but rather its own coherent conception of society." (Rocard 
1993 : 10) 
Thus 1989, "poses the question of a redefinition of what the left may be tomorrow. 
Not in relation to communism, but intrinsically.,,2o This begs a further question, 
of the relationship with capitalism, to which Mitterrand's 'economie mixte' provided no 
clear answer. In the post-war era, social democrats became reconciled to capitalism 
through, "the alchemy of Keynesian economics, [whereby] the particular interests of the 
workers in redistribution toward themselves was transformed into a general social 
interest."(Rogers & Streeck 1993) With the calling into question of the Keynesian 
paradigm (see chapter 1), social democrats needed once again to question how to co-
exist with capitalism. 
Les Lendemains ne Chantent Plus/ : The End of Transcendental Rhetoric 
Since its inception, the dialectic between the minimalist and maximalist21 traditions had 
19 Final text of the Arche conference Le Poing et fa Rose no. 135 Janvier 1992 p 29 
20p. Mauroy speech 24/11/91 (Paris; Fondation Jean Jaures 1992) 
21 which owes its longevity within French socialism fIrst to Jaures' formulation of 'evolutionary 
revolution' which retained a revolutionary end-game in a reformist strategy, and later to Blum's 
theorisation of the conquest and exercise of power. 
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ensured that French socialism always attached great importance to what Sassoon has 
called "the theology of the final goal."(l996 : 53) There has been a transcendentalist, 
millenarian faith, sustained by radical rhetoric, which characterised the 'rupture with 
capitalism' promises of the 1980 Projet Socialiste. With the collapse of Communism, 
and the acceptance of a 'new horizon' of market capitalism, such 'transcendentalist' 
rhetoric appeared increasingly anachronistic. There began a process, which preceded the 
fall of the Berlin wall, but which was accelerated by it, referred to subsequently as the 
'secularisation of French Socialism.'22 This secularisation refers to the simultaneous 
shift away from extravagant maximalist programmes, and away from an analytical 
framework heavily influenced by Marxism. 
There was a need to fill the gap, since it became increasingly apparent that capitalism 
was not about to be transcended. What was in prospect, in Blum's terminology, was the 
exercise du pouvoir, which amounted to a theoretical justification for the socialist 
management of capitalism. The final goal, already relegated to a distant future, was now 
completely off the agenda. Rocard and Jospin, amongst others, presaged this significant 
shift in French Socialist eschatology. Jospin's unanimous 1987 Litle conference motion 
advanced the cause of a 'secularised' socialism; 
"the Socialist movement is now more a movement towards socialism, cumulative 
reforms, and transformations of social relationships, attitudes and behaviours, 
rather than the quest for an end of History ..... to progressively bring about new 
balances in a composite society, to organise new relationships between individual 
and state, between individual liberties and collective institutions, between private 
initiative and public intervention." (quoted in Bergounioux & Grunberg 1992 : 
452) 
The 1980s, then, represented, 
"a rupture with that utopian and messianistic mode of thought which revolved 
around the conquest of power. The Left came to power, managed the state. It saw 
what could be done, and what could not be done. It integrated the culture of 
government - some times a little too much - seeing governing as an end in itself. 
That was a break with the Left of protest and contestation which existed, both 
within the PS and beyond it. ,,23 
22 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
23 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
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La Duree au L '/denfife 24 
"I believe that it is today considered natural for the Left to conquer power, 
and exercise it over a long period. This is, however, quite simply a major 
upheaval, even a revolution, in the history of our country." Pierre Mauro/ 
"The French Left, unlike its British and Swedish counterparts, seemed branded by a 
certain fatalism. It only came to power rarely and briefly." This same fatalism, Jospin 
argues, afflicted the Left in 1793, 1830, 1848, 1871, 1924, 1936 and 1945, giving birth 
to the myth of the Left's economic incapability, and its incompatibility with any long-
term power?6 (Jospin 1991 : 57-58) Although in part due to the instability inherent in 
the constitutional arrangements ofthe day, there was another more deeply rooted reason. 
Traditionally, French Socialism developed programmes that were strong on doctrinal 
purity, but weaker on realistic policy prescriptions. 
The party has always lived with a tension between maximalist aspirations of activists, 
such as Pivert's Gauche Revolutionnaire, who proclaimed that 'every is possible'; and 
'office holders' on the other hand, more grounded at the municipal or other level in 
practical politics?7 Today, nearly a quarter of the PS membership hold elected 
office.(Bergounioux & Grunberg 1992 : 478) As Weber observed earlier, the 'parti 
d'elus' status has always engendered a pragmatic approach to doctrine. Thus whilst, 
textually, doctrinal purity has never been in short supply, there has always been an 
approach to party texts which has tempered their impact. Yet the reluctance to sacrifice 
cherished ideological positions such as the 1970s triptych of 'nationalisation, 
planification, autogestion' in the interests of staying in power leads one to suspect that 
doctrine was never purely tactical. For all the tactical manoeuvring at the margins, 
doctrine nevertheless encapsulated a core of deeply held beliefs and values. Thus a 
tension exists, most noticeably encountered by the PS in the 1980s when translating 
their radical left-wing positions into governmental actions. 
24 The fonnulation is a chapter heading in Cambadelis' book (1996). 
2S PS Un Nouvel Horizon 1992 p 16 
26 Mauroy reportedly said to Mitterrand at the 07 summit shortly before the June 1982 devaluation, "if 
we do not make these choices, we will be condemned to follow the same path as ) 848 or 1936, where the 
Left does not govern over a long period."(quoted in Cambadelis 1996: 202) 
27 It was, Portelli argues, to allow peaceful co-existence of these conflicting impulses within the party that 
Blum theorised the distinction between the conquest and the exercise of power. This justified 
governmental action of a short tenn piecemeal nature, on the understanding that it was but preparing the 
conditions which would ultimately enable the realisation of the socialist transfonnation.( 1992: 30-32) 
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The decade after 1983 saw the return of a certain disjuncture between theory and 
practice. It is argued that the party was so caught up in the act of governing, that it could 
not 'digest' developments at the theoretical level; "The Parti socialiste experienced the 
constraints on governmental action without ever having theorised its change of direction 
in power.,,28 The effects of the disjuncture on French Socialism in the 1980s was a lack 
of coherence; 
"There is a longer line of causality, dating back to 1981. The coherence of French 
Socialism, resting on the triptych of 'planification, nationalisation, autogestion' 
ran counter to reality, so as from 1982-3 there was no longer any coherence. The 
Arche [congress in 1991] was an initial attempt to rediscover coherence. ,,29 
In order to paper over these cracks, Lionel Jospin advanced the theory of fa parenthese. 
(Jospin 1991 : 19-20) This formulation enabled French Socialism to avoid the extremely 
problematic issue of reconciling its principles to the constraints of holding governmental 
office by conceptualising the 1983 U-turn as merely a pause30 in its radical reformist 
• 31 trajectory. 
The failure of French Socialism to work out the relationship between doctrinal purity 
and the constraints of office was perpetuated by short-term tactical manoeuvres. 
Mitterrand actively avoided such theorisation, because of the far reaching implications 
of a shift towards a 'culture of government' would be bound to re-open the ideological 
cracks which the 'Mitterrandist majority' concealed.32 Mitterrand also did not believe 
such a theorisation was necessary, since doctrine was always a means to the end of 
governmental office. Thus there was never any doubt about whether doctrinal sacrifices 
would be made in the interests of retaining political power. As Bergounioux & 
Grunberg observe, "for Mitterrand, the traditional distinction between the conquest and 
exercise of power had no meaning ... he thus buried the 'Blumian' distinction between 
the conquest and exercise ofpower."(1992 : 266-7) 
28 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
29 Interview with Alain Bergounioux 18/9/97 
30 As with Morrison's 'consolidation', the propagators of the idea were careful not to address the question 
of when the time might be ripe for further advances to be made. 
31 Delors referred to a 'pause' in the reform programme, which, since it recalled the terminology of the 
Blum government's U-turn in 1937, was perhaps more appropriate. 
32 See later. 
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Jospin's theory of parenthesis was born out of expediency, but could not provide the 
foundations for Socialist ideological identity in the years ahead. Even for a party so 
accustomed to the pragmatic employment of doctrine, the concept was too flimsy - not 
to mention blatantly at variance with present or likely future governmental action. 
Cambadelis observes; 
"we did not integrate into our thought the fact that Francois Mitterrand implanted 
'la duree' into the Parti Socialiste ..... (thus ) 'La duree' was integrated into the 
party to the detriment of its identity, we did not theorise our passage into 
government, and were thus unable to explain our actions to our electorate. 'La 
duree' became an end in itself.,,33 
This view is shared by Moscovici, who insists that, "power is not a political project", 
and elsewhere "power, but what for?" (Moscovici 1994) Such observations, offered by 
the new generation of Socialist elite, indicate that the tension between ideological purity 
and governmental reality has not disappeared. Nor were such tensions resolved easily in 
the period following the V-turn, as Perrineau's survey of conference participant's 
attitudes shows; 
"The conferences of the 1980s were characterised by a slow and difficult change 
in the ideological orientations of Socialist militants. The birth of a culture of 
government was laborious. The old orientations had difficulty dying, whilst the 
new choices had difficulty being born." (Perrineau 1992: 227) 
The PS and Europe 
Governmental experience also profoundly affected the relationship between the PS and 
its European context. The role of Europe within PS ideology has been as a harbinger of 
modernisation, but also as a prime export zone for the specifically French path to 
modernity. This view is in keeping with Mitterrand's European approach.34 However, 
the advancing process of European integration challenged traditional French 
assumptions of indivisible national sovereignty which underpinned that approach. The 
1946 and 1969 declarations of principles both stated that, "the PS is at once both 
national and international." In 1946, this was justified, "because the laws of the 
economy have taken on a universal character." In 1969, the justification was, "the 
33 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
34 As Cole puts it, "Europe was viewed by Mitterrand in gallic tradition, where French interests were 
regarded as inseparable from those of Europe itself. Europe was perceived as a surrogate nation-state, the 
vehicle through which the French genius could manifest itself, for the benefit of the other peoples of 
Europe."(l997 : 150) 
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country is but a fraction of the whole of humanity; because relations between peoples 
have taken on a universal character."(Bergounioux 1999 : 94-99) 
In the wake of the 1983 U-turn, and the Fontainebleu summit which saw the process of 
European integration being actively pursued with a renewed vigour by Mitterrand, the 
PS's internationalism had undergone a thorough Europeanisation.(see chapter 6) This 
Europeanisation entailed a realisation that France is an integral part of the Ee, and given 
the degree of interdependence of the European economies, the French nation state must 
be conceived as intrinsically and increasingly part of a greater European whole. 
President Mitterrand's lead on Europe was seen by some in the party as a means of 
filling the 'gap' left by the end of transcendental rhetoric and the impact of governing 
constraints on maximalist programmes. Within the party as a whole, many realised that 
Jospin's parenthese would at the very least be a protracted one, leaving the PS, 
ideologically, in a state of flux. The party needed to regain its sense of engagement in fa 
transformation sociaie, and rediscover some doctrinal and programmatic coherence. 
Many saw advancing European construction as an appropriately large scale reformist 
project to substitute for the policies of Projet Socialiste.35 
By 1990, it was deemed necessary to rewrite the declaration of principles36 adopted in 
1969 - which was considered too heavily predicated on autonomous action at the 
national level to correspond to the changed realities of the international context. In the 
most significant evolution since 1969, the corresponding passage in the 1990 
declaration reads; 
"the PS situates itself with a national and international context ... the PS has 
chosen Europe in order to give the nations which comprise it the means to 
confront the challenges of the future ... the PS is attached to the acceleration of the 
process of European construction in all its dimensions: political, economic and 
3S Quite apart from, this, the party really did not have much choice, as opposition to a policy so publicly 
championed by 'its' president would have left the party very isolated. Thus, as Cole notes, "once the PS 
had officially accepted the turning point implied by March 1983, it was virtually condemned to follow 
the President of the Republic on all related issues; this was expressed notably, for example, by PS support 
for the Single European Act in 1986, notwithstanding severe misgivings from sections of the 
party."(1996: 74) 
36 The commission which spent the 2 months prior to the Rennes conference deliberating over the rewrite 
at Mauroy's behest contained representatives of every courant presenting a motion at Rennes. It is 
testament to the degree of commitment to European integration that, prior to the most divided congress in 
the history of the party, only Chevenement (see later) chose to fight the internal battle on the battleground 
of Europe. 
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social." (Bergounioux 1999 : 101) 
The corollaries of the commitment to European integration are of fundamental 
importance. It was simply unreasonable to expect every European nation state to sign up 
to the PS triptych of the 1970s, 'nationalisation, planification, autogestion.' The 
commitment to European integration was a recognition that, for all Jospin's talk of 
parenthesis, the ideas espoused by the PS in the 1970s were no longer on the agenda. 
We will explore the wider implications of this for PS ideology later. 
The PS in the 1980s and 1990s - Constituent Elements of its Ideological 
Identity 
Mindful of all the methodological pitfalls outlined earlier, we shall now attempt to map 
out the ideological identity of the party in recent times. For all the reasons cited above, 
this will be an imperfectly executed exercise. Our 'building blocks' must be the 
co urants , but we have seen how these do not perfectly translate ideological identity. 
Furthennore, recent developments have led to a waning of the role of courants in the 
articulation of distinctive ideological positions. Moscovici describes the ideological 
'softening' of the party in the 1980s and 1990s, identifying the difficulty the party has 
had in maintaining a creative tension between the different courants. The reason, he 
argues, is to be sought in the party's incapacity to rediscover an ideological 
dynamism.(l994 : 89) 
The point is a valid one. During the heyday of the courants in the 1970s, the range of 
ideological positions defended by the party was amply wide enough to nourish a number 
of competing courants - without their treading on each other's toes. In the 1980s, the 
realms of the possible were reined in by governmental experience, and the 
'secularisation' of French socialism. With, at the Arche congress of 1991, the 
acceptance of capitalism and the market economy as the 'new horizon' beyond which 
socialist doctrine may not look, the coherence of PS ideology was, as we saw earlier, 
undennined. Thus the ideological space occupied by the courants narrowed 
considerably, and the clarity of their ideological positions reduced. As Jean-Paul 
Huchon puts it, "the 'two cultures' continue to exist, but they are less and less removed 
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from one another, because the culture of government prevailed.,,37 
The Arche text codifies this sentiment thus, "with the exercise of power, the PS has 
abandoned the strategy of rupture in favour of a culture of reform.,,38 With the resultant 
convergence on more modest positions, distinctive self-definition by any 'sensibilite' 
has declined. This development has been compounded by a changing tactical context of 
intra-party factionalism outlined in chapter 3.39 As Cambadelis pointed out earlier, the 
sharp ideological distinctions between courants have given way to a centring on leading 
individuals. The evolution of the party's publications reflects this shift. The Popereniste 
Mutin laments; 
"Before 1981, there was a burgeoning of ideas, a proliferation of debate within the 
PS. The courants had their own theoretical periodicals; there was 'Reperes' for the 
CERES, 'Faire' for the Rocardians .... These were published regularly, and 
contained fundamental debates. Now, all we have is a sorry little week~ called 
'L 'Hebdo des Socialistes'. There is nothing in it! It is pathetic! Pathetic!,,4 
The consensual orthodoxy within today's party, and the official insistence that the 
courants no longer exist, makes it difficult to identify the constituent elements of 
today's PS. The Party can only really be divided up if one looks to historical 
allegiances. The Mitterrandist camp has split, essentially between Fabius and Jospin. 
Smaller groupings, around Mermaz, and until recently Emmanuelli, are also 
identifiable. The ex-Rocardians, retain a certain coherence. Some argue that Martine 
Aubry now commands the support once 'belonging' to Pierre Mauroy,41 to this we may 
reasonably assume, can be added the support of Delors followers.42 All these figures, as 
well as heavyweights are prepared to operate under the ideological umbrella of the 
'ligne majoritaire " to cohere around that 'pole of stability.' Their different inflections 
and emphases are only sufficiently distinct to merit them being referred to as 
'sensibilites', not' courants' - an important distinction in internal parlance.43 
37 Interview with Jean-Paul Huchon 29/9/97 
38 Le Poing et fa Rose no. 135 Janvier 1992 p.39 
39 Perhaps most important was the return to a consensual approach to conferences, first practiced at 
Grenoble in 1973, whereby the main' sensibilites' synthesise their general political statement before the 
conference, presenting a single 'motion' which is guaranteed between 80 and 90% of the vote. 
40 Interview with Marie-Therese Mutin 23/9/97. In 1999, it should be noted, the PS started a new ideas-
oriented publication, La Revue Socialiste. 
41 Interview with Jean-Marcel bichat 21111197 
42 Aubry has risen to prominence in the post-Rennes era, and therefore strictly speaking has never 
constituted her own courant, since she has never been first signatory of a motion at conference. Her 
following is thus difficult to measure. Such problems are, however, not central to our concern here. 
43 See chapter 3 for a discussion of the semantic relevance of the various tags. 
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In terms of authentic courants, who continue to present motions and affirm their 
ideological distinctness within the party, there remains only the rump Poperen courant 
and the Gauche socialiste. To this might be added the small group of Blairites, led by 
Edith Cresson and Jean-Marie Bockel, who presented a 'contribution'44 at Brest. Thus 
we may split our discussion of the constituent elements of the party's current ideological 
identity into two sections. Firstly, the 'historical allegiances', the 'sensibilites' which 
today co-exist within the 'ligne majoritaire', at the expense of some of their internal 
coherence and ideological distinctness. Secondly, we can identify the ideological 
outliers, for the most part still authentic courants, who have retained a critical distance 
from the positions oftoday's 'ligne majoritaire'. 
The Historical Allegiances: The Rocardians 
The Rocardian courant retains some traits of its most recent ancestor, the PSu.45 In the 
1960s, their 'modernist' branch sought, in the spirit of Pierre Mendes-France's 
pragmatic, technocratic and efficient Socialism coupled with sound economic 
management, to combat the stranglehold of the PCF. To this was added something akin 
to participative liberalism through democratisation of decision making and employee 
participation in the workplace. They placed great emphasis on the role of negotiation 
and contractual relationships in balancing social and economic power. This is why 
Rocard describes his modus operandi as "the method of social democracy working for 
the values of Socialism." (1987 : 315-6) 
A certain libertarianism underpins the Rocardian's limited decentralising anti-statism, as 
well as the emphasis on individuality and the role of the market. In the Rocardian view 
of society, the Jacobin statist strategy is an inappropriate mode of change. For Rocard, 
the state is not the exclusive instrument of social transformation. "Socialism ... aims for 
the recognition of civil society as a specific field of political action, distinct from the 
44 Like a motion, but not voted on, and therefore carrying less weight and symbolic significance. Mermaz 
also presented his own • contribution '. 
45 The PSU, due no doubt in part to its 'social democratic' method, was well supported amongst 
unionists, particularly the CFDT. It also attracted left-wing Catholics (never welcomed in the old anti-
clerical SFIO), and all these components had their impact on its ideas. Hence Hazareesingh's insistence 
on the importance of the 'social Catholicist tradition' to the ideas of the 'deuxieme gauche '.(1994: 220) 
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state." (Rocard 1986) Liberty for Rocard included freedom of the consumer and 
accepted the existence of the market. The idea of democracy was extended to embrace 
the economic field, finding expression through participation and negotiation in the 
workplace. This rehabilitation of the market was a subtle attempt at redefinition of 
Socialist values, which Rocard sought to write into the Party's declaration of 
principles.46 An unchanging reference was solidarity, which remained a key theme 
despite the commitment to economic efficiency and competitiveness, and sets clear 
limits on the individualism which more liberal elements in Rocardian thought might 
promote. 
This method and these values feed into a new balance between the state and the market 
which form the core of the Rocardian ideological position; 
"Socialism today must be able to redefine the role of the state and ensure its 
enhanced efficiency, not as a producer, but as a regulator of economic and social 
life, and favours the autonomy and initiative of the social partners. Less 
regulations, more negotiations; fewer laws, more contracts; less state tutelage, 
more conferring of responsibilities; that is the balance to be sought if we are to 
combine modernisation and solidarity." (quoted in Bergounioux & Grunberg 1992 
: 446) 
Rocardians shared in the anti-capitalism traditional to French Socialism, but the form it 
took differed significantly. Within the Rocardian universe, anti-capitalism is a moral not 
an economic argument.47 For Rocard, the market was not inherently bad, indeed, it was 
an essential element in any justly ordered society. In the Rocardian view, recognition of 
the role to be played by market was not incompatible with the dual desires for planning 
and the reduction of inequalities. The rehabilitation of the market represents Rocardian 
socialism's most significant contribution, and Rocardians saw themselves as the 
harbingers of modernity blessed with a healthy dose of realism. Developments once in 
office did little to dissuade Rocardians of their convictions about 'economic realism' 
and their role as the enlightened modernisers. With more than a hint of 'I told you so', 
Rocard's motion at the Toulouse conference of 1985 read, "My conviction is that we 
would not have suffered such failings if they had not been sustained by a disjuncture 
46 Le Monde 20/6/86 
47 In this sense it has a certain resonance with New Labour's attempt to reclaim the 'ethical socialist' 
heritage of Tawney, extracting from the ethical socialist canon only the moral dimensions of the 
arguments, and drawing a discrete veil over the economic framework which underpinned the argument. 
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between our discourse and our actions.,,48 Indeed, Jospin went so far as to admit that 
Rocard was right.{l991 : 101) 
The Mitterrandists 
The Rocardians, however, did not have free rein to effect this rehabilitation of the 
market. The process of ideological evolution which began after 1983 took place within 
fairly tightly limited boundaries- constraints imposed by the internal balance of forces 
within the party. As Rocard remained a minority force within the party, the attitude of 
Mitterrandists towards doctrinal change was a crucial determining factor. Yet the 
Mitterrandist majority, consolidated at Metz, was not a monolithic block. Bell & 
Criddle correctly identify the 'Mitterrandists' as "a constellation of mini-currents, some 
closer to the throne than others ... a heterogeneous collection of social democrats, 
marxists, technocrats, and arrivistes around an inner core of mitterrandistes de 
/oi."(1988 : 229) These distinctive bodies, however, all orbit around a pole some way to 
the left of the Rocardians. The attachment to what Portelli calls "statist republicanism," 
prioritising egalitarian state intervention, is strong.(1992 : 90) The final text at Metz 
thus proclaims, "our objective is not to modernise capitalism, but to replace it with 
socialism", to this end, "a break with the all-powerfulness of the market and its logic of 
profit will begin the transition,"49 Such pronouncements are firmly within the anti-
capitalist tradition within French Socialist rhetoric which today looks somewhat 
surpassed by events. 
In the 1970s, Mitterrand's allies had cohered around the triptych 'autogestion, 
planification, nationalisation'. In the 1980s, as all three elements of its rallying cry 
decreased in importance in governmental strategy, the Mitterrandist courant lost its 
coherence. To attempt to find a new coherence, based on a new ideological cement, 
would have been an extremely challenging task with little prospect of success. As 
Chevenement's resignation in 1983 proved, the ideological cracks in the original 
grouping were beginning to appear as a result of the U-turn which some referred to as 
'notre Bad Godesburg,.5o Instead, Mitterrand chose the path of ambiguity as the best 
48 Le Poing et fa Rose no. 112 May 1985 p.8 
49 Le Poing et fa Rose Text of the Metz Congress, February 1979. 
50 Emmanuelli & Chevenement PS Info no. 544 May 1993 
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means of keeping the internal coalition together.51 
In the mid-to-Iate 1980s, the fault lines were beginning to emerge close to the core of 
the Mitterrandist courant. These were to change the landscape in the aftermath of 
Rennes. Fabius, on the one hand, embraced 'modernisation' with all the zeal of a 
convert, just four years after having proclaimed "between the state and the market, there 
is the plan" at Metz. Jospin, although principally concerned as first secretary with the 
unity of the Mitterrandist majority,52 remained more firmly rooted on the left. As Friend 
observes, "there remained on Jospin's part a dislike of the way Fabius had adapted so 
easily from the Left-wing rhetoric of 1979 to the cool moderation of 1983 and 
after."(Friend 1997 : 152) 
The ideological distinctions between Jospin and Fabius should not be overstated. As a 
prominent Fabiusien, Weber is well placed to observe that, "the principle cleavage 
which opposed Jospin and Fabius .... is the leadership of the Movement. There may 
have been disagreements on one or two issues, but these were minor - it was not for no 
reason that they were in the same courant for years."S3 Rocard's lieutenant Huchon is 
dismissive, "if you are able to tell me what distinguishes Jospin and Fabius at the 
ideological level - you are doing well!"s4 Those hostile to Fabius draw a distinction in 
terms of method and approach to the institutions of the party, seeing in Fabius a certain 
aristocratic air or 'notablisme', who merely makes use of the party, whereas Jospin is 
portrayed as more a man of the party. 
The Ideological Outliers : The Poperenistes 
Poperen's courant was recognised as the only one to remain untainted by the thirst for 
power, and to continue to function as a genuine 'courant de pensee' on the model 
established in the 1970s. The Poperenistes remain an authentic courant within the 
party, continuing to present motions, offering a leftist critique of the majority line, for 
51 This was justified doctrinally through the extraordinary expediency of the theory of ·parenthesis'. This 
averted the explicit refonnulation of doctrine, which would have driven apart more of his allies than it 
united. 
52 see Bergounioux & Grunberg 1992 p. 450-452 
53 Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
54 Interview with Jean-Paul Huchon 29/9/97 
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vote at conference. Their support is marginal (between 5 and 10% of conference votes). 
Poperen remained to the left of the Mitterrandist pole, their Nouveau Monde and 
Synthese Flash55 publications still dominated by Marxist analytical categories. He was 
an ideological instigator, offering widely embraced concepts, such as the 'front de 
classe '. At the 1981 Valence Congress; 
"Jean Poperen ensured that the idea of compromise was written into the 
[ unanimous] motion. The compromise between social forces and the patronat ... 
Poperen defended the idea that there should be a compromise, but that the party 
itself ought to organise balance of power.,,56 
Right up until his death in 1997, Jean Poperen remained a respected and valued thinker 
in the party, continuing to campaign for an explicit compromise between social forces. 
Poperen's core idea was that concessions made to the Patronat in terms of subsidies, 
wage de-indexation, and state aids, should only be granted in return for social 
concessions for the workforce, secured through the co-ordinated action of the PS, 
unions, and groups representing the unemployed and socially excluded. Mutin regrets 
that, for all the 'favours' granted to the Patronat in the 1980s and early 1990s; 
"we never demanded anything in return ... We did not rely on, or mobilise, the 
mouvement social, we never created a balance of power within enterprises to 
oblige the Patronat to make concessions ... we succumbed to economic 
constraints, but we never created a balance of power to oblige the Patronat to 
succumb to the social constraints. ,,57 
Poperen's enduring critique of the PS evolution since 1981 was that the PS, "was more 
interested in adapting to liberalism than combatting it."s8 Accordingly, the Poperenistes' 
critiques were particularly sharp on issues such as the PS mainstream's 
'accommodation' with the flexibilisation of the labour market, and the excessively 
'liberal' character of the European project. With Poperen himself gone, it remains seen 
whether Marie-Therese Mutin can retain the coherence and energy the courant 
displayed in years gone by. 59 
~~ Replaced more recently by Vu de Gauche. 
~6 Interview with Marie-Therese Mutin 23/9/97 
57 Interview with Marie Therese Mutin 23/9/97 
58 Interview with Marie-Therese Mutin 23/9/97 
59 Their proximity, in terms of fundamental principles, to the Gauche Socialiste has led to speculation 
about a merger. So far, all approaches from the Gauche Socialiste have been rebuffed, not because of 
fundamental doctrinal diversity, but more out respect for the memory of Poperen - Interview with Jean-
Luc Melenchon 29/9/97 
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La Gauche Socialiste 
Established in the early 1990s, the Gauche Socialisle is an authentic courant, presenting 
motions at conference, offering a Left-wing critique of the ligne majoritaire. As a 
minority courant, the Gauche Socialiste cannot take their critique very far, but they 
remain a thorn in the side of the ligne majoritaire's ideological configuration. The 
Gauche Socialiste has representatives on the party's executive bodies, including 
respected figures such as Jean-Luc Melenchon, who stood against Hollande at Brest for 
the post of first secretary, and achieves on average a little over 10% of conference 
votes.60 The Gauche Socialiste sees itself as continuing the 'premiere gauche' tradition, 
affirming the concepts of 'rupture' and 'contestation' against social democratic 
'accompaniment' of, and 'adaptation' to liberalism. Accordingly, idea of bottom-up 
protest, such as the 'mouvement socia/e' embodied in the December 1995 strikes in 
protest at the Juppe plan, are important to its political outlook.61 These concepts are 
couched in a Republican discourse, defending "a conception of the PS profoundly 
linked to the republican identity. The Republican dimension being directly linked to the 
French identity and to the revolutionary spirit of 1789.,,62 
La Gauche Social isle claims to be the true legatees of Jaures within the party. His 
concept of the Repub/ique Sociale is central to their discourse. Their Brest motion 
advocates, "the RepubJique sociale that we want to set up in opposition to the liberal 
disorder which is corrupting the ordinary lives of French people." The Gauche 
Socialiste's critique of the PS mainstream is couched in terms of Jaures' urge to 
complete the republican project through instituting thorough-going social and economic 
equality. The harbinger of such equality should, it is argued, be the state, "the Left must 
affirm that the State need make no excuses for its existence, that public servants are not 
too numerous, and that public administration deserve better than to be denounced as 
60 The Gauche Socialiste amendment at the March 1996 convention was voted for by 40% of party 
members. This episode supports one of the Gauche Socialiste's claims, namely that they speak for the 
'real voice' of the militants. Melenchon observes of the Etats Genereux, "instead of being a 
demonstration of a pacified party, appeased and convinced of the most moderate reformist theories, it was 
quite the opposite which appeared. That is to say, a party very firmly anchored on the Left." Interview 
with Jean-Luc Melenchon 29/9/97 
61 Interview with Harlem Desir 22111197 
62 Interview with Jean-Luc Melenchon 29/9/97 
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inefficient, prehistoric monsters." La Gauche Socialiste calls for more audacious 
activism on almost all economic and social fronts, but particular emphasis is placed on 
fiscal redistribution, underpinned by, "a refusal to abandon the principle of egalite in 
favour of the concept of equite."(see later) The entire discourse is articulated in terms of 
the need to resist, "cultural submission to the anglo-saxon model towards which neo-
liberal globalisation pushes us on all fronts." 63 
La Troisieme Gauche 64 - The Blairites 
"Our Labour friends, under Tony Blair, have shown us the way,,65 proclaims the 
contribution of Bockel and Cresson at the Brest Congress. At present, the 'Troisieme 
Gauche' represent a tiny minority within the party, and choose not to present a distinct 
'motion' to conference.66 Bockel classifies the last 30 years of the PS's history as a 
struggle between 'archaics' and 'modernists,' and regrettably notes the enduring 
influence of the former over Jospin's Realisme de Gauche. "The acceptance of the 
economic liberalism has never been 'swallowed' ideologically ... the Socialists have 
never dared recognise that, on question such as this, they have fundamentally changed." 
The uneasy, ambiguous coexistence of 'archaics' and 'modernists' endures, and entails 
programmatic commitments which the party cannot deliver once in government. 
Bockel's call for 'social liberalism' is framed in terms of a rethinking of the nature of 
the PS' s engagement with globalisation; 
"I want the party to clearly affirm a social-liberal line. That is to say, that we do 
not attempt to fight a rearguard action against globalisation of the economy, 
against the necessary flexibility which creates jobs. We should not be fighting 
premature and unsound battles in the issue of the length of the working week. 
Instead we should fight our battles on the issue of equality of opportunity, 
63 La Gauche Socialiste 'Etat d'Urgence sociale - Pour Une Autre Coherence', Contribution at the Brest 
Congress. 
64 The Label comes from Bockel's 'La Troisieme Gauche - Petit Manifeste Social Liberal' (1999) Archer 
65 L 'Hebdo des Socialistes no. 31 8/9/97 p. 21 
66 The apparatchik in Bockel sees the 'war of succession' (of Jospin) as already under way. A minister in 
the Fabius government on 1984-1986, he sees in Fabius the best hope for the triumph of the 'modernists'; 
"The most modem speech, the most social-liberal speech I heard at the Brest congress (apart from mine) 
was that of Fabius." That said, Bockel considers Fabius to be just as hamstrung by ideological ambiguity. 
"even he did not dare go too far, for fear either of putting himself in a position of competition [with the 
ligne majoritaire], or of cutting himself off from part of his following, which is firmly rooted in the 
ideology of the left."- Interview with Jean-Marie BockeI9112/97. It is possible (although unlikely) that 
the centrifugal forces allied to Fabius' partial marginalisation alluded to earlier could in time push him to 
rediscover his 'modernising' self of 1984-86, and embellish it with a Blairite air. 
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education, training, security, and a return to communitarian ideas of solidarity.,,67 
Bockel calls for a 'recentring' of state activity. It is argued that "the state must 
profoundly change its relationship with the economic world,,68 becoming a 'motor' to 
encourage firms to create the jobs by reducing the taxation burden on firms to release 
the dynamism of market mechanisms. In tandem with this redefinition of the state's 
role, Bockel talks enthusiastically of the need to re-conceptualise the Party's core 
values. 'Egalite' is reformulated as 'equite', the significance of which we shall explore 
later. 
PS Ideological Redefinition since 1995 - Realisme de Gauche 
Situating himself somewhat equivocally in the Mitterrandist tradition, Jospin recalls the 
commonalities in ideological outlook of the 70s and early 80s, citing "his more 
'volontariste' economic approach, where politics was prioritised over economism, and 
where the social realm is conceived of as an asset to the economy, rather than an 
impediment on it ..... as well as the importance he attached to the state."(Jospin 1991 : 
99) When Jospin comes to the enunciation of his core Socialist values in the 1 990s, 
there is evolution, but only little; 
"We must clearly restate our objectives; full employment, material well-being, the 
reduction of income inequalities, and more balanced international economic 
relations. For if we renounce these goals, we by the same stroke renounce 
socialism."(1991 : 255) 
In the 1990s, the residual influence of hostility between Jospin and Fabius finds 
expression not in ideological terms, but in the internal power-brokering within the party. 
"If one recalls the Rennes Congress [see chapter 3], one can see the alliance of the 
Rocardian and Jospinian forces ... and it is true that they now have a preponderant place 
in the government. Whereas the Fabiusians are more centred in parliament.,,69 This can 
be seen in the relative absence of Fabiusians from positions of influence within the party 
machine, and a virtual absence from ministerial positions.70 
67 Interview with lean-Marie BockeI9/12/97 
68 Interview with Jean-Marie BockeI9/12/97 
69 Interview with Louis Mermaz 1/10/97 
70 Claude Bartolone initially refused (although a year later accepted) a ministerial position, presumably 
fearing isolation as the only Fabiusian cabinet minister.(Dupin 1998: 164) 
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The fact that within the 80% or so support which JospinlHollande command within the 
party, a 50% majority can normally be secured without relying on the support of Fabius 
suggests that this marginalisation may continue, potentially giving rise to sharper 
divisions, which may once more become ideological in character. That said, the 
ideological 'space' between Fabius and the ligne majoritaire is very small. As Mermaz 
admits, "in all honesty, and we [saw] it at the [Brest] Congress, if you look at Fabius's 
text, and also that which I prepared myself, which is certainly a more left-wing text than 
Fabius', yet all the texts resemble each other quite closely. We have all achieved the 
same synthesis." 71 
Jospin's presidential campaign document, 1995-2000 Propositions pour fa France 
proclaimed, "the values which inspire me are liberty, equality, solidarity, secularism and 
responsibility."(1995 : 3) The programme set out in the document affirmed an activist 
role for the state, and the use of the 'room to manoeuvre'; 
"we must learn the lessons of the past, in order to instigate the reorientations of 
economic policy which today are necessary and possible without increasing 
public deficit, nor putting our currency, our external balances, or the 
competitivity of our firms in peril. . .1 reject the idea that the state is powerless, and 
believe that it should deploy all its capacities to aid job creation."( 1995 : 4-6) 
Equality is a central theme of the Jospinian discourse. As former Education Minister, 
Jospin calls for, "a society of permanent equality of opportunity" (1995 : 19) Further to 
this equality of opportunity, is a commitment to reduce income inequality through fiscal 
measures such as the Contribution Sociale Generalisee.(see chapters 6&7) This 
highlights the convergence of the main courants on similar positions, since the CSG 
was a measure introduced by Rocard. In qualifying his admission that events after 1983 
showed that Rocard was 'right' about economic policy, Jospin observes; 
"it is not that there is nothing left of the debates on the economic and social order 
which opposed Rocardian and Mitterrandists in the 1980s. Differences and 
nuances remain - like a continuation of old and passionate discussions. But one is 
forced to observe that they are small beer .... let us not affirm differences which are 
no longer there, simply to show ourselves to be loyal to a past."(1991 : 101) 
It is this line which has allowed Jospin to present himself as the synthesis of the two 
cultures of the French Left, as he explicitly did in his speech to the Brest conference. 
71 Interview with Louis Mennaz 1/10/97 
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Bergounioux recognises Jospin's achievement; 
"Jospin, being at the same time a man coming from Mitterrandism, but, with the 
'droit d'inventaire " remaining at arms length from Mitterrandism, was able to 
achieve the synthesis between the aims of the 'deuxieme gauche' and classic 
Mitterrandism. He has those two elements, and today he governs like Rocard and 
talks like Mitterrand."n 
Socialism and Republicanism 
In a rhetorical ploy which tells us much about the character of Socialism in France, 
Jospin outlines his core values, qualifying them as not his Socialist values, but rather his 
Republican values. 
"Liberty, equality of opportunity and rights for all, the impartiality of the state, 
secularism, security, and a fair balance between individual and collective interest, 
national solidarity between generations and regions. The French must convince 
themselves that our Republic's values retain their mobilising force." (1995 : 41) 
Hazareesingh identifies the 'central tenets of Republican ideology' as, "a basic 
commitment to the concepts of political liberty and equality of condition."(1994 : 65) 
The importance of equality to French Socialism can trace its origins back to 1789. 
Within French Socialism, Jaures' Republican thesis, which saw 1789 as only the first 
step towards a true republic, laying the political foundations, leaving French socialists 
the task of translating political ega/iM (before the law) into a more thorough-going 
social egalite (of condition). The role of the state, as the embodiment of the Republic, in 
this egalitarian mission was unquestioned, extending liberty, fraternity and equality 
from the political domain to the social and production spheres. Thus the egalitarian 
element in French socialism has always been couched in republican terms, with a 
resultant statist approach not just to equality of opportunity, but also to greater equality 
of material conditions. Within French socialism, this particular brand of Republicanism, 
seeing "the Republic as providing the political and legal framework within which the 
battle for greater equality and social justice could be conducted most 
effectively,"(Hazareesingh 1994: 74) has influenced attitudes towards the institutions of 
the French State. 
This highlights an important structuring feature of French socialism. As Rey & 
72 Interview with Alain Bergounioux 18/9/97 
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Subileau's research demonstrated, the 'culture republicaine' is a fundamental 
organising frame of reference for French socialism.(1991) This accounts to a significant 
degree for the enduring faith in the state's interventionist role, and to the strength of 
attachment to equality as a core Socialist value. Furthermore, the importance of the 
Republican element in French Socialism has been bolstered in recent years by the 
demise of what was its most important rival element - namely Marxism. Republicanism 
thus compensates for the ideological 'deficit' resulting from the decline of Marxism.73 
Today, the values of equality, solidarity, co-operation, inclusion and '['interet general' 
or public interest are embodied in the concept of 'service pub/ique', the equivalent of 
the ethos of the civil service. It is in terms of these cultural values, institutionalised in 
the French state, that Jospin couches his argument; 
"The role of the state must be clarified, and we must re-institute the very idea of 
public service. The public service has an essential mission to combat social and 
territorial inequalities and to maintain social cohesion."( 1995 : 47) 
Thus France's particular cultural and ideological heritage gives Socialists much greater 
licence to talk in terms of state egalitarianism than is the case in some other western 
nations. This national tolerance of state activism is compounded, at the party level, by 
the dominance in the ranks of schoolteachers andjonctionnaires, all sharing the deeply 
ingrained concept of' Ie service publique'. This is an important structuring feature of the 
party's identity. Indeed, Portelli argues, the statist, egalitarian ideology of the party does 
little more than, "comfort the a priori convictions of Socialists."(1992 : 95) 
The Ongoing Process Of Ideological Redefinition 
To understand the ideological configuration of the French Socialist party today, we will 
examine three key debates which tell us much about the process and direction of 
ideological redefinition in progress. In each case, globalisation plays a crucial role as a 
catalyst for ideological redefinition. Firstly, we will examine the debate centring on the 
process of European integration. Secondly, we will explore the appropriate role of the 
state within society, and in particular in terms of economic strategy. Thirdly, we will 
look at the concepts of 'egalite' and 'equite' as the latter being seen by some as an 
73 The enduring influence of this Socialist republicanism is attested to by the writings of the Gauche 
Socialiste courant, who have once again taken up Jaures' concept of' La Repub/ique sociale '. 
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appropriate reformulation of the core vales of French socialism. 
Today's Key Debates: European Integration 
"The commitment to deepen European construction is the guiding 'red' thread, which 
explains what the PS has done since 1983. The absolute priority of European 
integration to give back to the old nation states the economic means they are losing 
as a result of globalisation." Henri Weber 74 
The implications of the European commitment within the declaration of the core 
principles of the party (see above) should not be under-estimated. In terms of the 
ideological identity of social democracy, this called into question one of the 
fundamental characteristics, that of 'methodological nationalism.' (see chapter 1) "Social 
democracy," Rocard observes, "elaborated its politics essentially in terms of the internal 
development of economies ... [through] 'national compromises'."(1993 : 11) The 
strength of the European commitment in the PS thus entails a shift in emphasis, with the 
national project now being situated within a wider context. This commitment to realise 
social democratic aspirations at a European level also required those aspirations to 
evolve. There could be no return to Changer fa Vie on a European scale. However, 
whilst European commitments foreclosed on certain ideological avenues, it opened up 
other potential paths of reformism. 
Underpinning social democracy's post-war national 'successes' was the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates, which secured monetary stability. The 1983 U-turn had 
proved to the PS that the 'methodological nationalism' of social democracy was no 
longer wholly compatible with the international context. As Gauron notes, "that 
monetary stability, which Keynes considered to be an essential condition of prosperity, 
has given way to generalised instability."{Gauron 1993 : 29) Rocard concurs, arguing 
that, "increased internationalisation ...... and the globalisation of markets (and especially 
financial markets) ... means that national policies reciprocally condition each other. This 
is a major structural change which affects not only our economies, but creates the risk of 
conflicts of all kind which will difficult for national States to control. "(1993 : 11) In the 
absence of the Bretton Woods international context, (see chapters 1 & 6) "any economic 
74 Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
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policy which seeks to combat unemployment at the national level is doomed to failure ... 
social democracy cannot rediscover its raison d'etre."(Gauron 1993 : 29) 
Where unemployment can, however, be tackled, is at the supra-national level; 
"It is thus the task of social democracy to carry on the political struggle within 
Europe .... in the two key dimensions of monetary and political union .... social 
democracy must work with [liberals and conservatives], but social democracy has 
the clearly defined goal of recreating the space for a Keynesian economy. "(Rocard 
1993:14) 
The PS ligne majoritaire, then, accepts that globalisation makes the pursuit of 
Keynesian strategies in order to secure social democratic goals of full employment and 
redistribution at the national level extremely problematic. Yet it remains committed to 
Keynesianism as the best social democratic 'strategic amalgam' (Pierson 1995) so far 
elaborated, and thus seeks to recreate an economic space where Keynesian economic 
strategies may once more be reconciled to the international economic context. This 
encapsulates the rationale of the PS's enthusiasm for European construction, for all its 
shortcomings. 
The conviction is widely held that European integration offers the only viable 'response' 
to globalisation, and therefore the PS - and indeed all European social democrats, must 
engage fully in the process of European construction; 
"The realisation dawned that national reformism in one country was no longer 
possible. This convinced many within the party elite, who were not a priori 
favourable to the European consensus, that there absolutely had to be an extension 
of Europe. These people became convinced that the only way that a Europe power 
could respond to globalisation was through European co-operation. Without that, 
there was no possible effective policy. This is what explains why, despite the 
difficulties, the reservations of public opinion, and despite internal cleavages 
within the Left, the majority of socialists have remained favourable to European 
construction. Their analysis of the process of globalisation accepts the necessity 
for the European nations to construct a regional power-bloc.,,75 
By the time Jospin took the helm of the PS, that European commitment was ingrained in 
most of the party's elite, members, and voters, and had seeped through into the party's 
very ideological being. Indeed, Bergounioux observes that, "since 1984, and the 
Fontainebleu summit, the European project has been increasingly part of the PS's 
75 Interview with Alain Bergounioux 18/9/97 
178 
identity."{1999 : 103) One testament to the growmg significance of the European 
dimension, and political activism at the EU level, within the PS is the propensity of all 
actors to situate their perceptions of the PS's ideological configuration within a wider 
European context. 76 
Manuel Valls situates a perceived convergence of European social democracy within the 
enlightenment tradition; 
"there has been a modernisation, an adaptation, and a redefinition of a body of 
doctrine and ideas which brought the PS closer to the 'norm' of all the thinking of 
all the socialist or social democratic parties in Europe today. The pronouncements 
of southern social democrats, such as the PDS and the PSOE, even the German 
social democrats, shows clearly that there are commonalities - as well, of course, 
as difference attributable to national histories, or recent political history. But the 
fact of putting employment at the centre of the analysis, for example, which is one 
of the many positions we all share, [means that] yes, one can talk of an adaptation, 
a modernisation of doctrine." 77 
However, a commitment to European integration presents one of the dilemmas of the 
redefinition of social democracy. For whilst there is much European social democrats 
agree on, there are also points of divergence which hinder co-operation. What is more, 
although currently enjoying the fruits of electoral success, social democrats clearly do 
not have a monopoly on political power in their countries. Thus, "In order to implement 
their long term programme, Socialists need to construct political Europe, because 
Europe is henceforth the pertinent 'space' for a large social democratic policy. Yet in 
order to build Europe politically, they have to work with those holding office 
throughout the community: liberals, conservatives, and Christian democrats." (Weber 
1993 : 7) 
For all the consensus within the ligne majoritaire, stark divisions remain over Europe, 
and the main angle of attack seeks to lay bare the effects of Anderson's paradox; "The 
politics of a rational Left needs to be international in a new and more radical way today: 
global in its conclusions. But it has not yet ceased to be national in its conditions." 
76 Both in texts and in interviews, PS ideology is considered in tenns of its point of insertion into a 
European social democratic tradition. This point, as welI as being made by alI interviewees, is also 
insisted upon in an OURS publication where PS actors were invited to define democratic socialism in 
1999. Hollande, Estier, Bergounioux inter alia were all at pains to situate the PS within a wider European 
context. Recherche Socialiste no. 7 (June 1999) 
77 Interview with Manuel ValIs 23/9/97 
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(1991 : 351) Critics both inside and outside the party have sought to exploit the 
inconsistencies between the PS' s doctrinal position and the Jospin government's 
European policy, and more generally the tension between the direction the PS believe 
Europe should take, and the nature of the actual process of European construction. 
CERES, alias Socialisme et Repub/ique, alias Mouvement des Citoyens 
Chevenement's CERES, alias Socialisme et RepubJique, alias Mouvement des Citoyens 
have been the most outspoken and long standing opponents to the vision of European 
construction articulated by the PS mainstream. Ever since 1983, the key dividing axis 
between Chevenement and his followers and the majority within the PS was Europe. 
For Chevenement, socialism has always been intimately related to national 
independence, and the strident nationalism of his courant ultimately could not accept 
the erosion of national sovereignty which European integration represented. 
Socialisme et Republique's objection to the 1990 declaration of principles was on the 
approach to Europe. Their amendment emphasised the national community, but made 
no mention of the European community. Indeed, Europe was an important catalyst 
which ultimately led Chevenement to leave the PS and create his own Mouvement des 
Citoyens party in 1992.78 Chevenement's departure, was, of course, not purely 
motivated by ideological purity. His gamble was to attempt to tap into anti-European 
feeling of the kind which manifested itself in the considerable socialist 'no' vote in the 
Maastricht referendum.79 The aim was to kick the PS when it was down, and walk away 
with a substantial section of its electorate. It was, in hindsight, a serious miscalculation, 
which mistook hostility to some of the specific provisions of Maastricht for a more 
deep-seated Euro-scepticism.80 
La Gauche Socialiste 
78 see Vendredi 9/10/92 for an account of Chevenement's dressing down by the Comi1£? Directeur of 
September 25th 1992 for campaigning for a 'no' vote on the Maastricht treaty 
79 See Duhamel, O. & Grunberg, G. (1993) 
80 The depths of the failure ofChevenement's move became apparent: Chevenement's Mouvement des 
Citoyens could only muster 2.54% of the vote. This result was significant in demonstrating the pitfalls for 
any courant within the party of taking up anti-European positions in its criticisms of the ligne 
majoritaire. 
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The tension between the direction the PS believe Europe should take, and the nature of 
the actual process of European construction has become more pressing as the pace of 
integration has advanced. The increasing impact of European policy and institutions on 
French politics was dramatically demonstrated by the Juppe government's attempts at 
drastic welfare cuts, justified as necessary to meet the Maastricht criteria, which 
provoked the social unrest of the Mouvement social. Seizing the political opportunity, 
the Gauche Socialiste has sought to reignite the debate about European integration 
within the party. Melenchon, leader of the Gauche Socialiste, characterises the majority 
line on Europe as; 
"Let us advance political Europe as far as possible, because as soon as we have 
created a balance of forces, we will create a social compromise (because this is no 
longer possible in one country). The method consisted of believing we could make 
numerous economic concessions, that is, accept and facilitate economic 
integration, giving it the characteristics that the liberals wanted, and that, in the 
end, in return, we would get political integration. Maastricht was the last 
compromise where both elements were present. Naturally, since then, it has all 
failed, the liberals have had the last laugh, as is testified by the Dublin pact and 
the Amsterdam summit.,,81 
The 'failure' relates to macroeconomic policy, industrial policy, and also labour market 
reform, where the 'liberal' European integration is seen as heralding an inexorable 
increase in flexibility and job insecurity. On a deeper level, Harlem Desir, views the 
accommodation with capitalism which Maastricht represents as an excessive 
concession to globalisation, which is seen as inherently neo-liberal; 
"If we do not reject this monetarist dogma, there will be no support for a policy of 
reflation for jobs. The central bank acquires more and more budgetary and 
monetary power. If there is no political Europe in opposition to this central bank, 
and an Economic Government, capable of orienting economic policy, I do not 
believe this Dobs] summit will have any effect. ,,82 
The Gauche Socialiste's critique of the ligne majoritaire's European policy lays bare the 
difficulty the PS continues to have living with global capitalism. The Gauche 
Socialiste attacks the Jospin line on the grounds that the 'room to manoeuvre' of which 
Realisme de Gauche makes so much has been inaccurately conceived, and that actually 
there is considerably more 'slack' in terms of scope for reformist activism than the 
Jospin government chooses to take up. The most important point made by the Gauche 
81 Interview with Jean-Luc Melenchon 29/9/97 
82 Interview with Harlem Desir 20/11/97 
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Socialiste in this regard is perhaps a not unreasonable one. Namely, that commitment to 
the single currency, and the stringent public spending and public deficit limits which it 
demands, hamstrings any socialist government. Even with sympathetic governments in 
most of the member states, there is little sign that ED-level social democratic activism is 
soon to become a reality. This dilemma is by no means unique to the PS, reflecting as it 
does the difficulty all social democratic governments have in reconciling national and 
supra-national goals. Nevertheless, it does demonstrate the degree to which ideological 
redefinition remains 'work in progress'. 
2 • The Role of the State 
As we in saw chapter I, the nation state has historically been of central importance in 
social democracy. This is especially true in the French case, where the republican, 
etatiste tradition identifies the French state as the harbinger of modernity, whose 
mission it has been to extend liberty, fraternity, and equality. However, the processes of 
globalisation have called into question the role of the nation state, and in particular state 
capacities of economic regulation and organisation. The ensuing process of redefinition 
has to some extent reflected different emphases on the role and ambit of the state of the 
different ex-courants. Fabius' lieutenant, Claude Bartolone, sees the emergent vision of 
the state's role as a victory for what Rocard would term the 'premiere gauche'. 
"In terms of ideas, Jospin has triumphed. The difference which endures between 
the Rocardians and the rest of the Socialist family - and the Mitterrandists in 
particular- is the role and conception of the state. Rocard' s vision seemed to me 
to attach less importance to the state, placing the emphasis on decentralisation 
of power and organisation. Jospin, whilst gathering the activist support of the 
Rocardians, imposed upon them a certain vision of the regulatory state, as the 
structuring feature of French society. It is Jospin's vision which has been 
victorious in the heart of the party. ,,83 
This suggests that some in the party, particularly those with a historical allegiance to 
Rocard, are not entirely comfortable with the current role of the state within Socialist 
ideology. However, unquestioning acceptance of the 'deux cultures' thesis, as we have 
already seen, leads to a serious mis-reading of the contemporary situation. As a 
rhetorical exercise, Rocard invoked the 'deux cultures' to oppose his courant to the 
Mitterrandists. In the 20 years since his speech, not only have ideological divergences 
83 Interview with Claude Bartolone 11/12/97 
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between Rocardians and Mitterrandists reduced considerably, but ex-Rocardians and ex-
Mitterrandists (or more accurately Jospinists) have begun working together to achieve 
ideological redefinition within the 'ligne majoritaire '.( see Cambadelis 1996 : pp217-
221) This is why Mauroy's lieutenant Le Garrec, amongst others, believes, "that (deux 
cultures) reading is no longer possible today.,,84 
Appreciative of the complex nature of French socialist ideology, Jean Le Garrec is less 
willing to talk in stark terms of victory and defeat, "a dominant political vision has 
progressively emerged. I think that that debate about the two cultures is behind us. That 
said, divergences can still remain. I think that the political rapprochement which has 
taken place (between Jospinistes and Rocardians) is at least in part linked to political 
opportunism." This is not to talk of triumph for Jospin, since Le Garrec insists that, "the 
talk of a more modest state - a cherished theme of the Rocardians - that is all to be 
found in Jospin's discourse.,,85 
It is difficult, however, to identify at any moment a fundamental shift in the role of the 
state in French Socialism. This is perhaps because there has been a gradual process of 
evolution ever since Mitterrand embraced the concept of 'i'economie mixte '. For 
example the Bordeaux conference text talked of the need for a modem state; 
"In a mixed, open and highly competitive economy, the state can contribute to 
strengthening the productive system through innovation, training, and research. 
The state must be capable of launching programmes linking public and private 
sector, research and industry. The state must expand its strategic role.,,86 
Although the French state is traditionally held up as a model of a 'developmental' state, 
these statements are more in line with the conception of the state as an 'enabler.' 
According to this model the state takes care of certain externalities, and secures a 
number of 'public goods', but in general tends not to be actively interventionist. 
Indeed, one can see elements of this kind of thinking gaining ground with respect to 
some aspects of state activity. The state's role in the economy is increasingly seen as 
that of a facilitator of the strategic restructuring of the French model of capitalism in the 
84 Interview with Jean Le Garrec 16/12/97 
8S Interview with Jean Le Garrec 16/12/97 
86 Vendredi no. 145 (28/5/92) 
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face of advancing processes of globalisation.87 A somewhat rhetorical theoretical 
distinction is made between the 'competitive' and 'non-competitive' sectors, with 
health, education and other such areas of public service provision defended as 
untouchable 'real public services'. However, in the competitive sector, the state's role 
involves forging strategic alliances, often at the European level, through the 'opening 
up' of French public firms to investment from European competitors.(see chapter 6) 
A prime example being the partial privatisation of companies such as France Telecom, 
EDF and Aerospatiale - where the public/private link, and introduction of capital from 
other European firms, has been actively encouraged. Similar thinking arguably 
underpins the state's role in recent moves to reorganise French banking around 
Paribas.88 In interview, many actors referred to a 'leaner,' 'more supple,' 'strategic' 
state.(see chapter 6) The Rocardian Marisol Touraine sees the state's role as; 
"defining the initiatives at the level of the state, but leaving to economic actors 
themselves to define in concrete terms, locally, the mechanisms. I think we are 
progressively moving towards a disengagement of the state as a primary economic 
actor, and I believe the evolution is irreversible.,,89 
As the distinction referred to above suggests, the idea of the 'enabling state' has enjoyed 
only partial acceptance. This is attested to by the conception of the mixed economy 
voted, this time under Rocard9o, at Bourget in 1993. 
"Socialists recognise, in certain domains, the dynamism and the efficiency of the 
market economy, they believe in the mixed economy, that is, a market economy 
framed by the intervention of public power.,,91 
There are limits to the acceptance of the 'enabling' (etat stratege) model. This is 
principally because suspicion of the market, and indeed capitalism, still runs very deep. 
Thus whilst prepared to embrace the role of the market in many aspects of economic 
activity, the text of the Bourget conference offers a caveat. "What distinguishes the left 
from the right is not the refusal of market mechanisms, but the refusal to abandon 
ourselves to their inhuman logic.,,92 
87 Interview with Louis Mennaz 1110/97; Interview with Claude Estier 19/9/97 
88 See Dominic Moisi in Financial Times 23/8/99 
89 Interview with Marisol Touraine 25111197 
90 The fact that under Rocard's tutelage, the party moves in a direction he himself did not personally 
favour is testament to the weakness of his grip on the party. a point insisted upon by his lieutenant Jean-
Paul Huchon in interview (29/9/97) 
91 Vendredi no. 196 (1/9/93) 
92 Vendredino. 212 (17/12/1993) 
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As a counterweight to the market, and couched in terms of the Republican discourse 
referred to above, the deeply ingrained concept of 'Ie puissance puh/ique' is evoked. 
Consequently, party texts have been careful to insist upon the possibility and necessity 
of state activism, particularly in the economic field. (see chapters 6&7) The activist, 
regulatory and redistributive role of the state was then codified at the party's national 
convention on 'Globalisation, Europe, and France's place in the World' in March 1996. 
TJ'lis clearly placed the state at the heart of a strategy seeking to secure Socialism's core 
values. The activist, regulatory state role attempts to compensate for the fact that, at the 
national level, Keynesian full employment policies are no longer viable. Thus the state 
not only co-ordinates and orchestrates a reduction in the working week to 35 hours, but 
also engages in an active employment drive. These elements compose an ensemble 
which is characterised as the French 'model' "founded upon competitiveness within 
a context of social justice and equality", distinct not only from the Anglo-Saxon but 
also from the Rhenish model of capitalism.93 
3: Egalitarianism and French Socialism 
The state of flux of French Socialist ideology is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in 
the nature of its egalitarianism. The new international economic context had made the 
socialists painfully aware of the limits of the possible. From every corner, political 
projects were founded on the assumption that international competitiveness was a 
necessary precursor to socialist advance. This brought the tension between economic 
efficiency and social justice into sharp relief. The egalitarian commitments of the PS 
have thus had to be re-evaluated. Pursuing Socialist policies in an open economy in the 
late twentieth century in a context of the advancing processes of globalisation has been 
shown to be an extremely difficult task.94 
As with Employment (see chapter 6) the PS increasingly articulates its egalitarianism on 
two levels. On the one hand, domestically, there is a commitment to shift the 
distribution of added value away from capital and towards labour, and to combat social 
exclusion through a range of benefits and fiscal activism. On the other hand, there is a 
93 Vendredi 276 8/3/96 
94 see Muet & Fontenau (1985) 
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commitment to a more thorough-going construction of 'I 'Europe sociale', with the 
social chapter of Maastricht seen as but the first step in ratcheting up social standards, 
and strengthening an inclusive, egalitarian European social model.(see chapter 7) It is 
for this reason that one of the PS's priorities in terms of egalitarianism is securing 
commitment to EU-Ievel fiscal harmonisation, which in the case of nations such as 
Luxembourg and to a lesser extent Britain, is seen as necessarily involving a levelling 
95 
up. 
Such moves are clearly long-term, and dependent upon agreement of all the European 
partners in the absence of qualified majority voting. At the national level, egalitarian 
commitments are tempered by the realisation of the limited realms of the possible in 
terms of macro policy. Here, the limits upon the Keynesian approach of the PS come to 
the fore. Whilst the Keynesian paradigm continues to influence PS thinking in terms of 
a need to improve spending power of lower and non-earners, this must be put into the 
context of the acceptance that traditional Keynesian solutions are not possible.(see 
chapter 6) 
This, then, is the dilemma facing social democratic governments in the contemporary 
international economic context. The degree of fiscal conservatism which all 
governments feel constrained to display threatens to limit egalitarian and redistributive 
commitments. At the level of the core values of French socialism, the term 'equi/e' 
involves a partial shift which recognises this dilemma. As one of the core values of the 
French Republic, 'egalite' has since the revolution had a much more prominent place in 
French public life than equality in some other European nations. Within French 
Socialism, it was at the heart of Jaures' conception of a Repub/ique Socia/e. Due to the 
competing nature of claims to social justice and economic efficiency in the international 
economic context of the 1980s and 1990s, commitments to such thorough-going 
equality could only be spurious. To effect such levels of equality presupposed capacities 
of state intervention and influence of the economy which even the historically dirigiste 
French state no longer possessed (if indeed it ever had). 
9S Some of the PS's most hostile assaults on European partners are launched over issues of 'social 
dumping', when production shifts from French plants to other European nations where social protection 
standards for workers, and taxation on capital are lower, as happened with Hoover's move to Scotland. 
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Instead, the idea of 'egalite' at the core of late twentieth century French socialism was 
much closer to the idea of complete equality of rights and opportunities rather than 
equality of outcomes. Many key actors, often of Rocardian origins, now use the word 
'equite' instead of the traditional 'egalite'. This is not just a semantic point or a 
linguistic triviality. La Gauche Socialiste see this development as a watering down of 
French Socialism's traditional anti-capitalism. In typically stark terms, La Gauche 
Socialiste frames the problematic in terms of a choice between two possible coherent 
approaches, "the accompaniment of neoliberal globalisation or action to reverse this 
trend. ,,96 The former entails convergence on an, "anglo-saxon model towards which 
neo-liberal globalisation pushes us on all fronts." In ideological terms, the latter 
involves, "a refusal to abandon the principle of equality in favour of the concept of 
equity ... we see starting in the party discussions about the concept of 'equitlf, as 
opposed to 'egalire '. The concept of egalite is a Republican concept, whereas the 
concept of equite is an anglo-saxon invention, and perfectly pernicious. ,,97 Yet as we 
saw earlier, such terminology is enthusiastically advocated by the small minority of 
Blairites a lafrancaise, Jean-Marie Bockel's Troisieme Gauche. 
The ligne majoritaire picks a path between these two positions. Cambadelis seeks to re-
articulate the PS' s egalitarianism through a return to first principles. Socialist identity 
today, he argues, 
"is less the goal of a socialism which will once more put the whole of human 
progress on its feet, but rather it is a tension against liberalism ..... The idea is to 
substitute the ideology of a rupture with the dominant system, and replace it with 
a will for justice ... Thus it is less the final goal, but the means - justice, and the 
tension of that social justice, which will be the expression of socialism, or at least 
of the left. ,,98 
Cambadelis then goes on posit 'equity' as a means to the end of 'egalite " implicitly 
accepting the former's more modest scope. "The key word, which features more and 
more in our texts, is justice - social justice - which is not simply a reparation, but a 
repartition, to permit, through greater equity, the rediscovery of egalite ." Examples of 
how this 'will for justice' is reconciled to the market economy include the state's role in 
96 La Gauche Socialiste Draft version of' Etat d 'Urgence sociale - Pour Une Autre Coherence' • 
Contribution at the Brest Congress. p. 4 
97 Interview with Jean-Luc Melenchon 29/9/97 
98 Interview with lean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
187 
non-competitive sectors (education, health), the new repartition through taxation, and 
the whole range of state aids - such as the ZEPs (funds for education in deprived areas). 
"Here, we rediscover egalite , through what Rawls would call 'fair equality'." 99 
For all the borrowing of terminology from Rawls, however, the 'tension' between 
Liberalism and French Socialism makes such cross fertilisation appear anachronistic. 
The often scathing tone used to describe the 'socio-liberalisme' of the late 1980s 
associated with Ben5govoy's economic management amply demonstrates the extent to 
which liberal ideology remains anathema to many Socialists. The embracing of some 
neo-liberal tenets, and episodes such as the creation of the second Bourse in Paris in the 
1980s, still provoke disparaging references to the zeal of neo-liberal converts today.IOO 
Indeed, Jospip sets up Liberalism as an ideology to be questioned, "Liberalism, whose 
theoretical apparatus is extremely poor, inclines greatly towards the submission before 
the facts ... this dominance of 'what is', is it not in the end a new ideology, perfectly 
consistent with the theme of the end of ideologies?"(1991 : 32) 
Given the importance of the enlightenment tradition, with its inherent positivist 
assumptions, part of the explanation for the crisis of Socialist identity can be explained 
in terms of the final undermining of this 'meta-narrative'. Jospin invokes Lyotard and 
Derrida to discuss the decline of Marxism - and with it the prospect of the end of 
History. "Relativism, introduced into Socialist government, has sterilised the great 
hopes, and the faith in a radiant future."( 1991 : 31) Yet to combat the pessimistic effects 
of such developments, Jospin problematises the concept of 'realism'. This could be 
conceived of as a concrete example of the synthesising of the constituent elements of 
French socialism in the 1980s and 1990s. Taking the concept of 'realism' - central to 
Rocard's thought, and to Beregovoy's economic management, and infusing it with more 
radical implications - a central desire of those disenchanted with the 'socialisme 
gestionnaire' of 1988-93. 
"I have learnt from the events of this century and from my political engagement, 
the virtues of realism, and even relativism. But the question which is asked of the 
left and of Socialists today, is it not precisely where that realism is located? At 
what point does the fear of going beyond the limits of realism condemn us to 
99 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
100 Such sentiments were expressed by a number of interviewees 
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immobilism?"(l991 : 11) 
In calling for a 'conceiving of the real', Jospin has in mind discerning the extent to 
which 'realism' is perverted by neo-liberalism. For Jospin, concepts such as 'economic 
realism' cannot be taken at face value, but must be interrogated. This problematic is at 
the heart of the critiques of economic policies in the latter Beregovoy era. lOt There was 
increasing propensity to criticise the view of economic management as a 'technocratic' 
or 'scientific' pursuit, and an insistence upon the need to search for and exploit the 
'marges de manoeuvre' in economic policy-making. 
Yet it would seem that the perceived limits of 'realism' are seen to necessitate some 
reformulation of the core values of French Socialism. The commitment to redistribution 
remains both in party texts and in the rhetorical justification and explanations of the 
Jospin government's actions. The underlying egalitarianism appears to be becoming 
more modest in its ambitions. Equite seems to be entering party parlance, with the effect 
that egalite is relegated, to recall Seliger's terminology, from an 'operative' to a 
'fundamental' element of ideology, where once it arguably straddled the divide. 
Although the translations imperfectly reflect the terms, this could be interpreted as a 
commitment to a high level of 'equality of outcome' giving way to greater emphasis on 
'equality of opportunity.' 
Conclusion 
As we saw in chapter 3, Jospin's internal legitimacy since 1995, in concert with the 
novel stability of the internal factions, allows the transcendence of some of the 
traditional internal restraints on ideological clarification in the party. The narrowing of 
the ideological 'space' the party occupies, and Jospin's not entirely disingenuous claim 
to provide a synthesis between the party's 'two cultures', further facilitates the process. 
The process of ideological redefinition is, however, very much 'work in progress' for 
the PS. The initially PS planned four National Conventions - now the forum for 
doctrinal precision - before the 2000 conference. This indicates the amount of work still 
to do before the party once more finds a defining set of core themes analogous to the 
101 See Moscovici (1994 ; 1997) 
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'planification, nationalisation, autogestion' of the late 1970s. 
Before a new coherence can be established, some redefinition, at the fundamental level, 
of core principles is not inconceivable. Both equality of outcome and full employment 
have become more distant goals than the PS once accepted them to be. The process of 
redefining social democracy in a world characterised by advancing processes of 
globalisation and ubiquitous acceptance of the market has brought into sharp relief the 
limits of the possible. The PS ligne majoritaire, accepts that globalisation makes the 
pursuit of Keynesian strategies in order to secure social democratic goals of full 
employment and redistribution at the national level extremely problematic, yet it 
remains committed to Keynesianism as the best social democratic 'strategic amalgam' 
(Pierson 1995) so far elaborated. 
A Keynesian framework continues to influence thinking about a redistributive role for 
the state in the economy, boosting purchasing power of low earners. However, the party 
is grudgingly 'post-Keynesian' in the role it apportions to public finances in its 
economic strategy. There is an enduring commitment to transcend the national level, 
recreating an economic space where Keynesian economic strategies may once more be 
viable given the international economic context, at the supra-national EU level. 
However, this approach must overcome considerable collective action problems 
involved in co-ordinated European economic policy. The reconciliation of the PS' s 
supra-national aspirations to its national conditions thus remains a distant goal. 
The historical context provided in this chapter has shown how acceptance of the market, 
the 'new horizon' of the capitalist economy, and Europe as a key arena of social 
democratic activism are all relatively recent and significant shifts in French Socialist 
ideology. In the wake of such upheavals, a new and coherent picture has yet to emerge. 
Weber echoes the sentiment of a number of national level actors interviewed when he 
observes; 
"the Parti Socialiste, like European social democracy as a whole, is in a phase of 
renovation, of change. Everyone running the party understands that the old 
Keynesian social-democratic model no longer works because of the changed 
conditions. Thus we must do just as our forerunners did - that is, reinvent a new 
model, a new social compromise. That is what Fabius, Jospin, and everyone else 
is working at redefining. Today, we can see some elements, but as yet we cannot 
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see the ensemble.,,(02 
102 Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
191 
Chapter 6 
PS Economic Strategy In The Late 19908 - Realisme De Gauche 
The 'crisis of social democracy' literature highlights the importance of a series of 
structural economic changes in the international economic order which, according to 
one's viewpoint, either removed social democracy from 'the agenda of history' (Gray 
1998 : 99) or necessitated a re-evaluation of economic strategy. This chapter explores 
the development of the PS strategy of Realisme de Gauche as a potentially viable social 
democratic economic strategy. The framework used to explore the issue of social 
democratic economic strategy in a changing economic environment will be the literature 
on globalisation and social democracy. The debate between 'hyperglobal' theorists and 
globalisation sceptics about the nature and advancement of globalisation provides a 
backdrop to our outlining of the key economic processes involved in globalisation. We 
then consider the impact of these processes on social democratic governments, and their 
implications for the relationship between globalisation and social democratic policy 
activism, which will subsequently be explored in greater depth in our consideration of 
PS economic strategy since 1983. 
An essential pre-condition to an adequate understanding of the PS' s strategy of 
Realisme de Gauche, is, we argue, a firm grasp of the logic and limits of the economic 
strategy pursued by the PS in the decade after the U-tum of 1983. The central role of 
Finance Minister Pierre Beregovoy in mapping out the policy of competitive 
disinflation will be explored. In seeking to understand the reasons why the strategy was 
chosen, we look primarily to the ramifications of advancing the European construction 
process - a recurring parameter of PS economic strategy since 1983. 
In the new international economic context, the pervasive influence of the political 
economic thought of the New Right was, it will be shown, facilitated by liberalisation 
and deregulation at the international level. The importance of the ideologically charged 
concept of financial and monetary credibility will be examined, and the implications of 
this dominance of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy for the PS will be explored with 
reference to Aubin and Lafay, whose findings support Przeworski's structural 
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constraints model of social democracy.(1985) The theoretical foundations of 
competitive disinflation will then be explored. These too are strongly influenced by neo-
liberal economic thought, as the degree of reliance on unfettered market forces, and the 
'natural' unemployment rate assumptions underpinning the strategy demonstrate. The 
strategy's at best only partial success can, it is argued, in part be explained by the flawed 
nature of some of these core assumptions. 
Moving on to the aftermath of the 1993 defeat, we will chart the process of auto-critique 
undergone within the party. A central theme of this auto-critique is, as we shall see, the 
challenging of the 'pensee unique', which was the French translation of the dominant 
neo-liberal economic orthodoxy. This questioning of received economic wisdom 
engendered a new diagnosis of France's key economic problem, as well as a re-
evaluation of the degree of volontarisme possible in the international economic context 
of the 1990s. These two elements, the challenging of the dominant economic orthodoxy, 
and its corollary, the changing diagnosis of the economic problem, inform a particular 
reading of the implications of globalisation for social democratic economic strategy. 
The PS is anxious to plot a course other than the swallowing of liberal medicine 
advocated by neo-liberal orthodoxy on the assumption that 'there is no alternative.' 
There is an insistence upon the existence of room to manoeuvre, a concept central to 
Realisme de Gauche. 
In the final section, we consider the translation of the overarching strategy of Realisme 
de Gauche into policy. A number of key policy areas are selected. In terms of micro-
economic policy, we examine the partial privatisation schemes, and structural measures 
undertaken to tackle unemployment - principally the youth employment plan and the 35 
hour week. Where macro-economic policy is concerned, we examine the focus on 
activism at the European-level, with the noteworthy enduring insistence upon the 
possibility of implementing the recommendations of the Delors white paper. In terms of 
monetary policy, emphasis is on the foundations of the Euro, with PS intentions distilled 
into four criteria set on the advent of the single currency. As for fiscal policy, the 
increased propensity to explore activist possibilities, and also the accepted limits of such 
activism, will be examined. We argue that despite the problematic nature of European-
level economic policy co-ordination, Realisme de Gauche, suggests that, whilst the 
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constraints highlighted by 'hyperglobal' pessimists are indeed powerful, nevertheless, 
globalisation does not preclude social democratic policy activism. 
Globalisation And Social Democracy 
As we saw in chapter 1, an important point in analysing the relationship between 
globalisation and social democracy is the need to appreciate that globalisation does not 
simply 'happen upon' nation states, or social democratic parties within them, as some 
hyperglobalists infer. (Ohmae 1995) Therefore globalisation does not, in any 
straightforward manner, 'impose' financial discipline or neo-liberal policy agendas on 
social democratic governrnents.(Gray 1996) Work by authors such as Scharpf seriously 
challenges the 'one way traffic' view of globalisation with respect to national economic 
policy making. What such work draws our attention to, as Held et al note, is, "how the 
social and political impact of globalisation is mediated by domestic institutional 
structures, state strategies and a country's location in the global pecking order .... [and] 
ways in which globalisation is contested and resisted by states and peoples." (1999 : 13) 
Understanding the differential nature of globalisation's consequences, which are in part 
dependent upon, "the forms in which it is managed, contested, and resisted"(Held et al 
1999: 14) is an essential precondition to a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between globalisation and social democracy. 
Over the course of the century, socialism and social democracy came to rely upon the 
potentialities of the nation state to 'deliver' social democratic 'goods' within a well-
defined national economic 'space,' a fundamental 'given' of the Keynesian 
paradigm.(see chapter 1) Whilst 'hyperglobal' theorist's excitement about a borderless 
world is surely premature, the areas of nation-state activity where hyperglobal theorist's 
predictions are most prescient (the nation-state's ability to regulate its national 
economic space) are precisely those potentialities of the nation-state on which social 
democrats came to depend in order to deliver their political programmes. 
Globalisation is a multi-faceted phenomenon, spanning cultural, legal, political and 
economic spheres. As Held et al note, "globalisation might be better conceived as a 
highly differentiated process which finds expression in all key domains of social 
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activity."(l999 : 12) Whilst mindful of the interconnectedness of these various 
dimensions, we recognise the need to keep these distinctive domains separate, and not to 
assume similar processes and trajectories across domains. We shall concentrate here on 
the economic aspects. In terms of the economic processes of globalisation, three 
phenomena are of fundamental importance. These are the growing intensity of 
international trade, of international financial exchanges, and the increasingly dominant 
role of multinational corporations and foreign direct investment. Here we will explore 
the processes of globalisation under scrutiny, I and briefly outline their impacts upon 
and implications for social democratic economic strategy, which will subsequently be 
considered in greater depth in our consideration of PS economic strategy since 1983. 
International Trade 
Trade liberalisation has been institutionalised in successive rounds of GATT 
negotiations. GAIT figures portray a steady increase in the volume of world trade since 
the 1950s. The stretch of trading arrangements appears to be unprecedented, with more 
states involved in global trading networks than ever before? Arguments put forward by 
globalisation sceptics3 point to commonalities between the period up to 1914 (Hirst & 
Thompson 1996) and recent contemporary trading patterns. Such observations, they 
argue, refute 'hyperglobal' assertions about the novelty, extent, and velocity of 
increasingly borderless global trade. 
Whilst this offers a valuable corrective,4 sceptics may not take sufficient account of the 
changed nature and intensity of trade, which aggregate figures dealing only with the 
I Debates rage as to the appropriate choice and interpretation of economic indicators to empirically 
evaluate how far advanced these processes are. (Hirst & Thompson 1996, Held et al. 1999) 
22 This should not blind us to the stratification within world trade. On balance the terms of trade clearly 
favour OEeD economies at the expense of developing economies.(Held et a11999: 167-175) 
3 They argue that, on closer inspection, this reflects less a 'globalisation' of world trade than a 
'triadisation'. Trade is increasingly concentrated amongst and between the three most developed regions -
Japan and the Newly Industrialised south-east 'Asian Tiger' economies, Western Europe and North 
America. (see Petrella 1996 : 75-78; Hirst & Thompson 1996) 
4 That said, there is little evidence of three trade bloc aggressively pursuing a new protectionist agenda. 
Indeed, "between 1979 and 1990 there was only a small rise in intra-regional intensity within the EU and 
actual falls in Asia and America .. , the institutionalisation of regional markets does not seem to lead to 
closed regions."(Held et al 1999: 168) As Perraton et al observe, "interregional trade has grown 
alongside intra-regional trade and indicators of the relative intensities of intra-regional and interregional 
trade do not reveal a trend towards increasing regional concentration." (1997 : 261) 
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amount of trade may not capture. There is considerable difficulty in finding indicators 
which 'get at' the impact of qualitatively different trade patterns.(see Held et al1999 : 
150-2) Some qualitative shifts are picked up, such as the almost exponential growth in 
global trade in services, which has more than doubled since records began in the 1980s 
to more than $1.3 trillion, or 20% of world trade.(Held et al 1999 : 170) Also, trade-to-
private GDP ratios, give more indication of how enmeshed in global markets national 
economies are than simple trade-to-GDP ratios, exceeded 1914 levels in the 1970s,and 
have continued to increase. (Held et al : 169, 180-181 figs 3.4 & 3.5) This indicates 
higher levels of trade intensity in the contemporary period than during the Gold 
Standard. Yet aggregate data still cannot offer much insight into trade impacts.5 
Furthermore, focusing only on aggregate data misses other qualitative shifts in the 
context of world trade, such as the changed infrastructure of world trade. Transportation 
and communication (particularly Information Technology) are much quicker and much 
cheaper than in the Gold Standard era. Moreover, the institutionalisation of the liberal 
trading regime within GATT (now the WTD) has brought permanent downward 
pressure to bear on some tariffs, and provided a coherent legal framework for the 
conduct of global trade. 
As a rising percentage of private domestic output is potentially tradable, so it is subject 
to international competitive pressures. Furthermore, "the interconnections between 
tradeable and non-tradeable production are becoming deeper and denser: non-tradable 
production often requires tradable inputs and non-tradeables output is often sold to the 
tradeables sector." (Held et al 1999: 151) As large and small companies from different 
countries increasingly penetrate each others' domestic markets and the intensity of trade 
flows increases, there is evidence of growing global competition and the evolution of a 
system of global market relations.(Held et al1999 : 171) 
The rise in intra-industry trade is another example of the qualitatively different nature of 
global trade today. It largely explains the expansion of trade between developed 
countries, and the increasing incorporation of some newly industrialised economies 
S for example, the loss of imported essential goods, although they may be a tiny proportion of total 
imports, would have a much greater impact than the loss of considerably larger proportions of non-
essential tradeables. 
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(NIEs) into global trading networks.6 One aspect of intra-industry trade is the trade in 
semi-finished manufactures, the so-called 'slicing up the value chain' (Krugman 1995)-
dividing up the production process, with each stage located wherever on the globe 
comparative advantage demands. This specialisation in each segment of the production 
process further demonstrates the increasingly enmeshed nature of production. Intra-firm 
trade now accounts for between one third and one quarter of total trade, and with 
segments of the production process located on different continents, "many domestic 
production processes, wherever they are located, have thereby become increasingly 
enmeshed in global production chains." (Held et al 1999: 175) 
Impact 
One significant element in terms of impact is the inter-penetration of domestic markets 
is the increasing importance of global competitive forces. 'Domestic' production is 
made increasingly aware of the fact that, "national economic activity is embedded 
within global networks of trading activity." (Held et al 1999: 151) The levels of 
sensitivity and vulnerability of national economies increase accordingly. "While the 
increased intensity of trading relations makes national economies more sensitive to 
international fluctuations in the demand for and prices of goods, whether they become 
more vulnerable depends on the adaptability of the economy to external shocks, 
including the ability to use offsetting macroeconomic policies." (Held et al 1999 : 183) 
Both the sensitivity and the vulnerability of the French economy were amply 
demonstrated in the early 1980s. One of the reasons for the economic imbalances which 
had provoked the crisis in 1983 was that the domestic expansion of 1981-3 had served 
to suck in foreign (and in particular German) imports, leading to a deteriorating external 
trade deficit,7 which was compounded by growing budget deficit and external debt.(Hall 
1986; Lordon 1998) The centrality of global trading networks to French economic 
strategy is clearly demonstrated by the targeting of higher competitivity to facilitate 
export-led growth as the primary objective of macro policy. The ensuing macro-
economic strategy of 'competitive disinflation' had as its core aim the reduction of such 
6 Intra-industry trade constitutes one third of manufactures exports for some NlEs. (Held et al 1999: 
174) 
7 Loss of competitiveness for French exports was a major problem in the early 1980s. Among the nine 
leading exporting countries, French market share fell from 10.4% in 1980 to 9% by 1985. (Taddei & 
Coriat 1992) 
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vulnerability, in the context of a heightened awareness of the sensitivity of the French 
economic to its international context.(see later) 
The competitive challenge from the NIEs with less stringent regulatory regimes and 
lower labour costs has undermined the international competitiveness of some sectors, 
notably the 'Fordist' manufacturing sectors of Western Europe. (Vandenbroucke 1998 : 
15-16; Perraton et af : 263-4) An emergent 'new international division of labour' has 
seen low or non-skilled industrial employment - not only in manufacturing but also in 
some services - shift out of DECD economies to the NIEs, which are now achieving per 
capita incomes equivalent to some poorer industrialised countries. (Held et af 1999: 
173) The changing new international division of labour had a profound impact upon 
French industrial, and indeed socio-economic structure. It heralded the accelerated 
decline of many of the traditional 'smokestack' plants in the industrial heartlands such 
as NordlPas-de-Calais. For example, in the steel industry, France lost 80,000 
steelworkers between 1961 and 1991.(Sassoon 1996 : 652) In terms of the wider social 
structure, whereas in 1960-61, 27% of the active population were involved in 
manufacturing, by 1992-93, that figure was down to 18.9%. In the same period, those 
working in community, social, and personal services had increased from 20.1% to 
27.8%.8 
Multi-National Corporations 
Multinationals, "now account for up to a third of world output and two thirds of world 
trade, with around a quarter of world trade being between branches of the same 
company."( Perraton et al 1997: 271) As with trade, the post war story has been one of 
an increasing intensity of Multi-National Corporation (MNC) activity. Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) has also seen a sectoral shift - away from primary resources and into 
manufacturing and services, with three quarters of all FDI now being located in 
developed countries.(Perraton et af 1997: 272) The sheer scale of FDI entails an 
empowerment of multi-nationals vis-a-vis governments, who are obliged to offer 
attractive conditions - in the form of lower corporation taxes, pliant workforces, and 
government subsidies - to global firms. The reduced 'exit' costs and increased exit 
8 All figures from ILO yearbooks of Labour Statistics. 
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options open to these firms also encourage governments to continue to offer attractive 
conditions to capital. 
A second problem is for governments seeking to pursue skills-based growth strategies, 
based on national level technological advantage. Global firms tend to jealously guard 
innovatory and Research and Development (R&D) elements of the production process 
within the firm. Formerly, this meant that, at least where 'domestically' based MNCs 
were concerned, the national economy benefited to some degree from such 
technological advances, but today this is no longer prevalent. "MNCs cannot rely solely 
on their domestic base for generating technological advantage and have responded by 
diversifying their innovatory capacity internationally."( Perraton et al 1997: 272) The 
53,000 or so MNCs, with their 450,000 subsidiaries account for over 80% of world 
trade in technology. This undermines, or rather circumvents, governments attempts to 
pursue 'Schumpeterian' growth strategies based on nationally orchestrated technological 
advantage in particular sectors. 
Impact 
For much of the post-war era, "in the field of foreign investment, the state adopted a 
determined policy of discouragement, even opposition, to the introduction of [in 
particular American] multinationals."(Stoffaes 1989 : 109) The French 'model' was 
predicated on advancing French industrial strength by resisting penetration of the 
domestic market and building a national industrial system in hi-tech and 'strategic' 
goods, thus further limiting import dependency. (Michalet 1997 : 314-315) French 
industry for much of the post-war era retained a distinctly national character, 
exemplified by the 'national champions' industrial policy. The 'champions' were mostly 
publicly owned, or state controlled through a majority interest. Foreign investment by 
French firms was subject to strict legal limitations, and was regarded with suspicion by 
workers and employers alike, and inward FDI was still less popular.(Michalet 1997 : 
318-319) By the 1980s, the French authorities appreciated that, since foreign 
subsidiaries could locate elsewhere in the EC and sell on French markets, it was better 
to encourage location in France, so at least this heightened competition could be 
compensated by job creation. Although the story of the late 1980s and 1990s has been a 
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shift to a fully open economy (Michalet 1997 : 320-333), hostility to FDI has not 
entirely disappeared in the contemporary period. The 1993 privatisation law explicitly 
stipulated that foreigners or 'those under foreign control' are forbidden from acquiring 
more than a 20% interest in the 22 privatisations envisaged by that law (although 
provision is made for possible exceptions for EU investors).(Szij 1998 : 20) 
The liberalisation of the FDI reglme heralded the internationalisation of French 
investment practices in the 1980s. "Inward direct investment increased almost fivefold 
during 1981-1992 as compared to 1973-1980 (from $15.7 billion to $70.8 billion), while 
investment of French firms abroad increased nearly tenfold (from $13 billion to $124 
billion)."(Szarka 1998 : 154) From 1977 to 1992, the proportion of the total stock of 
publicly quoted French shares held by foreigners increased from 12 to 20%. (Szarka 
1998 : 154) With rising levels ofFDI, the spheres of interlocking hard-core of investors9 
have increased the internationalisation of French capital, as the hard cores tend more 
and more to involve strategic European allies. Thus, "the internationalisation of French 
capital is found not only in the acquisitions and joint ventures, but also in the 
participation in the capital of foreign firms. "(Schmidt 1996 : 384) France ranks fourth in 
the world in FDI host countries behind USA, UK and Germany - with the value 
assessed at FF 100 bn in 1992.(Michalet 1997 : 325) The upshot is that foreign affiliates 
share of French manufacturing has risen to over a quarter.(Held e/ af 1999 : 252) 
Traditional French dirigiste industrial policy has become decreasingly compatible with 
the new ownership structure and internationalised context of French firms.(Schmidt 
1996) With the impetus for change coming not only from EU directives (see Boucek 
1993), but also from the competitive challenge from foreign MNCs competing for 
market share in the energy and communications markets as they become 
liberalised.(Szij 1998) 
International Financial Enmeshment 
Levels of international financial enmeshment have seen profound evolutions in the years 
since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Previously, national governments had, 
"the means of steering the capitalist economy to deliver [welfare and full 
9 Which is the prevalent structure of French large-scale capital.(Schmidt 1996) 
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employment] ..... through monetary policy and fiscal policy. The basic instruments of 
macroeconomic management were, on the one hand, setting of interest rates and 
exchange rates, and on the other, control of taxation." (Anderson 1994 : 14) The degree 
of autonomy under Bretton Woods, however, should not be over-stated. 'Embedded 
liberalism' (Ruggie 1982) did not remove the necessity to adjust macroeconomic policy 
in response to balance of payments deficits or surpluses, "but rather that adjustments 
could take place incrementally and in accordance with domestic economic 
concerns. "(Held et al 1999 : 201) This enabled states to support social protection 
systems, as well as pursue macroeconomic objectives such as full employment and 
sustained economic growth. 
Such scope for incremental domestic adjustment to changing international conditions 
has been considerably lessened by increasing financial enmeshment. "Today, world-
wide trading of currencies and government bonds means that exchange rates and interest 
rates, the two critical variables in the formulation of national macroeconomic policy, are 
determined in the context of global financial markets. "(Held et al 1999 : 189) The 
reasons for this are multi-causal, involving both conjunctural events in the global 
economy, the effects of state policies of financial market deregulation, and innovations 
within financial markets (both improved IT resources and new financial instruments). 
As Scharpf notes, there were two significant developments in the international 
economic context of the late 1970s. The second oil price shock of 1978 co-incided with 
increased lending activity from the 'Euro-banks', the 'offshore' players in the Euro-
Dollar market. The Euro-currency markets had been expanding since the early 1960s, 
due in part to substantial Soviet dollar deposits. The liquidity of these markets soon 
made them a source of substantial Eurocurrency loans for public and private actors 
alike. Eurobonds, issued in non-domestic currencies, became a further significant source 
of capital. In the down-turn which followed the 1978 shock, Western, Eastern Bloc and 
Latin American countries found themselves in need of credit to offset current account 
deficits. Meanwhile, OPEC countries had enormous surpluses they wished to recycle -
principally via the unregulated 'offshore' Euro banks. The effects of the ensuing debt 
crisis on the industrialised nations were two-fold. Firstly, as debt servicing became more 
of a burden, demand in debtor nations for Western goods decreased. Secondly, "creditor 
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banks imposed substantial risk premiums on interest rates, and the oligopolistic 
structure of credit markets allowed them to obtain the higher yields they needed to cover 
foreign risks in their domestic business as well."(l991 : 242-243) 
This upwards pressure on interest rates was compounded by an ideological shift in the 
USA. The effects of the oil price hike and the debt crisis on the US were climbing 
inflation rates, trade deficits, and a falling dollar. With the advent of the Reagan 
administration came a change of heart at the Federal Reserve Banle The newly found 
'sado-monetarism' (Keegan) of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank director new Paul 
Volcker, suggested a strict monetarist response to the problem. "As the Federal Reserve 
pursued its monetarist course, American interest rates rose sharply. The annual average 
interest rate on long-term government securities increased from 9% in 1979 to more 
than 14% in 1981. As the inflation rate dropped, real interest rates climbed 
dramatically. "(Scharpf 1991 : 243) When the dollar slowly stabilised, the attractiveness 
of the American capital market increased. In consequence, "the high dollar interest rates 
constrained the policy options available to European countries ... countries that were 
dependent on capital imports to offset their current account deficits were forced to offer 
conditions to international capital that were at least as attractive as those obtained in the 
US."(Scharpf 1991 : 244-245) As capital markets became internationalised, "and with 
the rise in real interest rates for long-term dollar investment, what had been a latent 
condition became a manifest constraint. National monetary policy had lost its 
sovereignty over interest rates."(Scharpf 1991 : 245) 
Liberalisation and deregulation, new instruments (notably derivatives) and technological 
advances have all served to increase the intensity of transactions. International bank 
lending, international bonds and equities, new financial instruments and foreign 
exchange transactions have all increased dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s. The total 
size of outstanding loans the international capital market is now around US$7.6 trillion. 
From negligible levels in the early 1980s, international equity issues now exceed $40 
billion annually. Furthermore, with the removal of capital controls in DEeD countries 
in the 1980s, the turbulence of the post-Bretton Woods world increases the potential of 
speculative gain. Trade in international derivatives has risen seven-fold since the early 
1980s to around $10 trillion annually, and turnover in the foreign exchange markets 
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now exceeds US$1.4 trillion every day. (Held et al1999 : 203-210) Currency values are 
determined by the day-to-day trading in foreign exchange markets. As Europe in 1992 
and East Asia in 1997 demonstrated, speculation can become contagious, with outflows 
in one economy inducing outflows from others. This, Held et al argue, demonstrates, 
"the ways in which short-term capital flows generate a high degree of volatility and 
systemic risk within global capital markets." (1999 : 213) 
Impact 
Increasing financial enmeshment - through mechanisms such as the lifting of capital 
controls, and increasing financial deregulation - has facilitated the mobility of financial 
capital beyond national borders. Echoing Przeworski's 'structural constraints' model of 
social democracy (1985), Frieden has identified how increased capital mobility has 
structurally empowered investors vis-a.-vis governments, because under deregulated 
conditions, holders of currency and securities denominated in domestic currency 
(government bonds, bank deposits or corporate stocks) have many more 'exit' options 
and lower 'exit' costs than before. Scharpf concurs, identifying a 'fundamental 
asymmetry' between 'subordinate' goods and labour markets, and 'hierarchically 
superior' capital markets. IO(1991 : 19) 
More mobile capital holders find it easier to 'shop around' internationally for the most 
advantageous investments. Germain, too, notes how the balance of power has shifted 
markedly in favour of private capital at the expense of public power, indeed he 
identifies, "a significant victory ... for the interests of internationally mobile 
capital."(1997 : 164) Regarding the allocation of credit, Germain observes, "states have 
allowed private monetary agents, organised through markets, to dominate the decisions 
of who is granted access to credit (finance) and on what terms. The international 
organisation of credit has been transformed .... from a quasi-public to a nearly fully 
private one."(1997 : 163) Frieden charts, "a secular shift in response to increased capital 
mobility, in which governments all over the world were forced to provide more 
10 Scharpf observes, "the supply side of the capital market thus has a choice among a number of options, 
with the crucial consequence that the market-clearing price for capital is not exclusively defined by the 
relationship of relative scarcity between the supply of capital and the supply of profitable opportunities 
for productive investment. As a consequence, capital owners depend less on the investment opportunities 
provided by enterprises than enterprises depend on the supply of capital."( 1991 : 19) 
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attractive conditions for capitalists ... lower wealth and capital gams taxes ... relaxed 
regulation of financial activities and labour relations."(1991 : 434) Such predictions are 
consistent with the French experience, with wages coming down whilst firm's profit 
shares increased.(Fitoussi et al 1993 : 25 & 27) These are the structural constraints 
within which social democracy must operate. 
In the wake of financial liberalisation and deregulation, "the intensity and extensity of 
contemporary cross-border flows are such that national financial systems are becoming 
increasingly enmeshed." (Held et al 1999 : 215) Such enmeshment seriously limits the 
ability of governments to control national financial markets. Furthermore, the 
deregulation which has occurred is not a process that can easily be reversed. Despite 
Hirst & Thompson's speculation about a shift back to reregulation,(l996) there is little 
progress in that direction. The problem is that any new regulatory framework must be 
global in its ambit, and therefore can only be established if collective action conditions 
obtain amongst an extremely large and diverse group of actors. 
Another significant impact of enmeshment is on the determination of interest rates. 
Whilst there has not been equalisation, there has been a degree of convergence, and 
interest rates are determined in "an emerging global capital market." (Held et al 1999 : 
218) This is further demonstrated by converging returns on bonds and equities, as well 
as profit values. This market has not achieved (and will not achieve) the perfection of 
economic theory .11 The point, however, is that it is qualitatively different from previous 
manifestations of international financial activity; "the dynamics of world financial 
markets reach directly into the day-to-day functioning and organisation of all but a few 
economies. In this respect domestic interest rates and exchange rates are significantly 
conditioned by the operations of global financial markets." (Held et al 1999 : 225) That 
these global markets do not adjust 'perfectly' is highly significant. Due largely to 
speculative activity, exchange and interest rates do not always reflect the underlying 
economic fundamentals, but rather market sentiment about the rectitude and 
sustainability (or otherwise) of a given policy. Thus, "contemporary financial 
globalisation has altered the costs and benefits associated with different macro-
economic policy options, at times so radically as to make some options prohibitively 
II It is the methodological fallacy of hyperglobalists and sceptics alike to expect that it will. 
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expensive." (Held et al1999 : 228) 
Global Financial Markets and the Dominance of Economic Orthodoxy 
"The whole management of the domestic economy depends upon 
being free to have the appropriate rate of interest without reference to 
the prevailing rates elsewhere in the world. Capital control is a 
corollary of this." JM Keynes 1943 
Keynesian demand management in the post war era was facilitated by international 
institutional arrangements, set up by Keynes inter alia at Bretton Woods, which 
permitted national economic management. When Nixon chose to allow the dollar to 
float in 1971, the regime was effectively abandoned by the us. This shock set in train 
"two fundamental institutional changes [which] mark a clear break in the international 
environment: first, the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates in the early 
1970's which resulted in the 1970's and 1980's being an era of floating rates; second, 
the replacement of the regulated financial markets of the 1960' s by the deregulated 
global markets of the 1980's." (Eatwell 1995 :277) These developments significantly 
affected the scope of national economic management. 
Governments have found themselves constrained to pursue tight monetary policies in 
order to avoid incurring a 'risk premium' imposed on borrowing by investors suspicious 
of potentially inflationary macro-economic stances. As Eatwell argues, "today the sheer 
scale of speculative flows can easily overwhelm any government's foreign exchange 
reserves...... Credibility has become the keystone of policy-making in the 
nineties ... Governments which fail to pursue 'sound' or 'prudent' policies are forced to 
pay a premium on the interest costs of financing their programmes. Severe loss of 
credibility will lead to a financial crisis." (1995 : 278) Analysis shows that, "long-term 
interest rates are typically higher for governments with high budget deficits and high 
public debts." (Held et al1999 : 229) This changed context rules out Keynesianism a 
I 'ancienne. 
Under the new conditions, fiscal and monetary policy instruments could not be 
manipulated with an eye solely, or even primarily, to domestic concerns. "The 
internationalisation of capital flows released by the deregulation of financial markets 
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has made it increasingly difficult to either devalue to restore the trade balances, or lower 
interest rates to stimulate demand ..... the mobility of speculative transactions instantly 
sensitive to fears of inflation, undermines the effects of each."(Anderson 1994 : 14) 
Given the new cost/benefit analysis of macroeconomic strategies, a more attractive 
strategy than Keynesian management is to secure "low and stable rates of inflation, 
through fiscal discipline and a tight monetary policy ... governments tend to adopt risk-
averse, cautious macroeconomic policies seeking to second-guess the reactions of global 
financial markets and to secure their approval." (Held et al1999 : 230) 
Neo-Liberalism, Credibility, And The Pro-Stability Post-Monetarist 
Intellectual Consensus 
These structural developments in isolation, however, do not tell the whole story of the 
new international political economy and its relation to social democracy. For these 
structural mechanisms interacted with ideological developments. The economic crisis 
which these developments precipitated coincided with the ascendancy of the New Right. 
The logic of Frieden's argument (1991) is one of a competitive dynamic operating 
through the financial markets on national governments encouraging them to provide 
attractive investment opportunities. It is highly significant for the subsequent effects of 
this process that the 'market leaders' were the US and the UK in the early 1980s, both 
countries with governments strongly influenced by the thinking of the New Right. 
These were the first countries to abolish capital controls and deregulate financial 
services, but the enduring financial dominance of the US meant that, in the late 19808, 
financial sectors felt the need to change along neo-liberal and deregulated lines in order 
to keep up. 
The ideological dispositions of neo-liberal opinion fonners strongly favoured floating 
rather than fixed exchange rates, both because of their penchant for the unfettered 
market mechanisms, and also because they explicitly rejected the Keynesian Welfare 
State model that the fixed rate regime of embedded liberalism (Ruggie 1982) permitted. 
The markets, as Keynes' 'beauty contest' analogy demonstrates, are governed by the 
average opinion of what the average opinion might be. They are thus dominated by the 
simple slogans such as public expenditure bad, private expenditure good, popularised in 
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the monetarist backlash against Keynesianism which was contemporaneous to their 
deregulation and ascendancy. Tagged onto these platitudes is a shift in government's 
policy agendas stretching beyond macroeconomic policy. This new dominant ideology 
has seeped through to practically rule out the pursuing Keynesian policies under these 
new international economic conditions. "Sound money, balanced budgets, low taxation 
and free markets are the order of the day. Governments no longer have autonomy in 
constructing their .... social settlement."(Hutton 1994 : 207). 
Many argue that financial globalisation has thus changed the role of the state, inducing a 
convergence towards 'market friendly' policies, and undermining welfare state 
provision, direct taxation levels, and promoting privatisation and labour market 
deregulation. (Held et al 1999; Germain 1997; Strange 1996) However, the effects of 
economic globalisation are mediated (and indeed contested) by states. This means that 
one cannot expect a particularly high degree of convergence, since the domestic 
institutional contexts with which these pressures for convergence interact vary greatly. 
Furthermore, whilst it is undoubtedly the case that the power balance has shifted in 
favour of private capital holders, such a disparate and diverse group of actors do not, in 
any uniform or predictable manner, 'impose' a policy agenda on states. Nor is it 
necessarily accurate to characterise all aspects of the new policy package as neo-liberal. 
The relationship to New Right political economy is important and at times 
misconceived. Balls frames the principle of "stability through constrained discretion" 
within what he calls, "the pro-stability but post-monetarist intellectual consensus upon 
which modem macroeconomic policy-making is based." (1998 : 117) Such a view 
accepts elements of Friedman's argument regarding the absence of a long-run trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment, "which is not, of course, to agree with those who 
concluded in the 1970s that, because people's expectations are entirely rational and 
forward-looking, there is not even a short-run trade-off between unemployment and 
inflation, or that there is a 'natural' rate of unemployment which is not affected by 
macroeconomic policy."( 1998, 118) Hence, contra the New Right monetarists, tying the 
governments hands to the sole aim of low inflation is not the answer. As Balls insists, 
"achieving stability requires the discretionary ability for macroeconomic policy to 
respond flexibly to different economic shocks - constrained of course, by the need to 
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meet the inflation target over time."(1998, 120) 
Some of the changed parameters of economic policy-making relate to changed realities 
of the global economy. It is important to draw distinctions between different elements of 
economic policy packages, and recall that whilst certain aspects may be closely linked 
to neo-liberal policy agendas, others are perfectly compatible with social democratic 
ones. Whilst the credibility demanded by financial markets does have ideological 
dimensions, often rooted in a broadly neo-liberal view of economic activity, it is to an 
extent a reflection of changed economic realities. Thus, in terms of macro-policy, 
despite traditional left reflexes which would label macro-economic stability as neo-
liberal, in fact, macro-economic stability is today as much a social democratic value. 
The scope of active demand macro-policy is circumscribed. "Under the changed 
international economic order, it seems that Keynesianism can no longer deliver those 
political goods which social democrats seek." (Pierson 1995 : 52) With this changed 
political context comes a change in the nature of the social democratic project. "Our 
primary objective with macro policy at present must be the delivery of sustained, non-
inflationary growth: the objections to this are simply not strong enough."(Corry 1994 : 
53 emphasis added) However, within a framework of a commitment to macro-economic 
stability, there remains room for manoeuvre over the degree of 'orthodoxy', as well as a 
whole range of other economic policy tools which may be exploited to prioritise 'social 
democratic' goals. 
In the contemporary period, "financial globalisation has imposed an external financial 
discipline on governments that has contributed to both the emergence of a more market-
friendly state and a shift in the balance of power between states and financial markets." 
(Held et al 1999 : 232) The size, scale and speed of global financial flows mean that 
governments have to pay close attention to their credibility rating with financial 
markets. (Eatwell 1995; Balls 1998) The key point, however, is that securing of 
credibility through stability-centric macro policy stances is compatible with a wide 
range of different priorities in other areas of economic policy. Furthermore, such a 
commitment to stability does not condemn a social democratic government to budgetary 
immobilisme. 
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Globalisation And French Economic Strategy 1983-1993 : Competitive 
Disinflation 
"The real turning point in French socialism, it was Beregovoy - the moment 
Beregovoy was made minister of Finance - I was his secretary, so I saw it at first 
hand. From 1988 onwards, no-one talked about parenthesis any more.,,12 
Beregovoy's mutation from staunch left-wing proponent of '['autre politique,13 to the 
ultra-orthodox voice of neo-liberal reason once installed as minister of Finance is very 
difficult to explain. It was BenSgovoy who personally insisted on the strictest of the 
Maastricht convergence criteria,14 a cause of such chagrin to the PS in the mid 1990s. 
(Friend 1998 : 190 & 220) Beregovoy's role as propagator and champion of the 
competitive disinflation strategy, which was pursued at the expense of all other 
economic priorities, is central to an understanding of PS economic strategy in the 1983 
to 1993 period. Conversely, after his death, the unease with his legacy, and the 
perceived need for change in the field of economic thinking and strategy, is essential to 
an adequate understanding of the PS in the post-Mitterrand era. 
Cameron highlights the institutional ethos of the Tresor as one explanatory factor, 
valuing defence of the Franc above all other economic goals. This view was reportedly 
shared by Mitterrand "why does he [Beregovoy] let himself get swallowed by those 
people at Finance? When I see him, he's very much on the Left, when he writes to me, 
he's worse than Raymond Barre."(quoted in Friend 1998 : 191) Indeed, Cameron's 
account of the U-turn of 1983 affords centrality to the role played by Camdessus, the 
director of the Tresor at the time, who went on to become director of the IMF. Whilst 
this may in part account for the shift, focusing solely at the national level cannot provide 
an adequate explanation. As Lordon notes of the 1983 U-turn, "this major shift, in fact, 
corresponds to the acknowledgement by the Socialists of the new rules of opened and 
internationalised economies."(1998 : 96) For Beregovoy, as for all those Socialists who 
experienced at first hand the currency crises provoked by the mismatch between 
domestic economic priorities and strategy, and international economic context, 1983 
12 Interview with Henri Emmanuelli 10/12/97 
13 Whilst secretary-general of the Elysee statT and minister for social affairs. 
14 That public deficits should not exceed 3% ofGDP. 
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was a salutary lesson into the limited nature of economic sovereignty. 
Mitterrand is much maligned for his tactical, instrumental employment of ideas. 
However, in chapter 5 we saw elements of continuity in Mitterrand's thought. Friend 
argues, "throughout his political career, Francois Mitterrand's most persistent and 
consistent belief was that France had to pursue its engagement in a larger European 
unity."(1998 : 204) Bell exaggerates only a little when he observes that, in the 
aftermath of 1983, "Europe' came to replace 'socialism' as a provider of a sense of 
purpose in the Mitterrandist scheme of things."(1997 : 40) The choice to stay in the 
EMS was both a decision to prioritise European construction, and also to work within 
the confines of an international capitalism from which, just two years earlier, the 
Socialists had promised to break free. 
Mitterrand's determination to press ahead with the process of European construction 
was initially couched in Socialist terms, Europe would "be socialist, or would not be" he 
asserted in 1974. 15 Maurice Bennassayag, an Elysee advisor and fellow traveller since 
the CIR days in the 1960s, sees the choice, when it came, somewhat differently; 
"Mitterrand made the choice, when there was an option of leaving the monetary 
'snake'. Many advised it, Attali, amongst others -his close friends. When he chose 
Europe, with Mauroy and Delors, incontrovertibly, that day, he accepted a lesser 
realisation of socialism. He chose Europe because he considered that regional 
scale to be indispensable to international competitiveness, of that, there is no 
doubt. As for socialism, that was of secondary importance.,,16 
The socialist credentials of the EC of the 1980s, in whose integration Mitterrand played 
such an active role, are somewhat dubious. Developments such as the single European 
act owe much to Mitterrand's co-operation with Kohl, and to Jacques Delors activism as 
president of the EC Commission. However, whilst the SEA represented a significant 
advance for the liberal conception of the EC as a free market zone, assuring as it did the 
free circulation of goods, services, people and capital, it did less to further the social and 
political ends of European socialists. As Lordon notes, "the 1983 decision was grounded 
on a strong - even if somewhat fuzzy - European commitment, based on an acceptance 
of the evolution of the world economy."(1998 : 1 02) 
IS L 'Unite January 1976, quoted in K. Featherstone (1988: 107). 
16 Interview with Maurice Bennassayag 22/9/97 
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The effects of the 1983 policy choice were, in Cameron's term, 'regime defining.' 
"In failing to negotiate a devaluation immediately upon entering office, in failing 
later to negotiate devaluations large enough to offset the cumulative inflation 
differential with Germany, and, ultimately, in failing to leave the EMS the 
government consigned itself to remaining in the EMS with an over-valued 
currency. In so doing, it consigned itself to the pursuit of an orthodox deflationary 
policy marked by fiscal restraint and tight money that inevitably resulted, over 
time, in low growth and high unemployment." (Cameron 1996 : 75) 
The rationale behind a strong currency, Emmanuelli argues, was not economic, but 
political. "People had been selling it to Mitterrand since 1982, and he accepted it, that 
the French-German coupling was necessary in order for Europe to work .. .1 witnessed it, 
Mitterrand was convinced that in order to shake Kohl's hand on equal terms, the Franc 
must hold strong - hence no more devaluations.,,17 Whilst there is some truth in this 
point, the preceding analysis has shown that the changed international economic context 
did not leave a great deal of room to manoeuvre. Given the wider context of orthodox 
macroeconomic policies, a more voluntaristic French policy could have undermined the 
government's credibility and in tum entailed heightened 'risk premia' penalties. 
In terms of economic strategy, the inflation differential with Germany remained a 
central concern throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. "When he [Beregovoy] served as 
Minister of Finance from 1984-86 and 1988-92, France pursued a policy of a strong 
franc, the franc fort, that maintained the existing franc-mark parity, despite the 
difference in French and German inflation rates and overvaluation of the franc during 
much of that time."(Cameron 1996 : 75) The political imperative of facilitating 
European construction was an important causal factor, leading Beregovoy to implement 
a macro-economic strategy of 'competitive disinflation'. The logic is simple, "under 
fixed exchange rates, a country with higher inflation loses competitiveness, and as a 
result demand for output falls. An increase in unemployment follows which makes 
inflation decrease sufficiently so that competitiveness is eventually re-established." 
(Fitoussi et a11993) 
The strategy was a crucial determinant of all aspects of economic policy from 1983 
onwards. Competitive disinflation comprised three elements. Firstly, the nominal 
17 Interview with Henri Emmanuelli 10/12/97 
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stability of the franc fort, pegged to the OM. Secondly, wage restraint and wage 
discipline, initially through a de-indexation of wages, and thirdly the prioritising of 
public deficit reduction. (Lordon 1998 : 103-5) Friend sees the strategy as predicated on, 
"the intimate link between the search for a balanced economy and the search for jobs 
and job creation ..... Low inflation was necessary for France to be competitive and to 
sell French products at home and abroad. More exports and fewer imports meant more 
business growth, hence jobs."( 1997 : 189) 
The competitive disinflation strategy was not a monolith, determining all aspects of 
economic policy at all times. In the post-1993 era, some critics within the party of 
'socialisme gestionnaire' have tended to caricature Beregovoy's policy a little. As 
Fitoussi et al observe, "French economic policy was not confined to this strategy -
fiscal rigour was not reduced to a dogma and indeed retained a measure of 
flexibility."(1993 : 2) The enduring unemployment insurance system, moderately 
progressive tax system,IS and the creation by the Rocard government of the Revenu 
Minimum d'Insertion or minimum income scheme - an addition to the built in 
stabilisers - can be offered as evidence of this. As Weber observes, "Beregovoy, whilst 
pursuing competitive disinflation, enacted a counter-cyclical policy ... allowing public 
debt to reach a high level, but rightly so, because he was not a dyed-in-the-wool 
• ,,19 
monetarIst. 
Potentially, at least, this seems to suggest the 'autonomy' of fiscal policy, which, as a 
separate mechanism, could be used to further Socialist aims concurrently to a monetary 
strategy of competitive disinflation. However, it is somewhat misleading to attempt to 
consider fiscal and monetary policy in isolation. A more useful conceptual approach is 
to talk about the 'policy mix', since "having two instruments - fiscal and monetary 
policy - does not allow us to independently target both growth (full employment) and 
price stability because the two instruments are not fully independent: they both operate 
via the level of demand. "(Corry & Holtham 1995 : 23) 
18 That said, the limited progressiveness of the French fiscal system is much highlighted within the party 
literature by those calling for egalitarian reforms. See e.g. Andre Gauron & Francois Hollande in 
Vendredi 2114/95 
19 Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
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Thus, globally, competitive disinflation was the framework within which all economic 
policy had to fit. In the first phase of a policy of competitive disinflation, inflation was 
seen as the principle problem. Accordingly, wages were de-indexed, and interest rates 
kept high to tackle it. The concern to consolidate the strength of the Franc was an 
additional incentive for high interest rates. Theoretically, the high interest rates and 
austerity represented a temporary phase, "interest rate and unemployment levels are 
higher than elsewhere. Both represent an investment in the future, given that the aim of 
the policy is that, in the future, the inverse will result: interest rates and unemployment 
levels lower than elsewhere."(Fitoussi 1995 ; 197) However, given the changed 
international economic context, and the strength of the Deutschmark within the EMS, 
there was little scope to lower French interest rates in the event of changing domestic 
priorities. As Fitoussi et al observe, "the use of traditional macroeconomic instruments 
has been more or less eschewed. The Franc has been pegged to the Deutschmark, 
eliminating monetary policy as an instrument of reflation. Activist fiscal policy has not 
been considered, and even automatic fiscal stabilisers have been partially turned 
off."(1993 : 17) 
This chimes with Hall's account of Socialist economic policy during Mitterrand's 
second term, with policy-makers becoming, "reconciled to the fact that they had very 
little room to manoeuvre on the macro-economic front ..... Accordingly, the initial fiscal 
stance of the Rocard Government was very cautious. It gave priority to reducing the 
budget deficit from 3.2% ofGDP in 1985 and 2.1% in 1988 to 1.7% in 1989; and, at the 
end of 1988, Rocard predicted at least 15 more months of such austerity." (Hall 1990 : 
181) In the long term, the theory has it, real depreciation of the currency will permit 
gains in employment. Furthermore, "the under-valuation of the currency fosters 
anticipation of appreciation, bringing down interest rates. Holders of currency set to 
appreciate will not demand such high interest rates, the lesser profitability being more 
than offset by the gains realised when the currency appreciates." (Fitoussi 1995 ; 197) 
However, as we shall see later, such long term benefits were very slow to materialise, 
begging the question how long is the long run. 
Credibility and French Economic Strategy 
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Consistent with the preceding analysis, the concept of credibility with financial markets 
is crucial to understanding the competitive disinflation strategy. For it to be successful, 
the markets must be convinced that there will be no return to devaluation. In the 
interests of boosting this all important credibility, all areas of macro-economic policy 
must display the 'sound'ness without which market are extremely unlikely to suspend 
their disbelief in the economic rectitude of a Socialist government. As Przeworski and 
Scharpf would predict, the markets were slow to trust the Socialist government. In a 
study of the 1987-1991 period, Fitoussi et al observe, "the evolution of interest rate 
differentials also shows that credibility has not come overnight: there has been no 
drastic downward jump, rather a slow and steady decline over the four years." (Fitoussi 
et al 1993 : 24) Actors in the socialist party elite appreciate the constraining effects of 
this difficult relationship.(Moscovici 1997) Henri Weber observes, "the question [of 
inflation] is settled. It is true, however, that the markets have long memories. We have 
to be careful what we do because they are quick to mistrust us, thinking inflation may 
turn ,,20 re . 
Aubin & Lafay's econometric analysis of French Monetary policy-making between 
1973 and 1993 offers evidence of the power of this constraint in its somewhat perverse 
findings? I When analysing the behaviour of Left-wing governments, the results show, 
"an overall financial orthodoxy much stronger than those observed for right wing 
governments. Left-wing governments react much more vigorously in the fight against 
inflation and they follow much more closely the German rate of interest." This seems to 
support the theory that Left-wing government's have to 'over compensate' in their 
pursuit of credibility. "The constraint of the EMS seems to have the effect of completely 
isolating monetary policy from the political situation under left-wing governments; this 
policy is only used for the fight against inflation and the maintenance of the exchange 
rate." (Aubin & Lafay 1995) 
This all flags up the political nature of 'credibility', and its structurally constraining 
20 Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
21 In their regression for monetary policy under right wing governments, Aubin & Lafay discover that, 
"paradoxically, it is only when the Bank's preferences are dominant that monetary policy becomes more 
volontariste .. ,. Since the political solidity of the right-wing government prevents a crisis of confidence in 
monetary and financial circles, the Bank is content to practice a moderately active internal monetary 
stabilisation policy whilst maintaining within the EMS a direct link with the German interest rate," This, 
they say, unearths the 'strongly political dimension of economic credibility.' (Aubin & Lafay 1995) 
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effects on the PS in government; 
"Ideological preferences should encourage left-wing governments to be more 
flexible than those of the right, but the external institutional constraints act much 
more strongly against them when they wish to follow more activist policies. Left-
wing governments seem to be penalised by their reputation for being susceptible 
to inflation. Even when the political situation is favourable, the Bank uses the rate 
of interest much less as a weapon in the fight against unemployment." (Aubin & 
Lafay 1995) 
An adequate explanation of such behaviour must add to this institutional constraint an 
intellectual one. Beregovoy and his advisors clearly believed in their strategy. 
Fitoussi identifies 'credibility' as the lynch pin of the economic strategy of competitive 
disinflation; 
"The determination of the monetary authorities, if judged credible by the financial 
markets, permits the reduction of the difference between domestic and foreign 
interest rates, which favours investment. It also encourages firms, since they know 
that their errors will not be compensated by inflation or devaluation, to pursue 
competitive strategies. Finally, it will be conducive to wage claim moderation 
....... Overall, credibility will have the effect of accelerating the adjustments 
which will permit a return to full employment."( 1995 : 181) 
These are what economists call 'credibility effects'. Once the regime had been changed, 
and that change accepted by all economic actors, the argument goes, "relying on market 
adjustments rather than devaluation would lead to a leaner, more efficient 
economy."(Blanchard & Muet 1993: 18) 
This excerpt hints at the intellectual building blocks of competitive disinflation. The 
strategy's reliance on 'credibility effects', and the 'natural' rate of unemployment 
recalls the New Classical Macroeconomics (NCM) which, as part of the intellectual 
backlash against Keynesianism, influenced the dominant economic orthodoxy of the 
1980s.(see chapter 1) At the heart of NCM is the rational expectations hypothesis; 
"economic agents are completely aware of the true structure of the economy (i.e. the 
form of each equation and the size of the coefficients in the econometric model which 
mirrors it) and make full use of this knowledge in forming their expectations."(Bleaney 
1985 144) If a government policy has 'credibility', according to the rational 
expectations hypothesis, assumptions about the consistency and predictability of that 
government's actions will speed up the adjustment processes of all other economic 
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actors. 
Friedman introduced this expectational aspect to labour market behaviour. His, 
"challenge to the Phillips curve was on a prioi theoretical rather than empirical 
grounds ...... By relying on a neo-classical and decidedly non-Keynesian theory of labour 
market equilibrium, Friedman questioned the validity of the observed empirical trade-
off between nominal wage changes and unemployment. "(Desai 1981 : 4) The core 
assumptions of Friedman's theory were, firstly, a strong belief in the walrasian market-
clearing model, and secondly, belief in a 'natural' rate of unemployment. "The whole 
foundation of the monetarist transmission mechanism lies in the proposition that real 
rather than money wages are negotiated for in the labour market and that there exists a 
process of market clearing which pushes unemployment inexorably towards its 'natural' 
rate."(Foster 1987 : 45-46) 
This faith in a 'natural' rate of unemployment was intimately related to Friedman's 
introduction of worker's expectations of inflation levels. "Only at a level of 
unemployment where expectations are fulfilled is the rate of inflation stable ... Because of 
expectations, inflation accelerates at any level of unemployment below the natural 
rate."(Alt & Chrystal 1983 : 64) Friedman's argument was, "that as high inflation 
became anticipated this would lever the inflation rate up again and again, eliminating 
any stability in the inflationary price for high employment."(Glyn 1995 : 36) The 
significance of this is in altering the relative importance of tackling unemployment and 
inflation overwhelmingly in favour of the latter. The neo-liberal view of the world 
rejected all the assumptions about the state's beneficial role in the running of the 
economy which form the bedrock of Keynesian economic analysis. 
Introduced on the coattails of the 'natural rate', but distinct from it is the Non-
Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU). The NAIRU theory has 
become influential, but it is important to differentiate between its different forms. Some 
economists are cautious about its bolder assumptions. "While economists use the notion 
of a NAIRU to organise their thinking about the economy, it is not an operational 
concept for policy .... There is no reason to think the NAIRU is stable or indeed 
invariant to the actual unemployment rate." Such questions asked of the theory affect 
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the degree of emphasis that should be placed on tackling inflation. "Increasing 
unemployment to reduce inflation will not, on historical evidence, be a temporary affair. 
If and when the economy returns to the NAIRU after a significant recession, the NAIRU 
will be higher; some loss of employment will be permanent."(Corry & Holtham 1995 : 
12-15) 
The evidence of the behaviour of inflation and unemployment in France in the 1980s 
and 1990s substantiates these calls to approach the concept of NAIRU with caution. 
However, the conception of NAIRU upon which competitive disinflation rested was 
akin to the 'natural rate' of what Corry & Holtham call, "the hard core true 
believers."(l995 : 13) It assumed that by focusing solely on inflation, and by placing 
faith in the equilibrium finding properties of market forces, the goal of full employment 
would eventually (and there's the rub) be achieved. It failed to recognise the 'ratchet' or 
'hysteresis' effect on the NAIRU, of higher unemployment, namely that higher 
unemployment reduces capacity and potential output permanently, raising the 
NAIRU.(Corry 1997 : 191-192) 
The basis of the strategy is thus less a technical one than a set of ideological 
assumptions. "The discussion is yet another round in the eternal debate between those 
who believe in the healing properties of the market and those who see a clear role for 
policy." (Blanchard & Muet 1993) What is surprising, in this instance, is the side of the 
argument on which the Socialist government is to be found. The route back to a fully 
employed economy, it was assumed, lay not with Keynesian macro-economic demand 
management, but microeconomic manoeuvres to improve French firms competitivity. 
As Daniel Vasseur observes, "the compliment to competitive disinflation was 
deregulation, to increase competition, and the competitivity of firms, and of the French 
financial system, and to align the latter on a European level. ,,22 Thus from 1983 
onwards, but to a greater degree after 1988, "fiscal austerity and a commitment to low 
inflation was the rule. Macro-policy was accompanied by structural policies aimed at 
improving market mechanisms, from the liberalisation of prices to the lifting of 
22 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17112/97 this chimes with the Projet de fa Loi des Finances pour 1992 
section on tax refonn 1988-1993, which highlights tax breaks to improve the competitivity of small and 
medium size finns, and the process of fiscal hannonisation within the EU. (Ministere de L'Economie 
1991) 
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restrictions of foreign exchange transactions." (Blanchard & Muet 1993) 
In 1991, French achieved the symbolic goal of lower inflation levels than Germany. 23 
(Ministere Des Finances 1991) The disappearance of the differential between short- and 
long-term interest rates in the period 1987-1993 displayed the reward for this. The 
financial markets were convinced of the rectitude of the socialist economic strategy. 
They did not perceive that devaluation would be used as a macro-economic policy tool 
in the foreseeable future, and were further convinced of the government's commitment 
to maintain a policy of low inflation. (Fitoussi et al 1993 : 24) Credibility, then, had 
been achieved. According to the model's assumptions, the corollary of this should have 
been 'credibility effects'. However, studies have found little evidence of their 
manifestation. We now explore the reasons why. 
One of the ceteris paribus assumptions underlying competitive disinflation is the 
'neutrality' of the price setting process, namely that wage moderation translates into 
increased competitivity by permitting price moderation. Events in France ran counter to 
expectations based on this model, with the price setting mechanism proving to be 'non-
neutral'. The inflation reducing exercise has had differing levels of success. Decreasing 
wage inflation was successful, with de-indexation in 1983-4. However, "the slow down 
of price inflation has been slower than that of cost inflation." (Blanchard & Muet 1993 : 
26) The reason is the 'non-neutrality' of the price setting process. Reduced costs did not 
translate into reduced prices, further reducing inflation. As wages reduced, rather than 
prices coming down, the slack was taken up by increased mark-up, thus raising 
profitability, not competitiveness. Blanchard and Muet's simulations unearth, "the 
steady increase in the mark-up from 1983 to 1987, from under 4.5% in 1982 to 11 % 
...... what would have happened to competitiveness, had firms kept a constant mark-
up? A back of the envelope computation suggests that prices would be about 15% 
lower, thus competitiveness 15% higher."{l993 : 27) 
A further anomaly can be discerned when we examine what happened to these increased 
profits. Economic theory suggests that an increase in profitability would instigate a 
parallel increase in investment. Indeed, investment did increase from 14.2% of GOP in 
23 One study to observed that, "France is on the verge of replacing [Germany] as the paragon of macro-
economic conservatism."(Fitoussi et a/1993 : 23) 
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1984 to 17.3% in 1991. However, "the econometric evidence suggests, the increase can 
be mostly explained by the evolution of output, and there is no evidence that profits 
have played an important role. The increase in profit has been used by firms to decrease 
leverage and increase foreign direct investment." (Blanchard & Muet 1993) Thus, 
contrary to expectations based upon orthodox economic theory, "the traditional -
accelerator - effect of growth on investment does not appear to have been strengthened 
by higher profitability."(Fitoussi et a11993 : 5) 
An increase in profitability is clearly a good thing for French firms, particularly given 
that analysts cite low profit margins as a major source of the crisis of French industry in 
the 1980s.(see Hall 1990; Stoffaes 1989) Indeed, a recent OFCE study suggests that the 
predicted investment effects are beginning to materialise.(l999 : 29-36) This suggests, 
consistent with our analysis of globalisation, that the increasing outward FDI has been 
at least partially offset by inward FDI.24 
The staunch proponents of competitive disinflation seemed to have been gravely 
mistaken in their analysis of the timescale on which a return to full employment could 
reasonably be hoped for. Significantly, the limited success of the strategy can be 
explained by the falsehood of certain assumptions, imported into the political economic 
debate by the neo-liberal New Right, about market behaviour. Whilst the theoretical 
logical consistency of the argwnent is valid, its translation into real-world economics 
may not be as smooth as its proponents like to believe. Certain assumptions about the 
market's ability to adjust and find its competitive eqUilibrium lie at the core of the 
strategy. These assumptions, for example about the effects of unemployment on wages, 
and in tum the price (competitiveness) of domestic goods, may not hold in the short to 
mediwn term. 
As Fitoussi et al point out, "bargained wages react to price changes with a time lag, and 
react slowly to labour market conditions; the price of domestic goods in tum adjusts to 
costs with a lag; there is a further lag in the response of exports and imports to changes 
in the terms of trade. "( 1993 : 19) These lags, another study concludes, mean that, "the 
24 Michalet observes, "paralleling the case of French investment abroad, Europe is the leading source of 
foreign investment in France. Between 1985 and 1992 three quarters of investment inflow originated in 
Europe.(1997 : 326; Table 10.3) 
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adjustment process on which [competitive disinflation] relies to achieve a return to full 
employment is a protracted one."(Blanchard & Muet 1993) Underlining this point, 
Moscovici observes that the orthodox view based on maximum reliance on market 
mechanisms can only work in the long term, "that long run in which, as Keynes pointed 
out, we are all dead."(l997 : 58) 
Despite these problems, publications from Beregovoy's Finance Ministry continued to 
assert that, "Competitive disinflation ... appears more than ever to be the only coherent 
strategy which can improve the employment situation.,,25 The cost, (in the short to 
medium term), in terms of traditional socialist goals, of competitive disinflation was an 
exorbitant one. For example the de-indexation of wages after 1983 'worked', in that 
inflation fell from 14% in 1981 to 4.7% by 1985. However, "living standards for 
salaried workers declined, and the loss of buying power was even greater for the 
middle-class and well paid salaried employees."(Friend 1998 : 188) With the resultant 
drop in demand, it is perhaps unsurprising that growth was relatively low in France over 
the 1980s. Indeed, Cameron characterises the 1983-1993 era as, "a decade-long 
commitment to an over-valued currency, austerity, low growth, and high and rising 
unemployment."(l996 : 72) 
This highlights an important point - the conflicting nature (in the short to medium term) 
of the goals of competitive disinflation and job creation. Austerity dampens demand, 
and high interest rates discourage productive investment. In the context of such a down-
turn, it is possible that the market medicine central to the competitive disinflation 
regime may, in fact, kill the patient. "As in all strategies which require workers and/or 
firms to shape up or drop out, there is a risk that drop out might be the 
outcome. "(Blanchard & Muet 1993 : 18) Persistent high unemployment produces 
'hysteresis' effects, with low activity and slow capital accumulation triggering 
bankruptcies, and destroying productive capacity. The recovery process is thus 
hindered, with the NAIRU being 'ratcheted' up accordingly. This scenario seems to fit 
the facts fairly well, from a level of 1.9 million in 1981, unemployment rose relentlessly 
to 3.3 million by 1994. (Hanley 1996 : 2) "The strategy followed has been, quite simply. 
to achieve disinflation and increased competitiveness through higher unemployment." 
25 Les Notes Bleues number 560 (30/9/91) p7 Ministere de L 'Economie, des Finances, et du Budget 
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(Fitoussi et al1993 : 18;Blanchard & Muet 1993) 
After Competitive Disinflation 
The crushing defeat of the Beregovoy government in 1993 presented the PS with a 
relatively novel situation. For the first time in 15 years, economic policy could be 
formulated in a context where there was no immediate prospect of attaining office. Such 
was the historic scale of the defeat, that many feared the stint in opposition would last at 
least a decade?6 This opened up the possibility of freeing up economic policy making 
from the fetters of governmental responsibility, and returning to the maximalist 
programmes of old. Such a shift was unlikely with the moderate Rocard at the helm, yet 
the Bourget text did contain some more radical aspects, explicitly challenging the 
financial orthodoxy which had been the guiding principle of policy in the previous 
decade. The opportunity of a radical shift seemed more likely to be taken under 
Emmanuelli, who replaced Rocard as first secretary in 1994. "I held a very Left wing 
Congress at Lievin," recalls Emmanuelli.27 Placed in this context, "the choice of the 
presidential candidate by the members, the choosing of Jospin over Emmanuelli," 
represents, according to one Rocardian now at Matignon, "an internal turning point.,,28 
The choice of Jospin over Emmanuelli takes on symbolic significance, breaking the 
cycle of extreme shifts to the Left in periods of crisis and redefinition?9 
The shift, then, was not as radical as history might have suggested. However, 
Beregovoy's suicide30 seemed to end an era of Socialist economic strategy. With the 
figure most associated with the policy of the last 10 years gone, the process of auto-
critique could begin in earnest. The failure of the Beregovoy government, like those 
before it, to deliver on its pledge to reduce unemployment led to a re-evaluation of 
Socialist economic strategy. Too much, it was felt, had been sacrificed at the altar of 
economic orthodoxy, with resultant gains in financial credibility, but not jobs. The 
Rocardian Marisol Touraine's explanation of the 1993 defeat captures a sentiment 
26 A point made by several interviewees 
27 Interview with Henri EmmanuelIi 10/12/97, see also Gaffney (1994) 
28 Interview with Manuel Valls 23/9/97 See chapters 3 & 4 for a discussion of the context. 
29 see Bergounioux & Grunberg (1992) 
30 Which, Friend speculates, may be in part due to his own perception of the failure of 'his' policy to 
deliver socialist goals (1998 : 192) 
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widely felt in the party; 
"We offered no answer to the biggest problem - unemployment. At the same time, 
the 1980s were les annees !ric. Deep down, the Left paid for having accompanied 
that evolution, that drift, which the Left should not have accompanied. The Left 
allowed itself to be seduced by money; the growth of inequalities, the fact that 
capital returns increased more than wages, what is more, the explosion in the 
number of financial scandals. Fundamentally, the Left was held responsible for 
not having been on the Left. ,,31 
Predictably, the process of auto-criticism in which the party engaged passed through the 
channels of the courant system, resulting in differing degrees of criticism. Claude 
Bartolone, a fellow Fabiusian and confidant, defends Ben!govoy's legacy; 
"Pierre's logic, and this is often forgotten, was defined before the fall of the Berlin 
wall ...... Pierre's problem was that he could not have foreseen the fall of the wall. 
From the moment when the Germans decided to recycle their surpluses in 
reunification, which they decided to finance through European borrowing - at that 
moment - we could have floated the franc.,,32 
Bartolone's point is supported by OFCE studies of French competitiveness, which chart 
a 10% improvement in French unit costs, and lesser improvements in price 
competitivity between 1987 and 1992. However, all these improvements were largely 
lost in the 1992-1993 EMS crisis, and its aftermath which rumbled on until1995.(OFCE 
1999 : 75) It is at this point in the story - where the goal of competitive disinflation was 
clearly running counter to the declared justification of long-term job creation, that 
another Fabiusian, Weber, takes issue with Beregovoy's approach; 
"An economic policy error was committed at the time of German re-unification, 
At that time, the Germans proposed a re-alignment of parities within the EMS, a 
revaluation of the Mark. Beregovoy refused, following lean-Claude Trichet' s33 
advice. There is no doubt he was wrong. ,,34 
It is worth recalling here that talk of policy error underlines the point made earlier that 
within a context of a macro-policy committed to securing credibility and stability, there 
nevertheless remains a certain room to manoeuvre, from which ensue policy 
alternatives. 
31 Interview with Marisol Touraine 25111197 
32 Interview with Claude Bartolone 11112/97 
33 The ultra-orthodox governor of the Banque de France at the time, 'reviled by Socialists as deflation 
made flesh' according to D. Bell (1998 : 483). He is set to be the European Central Bank's second 
~overnor 
4 Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
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Others, particularly those not in Beregovoy's Fabiusian camp, sought to offer a more 
thorough-going critique of competitive disinflation. A number of Socialists tried to 
dissociate themselves from the competitive disinflation policy - despite some of them 
having served in the government which pursued it. Cambadelis cites Strauss-Kahn, 
Moscovici, Hollande and Emmanuelli as 'violently opposing' the franc fort in the early 
1990s.(1996 : 170) Fabiusians, however, are sceptical of such posturing, "I do not recall 
the positions of those cited at the time, but they were much less clear-cut. Beware of 
retrospective perspicacity!,,35 Hollande and Moscovici's book seems to substantiate 
their claim,36 and Emmanuelli has long been an outspoken leftist critic. Strauss-Kahn's 
position is more ambiguous, as Emmanuelli wryly recollects, "Strauss-Kahn was 
opposed to the franc fort? That's an interesting fact I never knew! He never opposed it. 
He opposed Beregovoy, but not the franc fort.,,37 
Such squabbles are illustrative of the unease felt by all Socialists in the nineties of living 
with their unemployment record in office in the 1980s, and ambivalent relationship with 
the 'socialisme gestionnaire' associated with Rocard and Beregovoy between 1988-
1993. Similar sentiments explain Jospin's 'droit d'inventaire' over the legacy of 
Mitterrand. The fact that a socialist government should preside over increasing 
profitability for capital, decreasing wages for workers and high and rising 
unemployment was a source of much chagrin for the PS in the wake of the crushing 
1993 defeat. 
Pensee Unique 
The lack of an economic policy debate in the decade after the 'regime defining' decision 
of 1983 gave rise, in the late 1980s, to a critical analysis of an all-pervasive pensee 
unique, characterised as a received wisdom that is contrary to wisdom. This dominant 
orthodoxy, it is now argued within the PS elite, became excessively influential over 
economic policy-making in the RocardIBeregovoy era. Indeed, some economic analyses 
share this view; "in 1988, with inflation under control but unemployment still very high, 
35 Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
36 in 1991. Hollande and Moscovici. both Economics lecturers at the I.E.P. wrote L 'Heure des Choix 
editions Odile Jacob 
37 Interview with Henri Emmanuelli 10/12/97 
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the question arose agam of what to do next. By then, however, the debate was 
surprisingly muted, nearly non-existent." (Blanchard & Muet 1993) 
Vasseur, economic advisor to Moscovici at the Ministry for European Affairs, sees 
affinity between, "/a pensee unique and the neo-liberal model.,,38 It was this dominant 
orthodoxy which coloured the process of European construction and France's economic 
strategy in the decade after the U-turn of 1983. Sassoon highlights the policy 
implications of the 'dominant economic orthodoxy'; "in terms of issues, the difference 
between Left and Right had virtually disappeared. Both sides supported a wider single 
European market, both were committed to monetary stability; both advocated a 
European central bank; both wished to improve the French economy through 
competition, education and training."( 1996 : 569) 
Moscovici puts Jospin's presidential bid of 1995 into this ideological context. "The 
majority of French people wanted a change from the previous 14 years - during which 
the socialists only really governed for 10 - when liberalism had not been sufficiently 
challenged, when the priority of employment had not been sufficiently affirmed, and 
when ethical concerns had not been sufficiently respected. Overall, when the Left had 
not sufficiently fulfilled its role."( 1997 : 11) The influence of supply-side economists 
and monetarists over what Moscovici and Hollande titles the 'social-liberalism' of 
1988-93, is, in retrospect, deemed questionable.(1997 : 43-4) Moscovici offers a 
periodisation of PS economic policy which applauded the measures of 1983-1986 and 
1988-1991, but asserted that the policy of competitive disinflation was unnecessarily 
prolonged at great social cost. This forms the basis of the call to break with the 
orthodoxy of economic management. 39 
In somewhat Gramscian terms, Vasseur identifies dissenters from this 'pensee unique '; 
"There were quite a number of people who did not integrate this dominant 
'pensee unique '. There were efforts of resistance. For example, the unions, highly 
ideological in France, and who produce a lot of theory, a lot of general 
discourse .... There was always a pole of resistance - intellectual, not organic - on 
which Jospin can now build.,,40 
38 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17112/97 
39 Vendredi no. 202 1/10/93, the view is shared by Camdadelis in an interview with the author 25/9/97 
40 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
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Such poles of resistance were, unsurprisingly, also to be found within the Party. The 
Bourget text, written a few months after the defeat, observes of the 1983 U-turn that; 
"this choice did not instigate an authentic economic policy debate concerning the use 
ofthe available room to manoeuvre ... as a result, we were too ready to believe that the 
economy was not a matter of politics but rather of technical management.,,41 
We saw in chapter 5 Jospin's critique of liberalism. The tone of Jospinian discourse 
was set in his manifesto for the Presidential election; 
"We must learn the lessons of the past, in order to instigate the reorientations of 
economic policy which today are necessary and possible without increasing 
public deficit, nor putting our currency, our external balances, or the 
competitivity of our firms in peril. I reject the idea that the state is powerless, and 
believe that it should deploy all its capacities to aid job creation. ,,42 
One of the tenets of that liberalism, which was one of the philosophical foundations of 
Socialist economic strategy under Beregovoy, was faith in the healing powers of 
unfettered market forces. "This has not disappeared," observes Vasseur, "but now we 
see the limitations. We are not talking about re-regulation, but all the same, we are 
much more sceptical about the spontaneous functioning of the market.,,43 Jospin 
couches this scepticism about liberal orthodoxy in 'realist' terms. His 'conceiving of the 
real' seeks to discern the extent to which 'realism' is distorted by neo-liberal economic 
thought. For Jospin, concepts such as 'economic realism' cannot be taken at face value, 
but must be interrogated. This problematic is at the heart of the critiques of economic 
policies in the later Beregovoy era, and explains the increasing propensity to criticise 
the view of economic management as a 'technocratic' or 'scientific' pursuit. 
In this vein, Moscovici problematises the concept of 'credibility' with financial markets, 
seeking to explore its limits. Certain parameters for action, such as a commitment to 
monetary stability, are accepted, given the context of an interdependent and relatively 
open economy and deregulated financial markets. However, the precise location of the 
limits of the possible is contestable. The need to be seen to be credible by investors and 
speculators does not rule out all policy activism. The Maastricht convergence criteria, 
Moscovici observes, represent two 'anchors' of credibility - monetary and budgetary. 
41 Vendredi no. 212 (17112/1993) 
42 L. Jospin /995-2000 : Propositions pour fa France (PS 1995) 
43 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
225 
On the budgetary front, there is keeping the public deficit at around 3% of GDP. On the 
monetary front, there is the maintenance of the independence of the Banque de France, 
and of the Franc within the EMS bands. However, this context does not exclude a more 
autonomous monetary policy. "These two anchors of credibility constitute our 
constraints - with or without Maastricht. Without them ... we will not convince the 
markets or investors .... But they do open up room to manoeuvre which must be 
exploited to further French growth."(1997 : 94) 
The existence of 'room to manoeuvre' is demonstrated by the policy pursued by the 
Jospin government in 1997 of a 15% tax on non-reinvested profits, justified in terms of 
the need to reduce the budget deficit in order to meet the convergence criteria.44 In 
calling for the less restrictive conception of the convergence criteria, which is contained 
within the Maastricht treaty, but has been increasingly sidelined since Dublin,45 
Moscovici questions, "the erroneous conviction that the 3% level is an absolute barrier, 
separating monetary virtue from vice."(1997 : 95) 
Efforts should be made, in the interest of keeping the level of deficit around 3%, to 
reduce the 'structural' element of the deficit, by reducing 'less useful spending'. 
However, the 'conjunctural' element (i.e. the fluctuations due to the economic cycle) 
should not be changed even ifit were to slightly overshoot the 3% target. In the event of 
a conjunctural down-turn, with lower receipts pushing the deficit over the target level, it 
is argued, "any attempt to dampen the effects of automatic stabilisers through 
heightened rigueur .... Runs the risk of driving France and Germany towards a 
recession."(1997 : 96) This questioning of what has become a received wisdom, reliant 
as it is on a non-neo-liberal view of the economy, is justified in terms echoing Jospin as, 
"the path ofrealism."(1997 : 98) 
Vasseur equates the pensee unique with the neo-liberal interpretation of globalisation 
and its policy implications. Globalisation has, "served the purpose of building a 
dominant discourse which consists of justifying neo-liberal policies .... Alain Minc's46 
thesis .... served to justify a particular conception of globalisation, which was really 
44 Interview with Pierre Guidoni 24/9/97. Dupin (1998: 203) 
45 see Moscovici (1997 : 110) 
46 A prominent French 'hyperglobal' theorist 
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purely liberal." This particular VlSlon, informed by the neo-liberal rhetoric of 
globalisation, influenced not only French policy making, but also the wider process of 
European construction in the 1980s. 
"In that respect, European construction has been rather disappointing. Until the 
1990s, it was in reality nothing more than a means of framing that vision of 
globalisation, presented as a neutral mechanism, as purely technical. There were, 
however, vested interests, and an ideology behind the process - which sought to 
provoke a sense of fatalism. It was flagrant at the beginning of the 1990s - the 
pensee unique - 'there is nothing to be done.' Now, we see that there are many 
things that can be done, within the framework of increasing globalisation. Many 
countries exemplify extremely original models of society, whilst retaining a degree 
of economic openness still higher than our own. ,,47 
This chimes with Moscovici's contention - which has more or less become received 
economic wisdom with the PS ligne majoritaire - that, whilst appropriate in the 1980s, 
by the 1990s, competitive disinflation failed to alter in response to a change of 
circumstance, which offered more room to manoeuvre. The important point is that 
competitive disinflation is contested on the basis of different presuppositions about how 
the economy works. This shift receives support from less partisan sources. Fitoussi, 
when considering the competitive disinflation strategy in its latter stages, challenges the 
orthodox view of the relationship between tight anti-inflationary policies and budgetary 
rectitude; 
"What I have attempted to analyse is how, in breaking new disinflation records, 
the government lost more than it gained. They gain in credibility in terms of the 
fight against inflation, but they lose budgetary credibility. The implication is 
disinflation, thus a loss of public revenue, which increases the ~ublic deficit -
which in turn implies achieving the inverse of what was intended." 8 
Due in part to the analyses of more 'progressive' economists such as Fitoussi and 
Muet,49 there has been a paradigm shift in what Scharpf calls the 'cognitive framework' 
within which economic policy is elaborated. "Like all human action, economic policy is 
possible only within a cognitive framework that pair goals with available means and 
critical conditions of the decision environment. Neither the goals pursued nor the causal 
efficacy of economic policy instruments, nor the conditions of the economic 
47 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17112/97 
48 Interview with Jean-Paul Fitoussi 13/12/97 
49 Muet is now a Jospin advisor, Fitoussi played an advisory role in the preparation of the 1996 
Convention on G1obalisation, Europe and France - see Vendredi no. 276 8/3/96 
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environment, are sufficiently beyond dispute to be simply taken as facts."(Scharpf 1991 
: 14) Thus the rejection of certain tenets of dominant economic orthodoxy leads to a re-
conceptualisation of domestic economic policy-making, of the process of European 
construction, and also of the implications of globalisation. As Huchon notes, "what is 
characteristic of the new strategy, its philosophical foundation, is an insistence upon the 
existence of 'marges de manoeuvre'. There is a belief that all the means of tackling 
unemployment have not yet been explored."so Such questioning of received economic 
wisdom led to renewed analysis of the root of France's economic problems in the 1990s. 
Changing Diagnosis Of The Economic Problem 
"Clearly, since the 1993 defeat, since the party has reconstructed its programme, 
the key themes of our economic policy are no longer those of competitive 
disinflation. We can see beyond that. We see that the problem is one of demand. 
Our priorities have changed."sl 
Even those opposed did not take issue with the entire Ben!govoy legacy. Competitive 
disinflation had been necessary, it was accepted, in the 1980s. (Moscovici 1997 : 58) 
Critics objected to its prolongation beyond its shelf-life, and the way in which 'neo-
liberal' reforms, such as the partial flexibilisation of the labour market and the creation 
of a second bourse, which accompanied competitive disinflation, and were embraced, 
"with all the zeal of new converts!"S2 Defenders of Bert!govoy's legacy could argue, 
with some justification, that the changing diagnosis was testament to Beregovoy's 
success. Competitive disinflation has worked. "The problem is no longer one of 
pursuing a policy aimed at combatting inflation - it is virtually zero. The problem is 
solved ..... Today, the problem is one of stimulating the economy through demand and 
investment - hence we need a different policy."S3 
Yet the success story is at best only half-true. Inflation had been 'beaten', but -
theoretically at least - this was supposed, in turn, to bring down unemployment. 
Significantly, an econometric analysis of the limitations of the competitive disinflation 
economic strategy concludes, "decreasing unemployment by 3% in France requires an 
30 Interview with Jean-Paul Huchon 29/9/97 
31 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
32 Interview with Jean-Christophe Cambadelis 25/9/97 
33 Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
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increase in competitiveness of 30% .... the implication is clear. Policies which increase 
rather than shift demand must be part of the policy package if France is ever to return to 
full employment." (Blanchard & Muet 1993) The reason why competitive disinflation 
would not bring down unemployment, it has been argued, can be sought in the neo-
liberal assumptions at the heart of the model. 
The new economic diagnosis was built upon different economic foundations. Indeed, 
within the neo-classical world-view, the new diagnosis of the economic problem - a 
crisis of under-consumption requiring demand stimulation - is a theoretical 
impossibility. If Say's Law is to be believed, supply calls forth demand. Intervention, 
where necessary, should concentrate on the supply side of the economy. Such neo-
classical assumptions, re-popularised by neo-liberal economic thought in the 1970s and 
1980s, became, as we saw, influential even over Socialist economic strategy. With the 
calling into question of competitive disinflation came also the questioning of its 
theoretical foundations, and the canon from which they are drawn. The call for the use 
of automatic stabilisers to give a counter cyclical edge to budgetary policy betrays the 
residual influence of economic thought of broadly Keynesian origin within the PS. That 
influence can also be seen in the diagnosis of the key economic problems of France in 
the mid 1990s. 
In a report prepared for the 1994 National Convention on growth and employment, 
Moscovici and Huchon presented a critique of the Balladur government's economic 
strategy. "The government," they observe, "has privileged supply policies at a time 
when households and firms are undergoing a serious crisis of demand." Firms failure to 
invest is explained in terms of high real interest rates. Lack of confidence means that 
households do not borrow, "it is the fear of the future which weighs against getting into 
debt." As consumption by households decreases, their rate of saving increases. 
Evidence, such as low consumption, some falling prices, non-utilisation of productive 
capacity all point, it is argued, to "an error of diagnosis. The treatment will thus further 
injure the patient it is meant to cure, since it is being administered ill-advisedly."s4 
Fitoussi shares this view, observing of the early 1990s, "the recession has again 
weakened investment, but the cause must be sought in a deficiency of demand, rather 
54 Vendredi 4/2/94 p25 
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than a search to improve profitability."(1995 : 183) 
The PS is keen to highlight the ideological nature of this difference of opinion; 
"Economic liberalism fails because of a double error: diagnosis and therapy. The 
economic crisis is not due to insufficient supply, but insufficient demand. 
Multiplying the gifts to firms, or further deforming the repartition of surplus value 
in their favour will not address the weakness of purchasing power. "(Moscovici 
1997: 59) 
Although remaining within the framework of a commitment to stability, the advocated 
strategy has a Keynesian feel to it. "In order for investment to take off again, firms must 
first anticipate 'solvent' levels of demand - which presupposes mass consumption, and 
therefore higher salaries." The different ideological suppositions under-pinning this 
different view of the economy are explicitly highlighted. "Monetarism, budgetarism and 
wage flexibility are no longer appropriate. Today's crisis requires, on the contrary, the 
mobilisation of society towards a redefinition of public power - national and 
international - in favour of job creation." This is not, however, a call to return to old-
style Keynesian policies. "The impotence and harmfulness of the discourse and practice 
of liberalism, and the impossibility of a return to the nationalist, statist theses of the 
1970s impose on us the obligation to rethink afresh a new strategy, whose central end is 
the creation of jobs." (Moscovici 1997 : 59-60) 
Vasseur say of PS economic strategy today; 
"it is a bit neo-Keynesian. It is based on analysis of the partition of added value, 
which is interpreted as an element of structural dampening down of consumption. 
There are other factors, such as the high interest rates, and obviously the high rate 
of unemployment, which in tum incite households to save, to be prudent. ,,55 
Nor is talk of a crisis of under-consumption, and a failure to exploit the growth potential 
of the economy confined to PS actors. An INSEE study in 1995 noted the presence of 
the problem (1995 : 52-54), and this was corroborated by a recent OFCE study, noting a 
"structural insufficiency of demand." (1999 : 12) Huchon, for years Rocard's right hand 
man, characterises the break with the 1983-93 period thus; 
"The idea is that there is a crisis of under-consumption, so we need stimulation of 
consumption, we need to do a bit of Keynes! They [the current PS leadership] 
SS Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
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think of themselves as Keynesian, whereas Beregovoy ..... was more a liberal. He, 
like Rocard, thought that all the room to manoeuvre had already been used up, yet 
this was not the case. The proof being that we have managed to run a tight budget, 
whilst increasing purchasing power, and initiating the Aubry jobs plan."s6 
Realisme de Gauche 
These two elements, the challenging of the dominant economic orthodoxy, and its 
corollary, the changing diagnosis of the economic problem, inform a particular reading 
of the implications of globalisation for social democratic economic strategy - Realisme 
de Gauche. This rejects the orthodox assumption that 'there is no alternative', setting 
up 'political will' in opposition to 'laisser faire.' "Globalisation should not be seen as 
ineluctable ... often, it serves as a fallacious pretext for harmful, disastrous policies, 
... [so] fatalism must give way to Will."S7 To this end, the PS envisages activism at both 
the national and supra-national level. The 1996 convention text calls for the 
establishment of a new Bretton Woods international monetary system. The signing of 
the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations in Marrakesh is also seen as an appropriate 
arena for activism. The PS calls for the extension of the World Trade Organisation's 
ambit to regulate social dumping and FDI. Furthermore, building on a commitment 
contained in Jospin's presidential campaign, the PS remains formally committed to the 
'Tobin Tax', a globally enforced 1 % tax on all speculative transactions. 58 The aim is to 
counter, in "a world of practically limitless capital mobility,,,S9 the overwhelming 
predominance of speculative financial capital. 
The PS' position captures the essence of Realisme de Gauche. In their attempts to curb 
the power of financial capital, socialist actors are keenly aware of the caution that must 
be exercised. The problem with a speculative tax is one of co-ordination. To be 
effective, it must apply everywhere, and the infrastructure for enforcement does not at 
present exist; 
"If Jospin, all on his own, were to go and ask the Japanese and Americans to agree 
to Mr. Tobin's nice idea, he would look a bit ridiculous ...... If France calls for 
taxation of capital flows today - tomorrow we will wake up to a monetary crisis. I 
am one of the most Left wing members of this party, but I would not advise the 
S6 Interview with Jean-Paul Huchon 29/9/97 
57 Final Text of the National Convention on Globalisation. France. Europe 30-31 March 1996 Vendredi 
no. 276 8/3/96 
S8 Vendredi 2768/3/96 P 12 
S9 Vendredi 276 8/3/96 p6 
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Prime Minister to do it, because I do not want to see the government fall in the 
next three months.,,60 
The PS is anxious to plot a course other than the swallowing of neo-liberal 
orthodoxy. However, gone are the maximalist extravagant programmes with little 
concern for practical application. 
At the national level, Realisme de Gauche involves an insistence that room to 
manoeuvre does exist, and therefore some action is possible. The PS calls for the 
'rehabilitation of economic policy'- encouraging growth through expansion of demand, 
and fiscal redistribution in favour of lower earners to raise spending power. This aims 
in part to redress the oft-cited imbalance between wages and profits which emerged in 
the 1980s. Given the under-consumption problem, Jospin advocates; 
"stimulating purchasing power by three means: reducing the burden of wage-
earner contributions, shifting some to the CSG, a reduction in the working week, 
and a national salaries conference. The aim is not to sharply increase salaries, but 
to progressively restore their share of national revenue through state initiative and 
contractual politics. At the same time, this will increase the growth potential of the 
French economy, facilitating a boost in consumption and investment.,,61 
Employment policy is the central concern, and a multi-pronged strategy seeks a state 
regulated reduction of the working week, the creating of jobs for urban and 
environmental regeneration, and the encouragement of growth through interest rate 
policy. 
The mind-set of Jospin's Realisme de Gauche involves looking always to the room to 
manoeuvre - even under such tightly constrained circumstances. In macro-policy terms, 
there is an acceptance of the need to bring down budget deficits to meet Maastricht 
criteria. Vasseur sees the less orthodox economic outlook as offering a palliative to neo-
liberal medicine, "we are in favour of the 'regularisation' of public finances, but done 
in a very progressive, and above all balanced way.,,62 Realisme de Gauche involves 
establishing the parameters of activism. Running public deficits is, as we have seen, an 
extremely costly exercise. Thus, Vasseur concedes, the relationship with Keynesianism 
60 Interview with Henri Emmanuelli 10112/97 (a close confidant of Jospin. Emmanuelli was at the time of 
interview President of the Commission Des Finances at the Assemblee Nationale) 
61 Lionel Jospin. concluding speech to the National Convention For Employment: A Change of Policy 14-
15 December 1996. Reported in L 'Hebdo des Socialistes 20/12/96 pi 7 
62 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
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is perhaps a slightly distant one; 
"we are 'post-Keynesian' in the sense that public finances do not occupy a central 
role. This may be due less to a philosophical analysis of the functioning of the 
economy, than to the economic conjuncture in which the room to manoeuvre is 
extremely small.,,63 
The majority within the party has accepted that there are severe limitations on macro-
economic policy, "we have very clearly rejected the option of a budgetary reflation -
except, that is, a minority in the party, the Gauche Socialiste, who continued to defend 
such a policy at the last conference." Equally, however, there is a rejection of the 
'strong' globalisation thesis, and the immobilisme towards which it implies. The PS 
economic policy-makers, Vasseur contends, "are not, totally post-Keynesian, because, 
for example, we believe in using automatic stabilisers as much as possible." 64 
As we saw in chapter 5, the French state, institutionalising the values of solidarity, co-
operation and inclusion should act, it is argued, as a counterweight to the market to 
promote social cohesion, Greater efficiency is called for in state redistribution 
policies, necessitating fundamental reform of the tax system "to increase social 
justice, ceasing to privilege capital in order to favour labour, and to preserve 
solidarity," These elements compose an ensemble which is characterised as the French 
'model,' 'founded upon competitiveness within a context of social justice and 
equality', distinct not only from the anglo-saxon but also from the Rhenish model of 
. I' 65 capIta Ism. 
We will now explore how the approach, or 'cognitive framework' (Scharpf 1991) of 
Realisme de Gauche translates into policy approaches. We will consider first micro-
economic policy, looking at the approach to privatisation and the public sector. We will 
turn then to two central flagship policies of the Jospin Government, the structural 
policies seeking to reduce unemployment through the youth employment plan and the 
reduction of the working week. Turning then to macro-economic policy, we will 
examine how, even given the constraints of the convergence criteria given the 
advancing process of European integration, Realisme de Gauche nevertheless leads the 
63 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
64 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
6S Vendredi no. 276 8/3/96 
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PS to seek out and exploit room to manoeuvre. 
Privatisation, the Public Sector, and Public Services 
The French etatist tradition, and in particular the importance of dirigisme, and the 
concept of Ie service public, can be seen as integral to the PS's conception of the French 
'model' of capitalism. This nexus became even more closely linked with the Socialist 
government's nationalisation programme in the early 1980s. However, elements of this 
etatist tradition have begun to conflict with international trends towards privatisation. 
Although privatisation officially began under Chirac, a number of nationalised firms 
had 'illegally' sold off subsidiaries with the full knowledge of the Fabius government in 
1985 and 1986. "This was the case for approximately 70 affiliates of the nationalised 
enterprises, a majority of which were sold to foreign buyers." (Schmidt 1996 : 129) 
Under Mitterrand's second septennat, his concept of an 'economie mixte' became a 
reality. Between 1988 and 1990, the policy of 'ni.. .. ni... ' prevailed. After the rash of 
privatisations between 1986 and 1988, the Rocard government slowed the pace of 
change. Formally, in accordance with Mitterrand's presidential campaign, there was to 
be no further privatisation. However, "the Rocard government gradually diluted state 
ownership of nationalised enterprises by allowing exceptions to the policy to promote 
strategic alliances and decreased state control by arranging for recapitalisation of 
industry through the trading of shares among nationalised industrial and financial 
concems."(Schmidt 1996 : 176) The demands of capital-starved public corporations for 
additional investment funds and strategic alliances by allowing them to trade shares in 
one another, with foreign companies were met on a piecemeal basis by the Rocard 
government. 
After 1991, public corporations could trade shares with the private sector. The new 
policy ruled that up to 49% of some nationalised enterprises could be sold off, 
principally in the competitive sector. This facilitated the inter-mixing of public and 
private share ownership, since public enterprises could also invest in the newly 
privati sed industries. Beregovoy's personal ambition, not realised in his lifetime, was 
for a policy of 'et privatisation, et nationalisation', i.e. nationalisation of public 
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enterprises In monopolistic servIce sectors and total privatisation for those In 
competitive sectors. (Schmidt 1996 : 187) 
Given the radical changes in the public sector brought about by privatisation, then, old-
style dirigisme is not feasible. The French public sector, however, remains larger than 
most other EU countries, and enjoys a peculiar importance within the French 
constitutional nexus. That said, the PS now accepts that some reform is essential. In 
what was little more than a reworking of Mitterrand' s 'ni ... ni ... . of the 1988 campaign, 
Strauss-Kahn outlined the new approach. The government, he said, "does not subscribe 
to the doctrine of 'everything must be private', or that 'everything must be public," 
instead, he said, borrowing a Jospinian catchphrase66, what is needed is, "a new balance, 
a new alliance between public and private. ,,67 
··d ,,68 Claude Estier notes that, "Realisme de Gauche leads us to abandon certaIn leas. 
According to his former advisor Maurice Bennassayag; 
"when Mitterrand talked about 'neither privatisation nor nationalisation', and the 
mixed economy, he considered that a large sector, including parts of the 
internationally competitive traded sector, should remain in state hands. The clearest 
proof of this, is that when the Socialists regained power in 1988, Beregovoy 
launched a campaign against Societe Generale, they tried to recuperate what they 
had privati sed - a bank, in the competitive sector.,,69 
Mitterrand's desire for a large public sector in both competitive and non-competitive 
sectors has been increasingly abandoned. This shift has been a relatively recent one. The 
1997 legislative election manifesto pledged a halt to privatisation of public services. The 
joint PS-PCF declaration affirmed, "we propose to end the process of privatisation for 
France-Telecom, Thompson, and Air France."(Dupin 1998 : 92) Jospin's investiture 
speech proclaimed, "in the absence of a national interest justification, we are not in 
favour of privati sing the common patrimony that are the large public enterprises in the 
competitive sector."(Dupin 1998 : 92) However, that speech also contained a careful 
distinction between the 'public sector' and 'public services'. Within a month of taking 
office, Strauss-Kahn declared himself 'not opposed' to the 'opening up' of the capital of 
66 See Bergounioux & Grunberg (1992: 450-452) for a discussion of Jospin's employment of the 'new 
balance' rhetoric at the Lille conference in 1987. 
67 Quoted in Ladrech (1998 : 10). 
68 Interview with Claude Estier 19/9/97 
69 Interview with Maurice 8ennassayag 22/9/97 
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France Telecom, and soon after announced the privatisation of Thompson-CSF.7o 
Indeed, the Jospin government has in fact overseen more privatisations that its right-
wing predecessors. This is due in no small part to the fact that the 1993 law established 
no timescale for privatisation, and thus recent privatisations, such as GAN-CIC, are the 
culmination of a process set in train earlier in the 1990s. (Szij 1998 : 18; Dupin 1998) 
That said, the shift in stance is clear, and reflects a Realisme de Gauche acceptance of 
changing parameters of state action. In a separate but related development, during the 
campaign, Jospin also pledged to use the state share in Renault to prevent the closure of 
the Vilvorde plant. However, on June 7th , Jospin referred to finding a 'very advanced 
process,' and on July 1 S\ Jospin defended a reversal of the campaign pledge in front of a 
meeting of Socialist deputies, saying, "I regret this conclusion, but we no longer live in 
an administrated economy."(Dupin 1998 : 201) 
"There is, however," Estier affirms, "a need to maintain a strong public sector in the 
non-competitive sector. For us, there is no question of privati sing EDF or the SNCF. 
Yet on the other hand, in the competitive sectors - telecommunications, airlines etc. - in 
those areas, there is a need to adapt - it is a form of modernism. ,,71 Beregovoy's 
distinction between competitive sectors, and the public services sector thus remains. 
Louis Mermaz, a Minister during the nationalisation programme in the early 1980s, and 
also a Minister in the Rocard and Cresson governments which oversaw the retreat of the 
public sector, sees the changing international economic context as the key explanatory 
factor of the changing approach nature of French dirigisme.: 
"With European construction. . .. And above all with the phenomenon of 
globalisation, it becomes clear that national monopolies no longer exist. .. We 
need to change the field of action. The French are in the process of rethinking the 
role of the state. The whole public service sector .... Real public services, such as 
hospitals and national education, the post office, the telephones, here the state 
must continue to exercise its role. However, in the competitive sector, should the 
state's role really be - in the old French tradition of Colbertism - one of 
control?" 72 
The answer, it seems, is a tentative no. "The state must be present in certain sectors, to 
70 Although it was stipulated that Thomson Multimedia would remain public. 
71 Interview with Claude Estier 19/9/97 
72 Interview with Louis Mermaz 1/10/97 
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arbitrate, and regulate, but not necessarily be a primary producer.,,73 The drawing of the 
distinction, between 'public service' and 'competitive sector', is not as straight-forward 
as the rhetoric might suggest. As Mermaz concedes, "the distinction needs to be made, 
and what we are doing to the telecommunications industry is significant. It remains a 
public service, but because we need to forge alliances in Europe,74 part of the industry 
can be opened up to private capital. Thus we will have a public sector with the 
participation of private capital." There seems to be a sliding scale, with some 'public 
services' more sacrosanct than others. "In the future, we will look to exercise overall 
control, as happens in other countries, rather than manage directly. There are those 
sectors which are on the margins - Air France, France Telecom, maybe even the 
EDF.,,75 
In response to EU directives concerning the partial opening of the energy markets, there 
have been ad hoc changes to the legal status of public companies such as EDF, for 
example, which had previously been entirely outside the competitive sector. France 
Telecom provides perhaps the best example of the tension between state ownership and 
EU competition. Strauss-Kahn's warming to the opening up of France Telecom's capital 
base bore fruit in October 1997, when a public sale of shares reduced state holdings in 
the company to 76.8%. Ahead of the liberalisation of European telecommunications 
markets on January 1 sl 1998, the legal status of France Telecom changed, becoming 
both the operator of the public network and a telecommunications operator in the 
competitive sector.(Szij 1998 : 23) 
It is thus at the European level that the public sector has to be defended. This defence is 
couched in terms of the inclusive concept of 'Ie service publique', embodying the values 
of equality, solidarity, co-operation. inclusion and 'I'interet general' or public interest. 
The full range of such services, as we have seen, is difficult to define, but it extends 
beyond just health and education to include the post office, the SNCF and beyond. It is 
73 Interview with Marisol Touraine 25/11/97 
74 Similar thinking informed recent developments at Aerospatiale. Defence Minister Alain Richard 
insisted that the state would retain a majority interest in the concern. However, Dassault and Lagardere 
were 'invited around the table' to 'shift the weight of Aerospatiale' in the face of the two European 
partners - Dasa and British Aerospace - with whom a 'fusion' is planned.(Liberation 2/6/98) This 
example demonstrates the importance of the EU dimension. As integration advances, the pertinent 
regulatory regime is increasingly European. 
7S Interview with Louis Mermaz 1/10/97 
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in republican terms - of these cultural values, institutionalised in the French state, that 
Jospin argues for a powerful public sector. "The role of the state must be clarified, the 
very idea of public service re-affirmed. The public service has an essential mission to 
combat social and territorial inequalities and to maintain social cohesion."(l995 : 47) 
This, Ladrech argues, explains Jospin's insistence on the inclusion of a notion of social 
cohesion regarding public services in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Jospin sees the 
development in terms of 'room to manoeuvre', a concept central to his Realisme de 
gauche. 
"European directives give the member States the manoeuvring room necessary in 
order to maintain and develop the missions for their public service enterprises. In 
utilising this leeway, we can at the same time preserve, in France, our original 
conception of public service, while constructing a common vision of the role of 
public services, which would permit the Europe of the 21 51 century to affirm its 
model of society and its attachment to economic and social cohesion.,,76 
Structural Reforms To Tackle Unemployment: 1. The Youth 
Employment Plan 
Job creation has been a central concern of PS strategy since 1993, not least because 
most see the unemployment record of the last Socialist government as the key 
explanatory factor in the electoral defeat. Indeed, state sponsored employment creation 
schemes have been an increasingly central aspect of state employment policy in the last 
20 years. Benhayoun & Lazzeri chart an evolution in the global objective of 
employment policy. In the 1960s and 1970s, their aim was to accompany restructuring. 
From 1977 to 1987, their aim was to aid young peoples entrance into the world of work. 
Whilst this remains a central concern, since 1988 their ambit has widened considerably 
to embrace a wider fight against unemployment. The scale and range of measures is 
considerable, and has expanded since the mid-1980s (OFCE 1999 : 58 & 68 fig. VII.3) 
Ministry of Employment figures show that over 2,100,000 people were on state-initiated 
employment policy schemes in 1996. (Benhayoun & Lazzeri 1998 : 48) 
'Active' employment policy takes a number of forms, from apprenticeships, and work 
placements, to state-subsidised jobs, and employers' social security exemptions. There 
76 Jospin's Speech to the Colloquium: Energie, Poste, Telecommunications Quel avenir pour Ie service 
public en France et en Europe? (26/3/98) http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.frIPM/D260398.HTM 
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has been an increasing propensity to target particular groups 'excluded' from the labour 
market, notably the long-term unemployed, the uneducated, and young people. These 
groups have born the brunt of increased labour market flexibility in France. The new, 
more flexible, employment contracts are relatively over-populated with young workers, 
with nearly all new entrants being hired on short term contracts. Thus, "French society 
puts nearly all the burden of flexibility upon these workers."(Cohen et al 1997 : 272) 
There has been an expansion of programmes targeted at young people, such as the 
Travaux d'utilite collective (TUC), renamed contrats d'emploi solidarite (CES) in 1990. 
The number of young people on these and various other schemes rose from a total in 
1985 of 384,000 to 736,000 in 1994. These initiatives thus, "play an important role in 
the youth employment market in the last twelve or so years. "(Gautie 1997 : 16) This 
impact is clearly demonstrated by recent OFCE figures.(OFCE 1999 : 57 table VI.4) 
Since 1997, the Jospin government has redoubled efforts in this area. A National 
Convention was held on the subject in 1994, and the third of the 1996 thematic 
conventions was entitled 'For Employment: A Change of Policy.' When announcing a 
1 % fall in the unemployment figures in February 1998, the PS first secretary placed the 
developments within the context of the Jospin government's record in office; 
"These latest figures show that the economic, social and fiscal choices made since 
June 1 st 1997 are steering our country along the right path. We have to amplify the 
effort from now on, to further reduce unemployment, because growth alone will 
not suffice. That is why, more than ever, we must pursue the policies of youth 
employment creation, and fully engage in the process of a negotiated reduction of 
the working week." 77 
For reasons we shall explore later, the PS is concentrating on structural reforms of the 
French economy as its principle job-creating strategy. "In terms of macro-economic 
policy, employment policy has been abandoned. There is an attempt to make up for this 
in terms of structural policies, but in macro-economic terms, there is no longer an 
employment policy. Things may change after the single currency. Not before.,,78 
The programme elaborated at the employment convention, in December 1996, formed 
the basis of the election manifesto the following summer, and in tum of the Aubry plan. 
77 Communique de Fran~ois Hollande Premier Secretaire du Parti Socialiste 27 fevrier 1998 PS website 
http://www.parti-socialiste.frlhtml 
78 Interview with Jean-Paul Fitoussi 13/12/97 
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Particular emphasis was placed on the importance of youth job creation, with a 
commitment to create 700,000 new jobs. Vasseur situates the programme within the 
context of the wider economic strategy. "There is a general problem of the level of 
economic activity, linked to the problems of the division of the fruits of growth, which 
means that demand for labour is weak, and that the first penalised are those attempting 
to enter the job market - the younger job seekers.,,79 
Dominic Strauss-Kahn, who later became finance Minister, In his speech at the 
employment convention, outlined the policy; 
"Today we have decided: the state must undertake to create and finance, with the 
help of local collectivities, 350 000 new jobs, with contracts of indeterminate 
length. It will cost 35 thousand million francs, but that must be compared to the 60 
thousand million in firms' social contribution exemptions .... The choice is 
simple, do we want to pour millions and millions of francs into firms coffers, with 
minimal impact on employment levels, or do we want the State, directly, to take 
its responsibilities.,,80 
In addition to these jobs, a further 350 000 are to be created in the private sector in the 
next two years. Indications are that there has been considerable success here, too -
although this may be more due to the growth of the economy than government policy. 
Nevertheless, 400,000 jobs were created in 1998, and roughly 100,000 of them were 
within the framework of the Plan Aubry.(OFCE 1999 : 8,53 & fig. VI.4) The role of the 
state as guarantor of the job creation programme is affirmed, a central feature of 
France's 'model' of capitalism. In the run up to the election, the PS pledged to; 
"drastically simplify current employment schemes, without adding to public 
expenses, our objective is the creation of 700,000 genuine jobs for the young, half 
in the public sector, half in the private sector .... All historical examples indicate 
that only an engagement of public power can triumph over massive 
unemployment. A master budget, re-orientinfY public expenditures towards 
employment, will be a powerful lever of action. ,,8 
The strategy is part of an eclectic approach to employment policy. The emphasis of the 
Juppe government's employment policy was on increasing the level of low wage 
employment, in part by bringing down employer costs, particularly in the private sector. 
The accent was placed on the bottom of the wage scale, with social security 
79 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
80 Report of the general debate at the Convention in L 'Hebdo des Socialistes 20/12/96 p7 
81 L 'Hebdo des Socialistes 9/5/97 p.4 
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contributions at minimum wage level being reduced by 13%.{OFCE 1999 : 58) There is 
some continuity in this regard (see chapter 7), however, the PS sees this as one element 
in a wider strategy, and retains a belief in the importance of an actively interventionist 
state in any job creating strategy. As Estier observes; 
"Certain measures were taken to lighten the burden of social costs on firms. Yet 
we do not consider this, as the Right did, to be a be-all and end all strategy. The 
Right has always believed that by helping firms, you aid job creation. Yet this is 
not true. We can see that over the last few years, under Balladur and then Juppe, 
thousands of millions of francs have been spent helping firms, and all that did not 
translate into a single job created.,,82 
By contrast, the results of the Plan Aubry have been encouraging, with 95,000 jobs 
created in the public sector in 1998. (OFCE 1999: 58) 
2. The 35 hour working week 
The issue of reducing the length of the working week has long been of central 
importance for the French Left. A look at the evolution of the length of the working 
week during the century shows a strong correlation between its reduction and the brief 
periods of Left-wing government. 83 More recently, the scale of the unemployment 
problem in France has reduced the left's monopoly on the concept. Indeed, the Loi 
RoMen, introduced by the Juppe government in 1996, established a series of financial 
inducements for reductions in working time - which either saved or created 20,000 
jobs.{Gubian 1998 : 19) 
The aim of the reduction of the working week as an economic policy instrument is 
twofold. On the one hand, its objective is to reduce unemployment. On the other, if 
salaries are maintained at pre-existing levels, it will have a redistributive effect between 
labour and capital. The policy continued to receive the attention of PS actors in the 
1980s and 1990s, with the 1981 reduction seen as the first step. Final conference texts 
82 Interview with Claude Estier 19/9/97 
83 Thus in 1936, the popular front brought the working week down from 46 to 40 hours. This level was 
re-established after the liberation. However, this law was not strictly adhered to, and by May 1968, the 
average working week had crept back up to nearly 47 hours. In the wake of the 'events'. the Grenelle 
accords brought the level back down to 40. The next advance came with the election of the Mauroy 
government in 1981, when the working week was reduced from 40 to 39 hours.{Fonteneau & Muet 1985 
: 233-239) 
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regularly talked of the objective of a reduction of the working week.84 Emmanuelli sees 
the 35 hour week policy as a battleground where first and second left continue to 
skirmish; 
"The deuxieme gauche were for a reduction in salaries ... they dare not say 
anything, but they continue to think it. The first left was mainly concerned with a 
redistribution of added value from capital to workers ..... In reality, the deuxieme 
gauche has never accepted the analysis of added value.,,85 
The issue became a key point of division at the Bourget conference, with Rocard 
advocating a concomitant reduction in salaries, whilst Emmanuelli was holding out for 
maintaining salaries at pre-existing levels. Emmanuelli's 'victory' there doubtless 
influenced the subsequent elaboration of policy under Jospin. 
The redistributive element is not neglected by the PS elite today. The continuing unease 
at having presided, during the 1980s, over the progressive increase in capital returns, 
whilst wage earners suffered diminishing returns fosters an insistence on a redistributive 
element to contemporary policy. "That dimension is present within the policy of 
reducing the working week. When one works less for the same salary, it is a means of 
shifting added value in favour of salaries in a radical manner.,,86 However, the legal 
position is that salaries in the private sector are outside the government's jurisdiction, 
and thus the law makes no legal provision for wages levels, "because salaries are within 
the domain of negotiation. "( Gubian 1998 : 25) 
The law itself places great emphasis on the job creating aspect of the policy. State aid in 
the form of reductions in social security contributions are offered to firms creating new 
jobs (above a minimum of 6% of the workforce) as a result of the reduction of the 
working week by a minimum of 10%. Increased levels of exemption are offered to finns 
'making a particular effort in the field of employment,' notably those finns undertaking 
to reduce work time by 15%, and increasing their workforce by 9%.87 The state aids in 
the form of exemptions from employer social contributions are staggered (reducing 
from up to 9,000 F in the first years down to 5,000 F in the fifth year) - the aim being to 
84 the Arche text pledged a 'move towards a 35 hour week Le Poing ella Rose no. 135 janvier 1992 p83 
& p89 
85 Interview with Henri Emmanuelli 10112/97 
86 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
87 Excerpts from the Projel de Loi PS website http://www.parti-socialiste.frlhtml!change/index.html 
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relieve some of the burden of the cost of the transition from employers and employees. 
The fixed levels of these state financial aids means that they will be relatively more 
generous for lower earners. (Gubian 1998 : 20-21) 
The law also reflects enduring 'neo-corporatist' aspirations within the PS.(see chapter 2) 
Following the abortive attempts of the Mauroy Government before it, the Cresson 
Government unsuccessfully attempted to instigate co-determination in France in the 
early 1990s. (Schmidt 1996 : 185-186) One of the reasons for enduring efforts is the 
ability of consensual labour-capital relations to alleviate unemployment pressures. As 
Lordon notes, "in the absence of a strong enough neo-corporatism which could have 
driven a negotiated disinflation, wage discipline has been performed more brutally, by 
way of [higher] unemployment. "(1998 : 106) The 35 hour week law places great 
emphasis on negotiation between firms, employees, and state. The classic social 
democratic method, championed within PS ranks by Poperen in the last 20 years, has 
become a chosen policy tool. 
As Gubian notes, "the securing sizeable reductions which will create jobs, necessitates 
the rethinking of the organisation of work and the evolution of pay for established 
workers as well as new entrants, and these must be favourable to both parties 
[employers & employees], negotiation thus plays a primordial role."(1998 : 20) The 
national conference on salaries, attended by government, unions and patronat in 
September was testament to the PS's faith in negotiation. This may be evidence of the 
influence of Rocardian 'deuxieme gauche', many of whom hold prominent positions 
within the PS today. They have always emphasised the importance of negotiated 
settlements, their search for a consensual politics in part explains their reservations 
about a legal insistence upon no reductions in salaries. 
"The spirit of the law," Gubian argues, "is to put negotiation at the centre of the process 
of reduction in working time."(1998 : 20) This is attested to by the text of the law itself; 
"This law will open up the possibility for social partners to negotiate the details of 
implementation." Furthermore, "the financial incentive benefiting firms will be higher, 
the quicker firms engage in negotiation." Such negotiating, as we have seen, goes 
against the confrontational grain of French industrial relations. The law highlights 
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certain structural problems, such as the lack of union representation structures to 
orchestrate the negotiating process in many firms, particularly smaller ones. This comes 
back to the traditional low density of unionisation in France, and the fragmented nature 
of existing union structures. Despite such hindrances, the law aims to "facilitate the 
negotiation within firms over labour costs, which wage-earners often perceive to be 
unrewarding. ,,88 
The implication is that such a perception is at variance with the facts. Jospin's chief 
economic advisor, Pierre-Alain Muet, insists that, "through negotiation between social 
partners, we are putting in place a different model of development which privileges 
employment."(1998 : 73) Muet also attests to the 'statist' nature of the negotiation 
process in France as a response to the traditional weakness of negotiated, consensual 
industrial relations in France (see Chapter 2). "Since, in France, we do not have a 
tradition of negotiation without state intervention, it was necessary that there be an 
impetus provided by the state in order that the negotiations could begin."(l998 : 74) The 
site of such negotiations may vary, but on the whole the emphasis is likely to be on the 
firm- rather than the branch-level. 
The state plays an important role in other aspects of the implementation of the policy. In 
contra-distinction to the earlier Loi Robien the 35 hour week involves not just 'positive 
incentives', such as higher state aids for jobs created, but also 'negative' incentives - in 
the form of statutory increases in over-time payments for hours worked over the 35. 
Thus, whilst the state is not administering the change in accordance with the French 
state's Colbertist traditions, it is inducing the change through a set of 'carrots' and 
'sticks'. According to Muet, "the state must show the way, establish the framework, that 
is why there is a legal reduction in working time."(1998 : 85) This highlights an 
important point, which demonstrates the significance of the legal framework of 
industrial relations. France has traditionally, "given greater importance to parliamentary 
law and regulations and to administrative law."(Boyer 1997 : 78) This is reflected in the 
35 hour week, where the French state has at its disposal a policy tool not available in 
many other countries. "The legal duration of working time," Muet notes, "is a French 
characteristic; in other countries, for example Germany, the Netherlands, or Denmark, 
88 Excerpts from the Projet de Loi PS website http://www.parti-socialiste.frihtml/change/index.html 
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the length of working time is principally a result of collective conventions."(l998 : 85) 
Here we see the enduring 'statist' nature of Realisme de Gauche, in which the state 
continues to be of central importance to France's economic development, even if its 
modus operandi has changed considerably in recent years. 
In ideological terms, the 35 hour week policy is also seen as a rejection of neo-liberal 
interpretation of globalisation, and its implications for structural reform of labour 
market institutions Although labour market flexibility has increased in France in the 
1980s and 1990s, the path is not an inexorable road towards an anglo-saxon 'model.' 
The state retains a significant role, which seeks to secure equitable social norms. 
"People tell us that if we introduce the 35 hour week, we will drive international 
investors away. Labour costs are important - that is true, but there are lots of other 
considerations, such as the price of transport .... That is why they [New Labour] 
are wrong to concede. Because in doing so they align themselves with a liberal 
outlook which is not accurate ... Labour costs are one element among many."S9 
In good Realisme de Gauche fashion, however, this ideological stance is tempered by a 
pragmatic approach to the application of the theory. The PS accepts the need not to 
antagonise firms. 
The law is justified in economic efficiency terms by anticipated gains in productivity. 
Lower fatigue levels of workers, a lesser instance of absenteeism, and a more efficient 
organisation of working time will, it is argued, all improve productivity and reduce 
production costs. (Gubian 1998 : 16) The PS accepts the need not to antagonise firms; 
"We cannot ignore the fact that, even if there is an imbalance in their favour, the 
firms are primary actors in the implementation of this policy. Thus we cannot 
sustain a discourse saying that firms have excessive profit margins, and we need 
to effect redistribution.,,90 
Indeed, the premise of the law is that the burden of cost arising from the transition must 
be shouldered by state and employees, but not by firms. 91 "The gains in productivity and 
financial aid will contribute 60% of the total financing of the reduction of working time. 
Wage earners must thus finance the remaining 40%." (Gubian 1998 : 29) The law plans 
89 Interview with Henri Emmanuelli 10/12/97 
90 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17112197 
91 The PS accept the need to reduce employer costs as part of the job creating strategy, as indicated by 
recent reductions in Professional taxation (see chapter 7). 
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to effect the transition without increasing public expenditure in the long term. It is 
anticipated that gains from tax receipts, coupled with reductions in social security, RMI, 
an unemployment benefit bills will within 5 years compensate fully for increased 
expenditure through state aids.(Gubian 1998 : 26) Thus, the law implicitly recognises 
the need for wage moderation so that firms can stabilise their wage costs. This will be 
particularly important for higher earners, and some studies anticipate a 2 year wage 
freeze. 
Anticipated Results 
The 35 hour week is seen by the PS as an integral part of its own 'model' of capitalism 
it seeks to export. Situating the 35 hours within the bigger picture, Vasseur recalls 
Jospin's presidential campaign soundbite, "this is one of the core themes which justifies 
the reduction of the working week - we are trying to advance a new model of 
civilisation, within which the economy is at the service of man, and not the opposite.',92 
As a job creating strategy, the prospects of the schemes is a subject of considerable 
disagreement. Most accept that the targeting of state aids - with higher incentive 
payments going to firms hiring in particular categories (young workers, long-term 
unemployed) will go some way to improving the prospects for these 'excluded' 
categories. However, globally, little consensus exists about the number of jobs to be 
created. Some of the unions, and those on the Left in the PS, believe the transition had 
to be more rapid (not phased in over 4 years) if it was to create more jobs. More 
optimistic economic studies anticipate that the 35 hour week will result in the creation 
of 700,000 jobs.(Gubian 1998) Clearly, such results are dependent on wider economic 
developments such as the avoidance of recession. 
Significantly, OFCE research suggests a more modest result, in the order of 500,000 
jobs. Their predictions, however, are based on the assumption of employees shouldering 
the burden of transition costs through wage moderation. As Fitoussi puts it, "thus 
workers have to agree to share both their jobs and their salaries with the 
unemployed."(1998 : 81) However, if that exigent condition cannot be met - i.e. should 
negotiated wage moderation fail, the results in terms of job creation may be more 
92 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
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meagre. 
The European dimension 
"As the Prime Minister is often saying, the problems of growth and 
unemployment are also European problems ... that is why the strategy for fighting 
unemployment has two facets: a national dimension, and a European one seeking 
to re-orient European construction in favour of jobs and growth."(Muet 1998 : 85) 
For this reason, the imperfect match between the PS model and development paths 
currently being followed elsewhere in Europe is a grave concern, potentially threatening 
the success of the ambitious project. Acutely aware of how fruitless 'going it alone' is in 
today's interdependent world, the PS is looking beyond national borders for moral and 
political support for their 'model'. Thus Jean Le Garrec, the man chosen as rapporteur 
for the 35 hour week law, and thus responsible for its passage through the Assembh!e, is 
insistent upon the need for expansion to a European level; 
"The law I am preparing on the 35 hours moves things a little ... But clearly, if 
Europe does not move as well, things will become difficult. ... For me, today, the 
European dimension is un-bypassable. That does not mean that we are not obliged 
to explore all possible room to manoeuvre - that is exactly what we are doing. But 
if that room to manoeuvre is not linked, in the years to come, to the European 
level, we will have difficulties - perhaps even failures.'.93 
Emmanuelli, too, has his eyes on the European horizon when trying to gauge the 
chances of long-term success; 
"The 35 hour week involves an ideological mindset - who is a winner, who is a 
loser. The Italians are following us (we know why, it is to serve a strategic 
purpose). The debate is also being played out in the SPD today, between 
Lafontaine and Schroeder. On the whole, if the SPD were to move in our 
direction, things would become very interesting. If the SPD does not shift, we will 
try, but in my opinion, we will not get very far.,,94 
For all the insistence upon domestic 'vo!ontarisme', the PS accepts that it IS at the 
European level that the iniquitous effects of globalisation can most effectively be 
countered. 
93 Interview with Jean Le Garrec 16/12/97 
94 Interview with Henri Emmanuelli 10/12/97 
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European Economic Integration & French Macro-Economic Policy 
A fundamental premise of Realisme de Gauche, and the culmination of a journey 
begun in 1983, is an understanding of "what the process of globalisation was, and how 
it affected French sovereignty.,,95 Awareness of international economic context, and 
its impact on French socialism is nothing new. Ever since the V-tum of 1983 'external 
constraints' have become commonplace in the party's discourse. The Arche text 
'Projet socialiste', which talked of globalisation explicitly, observed, "Socialism .... .is 
developing at the heart of a globalised capitalism which today restricts our vision, but 
not our will to act. ,,96 What changed, particularly after 1993, was the reading of the 
room to manoeuvre which remained despite the external constraint. Under Jospin, the 
PS synthesised the auto-criticism prevalent within the party since 1993 with an in-depth 
analysis of the changing international political economy at the national convention on 
'Globalisation, Europe, France' in March 1996. 
Given the accepted importance of the wider international context to the health of the 
French economy, and with the advancing process of European integration, it is 
increasingly at that level that macro-economic policy must be considered. In keeping 
with Mitterrand's European approach, Europe is seen at once as a harbinger of 
modernisation, but also as a prime export zone for the specifically French path to 
modernity.(see chapter 5) European Affairs Minister Pierre Moscovici set out the 
French vision for European macro-economic policy; 
"Europe, from Jean Monnet to Francois Mitterrand, has always been an amplifier 
of French modernisation. We must fight for the three elements which can create 
European growth - a strong currency with low interest rates, less public debt and 
more public investment, and a large market with real political and social rights. 
These are the necessary conditions for a real European pact for growth."( 1997 : 
99) 
An enduring reference point in party texts97 is the Delors White Paper of December 
1993 on 'Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment.' The paper was based on the 
work of a group of economists headed by Stuart Holland.98 Holland has worked 
95 Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
96 Le Poing ella Rose no. 135 Janvier 1992 p. 18 
97 which was also referred to in a number of interviews 
98 see Holland (1993). The book was a report to the Commission of the (then) EC. See also Lightfoot & 
Wilde (1996) 
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extensively on the need for the establishment of a New Bretton Woods. The starting 
point of such work is an acceptance of the limits placed on unilateral national level 
macro-economic policy by the increasing levels of international financial integration 
prevalent since the 1970s. This changed context rules out Keynesianism a /'ancienne, 
yet whilst growth-oriented macroeconomic policies at the national level may be 
unsustainable, the same is not necessarily true of the supra-national level, namely the 
EU. 
Demand management policies, particularly any of an expansionary nature, could be 
internationally co-ordinated. The Delors White Paper outlined a trans-European 
investment in Public Works which were to create 15 million new jobs by the year 2000. 
This was to be financed, Lightfoot & Wilde observe, "from loans and bonds guaranteed 
by the EU, which would effectively act as a state, financing a Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement."( 1996) European co-operation is considered an essential response to 
globalisation~ 
"This explains, despite the difficulties, the reservations of public opinion, and 
internal cleavages within the Left, why the majority of socialists have remained 
favourable to European construction. Their analysis of the process of 
globalisation accepts the necessity for the European nations to construct a regional 
power-bloc.,,99 
French Socialists, whilst mindful of the practical difficulties, nevertheless retain faith in 
the strategy. "A real reflation, which would look something like a Keynesian policy -
either happens at the European level, or not at all."lOo In 1998 Jospin reaffirmed his 
Euro-Keynesianism in talks with Jacques Santer. 
The role played by European construction in PS economic strategy involves, "a two-
level strategy incorporating European with French policy development." This is both, 
"an admission of the limited scope for national innovation or manoeuvrability," and "an 
acknowledgement of the impact and influence of EU policies on national policy-
making."(Ladrech 1998 : 1) "For me," Jospin notes, "European voluntarism is an 
extension of national voluntarism. This is exactly the basis of our determination to go 
through with the construction of a united Europe."lol In the new international economic 
99 Interview with Alain Bergounioux 18/9/97 
100 Interview with Henri Emmanuelli 1O/l2/97 
101 Jospin's speech Assemblee Nationale. to the Debate on the recommendations of the European 
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context, the PS has come to accept that, "socialism - or social democracy - will not 'be' 
unless there is some compatibility at the European level." Accordingly, the PS accepts, 
"the need to co-ordinate national with European policy-making."( Ladrech 1998 : 2) 
Vasseur says of competitive disinflation, "that configuration was no longer appropriate 
from the beginning of the 1990s.,,102 One reason for this, in the context of increasing 
European integration, is that the 'beggar-thy-neighbour' logic of competitive 
disinflation goes against the grain of the international economic co-ordination so central 
to PS thinking. 
Monetary Policy 
Whilst accepting that structural developments of the international political-economic 
context have hemmed in macro-economic policy options, some commentators are 
unwilling to infer from this the end of autonomous national macro-economic policy 
making as some global theorists do. Such a position arguably surrenders too much 
ground to the ideological onslaught which accompanied the changing objective 
conditions. In terms of macroeconomic policy, the PS faces a problematic, common to 
all centre-left governments, of "the conflict between credibility and discretion"(Balls 
1998) - the desire to exercise discretion to pursue social democratic objectives, 
tempered by the need for government policies to be perceived as sound and sustainable. 
Realisme de Gauche in relation to the clearest example of European-level co-ordination 
- the process of economic convergence preceding the transition to a single currency -
encapsulated these dual concerns. The 1996 PS Convention on Globalisation, Europe. 
France explicitly rejected the view of Europe as a liberal trojan horse, "refusing the 
anglo-saxon model and affirming a European and French model." The final text 
pledged the party to a more comprehensive construction of 'I 'Europe social', with the 
social chapter of Maastricht seen as only the first step in this process. The need for a 
political structure as a counterweight to the European central bank was essential, the 
text argued, to avoid the single currency being "sacrificed to monetarism, the devolution 
pure and simple of monetary policy-making power to the governors of central 
Commission for the passage to a single currency (Ie 21 April 1998) http://www.premier-
ministre.gouv.frIPMlD210498.HTM 
102 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
250 
banks." t03 
Tomlinson, focusing on the process, not the rhetoric of globalisation, accepts that "the 
scope of [national economic] management has narrowed as the pace of international 
integration has intensified," but insists "the scale and nature of that integration needs to 
be treated with care." (1993 : 22) The implications for each macroeconomic policy 
instrument should be assessed separately. Thus whereas "official attempts to set 
exchange rates against market sentiment are battles between David and Goliath, without 
the likelihood of divine intervention on the side of David." (1993 : 23) The balance of 
forces in the monetary policy field is slightly more favourable, where "the movement 
towards a common currency zone will to some extent re-adjust the balance between 
private and governmental players in the foreign exchange market." (1993 : 24) 
The nature of that re-adjusting of the balance is central to PS macro-economic policy 
strategy. The fulfilling of the Maastricht convergence criteria as a precursor to the 
establishment of a single currency has tightly hemmed in macro-economic policy. 
Despite this, Jospin set out his hopes for the basis of the Euro in a speech to the 
Assemblee Nationale; 
"Faced with the challenge of globalisation, economic and monetary union will 
provide us with an effective instrument to enable us to fulfill our national 
destiny ... the Euro will be a stabilising factor, protecting our citizens from 
monetary crises ... we will be less dependent on the hazards of the international 
economic conjuncture ... the advantages of monetary union can already be 
perceived. If, despite the Asian crisis, there is a general economic up-tum in 
Europe, it is in part because the future monetary union is already perceived, in a 
tormented world economy, as a stable monetary space. In clarifying the horizon, 
in calming down the anticipations of economic and financial actors, in favouring a 
downward convergence of interest rates, the prospect of monetary union 
contributes to the return to growth in Europe."I04 
The conception of monetary policy as being solely concerned with monetary stability, 
with price stability, is challenged because such a state of affairs adversely affects 
growth. As with so many other areas, it is argued that recent practice has been 
excessively cautious, and that the instrument of monetary policy can be made more 
\03 Vendredi 2768/3/96 
\04 Jospin's speech Assembh~e Nationale, to the Debate on the recommendations of the European 
Commission for the passage to a single currency (Ie 21 April 1998) http://www.premier-
ministre.gouv. frIPMlD21 0498.HTM 
251 
compatible with other policy objectives. such as growth; 
"We all know, and economic theory demonstrates that the optimum configuration 
or 'climate' is one where economic actors take all objectives into account - and 
not just price stability. The economy at present is somewhat trapped, so monetary 
policy could be a little more expansionary, without the threat of inflation 
reappearing in the next 3-4 years.,,10 
Moscovici cites both Keynesian and liberal economists as sharing in the PS view of the 
root of the economic malaise, "all insist on the need, the imperative, to lower real 
interest rates, which condemn the West to recurrent crises, and penalise investment, 
growth and jobs. We need to use the monetary instrument wisely, and avoid budgetary 
fetishism."(1997 : 48) The price paid, for monetary myopia, in terms of low growth, 
slowed down by prohibitive interest rates and mass unemployment, is, it is argued, too 
great. "That is why such dogmas are today seriously challenged, not only on the 
grounds of social justice, but also on the grounds of economic efficiency."( 1997 : 58) 
Jospin attempted to reconcile his vision of Europe to the process of monetary union by 
imposing four criteria on the passage to a single currency. As Vasseur explains, for 
Jospin, "Europe, in economic terms, is more a means than an end in itself. We are not 
about to endorse austerity simply in order to create the single currency. Rather, the 
single currency must be a means, and in order to be sure that it will be a means of 
bringing growth and jobs, we must impose certain conditions - the four of Pierre 
M .. ,,106 OSCOVICl. 
The four conditions107 imposed by Jospin on the advent of the Euro are, firstly, the Euro 
must include as many countries as possible, with Spain and Italy cited explicitly, along 
with the UK 'if they wish.' Secondly, "Europe must be social and political," therefore, 
"we want the relations between participating Euro countries be founded not on an 
austerity pact (this is an explicit reference to the German inspired 'Stability Pact' of 
Dublin), but on a solidarity and growth pact, permitting policies in favour of job 
creation and social cohesion." Thirdly, next to the European Central Bank, there must 
be established "a European economic government, representing the people and charged 
with co-ordinating the economic policies of the various nations." Finally, there is an 
lOS Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
106 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
107 Inspired and in part elaborated by Moscovici, according to his advisor Vasseur (interview 1612/97) 
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insistence that the Euro must not be over-valued vis-it-vis the dollar and yen. IDS 
Although the most significant of those conditions - the creation of a 'political 
counterweight' to the ECB, has not been met, there have been attempts to partially fill 
that vacuum through ever greater emphasis on co-ordination of macro-economic policy 
between countries in the Euro zone. Such activity was particularly intense during 
Lafontaine's brief sojourn as Gennan Finance Minister, with the nascent Franco-
Gennan axis on macroeconomic activism to promote employment, evidenced by 
Lafontaine and Strauss-Kahn's joint statement calling for re-regulation of the 
international financial system, and for a European-level policy for employment and 
growth. 109 The establishment of the Euro X group - the regular meetings between 
Finance ministers of all countries within the Euro-zone - is also seen as at least a partial 
realisation of Jospin's 'economic government'. 
Fiscal Policy 
Fiscal policy, Tomlinson argues, offers more room to manoeuvre; "national policies 
about taxation (both levels and distribution) remain important and, in some areas at 
least, reasonably immune from pressures for harmonisation with other countries within 
the EU." (1993 : 25) Such observations are supported by Garrett's recent cross-national 
quantitative analysis of government expenditure and deficit level for 16 OEeD 
countries between 1967 and 1990. Whilst accepting the logical consistency of the 
position which sees capital mobility as tightly constraining government macro-
economic policy-making options Garrett seeks to unearth how far the process has 
actually progressed. The findings suggest considerable variations in expenditure and a 
wider room to manoeuvre for governments than is generally appreciated. I I 0 (1995) 
Beregovoy did not seem to share the Vlew that considerable room to manoeuvre 
pennitted a volontariste approach. He was convinced that an essential corollary of the 
lifting of capital controls within the EC was the harmonisation of national taxes on 
108 PS Changeons d'Avenir " Nos engagements pour fa France election manifesto 1997 pp I 2-13 
109 Liberation 23/1 0/98 
110 A Caveat must be offered here; the study ends in 1990, when capital controls were abolished in the 
EU, and as a result may miss subsequent developments resulting from increasing integration. 
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savmgs - and indeed initially secured commitments from the Germans to fiscal 
harmonisation as a quid pro quo of lifting capital controls, although these commitments 
were reneged upon.{Aeschimann & Riche 1996 : 48) In the absence of such 
harmonisation, Beregovoy feared a flight of capital to the low taxation countries, such 
as Luxembourg. Plans were made for a 'withholding tax' to reduce these effects, but 
German Finance Minister Theo Waigel again scuppered the move. In the absence of 
harmonisation, "Beregovoy felt obliged to cut taxes on profits from stocks, bonds, 
insurance policies, and mutual funds. In December 1989 he introduced legislation 
instituting tax-free funds for short term fixed-interest instruments, the sicav monetaire. 
These tax-free mutual funds rapidly became so popular that ... at their height in 1991, a 
trillion francs were invested in them."{Friend 1998 : 191) A Ministry of Finance 
publication outlining the plans for the 1992 budget identifies the primary objective for 
fiscal and savings reform as, "limiting the risks of delocalisation linked to the free 
circulation of capital within the EC."lll There seems to be an acceptance that 
liberalisation within Europe exerts insurmountable pressures towards hannonisation of 
fiscal policy. 
Realisme de Gauche entails a realisation of the need to operate at the European level, 
and the concern for harmonisation, remains central to PS thinking on fiscal reform 
today. Vasseur observes; 
"the pertinent echelon is Europe. The nature of European construction in the 
1980s, was on a somewhat Thatcherite model. When there are capital flows 
without prior harmonisation, one cannot deny the constraint of being somewhat 
obliged to align with the 'lowest bidder' in fiscal terms, i.e. Luxembourg."ll2 
However, the nature of engagement at that European-level is changing. There is an 
explicit attempt to challenge the neo-liberal thinking under-pinning the 'Thatcherite' 
model of Europe. Vasseur continues; 
"the Socialist government - and I am partially responsible for the evolution - is in 
the process of engaging in fiscal harmonisation. The process of correcting the 
imbalance in the taxation of capital and taxation of labour, also involving the 
Luxembourg government, is under way .... It could be a factor in reducing 
unemployment on our continent."ll3 
III Les Notes B/eues number 560 (30/9/91) p55 Ministere de L 'Economie, des Finances, et du Budget 
112 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
113 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
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This kind of European-level fiscal activism is seen as a promising avenue. Fitoussi et af 
argue that, once instituted, the single currency will further improve the case for fiscal 
activism, "the conditions characterising EMU are those in which fiscal policy is most 
effective. Indeed, there will be a negligible effect on the rate of interest, which will be 
set for the Community as a whole, and by definition exchange rates (already irrevocably 
fixed) will be unaffected, so that there will be no crowding out of either investments or 
exports."(1993 : 13) 
At the national level, Realisme de Gauche in the field of fiscal policy assumes the 
existence of some scope for activism. The strategy is built on foundations laid in 
Jospin's presidential campaign. There, whilst accepting the need to reduce public 
deficits, and meet Maastricht convergence criteria, Jospin insisted on sufficient room to 
manoeuvre to a change in the priorities of the system. This could be done, Jospin 
asserted, "without penal ising wage-earners, and without increasing overall charges on 
firms," by making the French fiscal system fairer. Commitments included, firstly, 
lowering social security contributions of low wage earners, whilst increasing them on 
the highest paid. Secondly, the extension of Rocard's Contribution Sociale Generalisee, 
considered "fairer than V AT or taxation on salaries alone," to cover all capital revenues. 
The rationale being that general health care, currently funded disproportionately by 
employee contributions, should be funded by general taxation. Thirdly, the abolition of 
numerous tax exemptions- particularly those covering capital assets and large firms -
"not justified by social or economic objectives". Lastly, the reform of an excessively 
complex and idiosyncratic local taxation system.(PS 1995 : 12-13) 
These themes were built on at the National Convention on economic and social policy 
entitled 'For Employment: A Change of Policy' in December 1996. The fiscal policy 
work-group, developed its propositions under the title, "a logic of redistribution and 
social justice." The 'archaic' fiscal and social contributions system needs to change the 
balance in two areas. Firstly, capital taxation must be increased, and wage-earner 
taxation reduced. Secondly, anti-redistributive indirect taxation must be reduced, in 
favour of a potentially more progressive direct taxation system. "We will not tax more, 
but will tax better." Any room to manoeuvre will be used to reduce taxes on everyone, 
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such as V AT, rather than reducing wealth tax, as the RPR government did. 114 
The 1997 election manifesto continued in the same vein, proposing a fiscal rebalancing 
act. The PS pledged, an extension of the CSG to replace health insurance contributions, 
and the reduction of employee social contributions. V A T on essential items, it was 
claimed, would be reduced. Finally, in terms of increasing taxation on capital, the 
manifesto pledged to, "install a fairer contribution of capital to national solidarity by 
raising the level of the Solidarity Tax on Fortunes (ISF).,,115 The pamphlet Ca Change, 
documenting the early record of Jospin's administration, distributed at the Brest 
conference, suggests progress is being made. It charts an increase in taxation on firms. 
As Pierre Guidoni, national secretary for international relations notes, "Lionel Jospin 
taxed the non re-invested profits of the biggest firms, and it provoked no protest, even 
from those firms concerned. Simply, it was a different political and ideological 
choice.,,116 A recurrent theme on corporate taxation has been sparing small and medium-
sized firms an increased tax burden in general, and tax disincentives to hire in particular. 
This has resulted in the substantial reduction in professional tax (see chapter 7). The 
rational according to Claude Estier, leader of the Socialists in the Senate, is to; 
"spare these firms, precisely so as not to paralyse them in terms of job creation. 
However, at the same time, when we have budgetary difficulties, a certain number 
of big firms make considerable profits. Thus there is still a necessity to take the 
money where we find it!,,117 
Ca Change highlights new taxation on certain financial profits,118 and the fact that 
health contributions have been shifted under the auspices of the CSG, meaning that 
contributions are now drawn from financial and capital revenues, as well as salaries. 
The 1997 budget was modified in the wake of the change of government, and "the 
spending levels frozen by the Juppe government were redeployed to finance new 
spending ... supplementary taxes, in particular on firms, were put into effect ... [overall, 
however] not wishing to interrupt the up-turn, the state's budgetary policy in 1998 was 
next-to neutral."(OFCE 1999 : 17) In 1998, part of the receipts from the increased 
growth went into reducing public deficit, whilst part went into active expenditure. Given 
114 L 'Hebda des Socialistes 20/12/96 p23 
115 PS Changeons d'Avenir : Nos engagements pour /a France election manifesto 1997 pp6-7 
116 Interview with Pierre Guidoni 24//9/97 
117 Interview with Claude Estier 19/9/97 
118 Prinicpally the 15% tax on non-reinvested profits of large firms justified in terms of the need to meet 
the Maastrich criteria. 
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some redistributive measures in the 1999 budget, for example the increase in the ISF, 
the overall package is slightly less restrictive than in 1998.(OFCE 1999 : 19 & 63) 
According to Fitoussi, however, the Jospin government, for all its good intentions, is 
condemned to behave as its predecessor did; 
"Budgetary 'regularisation' is the primary budgetary objective, when it should be 
growth and jobs. Thus there is an inversion in the objectives of economic policy, 
which correspond to government practice. But, today, let us say that the policy is 
much more begrudgingly applied than was the case in the past." 1 19 
It may be very well always looking for the room to manoeuvre, but the search may not 
be very rewarding. 
On balance, despite the acceptance of a need for stability, there is a greater insistence on 
the enduring possibility of fiscal activism than neo-liberal interpretations of the policy 
implications of globalisation choose to concede. One reason why 'external' constraints 
are not particularly pressing on French fiscal reform is identified by Le Garrec; 
"the room to manoeuvre is in part linked to the state of the French fiscal system. 
Certain fiscal instruments are completely outdated, not least the whole local 
taxation system. Thus there is a lot that can be done, without coming up against 
'external' constraints, which can nevertheless affect the dynamism of the French 
economy.") 20 
At a deeper level, however, there is a rejection of global theorists assumptions about the 
realms of the possible. As Vasseur notes; 
"we recognise that a certain room to manoeuvre exists. Firstly, because economic 
actors are not all that mobile. That is why the government did not hesitate in 
increasing taxation on savings. Although the somewhat crude analysis usually 
offered of the functioning of financial markets says that we can do nothing in the 
face of them, and we are obliged to align ourselves with the lowest international 
level of taxation, and if we do not, capital will flee overseas. We can see that this 
is greatly exaggerated.,,121 
The Problems of European-level Co-ordination 
Realisme de Gauche involves a profound re-evaluation of the nature of French 
economic sovereignty. In the new international economic context, and given the 
119 Interview with Jean-Paul Fitoussi 13/12/97 
120 Interview with Jean Le Garrec 16/12/97 
121 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17/12/97 
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advancing process of European integration, it is increasingly at that level that macro-
economic policy must be pursued. For this reason, the basis on which the Euro is 
established is of fundamental importance to the shaping of macro-economic policy in 
the years ahead. Yet this basis can only be elaborated in a co-ordinated manner, with, at 
the very least, the 11 countries seeking to enter the Euro in the first phase. This fact 
makes the establishment of a consensus over the basis of the Euro inherently 
problematic. Whilst the PS has in recent years sought to question the dominant 
economic orthodoxy, a parallel exercise has not necessarily taken place in the other 
countries. The Stability Pact of the Dublin summit, for example, demonstrated 
considerably less enthusiasm for measures to encourage growth or Keynesian-style job 
creation schemes. The process of co-ordination is thus extremely difficult. PS talk of 
'co-ordination' is a euphemism for 'persuading our partners to follow our example.' If 
and when France's European partners fail to comply, French economic strategy is 
placed under considerable strain - a strain exaggerated by intra-party divisions over the 
approach to the appropriate direction of the process of European construction.{see 
chapter 5) 
The tensions were most clearly demonstrated at the PES meeting in Malmo, where Blair 
scolded the likes of Jospin, telling European socialists to, "modernise or die!"(Blair 
1997) On the agenda was the Employment Chapter (including a commitment to full 
employment) which the Swedish social democratic government, building on work done 
by Elisabeth Ouigou for the PES, proposed to add to the Treaty of European Union at 
the IOC of 1996-1997 (see Lightfoot, 1997) The Employment Chapter proposed annual 
employment policy guidelines for member states, and a permanent employment 
committee, on a par with the monetary committee, thus creating, "institutional pressures 
within the EU to move it towards more radical goals on employment 
creation."{Lightfoot 1997, 111) 
Despite extensive preparations, which had heen under way for over a year,122 European 
social democratic co-ordination could not overcome the obstacle presented by the 
differing outlooks on the appropriate future direction of European job creation policies. 
A hi-partite declaration by the PS and Lafontaine's SPD, concerning the EU's role in 
122 see Ladrech 1998 ; Lightfoot & Wilde 1996 
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job creation, did emerge from Malmo. However, its message was a far cry from Blair's 
insistence upon flexibility, and less rigid, 'anglo-saxon' labour market institutions. At 
the Amsterdam summit in June 1997, Jospin's wishes to endorse the Employment 
Chapter and advance towards a 'social Europe' sharpened the division. In the build up 
to the summit, Jospin and Strauss-Kahn threatened not to endorse the Stability 
Pact.(Ladrech 1998 : 7) This, combined with Moscovici's talk of a possible rupture, led 
to expectations within the party of drastic steps being taken to ensure the fulfillment of 
Jospin's criteria. Many, particularly on the Left, eagerly anticipated a strategy of 
provoking a crisis in order to effect a drastic re-orientation. However, faced with an 
intransigent Blair, and an Anglo/German axis, Jospin was forced to back down in his 
bid to reorientate European construction, settling for a renaming of the stability pact 
(now the 'Growth and stability pacf), and a somewhat cosmetic jobs summit, which 
fell far short of the original Swedish proposals, let alone the Delors white paper. 
"Our big disappointment since last June has been Europe. On the Euro, we 
imposed some conditions, and we are relatively satisfied, including Jospin. After 
Amsterdam, however, I was not very happy. Jospin took me aside and said, "I 
know what you think, but I was at Malmo - and I was all alone! I was set upon by 
Blair - he is more right-wing than M. Kohl. What am I supposed to do all alone, 
I'm not going to fight a lone battle.,,123 
Yet with more recent electoral victories for governments of the Left in Germany and 
Italy, Jospin has begun to look less isolated in Europe. In October 1998, at the EU 
leaders meeting at Portschach, Austria, Jospin revived plans for, "a multibillion-pound 
programme to kick-start continental economies" in the wake of the single currency. The 
plans, of German as well as French origin, (Schroder himself called for a 'European jobs 
pact') advocated interest rate cuts to foster growth, large-scale public investment in 
infrastructural programmes to boost demand and reduce unemployment, as well as an 
agenda combatting unfair tax competition, setting minimum social standards across the 
EU and co-ordinating economic policies - i.e. the bulk of Jospin's Amsterdam agenda. 
What had changed was the replacement of the BlairlKohl axis with an emergent Franco-
German axis between Lafontaine and Strauss-Kahn's joint statement calling for re-
regulation of the international financial system, and for a European-level policy for 
employment and growth. 124 The pivotal role of France and Germany within the Euro 
123 Interview with Henri Emmanuelli 10/12/97 
124 Liberation 23/10/98 
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project, and the enthusiastic response of the Swedish, Portuguese, and new Italian 
governments, made the prospects for active employment-oriented policies, appear 
considerably less dire. 
Conclusion 
The competitive disinflation strategy, it is accepted by most commentators, as well as 
by key PS actors, was appropriate and necessary in the 1980s. However, the unease with 
the neo-liberal theory underpinning the strategy, and its failure to reduce unemployment 
grew in the 1990s. With the changing international economic context, particularly after 
German re-unification, doubts about the strategy's worth increased. In the wake of the 
1993 defeat and BenSgovoy's suicide, implicit unease translated into explicit auto-
critique. The process ofre-evaluation began to cohere, around Jospin's presidential bid, 
into a modified economic strategy - Realisme de Gauche. The new strategy was 
predicated on an analysis of a crisis of under consumption, requiring demand stimulus. 
The slightly neo-Keynesian feel to the approach betrays the different ideological 
assumptions which underpin it. 
The realism element involves taking account of the realities of the new economIC 
context. Perhaps the clearest example of the shift necessitated by such realism is in the 
approach to privatisation, where despite pledges to the contrary in the 1997 legislative 
election manifesto, the Jospin government has in fact overseen more privatisations than 
its right-wing predecessors. Another area where 'realism' has been demonstrated is in 
the field of macro policy. The PS's integration of the implications of international 
economic developments into its economic strategy has led to a realisation that 
reformism in one country cannot proceed very far. Stability, it is accepted, is a desirable 
goal of macro-policy, and budgetary policy under the Jospin Government has been 
fairly orthodox. 
However, the existence of room to manoeuvre is the philosophical foundation of 
Realisme de Gauche, and thus precise location of the limits of the possible is contested. 
To this end, Moscovici problematises the concept of 'credibility' with financial markets, 
seeking to explore its limits. Certain parameters for action, such as a commitment to 
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monetary stability, are accepted, but the wider ideological baggage of economic 
orthodoxy, heavily influenced as it is by neo-liberalism, is challenged. The Realisme de 
Gauche of the PS seeks to counter dominant economic orthodoxy in relation to the 
policy implications of globalisation in areas other than monetary stability. A degree of 
domestic volontarisme thus remains, leading to a series of structural reforms aimed at 
combatting unemployment, principally youth employment plan and the 35 hour week 
re-orientations. There are also reorientations in areas such as fiscal policy. Such 
departures from neo-liberal orthodoxy leads us to question the pessimistic reading of 
globalisation's implications for social democracy. Gray misconceives social democracy 
and prematurely discounts its capacity for renewal. Our study suggests that, whilst the 
constraints highlighted by 'hyperglobal' pessimists are indeed powerful, nevertheless, 
globalisation does not preclude social democratic policy activism. 
That said, a fundamental premise of Realisme de Gauche, and the culmination of a 
journey begun in 1983, is an understanding of the effects of globalisation on French 
economic sovereignty. There is an acceptance of the need for an internationally co-
ordinated approach as the only viable long term option. This is true of 'structural' 
reforms such as the 35 hour week, but it is all the more prescient for macro-economic 
policy. Given the accepted importance of the wider international context to the health of 
the French economy, and with the advancing process of European integration, it is 
increasingly at that level that macro-economic policy must be considered. Indeed, 
international co-ordination is a sine qua non of any activist policy. A thorough-going 
policy to tackle unemployment at the national level, it is accepted, is no longer 
appropriate. For all the insistence of Realisme de Gauche on exploring the options of 
domestic volontarisme, the PS places great emphasis on the need to re-orientate the 
process of European construction in order to expand 'room to manoeuvre'. 
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Chapter 7 
Comparative Political Economy: The Parti Socialiste and New Labour 
This thesis has so far sought to counter the argument that globalisation consigns social 
democracy to the rubbish bin of history using the example of the French PS. In this 
chapter, we will broaden the scope of our argument through a comparative study of the 
economic strategies of the PS and New Labour.) Clearly, consistent with our framework 
for the analysis of social democracy outlined in chapter one, a full understanding of 
New Labour requires in-depth analysis of the interaction with its institutional context, 
the changes in its internal organisation, the development of its electoral strategy. Space 
prevents this 'holistic' approach within the confines of this thesis, and instead here we 
concentrate primarily on New Labour's economic strategy. We argue that, despite 
considerable ideologieal and substantive differences, both Realisme de Gauche and New 
Labour's Third Way offer potentially viable, and - albeit to different degrees -
recognisably social democratic economic strategies compatible with a world 
characterised by globalisation. 
Sassoon argues that, "the unifying force of globalisation" (1998) has affected most 
parties of the West European Left in similar ways. This has led to speculation about 
convergence within European social democracy. Indeed, the path of development taken 
by the Labour Party under Kinnock and then Smith involved explicit, often enthusiastic 
self-classification within the continental social democratic tradition. It is no longer so 
apparent that, since the change of tack the party has taken under Blair, the trajectories of 
New Labour and continental social democracy run parallel. Whilst we concur with 
Sassoon that, "the Labour Party is now far closer to mainstream European social 
democracy than at any previous time in its history ,"{ 1998 : 93) one should be careful 
not to infer from this observation a convergence upon one 'model'. The degree of 
similarity across the West European Left is unprecedented, but it can be over-stated. 
Whilst broad similarities are discernible in the pressures felt by the parties in recent 
years, in terms of their responses, the picture is less clear-cut. Consistent with our 
understanding of social democracy, we challenge the inexorable convergence thesis, 
I See methodological appendix for further discussion of the choice of cases. 
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which is based on a dubious reading of the relationship between social democracy and 
globalisation. 
The two social democratic approaches considered here are distinctive. Before 
considering the trajectories of New Labour and the PS, we will reiterate our conception 
of 'globalisation', and how to understand Left parties responses to it. We will also 
reiterate our conception of social democracy, to point out the pitfalls of the 'doomed to 
decline' thesis. We will then outline New Labour's Third Way, and give some 
indication as to its similarities and differences from Realisme de Gauche. The 
differences, we argue, arise from differing conceptions of the limits of the possible, and 
different identifications of the core values of social democracy. The tension between the 
Third Way and Realisme de Gauche will be examined on two levels. At a fundamental 
ideological level, we may conceptualise the debate between New Labour and the PS as 
one about the implications of globalisation for social democracy regarding the level of 
commitment to egalitarianism (and in turn redistribution), and the role of state in the 
economy. At the policy level, we will examine the implications of differing ideological 
conceptions in a range of policy areas. 
Globalisation 
In analysing the relationship between globalisation and social democracy, it is important 
to appreciate that globalisation does not simply 'happen upon' nation states, or social 
democratic parties within them. Therefore globalisation does not, in any straightforward 
manner, 'impose' financial discipline or neo-liberal policy agendas on social democratic 
governments. Such a view ignores how the influence of the processes of globalisation is 
mediated by domestic institutions, and the actors working within them. As we argued in 
chapter 6, understanding the differential nature of globalisation' s consequences is an 
essential precondition to a deeper understanding of the relationship between 
globalisation and social democracy. 
The effects of economic globalisation are mediated (and indeed contested) by states, and 
by the 'cognitive framework' of actors within them. How globalisation is understood by 
policy elites crucially conditions responses to it. Furthermore, how domestic policy 
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elites articulate policy responses is conditioned by domestic institutional context and 
ideological traditions. We cannot, therefore, expect a particularly high degree of 
convergence, since the domestic institutional and ideological contexts with which 
pressures for convergence interact vary greatly. 
The debates outlined earlier between 'hyperglobalists' and globalisation sceptics thus 
plays an important role in our argument, since they reflect the interpretations of 
globalisation within policy elites, and in turn inform responses to it.2 For example, 
elements of Blair's discourse reflects an acceptance of the hyperglobal account. The PS 
seems more akin to Vandenbroucke in seeing considerable scope for egalitarian policy 
activism despite globalisation. 
Social Democracy 
It is crucial to an adequate understanding of the relationship between globalisation and 
social democracy that social democracy is correctly conceived. Social democracy is a 
"contingent historical phenomenon," (przeworski 1985) and must be related to its 
national institutional context. Factors such as the nature of party competition within the 
national party system, the socio-economic structure of society, and the relative openness 
and competitiveness of the economy, heavily influence the nature of each national social 
democratic 'project.' Each socialist or social democratic party developed within a 
specific liberal polity and capitalist society, wedded to a nation-state. The national 
setting provides a set of laboratory conditions in which social democracy sought to 
deliver egalitarian commitments through full employment and extensive welfare states. 
Padgett & Paterson identify the principle elements of social democracy as, "a hybrid 
political tradition composed of socialism and liberalism ... inspired by socialist ideals 
but heavily conditioned by its political environment and incorporating liberal values. 
The social democratic project may be defined as the attempt to reconcile socialism with 
liberal politics and capitalist society." (Padgett & Paterson 1991 : 1) Crosland identified 
the key elements of post-war social democracy as political liberalism, the mixed 
economy, the welfare state, Keynesian economics securing full employment, and a 
2 As we shall see, the use of such interpretations to justify approaches is not necessarily consistent across 
policy areas. 
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belief in equality.( 1956) 
Yet as we argued in chapter I, this was but one "strategic amalgam"(Pierson 1995) 
through which to pursue the politics of social democracy. That this approach, developed 
50 years ago, no longer retains the same relevance should not surprise us. Nor should it 
lead us to write off social democracy as a spent force. Rather, the changed international 
economic and domestic political context requires us to look how social democratic goals 
are pursued today, and seek to trace the outline of a new 'strategic amalgam' - or 
amalgams. Just as, in its Golden Age, social democracy was never uniform, 
encompassing varying emphases on different aspects of the economic and political 
'model', so now we should expect wide variation. 
Redistribution of wealth, (full) employment, equality of opportunity- these remain the 
'ends' of social democracy. We will now examine the economic strategies of New 
Labour and the PS in an attempt to identify the 'means' of social democracy in a world 
characterised by globalisation. Given its centrality to the social democratic project, 
employment and job creation will be our main focus. The areas of macroeconomic 
policy, job creation and employment policy, labour market policy, the approach to 
supra-national (EU) policy activism, and the appropriate level at which the minimum 
welfare standards 'ceiling' should be set will all be explored in an attempt to establish 
the similarities and differences between New Labour's 'Third Way' and Realisme de 
Gauche. 
New Labour's Third Way 
In attempting to flesh out the bones of New Labour's Third Way discourse, we may 
place the Third Way between neo-liberalism on one hand, and the modernised, 
circumspect European social democracy espoused in the British context by, say, 
Hattersley or Hutton, on the other. A core feature of the Third Way discourse has been 
an attempt to distance New Labour from some of the traditional institutional features of 
social democracy, such as 'neo-corporatist' centralised wage bargaining and approaches 
to policy-making, and high marginal rates of taxation. In more abstract terms, the Third 
Way claims to offer a distinctive 'model' of capitalist development, distinguishable both 
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from the 'European' and 'Anglo-Saxon' models of capitalism, reconciling, "a neo-
liberal emphasis on economic efficiency and dynamism with a traditional left concern 
for equity and social cohesion."{White 1998 : 17) 
According to Blair's understanding of the state's role in the economy; 
"governments can best improve economic performance by addressing supply side 
weakness ..... education, skills, technology, better infrastructure and transport 
systems are the key; not over-regulation and burden on business.... Subject to 
basic minimum standards of fairness in place, the best way for governments to 
provide job security is through education and an employment service that helps 
people to new jobs and re-training throughout their working lives."(1998a) 
Influenced by the writings of Robert Reich, and 'New Growth' theorists such as Paul 
Romer, emphasis is placed on tackling short-termism and market failures, and 
encouraging investment in 'human capital', in innovation and in skills, as well as 
infrastructure. As Brown put it in 1996; 
"access to knowledge is becoming more important than access to capital. The 
education and quality of the workforce is thus fast becoming the key determinant 
of economic success ... it is the quality, skills, motivation and team work of people 
applied to the new technologies which are the key to international 
. . ,,3 
competitiveness. 
The upshot of this perceived shift to a 'knowledge-based economy' is, "a more 
sophisticated role for governments: in tax policy, competition policy, corporate 
governance, support for small business, regional development agencies and education 
and training."{Balls 1998, 116) This outlook informs a core concept to the Third Way, 
"asset-based egalitarianism" .(White 1998a & b) Succinctly put, more egalitarian market 
outcomes can only be secured if endowments of assets are more equal. Education and 
training are seen as the most important asset, and the government sees its role as 
securing a "shift in the background distribution of these assets in a more egalitarian 
direction" (White, 1998b). Widening access to education and training, it is argued, also 
helps reduce income inequalities. 
The New Labour Government's economic objectives of growth, fairness, and jobs are 
pursued by ensuring minimum standards affecting conditions of work, terms of 
3 Gordon Brown's speech to the Friedrich Ebert Foundation New Labour, Europe and EMU: The Road 10 
a People's Europe 7/5/96 
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employment, and minimum wages. These standards are justified in efficiency terms, 
"efficiency became a word that Labour tried to grab back from the Tories, while the 
language of social cohesion was now framed in the words of fairness rather than 
equality."(Corry, 1997 : 188-189) Since the beggar-thy-neighbour low wage path is 
supposedly ruled out by the regulatory framework, firms are pressured into adopting 
quality-based strategies in order to remain internationally competitive. (White 1998a & 
b) Within this 'skill-centred growth path', however, a certain 'ceiling' in minimum 
terms of pay and conditions is accepted, beyond which profitability would be damaged, 
harming employment levels. 
In seeking to establish how thorough-going the egalitarian commitment is, and where 
the minimum standards 'ceiling' is to be found, some commentators have sought to 
distinguish between a 'radical centre' and a 'new centre-left' within the Third Way 
broad church.(Lawson 1998, Holtham 1998,White 1998) The fault lines are to be drawn 
over the nature of the (shared) commitment to 'opportunity'. Whereas the 'radical 
centre' frames this commitment in purely meritocratic terms of the need to combat 
social exclusion, the 'new centre-left' see the goal in more egalitarian terms - the need 
for greater economic equality. Whilst the latter maintain a robust commitment to 
equality - with concomitant policy implications in areas such as redistribution and 
taxation, the former, confining themselves to the terms inclusion/exclusion, may be less 
inclined to activism in these areas. 
This distinction engenders differences within the Third Way over the appropriate role 
and scope of redistribution, and over the location of the 'ceiling' of minimum standards. 
Whilst 'radical centrists' may be content with such indirect egalitarian measures, the 
'new centre-left' continues to insist that, "while asset-based egalitarianism may reduce 
the need for 'old-fashioned' redistribution, it will by no means eliminate it. 
Redistribution of earnings must remain a central component of social democratic 
strategy. "(White 1998b : 3; see also Hutton : 1998) Reich, for example, argues, "good 
education, training, health care, and public infrastructure - available to all ... will be 
costly .. Thus a central question concerns the extent to which America's fortunate 
citizens .. are willing to bear these burdens." (1991, 250) He recently called upon Blair 
and Clinton to demonstrate the 'courage' to make the better-off pay more to secure a 
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robust Third Way programme. (1998) However, as Vandenbroucke points out, the New 
Labour government, "lacks an explicit conception of distributive fairness." (1998, 63) 
This opens up the possibility of different approaches to the Third Way within New 
Labour. Blair and Mandelson, for example, can fairly safely be categorised as 'radical 
centrists', whereas Brown may be more accurately pigeon-holed within the 'new centre-
left.' Differences of approach to some policy areas studied may be traceable to this 
distinction. However, the only evidence of such differences of approach unearthed in 
this study is in the area of Brown's constrained fiscal activism, yet even here -
redistribution was targeted only at certain groups, principally the working poor (see 
later). 
The Third Way and Realisme de Gauche 
Although the concept remains nebulous and ill-defined, it may not be too difficult to 
identify the source of the tension between the Third Way and Realisme de Gauche. Blair 
himself seems unclear about the relationship of the Third Way to social democracy. 
Having stated early in 1998 that, "not just socialism but social democracy practised in 
most of Europe is past its sell-by date,,4 he has more recently offered an olive branch to 
social democrats, asserting, "the Third Way stands for a modernised social 
democracy."(Blair 1998c, 1) 
A recurrent theme in the talk of the modernisation of the Labour Party is the insistence 
that the core values of the party remain unchanged; 
"My conviction is that we have to be absolute in our adherence to our basic 
values, otherwise we have no compass to guide us through change. But we should 
be infinitely adaptable and imaginative in the means of applying those values ... 
These values [are]: solidarity, justice, freedom, tolerance and equal opportunity 
for all, the belief in a strong community and society as the necessary means of 
individual advancement." (Blair 1998b) 
However, some would argue that this list underlines a very significant change at the 
level of core values from European social democratic traditions. A clear point of 
departure from traditional notions of social democracy is the absence of any explicit 
4 Tony Blair interviewed in the European, 19 January 1998 
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reference to equality. One British academic at the heart of the Third Way debate argues 
that the Third Way is a departure from social democracy. "Unlike social democracy, it is 
not egalitarian. There is undoubtedly a commitment to social justice; but it is the kind of 
social justice that relies on ensuring minimum standards and equality of opportunity 
rather than on redistribution and equality of outcome." (Le Grand 1998, 27) Others have 
picked up on this aspect of the Third Way, "New Labour," argue Gamble and Kelly, "is 
seeking to develop its own distinctive political economy which is not rooted in the 
labour movement, aligned to a particular theory of macro economic management or 
instinctively redistributionist."(2000) Blair's explicit rejection of government action 
justified 'in the name of abstract equality,' and the exclusive focus on 'opportunity' 
rather than 'outcome' set a Blairite 'Third Way' vision apart from the Realisme de 
Gauche of the PS, which retains an explicit commitment to equality and redistribution. 
The Third Way also involves a break with the economic paradigm which has 
underpinned social democracy in the post-war era. "In today's deregulated, liberalised 
financial markets," argues Gordon Brown, "the Keynesian fine tuning of the past which 
worked in relatively sheltered, closed national economies and which tried to exploit a 
supposed long-term trade-off between inflation and unemployment, will simply not 
work."(Brown 1998) As Corry charts, as recently as 1987, the Labour Party's 
macroeconomic stance remained heavily influenced by Keynesianism. However, the 
backlash against Keynesianism, with New Classical Macroeconomics in the vanguard, 
undermined both the Keynesian paradigm, and the Labour Party's commitment to it. 
"By 1992, the policy had shifted markedly, and a new philosophy took over." The 
importance of the 'rational expectations' of the private sector, on which the New 
Classical school so insisted, suggested "trying to solve everything with demand policies 
was a mistake." (1997 : 188) 
Another aspect of the changing philosophical foundations of Brown et aI's economic 
thought is a different conception of the role of the state in economic strategy. The 
development of the concept of the 'enabling' state, coupled with an increasingly 
enthusiastic embrace of the role of market forces, and the need to accommodate the 
interests of the private sector have been features of New Labour's development. There 
ensued a reduction in the scale and scope of 'market failures' or 'externalities' which a 
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Labour government would intervene to correct, and a shift in emphasis to the supply-
side of the economy, centring on education and training, and research and development. 
New Labour's Third Way, at least in its Blairite articulation, has at its heart an 
understanding of governing the economy as efficient management and competent 
administration - 'what counts is what works' - largely abstracted from any ideological 
disagreements about how the economy works, or even what the priorities of economic 
policy should be. New Labour operates firmly within a new 'post-monetarist' consensus 
over economic policy (see later), and it is to this that Blair refers when he argues. "the 
Left can only be successful if it demonstrates economic competence."( 1998c : 9) This 
bears considerable resemblance to the approach to economic policy of the PS in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, now associated with the late Pierre Beregovoy. However, as we 
saw in chapter 6, there has been a self-conscious attempt by the PS, since 1993, to break 
with the idea of governing the economy as a question of efficient technocratic 
management. The PS is keen to affirm its distinctive understanding of how the economy 
works, a view still broadly influenced by some (though by no means all) Keynesian 
ideas. 
Blair's 'New Economics's Globalisation and the Third Way 
Third Way economic policy is framed within New Labour discourse in terms of a 
response to globalisation. The outlining of policy is put into the context of 'a new global 
economy', shorthand for a particular reading of changes in the international economic 
context in the last 30 years. On this reading, changes in international economic context 
'mean' that; 
"we must be the enablers of enterprise, equipping our people and business to make 
the most of their talent and ability ... the role of government has changed: today it 
is to give people the education, skills, and technical know-how they need to let 
their own enterprise and talent flourish in the new market-place."(Blair 1997) 
This interpretation of globalisation and its implications has been a feature of the Party's 
economic outlook since Blair became leader. Labour's 1994 policy document 
Rebuilding the Economy placed Labour's economic strategy in the context of the "new 
S The phrase is taken from Blair's Malmo speech, 6/6/97 
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global economy", with its global markets, and its 'knowledge revolution', a "world of 
modern added-value products, of technologically-driven innovations, precision working 
and persistent change ... [with] a premium on the skills of the workforce with the new 
knowledge-intensive industries demanding new highly-skilled labour forces." 6 
Blair's 1995 Mais lecture set out 'the economic framework' of a future New Labour 
government. The premise is that "the new world market ... demands a new economics." 
In terms of macro-policy, this involves accepting that; 
"the UK is situated in the middle of an active global market for capital - a market 
which is less subject to regulation today than for several decades. An 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policy that is at odds with other economies in 
Europe will not be sustainable for very long. To that extent the room for 
manoeuvre of any government in Britain is already heavily circumscribed.,,7 
In Labour's New Approaches: The Economy(l995), Reich's analysis is quoted 
approvingly in outlining the globalisation of industry and finance,( 1995 : 15) referred to 
by Brown as "the global sourcing of companies."g The daily transfer of $1,000 bn a day 
on international markets, as cited in New Labour: New Life For Britain in 1996, is 
routinely used in New Labour economic policy documents to support the case that New 
Labour's emphasis on supply-side measures to improve skills and education is the only 
option available.9 However, this understanding of the changes to industry and finance, 
as the quoting of Reich indicates, is heavily reliant on a 'hyperglobalist' reading of 
globalisation, and therefore oversimplifies both the process itself and possible responses 
to it.(See chapter 6) 
As Held notes, "New Labour's globalisation policy package suggests that globalisation 
is a fixed force which has in general to be adapted to. Leadership in these circumstances 
tends to be a matter not of setting targets, but of providing paths of adjustment. "(Held 
1998 : 27) A more adequate understanding involves conceiving of globalisation as a 
multi-layered phenomenon which interacts with domestic institutional settings and is 
contested and mediated by states and state actors. Once such elements of interaction and 
agency are introduced to the analysis, the hyperglobalist view of globalisation 
6 Rebuilding the Economy (London, Labour Party, 1994), p.13. 
7 Tony Blair, Mais Lecture 22/5/95 
8 Friedrich Ebert foundation speech 7/5/96. 
9 It most recently surfaced in Blair's speech to the Party conference at Boumemouth, 28/9/99 
271 
'impacting upon' states rather breaks down. Some critics point to the somewhat 
disingenuous and rhetorical nature of this use of globalisation. It is employed, some 
argue, as a justification for what New Labour says and does, without necessarily 
establishing the causal connections within the argument, and as such often 'renders the 
contingent necessary'. (Hay 1999) Held identifies, "a tendency to restrict the meaning of 
political prudence to the pursuit of a particular economic logic."( 1998 : 25) 
Whilst no commentators dispute that radical changes in economic context have 
occurred, a vibrant debate rages over the implications of the changes, and the strategic 
options open to social democratic governments in the wake of them. (Hirst & Thompson 
1996, Vandenbroucke 1998, Held et al 1999) The analysis of globalisation, or more 
precisely the understanding of the implications of globalisation for social democratic 
political strategy, upon which Jospin's programme is predicated differs significantly 
from New Labour's approach. The 'hyper-globalism' of Blair, which draws on Giddens 
in his more hyperbolic moments, involves taking as 'given' the nature and advancement 
of globalisation - leaving adaptation to such secular changes in the global economy 
(Blair's 'New Economics') as the only option. Realisme de Gauche, suggests that, 
whilst the constraints highlighted by 'hyperglobal' pessimists are indeed powerful, 
globalisation is a contested process with which social democratic governments must 
critically engage. As such, the PS's understanding of globalisation is closer to 
Vandenbroucke than Giddens. 
The French PS is anxious to plot a course avoiding the policy solutions advocated by 
neo-liberal orthodoxy on the assumption that 'there is no alternative.' By exerting 
'political will' in opposition to the fatalism of 'laisser faire', and conceiving of 
globalisation not as ineluctable but contested the PS argues that a significant degree of 
voluntarism remains possible, despite constraining global forces.(see chapter 6) We 
will now explore how these different conceptions of the appropriate responses to 
globalisation feed through into different policy prescriptions. As indicated above, the 
picture is a varied one, with different degrees of similarity and difference across policy 
areas. 
Proposals for International Financial Re-Regulation 
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A long-held concern of many social democrats, reinforced by the recent global financial 
turmoil triggered first by the Asian crisis in 1997, but later by the Russian default in 
1998 and the collapse of the immense US 'hedge fund' Long-Term Financial 
Management, is that the excesses of 'freewheeling', 'footloose' capital should be curbed 
through some attempt to re-regulate global financial exchanges. In its strong form ,this 
desire finds expression in the 'Tobin Tax' on speculative activity. More modest and 
more practicable suggestions were articulated in the statement submitted by the PS to 
their European partners aiming to, "redesign the architecture of the international 
financial system in order to improve effectiveness and transparency ... [and] provide for 
prudential regulation in the banking sector, making multilateral institutions and the 
private sector aware of its responsibilities. "(Jospin in The Guardian 16111/99) 
Gordon Brown, in his role, taken on in the wake of the financial turmoil, as Chairman of 
the IMF, has advanced a particular conception of this programme. As he observed in his 
1999 Mais lecture; 
"In Washington last month, the IMF agreed a new framework of codes and 
standards, new economic disciplines for openness and transparency to be 
accepted and implemented by all countries which participate in the international 
financial system. These codes and standards - including fiscal, financial and 
monetary policy - will require that countries set out clear long term objectives, put 
in place proper procedures, and promote the openness and transparency necessary 
to keep markets informed.")O 
Held contests that such re-regulatory plans remain, "consistent with neo-liberal 
consensus."(1998) Yet even this fairly minimal, 'neo-liberal' programme is problematic. 
Financial deregulation cannot easily be reversed. Despite Hirst & Thompson's 
speculation about a shift back to reregulation,( 1996) there is little progress in that 
direction. The problem is that any new regulatory framework must be global in its 
ambit, and therefore can only be established if collective action conditions obtain 
amongst an extremely large and diverse group of actors. Thus even though the PS and 
New Labour, along with many other European Social Democrats, hold broadly similar 
views on the desirability of some reregulation, the prospects for anything other than 
minimal changes are meagre. 
10 Gordon Brown, Mais Lecture 19/10/99. 
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Macroeconomic Policy Stance 
New Labour's principles of macroeconomic policy making, Balls argues, "flow 
logically from the changes in the world economy and the world of economic ideas over 
the past twenty to thirty years."(Balls 1998 : 117) As outlined above, one of the 
ramifications of this changed context within the Labour Party has been the virtual 
abandonment of a Keynesian framework for thinking about macro policy. However, this 
does not necessarily entail a wholesale embrace of monetarism, as some critics infer. 
(Arestis & Sawyer, 1998; Hay 1999) The relationship to New Right political economy 
is, as we saw in chapter 6, at times misconceived. Balls frames the principle of "stability 
through constrained discretion" within what he calls, "the pro-stability but post-
monetarist intellectual consensus upon which modem macroeconomic policy-making is 
based."( 1998 : 117) This accepts the absence of long-run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment, but does not involve a commitment to all the assumptions of the rational 
expectations hypothesis. It does not commit governments to anti-inflationary myopia 
characteristic of some monetarist thinking. As Balls insists, "achieving stability requires 
the discretionary ability for macroeconomic policy to respond flexibly to different 
economic shocks - constrained of course, by the need to meet the inflation target over 
time."(1998 : 120) 
It is important to draw distinctions between different elements of economic policy 
packages, and recall that whilst certain aspects may be closely linked to neo-liberal 
policy agendas, others are perfectly compatible with social democratic ones. The 
credibility demanded by financial markets does have ideological dimensions, reflecting 
a broadly neo-liberal view of economic activity, but it is also a reflection of changed 
economic realities. The 1997 Labour Manifesto argued, "economic stability is the 
essential platform for sustained growth. In a global economy the route to growth is 
stability not inflation. "(1997 : 11 ) Yet, despite traditional left reflexes which would 
label macro-economic stability as neo-liberal, in fact, macro-economic stability is today 
as much a social democratic value. The scope of active demand macro-policy is 
circumscribed. With this changed political context comes a change in the nature of the 
social democratic project. As Gordon Brown argued in 1996; 
"inflation is the enemy of the poor and the weak. It is those on low incomes and 
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those on fixed incomes, especially pensioners and those who depend on their 
savings who suffer most if inflation rises. And it is the insecure and the 
unemployed who suffer most from the consequences of macroeconomic policy 
mistakes ... stability and consistency in the approach to the overall management of 
the economy is a pre-requisite for rising prosperity and opportunity for all."(( 
In the contemporary period, the external financial discipline imposed by financial 
globalisation means that governments have to pay close attention to their credibility 
rating with financial markets. (Eatwell 1995; Balls 1998) The key point, however, is 
that securing of credibility through stability-centric macro policy stances is compatible 
with a wide range of different priorities in other areas of economic policy. Within a 
framework of a commitment to macro-economic stability, there remains room for 
manoeuvre over the degree of 'orthodoxy', as well as a whole range of other economic 
policy tools which may be exploited to prioritise 'social democratic' goals. A 
commitment to stability does not condemn a social democratic government to budgetary 
immobilisme. 
New Labour's macroeconomIC framework alms to, "ensure stability through 
establishing the right long-term policy objectives and to build credibility in the policy 
through well-understood procedural rules that are followed for monetary and fiscal 
policy. "(Brown 1998b) Key objectives are, "price stability through a pre-announced 
inflation target and sustainable public finances through applying the golden rule, that 
over the economic cycle current spending should at least cover consumption ... 
combined with a prudent approach to public debt." (Brown 1 998b) The independence of 
the Bank of England is the institutional expression of this rules-based new system of 
monetary policy making. In terms of fiscal policy, traditional fiscal activism is 
stigmatised as "old-style tax and spend", and replaced by, "rules-based decision 
making," and "long term fiscal stability that delivers sustainable public finances." The 
means to this end are, "a fiscal stability code and a pre-announced commitment to 
prudence." This fiscal framework promises to yield "surpluses on the current budget for 
the coming three years of 7, 10 and 13 billion pounds." This surplus will be used to 
repay public debt, meeting the 5 year deficit reduction plan. The debt to GDP ratio, 
which must be "prudent and stable". In concrete terms this translates as reducing the 
ratio from the 45 per cent at which it stood when New Labour were elected to a targeted 
II The Treasury's Mission Under Labour, lecture delivered to the Manchester Business School, 29/4/96 
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38 per cent. The third rule addresses public sector net borrowing. The intention is to 
reduce it from, "over 3 per cent of GDP in the last cycle" to an "average 0.2 per cent for 
the parliament." The overall aim being to, 'lock in the fiscal tightening.' (Brown 1998b) 
"The principle of credibility through sound long-term policies"(Balls 1998) is at the 
heart of this approach. Credibility boils down to market actors believing in the 
soundness and sustainability of government policy, meaning inflation will be held 
down, and therefore assets will not depreciate in real value. It is increasingly important 
given liberalised deregulated bond and currency markets because of the increasing 
number and speed of economic decisions which hinge upon the believability or 
otherwise of government intentions. Thus, "the rapid globalisation of the world 
economy has made achieving credibility more rather than less important, particularly for 
an incoming left-of-centre govemment."(Balls 1998, 122). Credibility, "the elusive 
elixir of modem macroeconomics"(Balls 1998, 120) is, "a question of whether 
announced intentions are believed."(King 1995) This explains Labour's commitment to 
increased transparency in economic policy making and pre-commitments to 'soundness' 
through measures such as the independence of the Bank of England. 
However, all this emphasis on credibility should not blind us to an enduring role for 
discretion (or policy activism). Brown's November 1998 statement on the pre-budget 
report talked of, "a consistent long term framework for both monetary and fiscal policy -
one that has an inbuilt capacity to respond credibly to short term pressures.,,12 Social 
democratic macroeconomic policy makers have to face, "the conflict between credibility 
and discretion"(Balls 1998) - the desire to exercise discretion to pursue social 
democratic objectives, tempered by the need for government policies to be perceived as 
sound and sustainable. 
Attempts to reconcile these financial constraints to social democratic objectives within 
New Labour's policy paradigm have been made by two means. Firstly, there has been a 
reorienting of current spending commitments it inherited on entering office to prioritise 
its goals. Secondly, there have been instances of what some commentators (and indeed 
the opposition) have labelled 'fiscal activism by stealth.' The most visible example of 
12 Gordon Brown, statement on the pre-budget report. 3/\\/98. 
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fiscal activism, the windfall tax on the privati sed utilities announced in Brown's first 
budget which was earmarked to raise £5.2 bn destined to fund the New Deal (see later), 
was by no means an isolated example. 
In analysing New Labour fiscal record, it is important to distinguish between high 
profile tax cutting measures, and less visible but nevertheless fiscally significant 
increases in the tax burden. For example, the March 1998 budget cut corporation tax 
from 31 % to 30%. In March 1999, income tax fell from 23% to 22%, and a 10% income 
tax band was introduced. However, in less reported areas, the government was 
increasing its fiscal revenues. The abolition of Pension Funds Tax credits for Advance 
Corporation Tax raised significant revenue. In the 1999 budget, a number of tax 
'loopholes' or exemptions have been progressively removed, for example on married 
couples allowance and mortgage tax relief. Furthermore, national insurance 
contributions were raised on higher earners, and an energy tax was introduced. 
Thus the leeway in terms of discretion provided by the overall macro-economIC 
framework (and the position at a growth stage in the economic cycle) enabled New 
Labour to operate a partially activist fiscal policy, albeit only targeted on a few very 
specific areas, notably in helping the working poor. Existing spending was re-
prioritised, in a moderately redistributive manner, and in 1998 the comprehensive 
spending review outlined significant increases in funding for New Labour's core 
programmes, principally education (£19 bn.) and health (£20 bn.), but also favouring 
poor pensioners, transport and housing. Brown has gone so far as to confidently assert 
that he would, if necessary, borrow to cover these spending commitments. 13 What is 
more, the prospect of global downturn heralded by the financial crises of 1998 made the 
policy stance appear moderately countercyclical, betraying a faint residual Keynesian 
influence. 
In the pursuit of credibility, Labour's macro-economic policy stance resembles the PS. 
Comparison is hindered by the fact that France has joined the single currency in the first 
wave, and this hems in its macroeconomic policy.(see chapter 6) Nevertheless, within 
the problematic of the conflict between credibility and discretion, the PS have a 
13 Financial Times 23/10/98 
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different conception of how far to constrain discretion in the interest of maintaining 
credibility. The French PS seek to explore any 'room to manoeuvre' which flexible 
interpretation may allow despite the straitjacket of the convergence criteria.(Moscovici 
1997) The deficit should kept at around 3%, but, in the event of a conjunctural down-
turn, spending should not be changed even if it were to slightly overshoot the 3% 
target.(see chapter 6) The French PS also talk more freely about using macro-policy 
actively to counter a crisis of insufficient demand as part of their job creating efforts. 
(PS 1997) As such the 'post-Keynesianism' of the PS is considerably more reluctant 
than that of New Labour. As Vasseur notes; 
"the PS is 'post-Keynesian' in the sense that public spending does not playa 
central role [in the economic strategy]. I am not sure that this idea is linked to a 
philosophical analysis of the functioning of the economy. Rather, I think that the 
economic conjuncture means that the room to manoeuvre has been extra-
ordinarily reduced.,,14 
There remains within the PS, however, an attachment to certain Keynesian conceptions. 
The idea of the crisis of under-consumption, the need to redistribute to lower income 
brackets with a higher propensity to spend as a means of keeping demand buoyant, and 
explicit talk of the role of automatic stabilisers allows Vasseur to maintain, "we remain 
a bit Keynesian, and the concern for equity justifies that orientation, but on the other 
hand, we have very clearly abandoned the option of a budgetary reflation.,,15 The precise 
location of the limits of the possible is contested, as is New Labour's strict and orthodox 
reading of' sound public finance.' 
The PS, too, despite the stringent constraints imposed by the transition to a single 
currency, and the perceived pressing need for further deficit reduction, can boast some 
fiscal activism.(see chapter 6) Re-prioritising of the tax burden has been achieved, 
notably through the role of Contribution Social Generalisee - a more progressive form 
of taxation. Prioritising employment creation has been achieved through changes to 
Professional Tax (see later). Similar to New Labour, one means of fiscal activism has 
been through increasing environmental taxation - by replacing the previous fragmented 
system with a single 'eco-tax' on polluting activity. 
14 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 16/12/97 
15 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 16/12/97 
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The Solidarity Tax on Wealth (lSF) was increased in the 1998 budget, and a new band 
introduced in the 1999 budget.(OFCE 1999 : 19 & 63) Other measures advancing the 
declared aim of increased 'fiscal justice' include reductions on tax breaks on inheritance 
and life assurance, and reducing concessions for firms investing in other financial 
ventures, as well as future plans to reform V AT and habitation tax along more 
progressive lines.(Liberation 23/7/98) That said, the advances in terms of fiscal justice 
were limited. For example, the ISF increase was not imposed upon capital goods. 
(Dupin 1998 : 147) The conflicting pressure of the need for budgetary 'regularisation' 
(deficit reduction) means that even the PS's greater insistence upon 'discretion' can be 
situated within an overall concern to keep public finances 'sound' in order to preserve 
credibility . 
Macroeconomic policy, Employment and Supra-National Policy Activism 
The growth in European unemployment levels over the last 2 decades, and the widely 
accepted 'structural' character of much European unemployment, have weakened the 
resolve of many parties on the Left; 
"Significantly, no plausible programme for the restoration of full employment has 
yet been framed, from any quarter, in the nineties - as if the limits of this mode of 
production, now uncontested, preclude any chance of it." (Anderson 1994, 19) 
Commitments to full employment are today symbolic, yet so central is the idea of full 
employment to a coherent concept of social democracy that some parties refuse to 
abandon it altogether. The PS, whilst no longer promising full employment, 
nevertheless emphasise the active, interventionist role the social democratic state can 
play in reducing unemployment. This highlights a significant difference of approach 
between New Labour and the PS regarding the role of macroeconomic policy in 
promoting employment. 
Balls identifies three pillars of Labour economic policy, "delivering macroeconomic 
stability, tackling supply side barriers to growth and delivering employment and 
economic opportunities to all." (1998, 113) Underlying this evaluation is a 
compartmentalisation of economic policy. "Delivering on [growth, jobs and fairness] 
depends not simply on one policy pillar, but three ... the proper role for government in 
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economic policy making goes well beyond macroeconomic policymaking." (Balls 1998, 
115-116) Macroeconomic policy aims to provide stability, the framework within which, 
in the medium term, the fruits of 'new growth theory' may flourish. Delivering jobs, 
within New Labour's economic outlook, is a matter principally of social and labour 
market policy, not macroeconomic policy. 
For New Labour, job creation is primarily a supply-side issue, whilst on the demand 
side, macro-economic policies should focus on low and stable inflation. 16 (White 1998b) 
The PS, like some other European social democrats are unwilling to concede that 
demand activism is impossible. We have seen how, whilst realising that demand 
management in one COUfltry cannot work, the PS feel the same need not necessarily be 
true of the supra-national level, namely the EU.(chapters 5 & 6) The Delors White Paper 
of 1993 proposed internationally co-ordinated demand management policies, and a 
trans-European investment in Public Works to create 15 million new jobs by the year 
2000. This was to be financed by the introduction of new European financial 
instruments, notably European 'Union bonds', and the establishment of a European 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement. (Coates & Holland 1996, Coates 1998) The 
Euro-Keynesianism of the Delors White Paper is still today part of the French PS 
economic strategy. Yet, what is striking about New Labour's political project is how 
little resonance this conception of the EU as an economic space in which to pursue 
social democracy has within Britain. (Gamble and Kelly 2000) 
As recently as 1996, Brown was advocating, "the creation of a European Recovery 
Fund that is unashamedly contra-cyclical, permanent and able to draw on the credit 
worthiness of European institutions, able to invest not in infrastructure but in 
employment projects in a recession, and able to run in surplus in a boom.,,17 However, it 
would appear that New Labour abandoned this position some time before taking office. 
The fate of the Employment Chapter (including a commitment to full employment) 
which the Swedish social democratic government, in September 1995, proposed to add 
16 It is a mistake to infer from this that New Labour's macro-economic outlook 'rules out' Keynesian 
policies. As Corry points out, in certain circumstances, such as a recession, when unemployment falls 
well below the NAIRU; "in this case macro-policy can undoubtedly be very effective and should be used 
boldly." (1997 : 191) However, despite this theoretical possibility, there is in practice little or no prospect 
of New Labour actively entertaining the possibility of such 'bold' Keynesianism. 
17 Friedrich Ebert foundation speech 7/5/96. 
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to the Treaty of European Union at the IGC of 1996-1997 (see Lightfoot: 1997) 
illustrates New Labour's newly found scepticism. The Employment Chapter proposed 
annual employment policy guidelines for member states, and a permanent employment 
committee, on a par with the monetary committee, thus establishing, "institutional 
pressures within the EU to move it towards more radical goals on employment 
creation. "(Lightfoot 1997 : 111) 
The battle lines were drawn up at the PES meeting in Malmo, where Blair scolded the 
likes of Jospin, telling European socialists to, "modernise or die!"(Blair 1997) Despite 
the prolonged canvassing of support for the Swedish initiative within the PES, European 
social democratic co-ordination could not overcome the obstacle presented by the 
differing outlooks on the appropriate European job creation policies. A bi-partite 
declaration by the PS and Lafontaine's SPD, concerning the EO's role in job creation, 
did emerge from Malmo. 
At the Amsterdam summit in June 1997, Jospin's wishes to endorse the Employment 
Chapter and advance towards a 'social Europe' sharpened the division. In the build up 
to the summit, Jospin and Strauss-Kahn threatened not to endorse the Stability 
Pact.(Ladrech 1998 : 7) However, shocked by the intransigence of Blair, and faced with 
a BlairlKohl axis l8, Jospin was forced to back down in his bid to reorientate European 
construction, settling for a renaming of the Stability Pact (now the 'Growth and 
Stability Pacf), and a somewhat cosmetic jobs summit, which fell far short of the 
original Swedish proposals, let alone the Delors white paper. 
Part of the explanation for New Labour's reticence and scepticism vis-a-vis fiscal 
activism at the EU level can be traced to the shift away from Keynesianism charted 
above. Within the PS, as with some other European social democratic parties, the EO is 
conceived as a potential political and economic 'space' where Keynesian policies could 
be carried out even within the changed international economic context.(see chapter 5) 
Such supra-national strategies, however, run counter not only to New Labour's 
scepticism regarding 'old style' Keynesian policies. It also presumes a very different 
role of the state in the economy than the Third Way suggests, and resurrects a 
18 Interview with former PS leader, and long time Jospin ally Henri Emmanuelli 10/12/97 
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commitment to egalitarian redistribution of wealth which New Labour has distanced 
itself from in recent years. As Gamble and Kelly have argued, "there is little prospect of 
Labour pursuing any such social democratic agenda. Even those within the government 
thought to be sympathetic to the traditional Keynesian social democratic agenda have 
gone out of their way to distance themselves from these positions."(2000) 
However, in October 1998 at the EU leaders' meeting at Portschach, Austria, Jospin 
revived plans for, "a multibillion-pound programme to kick-start continental 
economies" in the wake of the single currency. The plans, of German as well as French 
origin, (Schroeder himself called for a 'European jobs pact') advocate interest rate cuts 
to foster growth, large-scale public investment in infrastructural programmes to boost 
demand and reduce unemployment, as well as an agenda combatting unfair tax 
competition, setting minimum social standards across the EU and co-ordinating 
economic policies - i.e. the bulk of Jospin's Amsterdam agenda. What has changed is 
the replacement of the BlairlKohl axis with an emergent Franco-German axis on state 
intervention and macroeconomic activism to promote employment, evidenced by 
Lafontaine and Strauss-Kahn's joint statement calling for a European-level policy for 
employment and growth. (Liberation 23/10/98) 
The pivotal role of France and Germany within the Euro project made New Labour's 
reticence and scepticism seem out of kilter with the rest of Europe. Accordingly, New 
Labour's position has shifted from hostility to a cautious welcoming of the plans. Whilst 
this may improve the prospects for 'Euro-Keynesian' policies, it flies in the face of New 
Labour's 'Third Way' leading the way in Europe. 
The European Social Model: a social democratic 'buffer' against 
Globalisation? 
John (now Lord) Eatwell, one of Kinnock's chief economic advisors, saw in an earlier 
manifestation of Labour modernisation a, "replacement of hostility towards the EC .... 
with an enthusiasm for the EC as an arena within which Labour's objectives can best be 
attained." The industrial potential for Britain of monetary union was recognised, as was 
the need to pursue "policies at an EC level which would sustain expansion and 
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employment throughout the Community."(1992 : 335-336) Eatwell sees this evolution 
as part of; 
"[a] wider and more important change in Labour Party thinking. I would 
characterise that change as a tum toward the core ideas of European social 
democracy, and away from a peculiarly British version of 'socialism' - a tum 
away from the Anglo-American model of the market economy, towards a more 
efficient European model."(1992 : 337) 
A distinctive characteristic of the Third Way is the fading enthusiasm for this 'European 
Social Model', and with the social and labour market policies and institutions which 
underpin it. The model can, for our purposes be understood as applying in particular to 
two key policy areas, labour market institutions and welfare provision. We will now 
explore the differing approaches of New Labour and the PS to these two areas. 
Welfare Provision 
The PS, remain explicitly committed to equality, and to redistribution. This informs the 
more generous welfare policies they pursue. There is a firm commitment to a socially 
cohesive 'European Social Model,' and the need for institutional changes to the EU to 
protect and entrench that social model against beggar-thy neighbour 'social dumping.' 
As highlighted above, although enthusiasm for advancement of the EU along these lines 
was widespread in the early 1990s, today the priorities have changed. New Labour's 
fiscal tightening, coupled with the waning commitment to redistribution, informs moves 
towards a 'liberal' (Epsing-Andersen : 1990) increasingly means-tested welfare state 
and away from the 'inclusive' universalism characteristic of social democratic 
conceptions of welfare which underpin the PS's understanding of the 'European Social 
Model.' 
Accessible and generous benefit systems, New Labour argue, hinder employment 
creation from both supply and demand sides: offering disincentives to work and placing 
excessive strain on firms in terms of employer contributions, payroll taxes, resulting in 
slow employment growth and poverty/joblessness traps - what Blair calls, "welfare 
systems that lock people in idleness and dependency."( 1998a) Dovetailing with this 
analysis are assumptions about the kind of welfare state compatible with 'the global 
economy.' Such thinking informs the particular conception of appropriate minimum 
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welfare standards - evidenced by less generous benefit levels, and relatively low 
minimum wage and replacement rates in Britain. 
In December 1998, Jospin announced a 3% increase, back-dated to the beginning of 
1998, in the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion (RMI), and two similar benefits, all aimed at 
providing a minimum income for the jobless. These increases, which affected 1.6 
million households, were envisaged to cost the state 2.5 billion francs. Jospin explicitly 
justified the move in terms of, "social justice. When we realised a 3% growth rate in 
1998, and the disposable incomes of households also increased by 3%, we had our 
justification." (Liberation 16/12/98) Two distinctions from New Labour's approach 
warrant emphasis here. Firstly, the reliance upon 'Keynesian' indicators - households' 
spending power - indicates the enduring emphasis on the demand side, and the effect of 
macro-policy upon it. Secondly, in terms of welfare provision, the Jospin government 
targets both working and non-working poor. This is a clear break from the fiscal 
activism of Brown, which is clearly targeted at the working poor, and offers little to the 
non-working poor. 
The welfare provision system in France, as Boyer argues, "sustained an ever-growing 
source of redistribution in terms of social welfare. "(1997 : 81) Replacement rates in 
terms of unemployment benefits, and early retirement pensions remain quite generous. 
Indeed, the changes in what Boyer terms the 'wage relation' have on the whole been 
achieved whilst maintaining general welfare cover.(1997 : 86 & 96) According to 
UNEDIC (the unemployment insurance body) the replacement rate in France reduced 
slightly from 53.6% in 1989 to 49% by the end of 1996. Despite the reduction, this still 
attests to a fairly generous replacement rate. This indicates how understanding of 
appropriate minimum standards within Realisme de Gauche exceed Third Way 
'ceilings.' Enduring commitments to universal welfare and redistribution within the PS 
lead to a rejection of New Labour's assumptions of the implications of the new 
economic context for the welfare state and the resulting lower minimum wage levels 
and replacement rates in Britain .. 
Labour Market Institutions 
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There has been a highly significant and relatively recent shift in New Labour's attitudes 
towards the labour market. Many of Labour's 'modernisers' of the 1980s and early 
1990s were seduced by precisely those 'Rhenish' welfare and labour market institutions 
which the Third Way explicitly rejects.(Marquand 1988, 1997; Hutton 1995; Eatwell 
1992) Indeed, as recently as 1996, in the wake of his Singapore 'stakeholding' speech, 
many commentators believed that Blair wished to import elements of the Rhenish 
economic model to Britain.(see Gamble, Kelly & Kelly 1997) At the risk of some over-
simplification, in the ensuing three years there has been a turnaround. Then, Labour 
contemplated the import of significant elements of the Rhenish model, principally long-
termism and co-operative employer/employee relationships, to Britain. Today, New 
Labour advocates the export of significant elements of the Anglo-Saxon model, 
principally deregulated labour markets, to continental Europe and beyond. The 
problem, as Soskice pointed out regarding the earlier exercise, is that 'models' of 
capitalism are an ensemble, embedded in an historic institutional context, from which 
they are not easily extracted. Thus, "transplanting institutional policies from one type of 
system of advanced capitalism to another has seldom worked ., [because] other systems 
... are institutionally interlocked."(Soskice 1997 : 220) 
Thus deeply embedded institutional national specificities prevent the import of elements 
of foreign labour market models, or any straightforward convergence upon a single 
'flexible' model. French labour markets have become more 'flexible' in the last decade. 
In 1986, the requirement to notify the labour inspectorate of planned mass redundancies 
was abolished, marking a significant withdrawal of the state's regulatory role in the 
labour market. In the late 1980s and 1990s, laws on working time enhanced temporal 
flexibility through company level negotiation. Increased flexibility of work contracts 
have been differentiated considerably (with the introduction of fixed-term, part-time, 
and temporary contracts), increasing quantitative flexibility (the range of number of 
hours worked), although not necessarily qualitative flexibility (the nature of 
work).(L'Horty 1999) This at first glance appears to be the kind of 'normalisation' of 
labour market practices that convergence theorists would predict. However, closer 
inspection reveals significant degrees of enduring distinctiveness. 
Firstly, "wage distribution inequality has increased only moderately in France. Overall 
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earnings inequality fell slightly between 1984 and has risen a little since then, with the 
increase occurring only at the top end of the distribution."(Fitoussi 1994 : 60) The ratio 
of the minimum wage to the average wage has increased consistently and this has the 
effect of compressing the lower end of the wage distribution. Significantly, one of the 
acts of the incoming Jospin government was a 4% increase in the minimum 
wage.(Dupin 1998) As Card, Kramarz and Lemieux have shown, wage differentials 
between different levels of education have remained constant, or even diminished 
slightly in the 1980s and 1990s.( 1996) Wage flexibility, then, has not been prevalent in 
France, in contrast to Anglo-Saxon manifestations of labour market flexibility. As a 
more egalitarian society, France was not prepared to countenance the scale of growth in 
inequality in the labour market witnessed in UK. 
Secondly, the degree of hiring and firing activity is not as high as flexibility-enhancing 
reforms allow. As Cohen et al note, "the [short-term contract] system makes it basically 
costless to fire young French workers if necessary. Yet their separation rate l9 is still 
50% lower than that of their American counterparts ... [due] to irreducible cultural 
differences .... part of an 'implicit contract' that makes it difficult for a firm to fire a 
worker."(1997 : 274) This idea of 'implicit contract', which has been explored by 
D'Iribarne in his analysis of the French labour market(1990) returns us to the social 
norms underpinning the labour market. 
This indicates that the degree of flexibility advocated by New Labour's Third Way 
would be difficult to reconcile with regulated French labour markets, securing higher 
minimum standards. Limited flexibility within the framework of regulated labour 
market institutions seems a more likely path of development than 'exit' from them. 
Indeed, it is not clear that the PS accept that further deregulation is desirable. State-
orchestrated changes in labour market institutions such as the reduction in the working 
week point in a rather different direction. This less thorough-going commitment to 
deregulation of labour markets has considerable empirical justification. Assumptions 
about higher unemployment associated with more regulated labour markets are 
confounded by recent research, which offers little evidence of continental labour market 
institutions, with their stricter labour standards and greater employment protection 
19 The rate at which workers are laid off or fired. 
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increasing aggregate unemployment levels.{Nickell & Layard 1998) Thus the tepid 
response to a 'Third Way' for labour markets may, at the intellectual level, be linked to 
a rejection of some of New Labour's assumptions. 
Third Way Labour Market Policy and Employment-Centred Social Policy 
Central to Third Way ideas about labour market reform are the imperatives of operating 
within the global economy. A highly flexible labour market and a skilled workforce are, 
it is argued, necessary conditions of international competitiveness. New Labour's 
'employment centred social policy', which proponents claim can be applied to either 
model, aims to overcome the following trade-off; 
"The economies of North America, the United Kingdom, and Australia have been 
creating lots of jobs, but suffering from wage stagnation and growing inequality; 
economies in Western Europe have featured growing wages and more modest 
income gaps, but have been far less successful at job creation."(Haveman 1997 : 
30) 
The aim is to get social policy and labour markets working in tandem, with the poorest 
protected, incentives to work not undermined, and jobs being created. 
As we saw earlier, New Labour argue that accessible and generous benefit systems 
hinder employment creation from both supply and demand sides: offering disincentives 
to work and placing excessive strain on firms in terms of employer contributions, 
payroll taxes, resulting in slow employment growth and poverty/joblessness traps. One 
solution is 'in-work benefits' and subsidies. These could have supply and demand 
aspects, financial incentives to employers who hire extra low-skill workers, and 
subsidies for low-wage workers. (Haveman 1997, 35-39) Subsidising cheap labour by 
such means is seen as a highly effective job creating mechanism, and is the inspiration 
behind the Working Family Tax Credit. 
New Labour's 'Welfare to Work' approach is captured by Brown's New Deal, "based 
on opportunities matched by responsibilities .... In exchange for long term targets for 
improving business start-ups, skills and educational qualifications, a total of £800 
million will be allocated to the New Deal for Communities... helping the young 
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unemployed to become self-employed.,,2o The New Deal has since been expanded to 
cover, "60,000 opportunities ... for the long term unemployed in 28 areas of the 
country," and a, "nation-wide New Deal skills shortage programme, [offering] up-front 
support for training to help fill the vacancies that come on-stream every month. ,,21 
The New Deal is intended to work in close harmony with tax and benefit system. thus, 
"side-by-side with the New Deal there will be new guarantees that work will pay more 
than benefits.... as a result of abolishing the entry fee to national insurance, all 
employees will receive a tax cut of 66 pounds a year.,,22 Thus the policy of welfare to 
work is predicated on offering incentives to both claimants and employers, and is 
overwhelmingly predicated upon the role of private sector, where the market will be the 
motor of job creation. Another aspect of New Labour employment-centred social policy, 
echoing Giddens' refrain of "no rights without responsibilities", is for, "active labour 
market policies that offer opportunities," to be, "matched by obligations to the youth 
and long term unemployed."(Blair 1998a) This explains the compulsion element in the 
welfare to work programme. 
Commonalities of Approach to Employment Policy 
Mandelson has claimed that, "economic, industrial and social policy in Europe is 
increasingly based on common principles that Britain's New Labour Government 
shares."(l998 : 9) In outlining his putative consensus, Mandelson observed, "the best 
long term policy for job creation is to get the conditions right to enable small and 
medium-sized enterprises to flourish."(1998) The onus on job creation through 
removing the obstacles placed upon business by labour market conditions, and the view 
that small and medium-sized businesses are the best job creators, warranting tax breaks 
and hiring incentives, are common to the French PS and New Labour. The Franco-
British Task Force, created by Jospin and Blair, aims to explore how public policy at 
national, and where appropriate European levels, could be made more positive towards 
the smaller business sector.(Blair 1998b) 
20 Gordon Brown, comprehensive spending review statement, 1417/98 
21 Gordon Brown, Statement on the Pre-Budget report 3/11/98. 
22 Gordon Brown, Statement on the Pre-Budget report 3/11/98 
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A number of measures broadly comparable to New Labour's taxation policy have come 
on stream. The overall aims are to facilitate small and medium sized firms in hiring new 
employees, and to reduce the costs to employers of hiring low wage workers. One 
measure, of increasing significance since 1997, has been the reduction of employer's 
contributions on low earners (on or slightly above the minimum wage). This relief 
involves, at the height of its sliding scale, state remuneration of 18.2% at minimum 
wage level. (Gutman & Lefebvre 1999 : 9) In the budget for 1999, measures aimed at 
reducing employer's costs, particularly for hiring low earners, have been introduced as a 
means of tackling unemployment through fiscal stimuli to combat perceived 
disincentives to hire. The Professional Tax, which is currently levied on employers 
wage bills, will be shifted over 5 years to exclude wages. In this way, small and medium 
sized firms, it is argued, will be released from a powerful disincentive to hire new 
workers. Strauss-Kahn estimated that the lightening of firms' tax burden by 7.2 billion 
Francs by this means, acting in concert with the 35 hour week (see later), would create 
300, 000 jobs in the year following the budget. (Liberation 19/10/98) 
NAIRU23 and the 'Compartmentalisation' of Employment Policy 
Within New Labour's policy paradigm, 'Employment-Centred Social Policy' measures 
are conceived as supply-side reforms, underpinning what Brown calls, "a decisively 
different approach to employment policy over the past two years aimed at reducing the 
NAIRU.,,24 New Labour discourse advocating labour market flexibility is bound up with 
a particular understanding of the NAIRU, and the role of institutional characteristics of 
the labour market. Replacement ratios, minimum wages levels, employment legislation, 
the benefit structure and skills shortages are all seen as key supply side factors 
influencing the NAIRU level. The more flexible the labour markets, it is thought, the 
lower the level of the NAIRU. Thus, Brown argues of the New Deal and Working 
Families Tax Credit, "the more our welfare to work reforms allow the long-term 
unemployed to re-enter the active labour market, the more it will be possible to reduce 
unemployment without increasing inflationary pressures.,,2S 
23 The Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment. 
24 Gordon Brown, Mais Lecture 19/10/99. 
2S Gordon Brown, Mais Lecture 19/10199. 
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The pervasive influence of the NAIRU framework is one example of the influence of 
neo-liberal political economy over New Labour's outlook. Friedman's ideas have 
gained acceptance. As Cross notes, "the natural rate hypothesis provides a rationale for 
the contemporary fashion of confining macroeconomic policy to the task of achieving 
targets for the rate of inflation or of price stability. The counterpart is that the only 
effective way to reduce unemployment or raise output in a sustainable way, is through 
micro or 'structural' policies."(1999 : 66) As such it is not too far removed from the 
NAIRU assumptions underpinning competitive disinflation in France. 
As we saw in chapter 6, there are different conceptions of the NAIRU. Underlying 
distinctions between 'hard' and 'soft' conceptions is a different understanding of the 
potential role of the state in employment policy. The 'hard' version sees the market as 
the best employment creating mechanism. This relates to the 'compartmentalisation' of 
employment policy outlined above. Within New Labour's approach, there is an 
assumption that supply side policies alone can affect employment. New Labour's 
employment policy may be understood primarily in terms of supply-side reforms to the 
labour market to increase flexibility and introduce fiscal incentives to employers and 
potential employees. 
Within the PS, a more equivocal commitment to NAIRU assumptions opens the door to 
a potential role for the state macro policy in the strategy to tackle unemployment. The 
role of policies affecting demand retains an important role within the French analytical 
framework. The level of spending power of households is seen as a centrally important 
economic indicator, an analysis informed by the view that the French economy suffers 
from a structural insufficiency of demand. Such scope for macro-activism to boost 
demand, however, is constrained by the ECB and the Growth and Stability Pact.(see 
chapter 6) 
Where the different approach to a NAIRU framework does offer more scope is in the 
different kinds of structural policies chosen. The PS' s policy rethink after 1993 led them 
to be sceptical about surrendering too much to market forces as a means of tackling 
unemployment. Such scepticism informs their overall approach to unemployment which 
is less heavily predicated on the role of the market than it was in the late 1980s and early 
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1990s. Cross's critique of the NAIRU framework suggests that it, "leaves structural 
policies to increase labour market flexibility as the only means of reducing 
unemployment."(1999 : 66) The PS's approach suggests otherwise, combining as it does 
elements of New Labour's 'employment-centred social policy' approach with an 
enduringly significant state role- both as employer and orchestrator - of a more eclectic 
approach to overall employment creating strategy. 
French Employment Policy: Public Sector Job Creation 
Thus, as well as different demand-side approaches, there are also significant distinctions 
to be made between the kinds of supply-side measures being advocated by New Labour 
and those of the PS. The PS continue to insist upon the role of public sector job creation 
in tackling unemployment. State-led employment creation schemes have become a 
structuring feature of the French model, (OFCE 1999 : 58 & 68 fig. VII.3 ~ Benhayoun 
& Lazzeri 1998 : 48) yet are stigmatised within New Labour's rhetoric as "unfocused 
expansion of the public sector which has led to high taxes and high deficits."(Blair 
1998a) 
Here a clear distinction can be made between the New Deal, operative mainly through 
changing incentives in the private sector, and the French Socialist's Plan Aubry, which 
pledged 350 000 private sector and 350 000 public sector jobs. Interestingly, the New 
Deal resembles in certain respects the Juppe government's employment policy, which 
emphasised increasing the level of low wage employment, in part by bringing down 
employer costs, particularly in the private sector, with social security contributions at 
minimum wage level being reduced by 13%.(OFCE 1999 : 58) In contrast to that 
approach, the Jospin government clearly affirms the state's enduring role in the job 
creating strategy in France. Nowhere is this more in evidence than with the state 
orchestrated shift to a 35 hour week. 
35 Hour Week 
The Jospin government has implemented a 35 hour working week, aiming to reduce 
unemployment and to have a redistributive effect between labour and capital.(see 
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chapter 6) The French law emphasises job creation, with state aid in the form of 
reductions in social security contributions offered to firms creating new jobs as a result 
of the reduction of the working week. Increased levels of exemption are offered to firms 
'making a particular effort in the field of employment. ,26 The law also emphasises 
negotiation between firms, employees, and state. This classic social democratic method, 
somewhat unfamiliar to French public life, was enacted at the national conference on 
salaries, attended by government, unions and employer associations in September 1997. 
In ideological terms, the 35 hour week policy is seen as a rejection of the neo-liberal 
interpretation of globalisation, and its implications for structural reform of labour 
market institutions. The inexorable road to flexibility touted in Anglo-Saxon circles is 
not the path chosen. The 35 hour week is seen by the PS as an integral part of its own 
'model' of capitalism it seeks to export. (PS 1996) Situating the 35 hours within the 
bigger picture, Vasseur recalls Jospin's presidential campaign soundbite; 
"this is one of the core themes which justifies the reduction of the working week -
we are trying to advance a new model of civilisation, within which the economy is 
at the service of man, and not the opposite.,,27 
Industrial Relations 
New Labour's industrial relations agenda, codified in the Fairness at Work white paper, 
represented according to Robert Taylor, "the most comprehensive package of legislative 
proposals to extend employee and trade union rights seen in the UK for more than a 
quarter of a century ."( 1998b : 451) Although the policy is couched in terms of securing 
labour market flexibility and ensuring Britain has "the most lightly regulated labour 
market of any leading economy in the world," New Labour's industrial relations 
package nevertheless represents a siginificant advance in the areas of union recognition, 
the legal structuring of employment relationships with emphasis on individual rights, 
and the establishment of a national minimum wage.(Taylor 1998a & b; Undy 1999) 
Part of the impetus for the partial empowerment of employees vis-a-vis employers 
doubtless results from the ending of the opt-out to the EU Social Chapter, and the 
26 Excerpts from the Projet de Loi PS website http://www.parti-socialiste.fr/html/change/index.html 
27 Interview with Daniel Vasseur 17112/97 
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acceptance of the Employment Chapter at Amsterdam. There are a series of 'family 
friendly' policies, notably extended rights to parental leave, which are a direct result of 
the social chapter. A further development is the introduction of works councils for 
European companies employing over 1000 people with at least 150 in two member 
states. In the future, this 'Europeanisation' of British industrial relations will bring EU 
directives on areas such as part time work to bear 
In terms of collective representation, on the key issue of union recognition, the impetus 
was domestic, and the final outcome was favourable to the unions - namely that a ballot 
of 30% of employees in a bargaining unit should secure recognition. Furthermore, "if 
the union can 'have clearly demonstrated' that half the relevant workforce are members 
they can secure automatic recognition without any need for a ballot."(Taylor 1998b : 
454) As for individual rights, other significant advances were made over abuse of zero-
hour contracts, on tightening unfair dismissal regulations, and abolishing the £ 12,000 
ceiling on unfair dismissal claims. On the minimum wage, although the youth rate was 
set lower than the low pay commission's recommendation, nevertheless, Metcalf 
suggests that, overall, most studies have underestimated the redistributive effect of the 
national minimum wage.(1999 : 184) 
It was on the basis of this not insignificant strengthening of Trade Union influence that 
the Labour Government sought a 'long-term settlement' of UK industrial relations. This 
leads even a critical commentator to concede that, although constantly couched in terms 
of flexibility; 
"[New Labour's Third Way for industrial relations] is clearly not an endorsement 
of neo-liberalism. It imposes a minimum wage and seeks to regulate important 
areas of industrial relations, including employee representation and union 
recognition ... [I]n signing the EU's social chapter, New Labour exposed itself to a 
further series of improvements in employee rights."{Undy 1999: 332) 
This again undermines simplistic notions of the implications of globalisation for social 
democracy, all the more so since the reforms are enacted by a Government accepting 
much of the hyperglobal analysis. Yet for all the talk of 'partnership,' Blair continues to 
equate advocacy of social dialogue strategies with a nostalgic desire to return to "the 
social democracy of the 1960s"(1998a). The impression given is that talk of a more 
comprehensive 'Europeanisation' of UK industrial relations is misplaced, as this would 
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doubtless compromise New Labour's unswerving commitment to labour market 
flexibility. 
Conversely, the development of a 'neo-corporatist' strategy, of the kind 'Northern' 
social democracy pursued for much of the post-war era, is often evoked as a desirable if 
slightly unrealistic aspiration in France. The historical and institutional context of 
industrial relations in France, coupled with the weakness, low density and poor coverage 
of French unions make such a prospect extremely unlikely. As Boyer notes, "there is .. 
a lack of social partners at once autonomous, dynamic and able to negotiate concessions 
independently of such [government] interventionism."(1997 : 95) Nor were prospects 
for 'neo-corporatism' improved by the proliferation of 'micro-corporatism,' or 
decentralised company level agreements, largely at the expense of branch-level or 
geographically wider accords whose scope was progressively reduced in the wake of the 
1982 Auroux Laws.(Howell 1998) 
The state has traditionally played a compensatory role for the weakness not only of 
unions, but also of the employer associations. The most recent example of this was the 
Wage and Employment conference held by the Jospin government in October 1997, 
with the Patronat and unions in attendance. This demonstrated the PS's enthusiasm for 
state intervention to overcome obstacles to the social bargain in the pursuit of a Pareto-
superior global compromise. (Calmfors & Driffill 1988) This proved to be an isolated 
example, not least because of the Patronat's fury at being, they felt, steamrollered into 
accepting the 35 hour week reform at the conference.(Dupin 1998) The point, however, 
is that, whilst lacking the institutional structures, the PS entertains the aspiration of 
pursuing such 'neo-corporatist' approaches. New Labour, on the other hand, explicitly 
rejects any such notions despite a potentially more propitious institutional setting. 
Conclusion 
Our study has highlighted a number of similarities, and rather more differences, between 
the economic strategies of the PS and New Labour. At the root of significant 
differences, we have argued, is a fundamental tension between the New Labour's Third 
Way and the PS's Realisme de Gauche. This tension is thrown into relief when we 
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examine the different understandings of the implications of globalisation for social 
democracy, ranging from the 'hyperglobal' analysis of Blair to the more critical 
engagement with globalisation of the PS. This distinction impacts upon the level of 
commitment to egalitarianism (and in turn redistribution), and the role of state in the 
economy. In both these areas, we have identified emergent differences at the level of the 
ends of social democracy between New Labour and the PS. 
At the policy level, the picture, as we might expect, is a complex and varied one. In 
some areas, such as calls for re-regulation of international finance, or the overall 
macroeconomic concerns for stability and credibility, the degree of similarity is 
considerable. Other areas suggest a more arms-length relationship between New 
Labour's Third Way and the Realisme de Gauche of the PS. In terms of job creation 
policies, New Labour's scepticism concerning European-level demand activism is at 
odds with French conceptions of a European jobs pact. Whist all social democratic 
parties accept the discipline of the new orthodoxy enshrined in the Maastricht criteria as 
a constraint on their action, New Labour sees the 'room to manoeuvre' as more tightly 
limited than perhaps do the PS. Overall approaches to macro-policy are, however, 
broadly similar. Where macro-policy does seem to unearth a rift is in the field of 
potential European-level co-ordinated macro-activism to promote growth and job 
creation. New Labour's self-imposed prudence and financial orthodoxy continues to 
engender scepticism towards 'Euro-Keynesianism' . 
In terms of 'structural' policies to tackle unemployment, some elements of Labour's 
'employment centred social policy' finds echoes in the French approach. However, 
underlying New Labour's employment policy is a compartmentalisation of policy, 
seeing the supply-side as the only possible avenue for activism. This reflects, at a deeper 
level, a reduction of the role of the state in securing employment. Accordingly, it 
informs different policy approaches to job creation. New Labour eschews public sector 
job creation, or state orchestrated reductions in the working week as job creating 
strategies. The distance from the PS' s eclectic and statist approach is noticeable. 
The shift towards greater labour market flexibility points to some commonality of 
outlook. However, significant differences in national context endure. The Third Way 
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seeks to secure lower minimum standards, and targets a more tightly defined group of 
'excluded' -to the exclusion of the non-working poor. This returns us to the absence of 
firm egalitarian and redistributive commitments within the New Labour's policy 
paradigm. France's embedded welfare and labour market institutions, engender lower 
levels of wage inequality, and higher minimum standards in terms, for example, of 
replacement rates. The PS approach to welfare provision is also arguably more inclusive 
in targeting all low income groups, including the unemployed. The PS clearly affirms 
such commitments, and seeks to entrench and defend them at the EU level through the 
institutionalisation of a European Social Model. In the field of industrial relations, for 
all New Labour's enthusiasm for flexibility, there has been an adoption of certain 
European norms of individual rights recognition, and minimum wage setting. The PS 
continues to affirm the state's role in industrial relations, and entertains 'neo-
corporatist' aspirations. 
The governing experience of both New Labour and Realisme de Gauche is too short to 
draw firm conclusions. Furthermore, the Third Way needs more rigorous definition 
before its compatibility with modem European social democracy can be conclusively 
established. Similarly, as we saw in chapter 5, the PS's process of programmatic 
clarification remains unfinished. That said, even at this early stage, it would appear that 
there are significant differences between New Labour's Third Way and Realisme de 
Gauche, both in terms of national institutional settings, and intellectual aspirations. For 
all that, both offer potentially viable, and - albeit to different degrees - recognisably 
social democratic economic strategies compatible with a world characterised by 
globalisation. This further underpins our suggestion that, whilst the constraints 
highlighted by 'hyperglobal' pessimists are indeed powerful, nevertheless, globalisation 
does not preclude social democratic policy activism. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to challenge some of the assumptions and assertions of the crisis 
of social democracy literature. We have questioned the inadequate treatment of the 
internal workings of political parties, the inaccurately dire electoral prognoses, the 
ahistorical and static conception of social democracy, and the problematic analysis of 
globalisation which underpin many of the premature obituaries of social democracy. 
We will briefly reiterate these points with reference to our two cases, the French PS and, 
the British Labour Party. 
The Party as an Independent Variable 
One of the problems, we have argued, with much of the 'crisis of social democracy' 
literature, is its propensity to treat parties as completely dependent actors, 'upon whom' 
a range of structural changes 'happen.' This thesis has treated the PS as an independent 
variable, 'relatively autonomous' from its socio-economic context, and capable of 
responding actively in an innovative manner to change. Employing a 'structural' 
approach to the study of the party, we have insisted upon the need to open the 'black 
box' of intra-party politics in order to understand how the evolving organisational 
structure of the party has affected and influenced the wider process of party change. The 
importance of both formal organisational rules, and informal organisational conventions 
as 'transmission belts' mediating external factors within the party has been insisted 
upon. We have seen how the organisational structure of the party conditions and 
influences 'responses' to external shocks, both in terms of internal debates and internal 
reform processes. 
Up until 1995, the interaction of factionalism and the question mark hanging over 
Mitterrand's succession stood as an obstacle in the path of internal reform. The Rennes 
conference made the party brutally aware of the dysfunctional nature of the courant 
system, and the need to limit its excesses. Yet, due to the ongoing war of succession, all 
attempts at thorough-going change to the courant system either met with resistance 
from courants adversely affected by them, or were manipulated by those parties set to 
gain from such changes. The crushing electoral defeat of 1993 - interpreted as a vote of 
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no confidence in the party's behaviour in recent years - only served to underline the 
gravity of the problem. 
The evolving role of factionalism within the party has been seen to be central to 
understanding the party's organisational structure, affecting what resources are at actors' 
disposal, providing a set of opportunities and constraints, and pushing actors into 
coalitional strategies. Thus, by 1995, Jospin had secured the backing of all ex-
Mitterrandists not allied to Fabius, of former Rocardians and the friends of Mauroy and 
established a 'dominant coalition.' Jospin's ligne majoritaire, comprising all the major 
courants, induced internal stability and assured internal hegemony, since opposition 
entailed marginalisation and potential exclusion from the party's governing bodies at 
both national and federal level. 
Jospin's 'incontournable' (un-bypassable) leadership position created the stability and 
consensus required to effect the organisational changes discussed since 1991. The 
increasing importance of direct democracy has seen the voice of individual members in 
the party enhanced, both through the one member, one vote principle, and through the 
expansion of the national convention as a locus of doctrinal and organisational 
innovation and precision. This has acted in concert with the introduction of majority 
voting as a counterweight to the traditional proportionality, which has in tum led to 
changes in the modus operandi of the courants, now renamed sensibilites. 
The reforms have been only a partial success, with enduring problems, such as co-
optation, requiring qualification to the party's claims to internal democracy. A more 
significant fly in the ointment, however, is the centrality of Lionel Jospin's hegemonic 
position to the process of reform. At this stage it is impossible to discern how firm the 
foundations of the new operating procedures are. The extent to which the evolution of 
the courants is due less to fundamental change in nature than to a changed tactical 
context given Jospin's internal hegemony remains unclear. The real test will only come 
when the struggle for power begins afresh, which is unlikely to be before the next 
presidential election. The reforms will have been in effect for some time by then, yet 
their ability to overturn long-held habits of internal skirmishing is questionable. 
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Electoral Crisis? 
We argued in chapter 1 that analysis of the electoral 'crisis' of social democracy has 
tended to be excessively apocalyptic. The misconception of social democracy's electoral 
fortunes was, we argued, predicated on a misconception both of parties' relationships 
with their core electorates and of their capacity to respond to changing electoral 
conditions. In chapter 4, we saw that PS electoral strategy represented a successful 
response to changing conditions, and an evolution of the relation to the PS' s electoral 
base, which itself is changing in part in response to socio-economic change. 
Although increased dissatisfaction with the political system has translated into more 
electoral volatility and abstentionism, and a significant reduction in • governmental' 
party support, the PS nevertheless remains the largest single electoral force on the Left. 
and has demonstrated its capacity for electoral success. That said, a new configuration 
around the Left pole of the French party system has emerged. In an age of diminished 
expectations, the PS cannot gain power without the help of a growing number of allies. 
As well as traditional partners, the Radicals and the PCF, there are new groupings, the 
Verts and Chevenement's MDC. Yet the PS continues to benefit from systemic 
inducements for rassemblement of the majoritarian two round system in 'decisive' 
elections. Thus smaller parties continue to come to arrangements with the 
'governmental' PS. 
In strategic terms, the same logic that once underpinned the Union de Gauche was the 
guiding principle behind Jospin's work with electoral allies since 1993, and now brings 
the gauche plurielle together. In terms of the PS's relationship with its own electorate, 
there is an enduring attachment to old 'core' constituencies, but at the same time a 
heightened awareness that phenomena such as the FN's advance, socio-economic 
change and electoral volatility require the PS to constantly look beyond such groups for 
support. The PS finds itself obliged, at every election, to attempt to reconstitute its 
electorate, taking account of the nature of the election, the strategic context, the key 
issues and personalities of the campaign. This process of reconstituting an electorate 
involves bringing together diverse ideological orientations and people from widely 
differing social positions. The difficulty of this exercise, we argue, means that 
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paradoxically, despite the success at the 1997 legislative elections, the results point to 
the enduring electoral frailty of the PS. 
Ideological Redefinition 
Since 1995, Jospin's internal legitimacy, in concert with the novel stability of the 
internal factions, has allowed the transcendence of some of the traditional internal 
restraints on ideological clarification in the party. The process of ideological redefinition 
has been made easier by the narrowing of the ideological 'space' the party occupies, and 
Jospin's not entirely disingenuous claim to provide a synthesis between the party's 'two 
cultures.' There remains considerable work to be done before the party once more finds 
a defining set of core themes analogous to the 'planification, nationalisation, 
autogestion ' of the late 1970s around which its ideological identity can cohere. In terms 
of the core values of social democracy, both equality of outcome and full employment 
have become more distant goals than the PS once accepted them to be. The role of the 
interventionist state, on the other hand, remains clearly affirmed. 
The process of redefining social democracy in a world characterised by advancing 
processes of globalisation and ubiquitous acceptance of the market has brought into 
sharp relief the limits of the possible. Yet this is not to say that social democracy has 
been 'abandoned'. Our rejection of this notion is predicated upon our understanding of 
the nature of social democracy. Our argument has two elements. Firstly, social 
democracy is not a constant unchanging entity. A more nuanced and historicised 
understanding of social democracy has been offered in this thesis. As we argued in 
chapter 1, the reconciliation of socialist aspirations to liberal democracy and capitalism 
by means of Keynesian economics and the welfare state was but one 'strategic 
amalgam'(Pierson 1995) through which to pursue the politics of social democracy. 
Developed 50 years ago, this configuration cannot hope to retain all its relevance. Yet 
this need not lead us to write off social democracy as a spent force. Rather, the changed 
international economic and domestic political context requires us to look how social 
democratic goals are pursued today, and seek to trace the outline of a new 'strategic 
amalgam' - or amalgams. Just as, in its Golden Age, social democracy was never 
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uniform, encompassing varying emphases on different aspects of the economic and 
political 'model', so now we should expect considerable variation. 
Employment, equality of opportunity, redistribution of wealth - these remain the 'ends' 
of social democracy. PS economic strategy has been conceived here as one attempt to 
elaborate a distinctive set of means - some familiar, some novel - of social democracy 
in a world characterised by globalisation. Given the radical change in context, 
significant departures can be found in the field of macroeconomic policy. In job 
creation, employment policy, and labour market policy, we find enduring ends, secured 
by rather different means, combining demand and supply side measures, involving at 
once considerable levels of state intervention, and state orchestration of the policy, but 
at the same time shifting the incentives of private firms and relying on the market. More 
fundamentally, we have seen the at least partial re-evaluation of social democracy's 
'methodological nationalism,' with the increasing importance of supra-national (EU) 
policy activism. 
The second element of our rejection of the abandonment of social democracy thesis 
insists upon the point that not all the traditional reference points have disappeared. 
Employment and job creation retains its centrality to the social democratic project. The 
role of the state is strongly affirmed, and there remains a commitment to egalitarianism 
which finds its expression in part in the appropriate level at which the minimum welfare 
standards 'ceiling' should be set. The PS ligne majoritaire, accepts that globalisation 
makes the pursuit of Keynesian strategies in order to secure social democratic goals of 
full employment and redistribution at the national level extremely problematic, yet it 
remains committed to Keynesianism as the best social democratic 'strategic amalgam' 
(Pierson 1995) so far elaborated. For all the party's grudging 'post-Keynesianism' in the 
role it apportions to public finances in its economic strategy, a Keynesian framework 
continues to influence thinking about a redistributive role for the state in the economy. 
boosting purchasing power of low earners. 
Furthermore, there is an enduring commitment to transcend the national level, recreating 
an economic space where Keynesian economic strategies may once more be viable 
given the international economic context, at the supra-national EU level. The 
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considerable collective action problems involved in co-ordinated European economic 
policy mean that the reconciliation of the PS's supra-national aspirations to its national 
conditions remains problematic. Yet this does not detract from the strength of their 
commitment to recreate social democracy at the European level, written as it is into the 
party's declaration of principles. 
The historical context provided in chapter 5 has shown how acceptance of the market, 
the 'new horizon' of the capitalist economy, and Europe "as a key arena of social 
democratic activism are all relatively recent and significant shifts in French Socialist 
ideology. In the wake of such upheaVals, a new and coherent picture has yet to emerge. 
Weber echoes the sentiment of a number of national level actors interviewed when he 
observes; 
"the Parti Socialiste, like European social democracy as a whole, is in a phase of 
renovation, of change. Everyone running the party understands that the old 
Keynesian social-democratic model no longer works because of the changed 
conditions. Thus we must do just as our forerunners did - that is, reinvent a new 
model, a new social compromise. That is what Fabius, Jospin, and everyone else 
is working at redefining. Today, we can see some elements, but as yet we cannot 
see the ensemble."\ 
Globalisation and Social Democracy 
In analysing the relationship between globalisation and social democracy, we have 
underlined the importance of appreciating that globalisation does not simply 'happen 
upon' nation states, or social democratic parties within them. Therefore globalisation 
does not 'impose' neo-liberal policy agendas on social democratic governments. Such a 
view ignores how the influence of the processes of globalisation is mediated by 
domestic institutions, and the actors working within them. 
We have argued that understanding the differential nature of globalisation's 
consequences is an essential precondition to a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between globalisation and social democracy. The effects of economic globalisation are 
mediated and at times contested by states, and by the 'cognitive framework' of actors 
within them. How globalisation is understood by policy elites crucially conditions 
I Interview with Henri Weber 29/9/97 
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responses to it. Furthermore, how domestic policy elites articulate policy responses is 
conditioned by domestic institutional context and ideological traditions. 
Our study suggests that, whilst the constraints highlighted by 'hyperglobal' pessimists 
are indeed powerful, nevertheless, globalisation does not preclude social democratic 
policy activism. Globalisation heralds a changing costlbenefit analysis of social 
democratic economic policies, not the end of social democracy. Thus whilst 
globalisation does constrain social democratic policy options, it is a mistake to infer 
from this that there are no longer significantly different approaches to economic policy, 
involving different hierarchies of priorities in terms of employment, inflation and 
redistribution, and more fundamentally, different understandings of how the economy 
works. 
Comparative analysis of the PS and New Labour unearthed a number of similarities, as 
well as significant differences between New Labour's Third Way and Realisme de 
Gauche. The idea that, given the new international economic climate, stability is as 
much a social democratic value as it is a neo-liberal one, is shared by both parties. The 
need to secure credibility with financial markets, and to display sufficient 'soundness' 
for market actors to suspend their disbelief in social democratic government's financial 
rectitude is a commonality underpinning both economic strategies. Similarly, the 
perceived need for some re-regulation of international financial markets is a shared goal. 
The importance of increasing the hiring incentive of small and medium sized firms as a 
means of tackling unemployment is also a common objective. 
However, in terms of employment policy more generally, New Labour's 
compartmentalisation of supply side reforms as the only area for activism is at odds 
with the PS' s more eclectic and interventionist approach. The two parties also have very 
different aspirations for the future shape of EU institutions and their potential impact on 
domestic economic policy-making. An increasingly important component of social 
democratic economic strategy in the post-Bretton Woods world is the potential 
advantages of international co-operation and co-ordination. It is at the European level 
that social democrats seek to resolve the tensions between the globalisation and social 
democracy. This thesis has explored both the strengths and weaknesses of this case. We 
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have seen how central ED level policy activism has become to PS strategy, seeking to 
institutionalise welfare and labour market standards at the ED level as a buffer against 
globalisation. However, we have seen the difficulties of co-ordinating such an approach, 
even with its 'sister' party, New Labour, let alone the rest of the member states. 
New Labour has become deeply sceptical of any attempts to reinvent social democracy 
at the ED level. At the heart of this policy difference is a wider disparity concerning the 
perception of the appropriate role of the state in the economy. Part of the explanation for 
New Labour's reticence and scepticism vis-a.-vis fiscal activism at the ED level can be 
traced to the shift away from Keynesianism. Within the PS, the ED is conceived as a 
potential political and economic 'space' where Keynesian policies could be carried out 
even within the changed international economic context. Such supra-national strategies, 
however, run counter to New Labour's scepticism regarding 'old style' Keynesian 
policies. It also resurrects a commitment to egalitarian redistribution of wealth which 
New Labour has distanced itself from in recent years. 
Some of the key differences between New Labour's 'Third Way' and Realisme de 
Gauche are explicable in terms of the differences of national institutional setting. 
Others, on the other hand, are traceable to different intellectual aspirations - for example 
the enduring emphasis on equality, including equality of outcome, within the PS, the 
greater faith in the interventionist role for the state in the economy, and the more critical 
engagement with the rhetoric of globalisation within the PS policy paradigm. That the 
two parties have different understandings of how the economy works, and the 
appropriate role of the state in the economy, based on different analyses of the 
implications of globalisation for social democratic economic strategy is testament to the 
limited impact of a neo-liberal economic paradigm which, only a decade ago, appeared 
all conquering. Indeed, the PS continues to draw on the insights of Keynesian economic 
analysis which crisis theorists argued had been rendered inoperable. The residual 
Keynesian thinking of the PS involves a higher degree of interventionism, and a 
conviction that demand side intervention to boost a perceived crisis of under-
consumption has been a corollary of structural job creating policies on the supply side. 
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Both parties offer potentially viable, and - albeit to different degrees - recognisably 
social democratic economic strategies, prioritising employment, equality of opportunity, 
and some redistribution. Furthermore, the governing experience of both New Labour's 
Third Way and the PS's Realisme de Gauche confirms that both are compatible with a 
world characterised by globalisation. This further underpins our suggestion that, whilst 
the constraints highlighted by 'hyperglobal' pessimists are indeed powerful, social 
democratic policy activism remains compatible with a world characterised by 
globalisation. 
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Methodological Appendix 
Our framework for the analysis of social democracy is conducive to a particular research 
strategy. The methodological implications of this strategy are considered here. There is in 
comparative politics as in all fields of political inquiry, a trade-off to be made between 
generalisability and complexity. Case studies sacrifice generalisability to depth or 
'thickness' of understanding. Conversely, comparative studies sacrifice some of this depth 
of understanding in favour of greater inclusiveness. Our choice of two cases, which trades 
off a degree of generality for the heightened complexity which is characteristic of the 
subject under scrutiny, nevertheless can make a contribution to establishing the generality 
of propositions. 
The main body of this thesis offers a structured study of a particular case - that of the 
French PS, hinging on the key explanatory variables outlined in chapter 1. The principle 
merits of the case study approach are the depth of knowledge and understanding which can 
be gained. Problems of reliability and validity of data, and reliance upon data which cannot 
be properly evaluated, which sometimes plague the statistical approach (Lijphart 1975 : 
171) are unlikely to occur. Case studies can make a valuable contribution to theory building 
and testing. Lijphart's 'hypothesis-generating' case study takes, "a more or less vague 
notion of possible hypotheses, and attempt to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested 
subsequently among a larger number of cases."(1971 : 692) There are also theory infirming 
and theory confirming case studies, which, "are analyses of single cases within the 
framework of established generalisations." (1971 : 692) As Ragin puts it, "case studies 
respond to theory, by refuting and extending it or by illuminating important phenomena that 
are outside the scope of existing theory." (1991 : 6) 
"Certain types of case studies," as Lijphart observes, "can even be considered implicit parts 
of the comparative method." (1971 : 691) This is because, "single cases investigated in case 
studies are usually implicitly viewed in the theoretical context of a larger number of cases: 
a case study is a study of a certain problem, proposition, or theory, and a case belongs to a 
larger category of cases." (1975 : 160) This is the aim here, with the PS as an example of a 
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West European party of the left being analysed in the light of theories of the crisis of social 
democracy, and also of theories about globalisation. Comparison and case study here 
constitute mutually reinforcing and complementary undertakings. The case study is 
reconciled to the comparative method in the comparative political economy chapter, which 
compares the evolving political economies of the PS and the British Labour Party. Again 
the analysis proceeds in the light of theories of the relationship between social democracy 
and globalisation. 
The comparative politics canon offers a wealth of competing research strategies and 
techniques. Collier's recent survey of comparative techniques and debates concludes, "the 
most fruitful approach is eclectic, one in which scholars are willing and able to draw upon 
these diverse techniques."(1991 : 105) The aim is to minimise the weaknesses and 
capitalise on the inherent strengths of various techniques. (Lijphart 1971 : 693) An eclectic 
approach seems sensible, given that no one design displays a perfect fit with our substantive 
interest. 
Lijphart defines comparative method as the assessment of rival explanations, based on 
systematic, qualitative comparison of a small number of cases. In seeking to establish the 
strategic options open to social democracy in relation to systemic constraints, many 
operative variables which structure the field of action within which these choices take place 
must be analysed. (Scharpf 1991; Sassoon 1996) The complexity of such phenomena 
demands caution in designing research, as captured by Lijphart's quintessential conundrum 
of comparative politics, "many variables, small n. "(1971) We are apparently confronted 
with; 
"a multiplicity of conditions, a compounding of their influence on what is to be 
explained (the dependent variable) and an indeterminacy regarding the effect of any 
one condition or several conditions in combination. The corresponding problems 
facing the investigator are to reduce the number of conditions. to isolate one 
condition from another, and therefore to make precise the role of each 
condition."(Smelser 1976 : 152-3) 
The 'too many variables' problem can be tackled in a number of ways, as Lijphart helpfully 
illustrates. Firstly, we can "judiciously restrict [ourselves] to the really key variables, 
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omitting those of only marginal importance." (1971 : 690) To an extent we are heeding 
Lijphart's advice in choosing our key variable set outlined in chapter 1 - consisting of a set 
of national, party specific, and global explanatory variables. Here we must take on board 
Meckstroth's critique of 'many variables, small n' studies; 
"the comparative method, as a derivative of Mill's methods, provides no criteria to 
select among the limitless supply of attributes that might be introduced as controls or 
as explanations of any given phenomenon ...... The method is completely dependent on 
criteria of relevance supplied by previously formulated concepts, propositions, and 
theories.... 'theoretical relevance' must be relied upon to limit the number of 
properties to be controlled and to avoid the problem of overdetermination." 
(Meckstroth 1975 : 134) 
Our focus on a number of 'key' factors can only be justified by prior theoretical 
assumptions. That said, the extant literature on social democracy, and on globalisation, 
provides strong arguments for focusing on these 'key' variables.(Merkel 1992; Scharpf 
1991; Sassoon 1996) 
In a different vein, the comparative political economy section partially follows another of 
Lijphart's techniques - the comparable cases strategy, focusing on a small number of 
carefully matched cases. Arguably, New Labour and the PS are 'matched' on a number of 
significant variables - parties of the left, recently gaining office in West European 
democracies with advanced economies. However, in the key variable that is the focus of the 
analysis - their political economies - the two differ significantly. 
Given recent calls for eclecticism in research design, however, this study will not confine 
itself exclusively to Lijphart's techniques. Collier's development of 'process-tracing' case 
study techniques is invaluable. "The goal is to assess whether the dynamics of change 
within each case plausibly reflect the same causal pattern suggested by the comparative 
appraisal of the case in relation to other cases. "(1991 : 115) This seems a pertinent 
framework from which to assess the impact of globalisation on social democracy through 
comparative consideration of the British and French cases. Comparative application of 
prevalent theories of change in social democratic parties to the two parties will establish the 
fit between theory and facts. Differential results of such a 'fit' may point to new hypotheses 
being developed. Such a comparative study may perform Lijphart's 'theory-confirming' 
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and 'theory-infinning' and 'hypothesis-generating' functions.( 1971). 
Whilst Lijphart's reflections on the logic of comparative and case study analysis offer 
valuable insights to our research design, we does not share all his assumptions. "The 
comparative method," Lijphart argues, "must be considered the weaker method, it is usually 
advisable to shift to the statistical method if sufficient cases are available for investigation." 
(1975 : 165) Whilst Lijphart admits the existence of a distinction between the 'statistical' 
and 'comparative' method, he fails to fully appreciate that, "these two traditions exist side 
by side as similar but qualitatively different ventures."(Ragin 1991 : 3) Lijphart seeks to 
emulate the statistical logic because he sees the statistical method as the more worthy 
pursuit, "the 'comparative method' is said to lead to no more than partial generalisations, 
while the real need is to fashion generalisations of universal scope and validity."{l975 : 
1 72) This displays a positivist approach to knowledge and the social world. As Meckstroth 
points out, the claim to universality falls foul of the Popperian critique of scientific inquiry, 
propositions in all sciences, but above all the social sciences, "are always subject to 
disproof regardless of the number of corroborating instances; and they can never be 
regarded as conclusively established."(1975 : 134-135) 
The claim of 'universality' in the social sciences makes bold assumptions about the nature 
of social scientific knowledge. Meckstroth is more cautious; 
"universality ... does not mean that the proposition must literally explain circumstances 
in all physical circumstances. Nor is evidence from all locations necessarily relevant 
for corroboration or falsification of such a proposition. This is due to the recognised 
status of 'initial conditions' in universal propositions which denote limiting 
circumstances under which a proposition is expected to operate."(1975 : 135) 
A proposition may be limited, for example, to West European Democracies, yet such a 
proposition will have a different epistemic status, based on different ontological 
assumptions. Thus the real problem of Lijphart's positivist leanings runs much deeper than 
the Popperian critique of inductivism. It entails a set of assumptions about the "rules of 
interpretation and criteria for admissible explanation" (Holt & Turner 1970 : 2) which are 
inappropriate to the qualitative historical comparative method. 
This is demonstrated when Lijphart argues that, "the comparative method and its special 
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limitations constitute a strong argument against what Lasswell and Braibanti call 
'configurative' or 'contextual' analysis."(l971 : 690) Such an approach, according to 
Lijphart, displays insufficient rigour and theoretical parsimony. However, analysis of 
change within social democracy requires precisely such 'configurative' theorising; 
"The relationship between the main social-economic actors (i.e. representatives of 
capital and labour) and systemic features of advanced capitalist society ...... shape 
specific matrices of choices and constraints that represent the room to manoeuvre for 
social democracy." (Kernan 1993 : 311) 
The historically and nation-specific nature of these 'matrices', and their dependence of so 
many 'variables,' leads us away from parsimonious concentration on one or two key 
variables. Instead we are dealing with 'conjunctural causality', the configurative working of 
several, often interrelated, variables. The object of analysis is "the intermediary 
conjuncture between actions and events and the systemic circumstances that structure the 
room to manoeuvre."(Keman 1993 : 312) This points towards the context-embedded 
'disciplined configurative approach' developed by Heckscher and Verba in the 1960s. Its 
most recent proponent is Ragin. whose 'case-oriented', 'holistic' approach - analysing 
'conjunctural causation' - would appear appropriate for analysing social democracy.(1987) 
This 'Weberian'(Ragin & Zaret 1983) approach to interpretative understanding aims at, 
"deciphering the meaning of behaviour and institutions to the actors involved."(Collier 
1991 : 110) There are similarities between this approach and the concept of 'policy 
strategies' pursued by actors, central to Scharpfs work. Looking at economic strategy. 
Scharpf notes; 
"the relationship between economic outcomes and institutional arrangements was 
mediated by the economic strategies that were actually pursued .. . [we may] define 
'strategy' as a recognisable 'pattern or stream of decisions' by individual actors or 
organisations ..... economic policy makers are likely .... to be guided by their own 
interpretation of the situation ..... Like all human action. economic policy is possible 
only within a cognitive framework that pairs goals with available means and the 
critical conditions of the decision environment." (Scharpf 1991 pp 11-13) 
Comparative analysis of policy strategy is, Scharpf insists. a distinct exercise from the 
'statistical' approach, which Lijphart sees the comparative method as emulating; 
"These strategies are excluded from the analytical design of quantitative comparative 
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studies, and their exclusion is not an accidental or easily corrigible defect but a 
fundamental methodological limitation ..... neither the goals pursued nor the causal 
efficacy of economic policy instruments, nor the conditions of the economic 
environment, are sufficiently beyond dispute to be simply taken as facts that could be 
plugged into cross-national multivariate regression equations. "(Scharpf 1991 : 11 & 
14) 
This is not to question the merits of statistical analysis, merely to recognise the relationship 
between qualitative and quantitative analysis. "Both are compatible with the goals of 
explanation and generalisation, but they produce different types of explanation with 
different degrees of abstraction." (Ragin & Zaret 1983 : 733) 'Laws' or theories emanating 
from a 'Weberian' approach sacrifice positivistic claims to 'universality' in the social 
sciences which make bold assumptions about the nature of social scientific knowledge. 
Sophisticated analysis of social democracy must be more cautious, offering what Lijphart 
calls, "no more than partial generalisations." (1975 : 172). Theories and hypotheses 
generated by this study will be based on a more circumspect 'universality', which "does 
not mean that the proposition must literally explain circumstances in all physical 
circumstances. Nor is evidence from all locations necessarily relevant for corroboration or 
falsification of such a proposition. This is due to the recognised status of 'initial conditions' 
in universal propositions which denote limiting circumstances under which a proposition is 
expected to operate."(Meckstroth 1975: 135) In spelling out the necessary conjunctures of 
variables under which a theory applies, we restrict the applicability and ambit of the theory. 
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